How Many Runs Won’t Wil Myers Save in Center Field?
According to Dennis Lin of the U-T San Diego, the San Diego Padres — despite rumors to the contrary — aren’t interested in flipping the recently acquired Wil Myers to the Phillies in exchange for Philadelphia left-hander Cole Hamels.
Writes Lin:
Indications from sources within the organization… are that the Padres intend on playing all three of their newest outfielders, including Myers. The early plan is for the 2013 American League Rookie of the Year to start in center field, flanked by fellow power-hitting right-handers Justin Upton and Matt Kemp.
The bold is mine and the bold is of some interest insofar as center field, with the exception of 51 innings in 2013, isn’t a position at which Wil Myers has spent much time as a major leaguer. He played it to a greater extent in the minors, making about two-thirds as many starts there as he did in right field while still a member of the Royals organization. But one also notes that minor-league defensive assignment aren’t necessarily excellent indicators of future major-league defensive prowess. Miguel Cabrera, for example — on something more intimate than just nodding terms with inertia even as a 20-year-old rookie — nevertheless made more minor-league starts at shortstop than any other position. Michael Morse made 95% of his nearly 500 minor-league starts at shortstop leading up to his 2005 major-league debut. His physique now isn’t identical to his physique then, but he’s still the same human — and that human wasn’t a good shortstop in 2005.
So we acknowledge, owing to Myers’ minor-leaguer experience there, that center field at least won’t be entirely foreign to him. But having some familiarty with a position and possessing the capacity to prevent runs there at a league-average rate — these aren’t identical propositions. Our interest is in understanding the effect on the Padres’ capacity to prevent runs of Myers playing center field for that team.
There are probably multiple ways to estimate Wil Myers’ ability to prevent runs in center field. I’ll consider two of them here. One is easy and one is more difficult. Or more involved, at least.
The first is easy because it’s a fixture of the calculation for WAR. Over a full season, a league-average center fielder receives a positional adjustment of +2.5 runs; a corner outfielder, of -7.5. As Dave Cameron noted when introducing WAR to this site’s readership back in 2008, that gap is derived empirically using historical UZR values. Typically, defenders who’ve moved from a corner-outfield spot to center field have prevented 10 fewer runs per 162 games following the transition. Conversely, center fielders who’ve moved to a corner have saved more than 10 runs. Again, on average.
I say that those positional adjustments were derived empirically, but they were also derived empirically almost 10 years ago now. A lot has happened in 10 years. Like more than half of the Fast and Furious movies, for example. And a lot has happened in baseball, too. Clubs, or at least some clubs, have more thoroughly embraced the idea that a player with a center-field profile can have success in a corner-outfield position. Carl Crawford and Brett Gardner have mostly happened since then, neither typical corner outfielder but both successful.
This leads us to the second way of estimating the numbers of runs Wil Myers’ might prevent as a center fielder: by finding other recent players who’ve transitioned between a corner-outfield spot and center field — and then calculating the difference in the runs they’ve prevented at each position.
The challenge of doing so, of course, is finding players who’ve recorded not only somewhat robust samples at each position (because UZR becomes reliable rather slowly), but also samples that occurred either simultaneously or, at least, within one season of each other — so that it’s essentially the same guy producing the numbers and not the 22-year-old version of him versus the slower, 34-year-old one.
With this in mind, I first identified those players who’d recorded more than 1000 innings at center field between 2012 and -14. This wasn’t a necessary constraint, per se, but useful as a starting point to narrow the sample of players. From that sample, I found every defender who’d Played at least 500 innings at corner outfield position in the season just before, during, or just after another season during which he recorded at least 500 innings in center field. I then selected, from that group, defenders who’d played no fewer than 1000 innings at both positions (corner and center field) within three-year span.
The results: 12 players (including two versions both of Brett Gardner and Shane Victorino) who met the necessary criteria.
