A while ago, we talked about the marginal value of a win, and how it differs from team to team, changing the calculation on what a team should pay for a given player given what they already have on the roster. The wins that have the largest impact on playoff odds are in the upper-80s, so if you’re a slightly better than .500 club, adding another additional win or two can have a pretty dramatic impact on your chances of playing in October.

For a team that isn’t likely to contend, the marginal value of each win is pretty low, which is one reason why those teams often go young and give prospects a chance to play rather than upgrading the roster with more expensive veterans. However, the win curve has two sides where the marginal value of an additional win is low, and in New York, we may be seeing evidence of how a team responds when their marginal value of a win is way past the peak.

The Yankees have made a bunch of good moves this winter, adding Curtis Granderson, Nick Johnson, and Javier Vazquez to a roster that was the best in baseball a year ago. Their true talent level, as currently constructed, is probably that of a 100 win team. The Yankees are going to be very good in 2010.

So, perhaps we should not be so surprised that New York is bargain shopping in left field, avoiding the likes of Matt Holliday and Jason Bay. They are at the other end of the win curve, and it doesn’t make much sense to spend a lot of money there either. The marginal value of the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd win in terms of playoff odds is really quite small. And that’s approximately the upgrade that Holliday would represent over the current production that Gardner offers in left field.

The Yankees have entered the prime area of significant diminishing marginal utility. They are so good that adding another high quality player doesn’t help them that much in 2010, and because of the long term contract that is required, they’d be risking future flexibility to add wins that may actually matter for an upgrade that just isn’t necessary.

It’s a rational decision made by smart people who understand just how good their roster currently is. In the past, New York has pursued every big ticket free agent on the market because they represented a real, tangible improvement in their quest to bring home another championship. Given how well Brian Cashman has put together this roster, though, a big ticket left fielder is superfluous. He’s right to keep his money locked up. They just don’t need another good player.

I would like to make a plea with anyone who plans on writing anything about how a team’s off-season has gone – please, please, please do not treat 2009 as a constant.

This happens all the time. Team X added Player Y but lost Player Z, so they are about the same as they were. Or sometimes it will appear in a slightly different form – the team brought in this guy to replace the big hole they had last year, so with that improvement and no obvious downgrades, they’re going to be even better!

All of these statements presuppose that each team should expect to get something close to equal to the 2009 performance of all the players they are retaining from last year’s roster. But that’s not even remotely close to true, and everyone knows it. We all know about career years and how you have to expect regression after a player does something way outside the ordinary, but regression doesn’t just serve to bring players back to earth after a big year.

Regression “fixes” a lot of problem spots from the prior year, even if the team doesn’t make a serious effort to change out players. The Royals got a .253 wOBA out of their shortstops a year ago. I don’t care how bad you think Yuniesky Betancourt is, you have to expect that number to be higher this year. They didn’t do anything to improve their shortstop position this winter, but the level of production they got from the position in 2009 is not