Below is a table featuring those 12 players as corner outfielders. Year denotes the relevant seasons included in the sample. Inn denotes total innings played at the relevant position during the sample. UZR denotes the numbers of runs saved at the position relative to a league-average fielder. UZR150 denotes the numbers of runs saved relative to average per 150 games (or, 1350 innings).
| Name | Pos | Year | Inn | UZR | UZR150 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alejandro De Aza | COF | 2013-14 | 1461 | 6 | 5 |
| Alex Rios | COF | 2007-12* | 4432 | 23 | 7 |
| Andre Ethier | COF | 2012-14 | 1958 | -3 | -2 |
| Brett Gardner No. 1 | COF | 2010-11 | 2064 | 52 | 34 |
| Brett Gardner No. 2 | COF | 2014 | 1075 | 2 | 2 |
| Coco Crisp | COF | 2004-05 | 1493 | 30 | 27 |
| Denard Span | COF | 2008-09 | 1366 | 12 | 11 |
| Desmond Jennings | COF | 2011-12 | 1406 | 13 | 12 |
| Gregor Blanco | COF | 2012-14 | 1546 | 15 | 13 |
| Michael Brantley | COF | 2010-13 | 1914 | -1 | -1 |
| Shane Victorino No. 1 | COF | 2006-08 | 1114 | 16 | 19 |
| Shane Victorino No. 2 | COF | 2012-13 | 1325 | 32 | 32 |
| Shin-Soo Choo | COF | 2012-14 | 1986 | -24 | -16 |
| Will Venable | COF | 2012-14 | 1774 | -3 | -2 |
| Total | — | — | 24917 | +169 | +9 |
And now as center fielders:
| Name | Pos | Year | Inn | UZR | UZR150 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alejandro De Aza | CF | 2013-14 | 1003 | -1 | -1 |
| Alex Rios | CF | 2007-11* | 3506 | 1 | 1 |
| Andre Ethier | CF | 2012-14 | 1161 | -2 | -2 |
| Brett Gardner 1 | CF | 2009-11 | 1025 | 9 | 12 |
| Brett Gardner 2 | CF | 2013-14 | 1343 | 0 | 0 |
| Coco Crisp | CF | 2004-06 | 1787 | 4 | 3 |
| Denard Span | CF | 2008-10 | 2053 | -1 | -1 |
| Desmond Jennings | CF | 2011-13 | 1414 | -5 | -5 |
| Gregor Blanco | CF | 2012-14 | 1243 | 10 | 11 |
| Michael Brantley | CF | 2009-12 | 2377 | -19 | -11 |
| Shane Victorino No. 1 | CF | 2006-08 | 1768 | 15 | 11 |
| Shane Victorino No. 2 | CF | 2012-13 | 1047 | -3 | -3 |
| Shin-Soo Choo | CF | 2013 | 1333 | -17 | -17 |
| Will Venable | CF | 2012-14 | 1115 | 4 | 4 |
| Total | — | — | 22176 | -6 | 0 |
One sees immediately the extraordinary variance that can occur in just a thousand-inning sample — and thus the importance of combining all the relevant player-seasons together. Between 2012 and -13, for example, Shane Victorino saved 32 runs per season as a corner outfielder but -3 runs as a center fielder during roughly that same time period. That’s a substantial gap — much larger than the 10 or so runs suggested by WAR’s positional adjustment.
In the aggregate, however — with samples of over 20,000 each — the numbers appear quite reasonable. As a group the 12 players here (or 14, depending on how one cares to define it) have saved about 9 runs per every 150 games as corner outfielders while saving 0 runs while playing center field during the same basic timeframes within their respective careers. Those defenders, in other words, have saved nine fewer runs per 150 games as a group while playing center field than either left or right field.
This figure is remarkably similar to the one already present in the WAR calculation. One notes, as well, that the positional adjustment present in the WAR calculations accounts for 162 games, while we’ve prorated the defensive-run figures here to 150 games. Accounting for that difference brings the difference between the two even closer to the 10-run figure already extant in the WAR calculation.
Turning our attention to Myers, specifically, we find that he’s produced 0.4 UZR/150 in right field over the first 1279 innings of his major-league career at that position. He has been, in other words, almost a precisely league-average defender there. Given the calculations present here, one could reasonably expect him, as a center fielder, to concede nine more runs defensively in 2015 — should he, in fact, play that position for the Padres.
Carson Cistulli has published a book of aphorisms called Spirited Ejaculations of a New Enthusiast.
-9. Not Soo bad. That is, not ‘Shin-Soo’-bad.
Better than Mike Trout!
http://www.fangraphs.com/leaders.aspx?pos=cf&stats=fld&lg=all&qual=y&type=1&season=2014&month=0&season1=2014&ind=0&team=0&rost=0&age=0&filter=&players=0
This is blasphemous, and should be taken down by an administrator. There is no ‘Better than Mike Trout’
Trout scored 45 points for the Charlotte Bobcats last night before kicking the winning field goal in the Monday nighter. And that was after scoring on not one but two free kicks for AC Milan earlier in the day.
There is no better.
45 points for a team that doesn’t even exist. Very impressive.
FWIW, the 2013 Reds had the 4th fewest runs allowed (and won 90 games,) despite Choo being flanked by lumbering Ludwick and average-ish Bruce. Their infield defense was outstanding by UZR, so maybe that’s where the Padres should focus next.
I betcha a bajillion dollars that Myers does something OTHER than produce exactly -8.6 runs in a full season in CF in 2014.
It would be impossible assuming it is a continuous variable.
Of course, given the absurdly low individual probability of even the single most likely outcome, the smart money would almost always bet on “something other than [specific numeric outcome].”
I’m pretty sure it’s actually a discrete variable due to the way UZR is calculated.
That’s what I was thinking. I wasn’t sure how it was calculated though.
so would a non-sentient lipoprotein
What?
I believe his point is that a non-sentient lipoprotein is unlikely to produce -8.6 runs in CF because they usually end up further left on the defensive spectrum.
Right, but is there some relationship between Wil Myers and lipoproteins? I’m not seeing the reference.
I got the horse jangles
Is is further to Chicago or by bus?
This was funnier in your head.
It’s not that, I’m a biochemistry undergrad and I was racking my head trying to come up with a connection.
An excellent article that illustrates, clearly, that the Padres do in fact intend to make every effort to trade Myers to the Phillies (with Hedges) for Hamels. No way they can use Myers in CF, and neither Upton nor Kemp is sitting to allow Myers to play LF/RF.
I actually think Kemp is a worse corner outfielder than Myers would be a CFer.
Wait, what? -9 UZR/150 in 2014 would have put him right between Ben Revere and Austin Jackson, and he’s almost certainly going to hit more than each of them.
Is he going to hit more than them? If he keeps pulling balls into the shift and being awful against fastballs, I’m not so sure.
And keeps recovering from a broken wrist!
The nerve of him!
He wasn’t setting the world ablaze prior to the DL stint
Good point. He was only hitting a little better than Carlos Santana and Denard Span, and identically to Chris Carter, when he got hurt at the end of May.
There was no way he would have bounced back, had he not hurt his wrist.
Jason Collette had an interesting take on the trade on the latest podcast. Rays were dissatisfied with his stubbornness.
Why should we assume they won’t keep him? Apparently they plan to use Derek Norris behind the plate, Will Middlebrooks at 3b, and Matt Kemp in LF. This is not a team for which defense is a priority.
By playing Middlebrooks, offense may not be a priority either (at least from 3B).
Myers might play a better 3B then WMB. Yeah really.
Not a chance. Myers is probably worth more than Hamel’s and his $100M commitment. Throw in Hedges are you are just being silly.
Hamels is identical to Lester in every way over the last few years, and is guaranteed roughly $50m less. He has a pretty good contract.
I’d probably trade Myers for him if I was the GM of any team other than the Padres, who need all the bat they can get.
Hamels is making $3M less per year.
The surplus is around $12M. That’s a 76-100 hitter or a back half pitcher and something fringy according to the excellent Point of Pittsburgh stuff.
But the total guaranteed is much less because of the remaining length on Hamels’ contract. A lot lower risk in the final years than the final years of Hamels’ contract.
And if your remaining FA options for a #1 starter are James Shields and Max-Contract Scherzer, Hamels is looking pretty darn nice right about now.
and this is all if you are basing his stats off his 2014 fWAR. If you base it off his rWAR its a significant difference.
As a TB fan I can tell you that Myers is not as athletically gifted as any of those 12 outfielders listed. He began in the minors as a catcher.
Regardless of athleticism, he still has a 0.4 UZR/150, so it must be other traits (arm & reliability) that allow him to be an average right fielder. Those same traits would probably keep him as a below average center fielder instead of a disastrous (-20 UZR/150) one.
You’ve got to be able to cover territory in CF, and Myers can’t. He’s a project, still learning in the outfield. Kemp would very likely be better in center.
Given that comment, I’m willing to bet that, as a Tampa Bay Rays fan, you haven’t seen a lot of Matt Kemp playing CF.
Agreed, UZR has been really lenient on Myers from what I’ve seen.
DRS has him at -10/150 in RF, and Plus-Minus has him at -5/150.
“on something more intimate than just nodding terms with inertia”
If Carson Cistulli was a beat writer I would read his game recaps. Every. Day.
Interesting stuff, Carson, thanks for taking the time. So while the average is around 0, the range could run anywhere from +-15, basically. Having watched Won’t attempt to play RF I can’t wait to see the blooper reel of him in center. He’s got confidence, though, which I guess is all that you really need in his world.
I’m guessing he breaks something in CF trying to play over his head.
Very useful information but in no way do I think you can infer from it that it is most likely Myers will have approximately a -9 UZR in CF. Just from looking at the samples provided the range varies widely as to how each player did from the corner to the center, with some going up and some going down. So while it may provide the “average” of what Myers might do, that’s all it is and doesn’t take into account any of Myers’ particular characteristics into account. Could be much better than -9, could be far worse.
I’m a Padre fan, the idea of these three outfielders patrolling Petco scares the bejeezus out of me, but at the same entices if they can pull it off. Maybe Preller, White and Black know something the rest of us don’t.
They probably know that it’s a lot easier to win despite bad defense than despite bad offense.
You literally cannot win if you don’t score runs. That’s why the only teams who make noise with sub-20 WAR from their position players are ones like the 2005 Yankees, who scored a terrifying amount of runs.
It’s a lot easier for a good offense and rotation to compensate for bad defense than it is for a good defense and rotation to compensate for bad offense.
Do you have anything to back up this opinion of yours?
“The only teams to make noise with sub-20 WAR from their position players are ones like the 2005 Yankees, who scored a terrifying amount of runs.”
Look it up yourself.
How does a team accumulate less than 20 WAR from its position players and still score a lot of runs? Isn’t that akin to saying ‘only a few teams in history have won a lot of games while failing to score a lot of runs’? Doesn’t WAR (for position players) correlate quite closely with runs scored? For a team with relatively few position-player WAR to score a lot of runs, it takes a bunch of luck, I think.
Or maybe I simply don’t understand your comment.
…because WAR is derived from both offense and defense? The 2005 Yankees had 17.4 WAR from their position players, and a .350 team wOBA.
That’s reasonable, thanks for clarifying. Obviously this comes down to whether the loss defensively is made up for by the improvement with the bat. The projections don’t like the likelihoods of those things happening, or at least, they don’t like the Padres’ chances of being a contending team. But we’ll see how the season plays out.
But my point is that offensive runs may actually be more valuable than defensive runs. The 2005 Yankees were a 70 win team based on WAR, and won 95 games, because they had an elite offense.
Scouts thought that Myers could be a fringy CF for a few years before shifting. Somewhere between -5 and -10 runs there sounds about right.
They’re betting he’ll be more than 10 runs better offensively than Venable once his wrist heals up. That seems pretty safe to me, at this point.
Intuitively, it seems odd to just think you can knock 10 runs off of a corner outfielder when moving him to center. You’d think the hit would be a lot higher if the guy is a bad defender and lower if he is a good defender.
The issue is that we only have a few people in the sample who aren’t good defenders as COFs.
People who are bad LFs or RFs usually don’t get a chance to play 1000 innings of CF.
Shin-Soo Choo did, and he might be the most relevant example.
I agree. Unfortunately, we only have a single season’s worth of data from Choo in CF (for obvious reasons), which really can’t tell us all that much.
Possibly relevant to the Padre situation is Venable who had a -3 UZR as a corner outfielder but a +4 as a center fielder, cutting completely against the thesis of the piece. Maybe something having to do with Petco helped those numbers and might help Myers as well.
I think it’s likely to be UZR randomness, considering that Venable has less than two seasons worth of data in CF.
This is absolutely true. I wasn’t really accusing anyone of jumping too far on this, but just saying that it would probably be a mistake to think that any corner outfielder could play center and just lose 10 runs more compared to average than he does at a corner.
This is an interesting point, although looking at this (admittedly small) sample tells a conflicting story.
Examining those players who have UZR/150 scores in the same range (Venable, Ethier, Brantley, Gardner (#2), De Aza, and Rios), and ignore the players who are, according to these data, more elite in the corner outfield positions (as well as Choo, whose data show him to be just awful, and will be totally ignored for this analysis) than Myers has shown himself to be gives a different result altogether. When we limit the sample to these players, things are a much nicer picture: the average UZR/150 among that group drops by only 3 runs, which isn’t nothing, but is a far cry from the 9 figure that Carson came to.
Meanwhile, examining the elite corner outfielders, the loss is considerably higher, as Gardner 1, the two Victorinos, Crisp, Blanco, Jennings and Span combined for an aggregate average of -19 runs saved. Counter-intuitive, I know.
To try to make sense of this, I looked at this from the other perspective as well: examining those who seemed to be better as CF and examining how much better they were as corner outfielders and comparing them with those who were worse at CF. The penalty for playing CF in this case worked to benefit the elite CFers more than the previous analysis did, as they were about 8.5 runs better as corner outfielders, and weaker CFs were 14 runs better as corner outfielders.
So maybe this doesn’t tell us much. It says that, of this sample, (relatively) lousy corner outfielders weren’t hurt that much when they moved to CF, while (relatively) lousy CFers were a lot better in the corners. These outcomes tend to disagree, and my brain is starting to hurt, so I’m going to go read some celebrity news.
This whole approach to positional adjustments is a little off. The impact of changing positions among the population of those who chose (or were chosen) to make positional adjustments is not the same as the change for some hypothetical changer, unless the sample of switchers was randomized.
Presumably some of the changers changed because there was some reason for the switch beyond just no room at the corner outfield inn. Like they showed some specific aptitude (again, at least in some cases). More generally using self selected activities as a proxy for a treatment effect is terribly dubious.
A bound in the other direction would be to aggregate innings from corner outfielders who moved because of emergencies (i.e. injuries or late innings of games), or something like that, that was closer to random treatment. These are still decent bets as center fielders, since they were chosen instead of a slug COF, but at least there would be some sense that the move was not as much of a choice.
Also you don’t need a lot of players as much as you need a lot of innings if the treated group is randomized.
I agree. Selection bias has a lot of an effect here, and essentially, this is the assumption the Padres are testing here, perhaps with tremendous risk. Is Wil-Myers-in-CF a terrible risk, or not? If this falls flat on its face, and Myers turns out to be terribly lost out there, or (perhaps just as likely) Matt Kemp needs to move to 1B with Myers moving back to the corner and…someone else, playing CF, Myers won’t wind up with enough innings to be considered in a similar analysis in the future. The failed attempts at conversion are not captured here, because Managerial observation (which should not be totally dismissed) of a failed experiment will halt it before UZR can normalize or the inning count gets high enough.
Put another way, if you look at players who made that transition and failed to stick at CF for very long, you might come to a much different, a much worse, number than nine runs lost.
Bad fielding is the new market inefficiency.
I don’t think it’s about “bad fielders” so much as the fact that it’s a lot easier to get an above average defensive OF than a good hitter.
If those three guys hit, it won’t matter that much. The Pads won 77 games last year with zero hitting, average defense and great pitching. I think great pitching, markedly improved hitting and average to below average defense will be a winner.
The Padres didn’t have great pitching last year. Their low ERA was entirely based on their park factors. By WAR they were 23rd in baseball and by FIP, both of which are adjusted for park, they were 28th.
This team was bad by any measure last year. Their win total probably overrated them.
FIP is not adjusted for park. WAR is, as is FIP- and xFIP, but not FIP. Nonetheless, their pitching wasn’t as good as their ERA would suggest.
On the other hand, they do play at Petco. So having an ERA that is lower than FIP is probably to be expected for that team, and expecting that pitcher WAR won’t correlate terribly closely with actual pitcher performance is also reasonable. Remember, WAR and FIP endeavor to measure true talent, and isolate out luck, park, and league factors. But these are indeed factors that will help the Padres’ pitching staff next year. Expecting a team with the third-lowest 2015 pitcher WAR projection to be better than that in terms of actual runs allowed is probably a reasonable expectation.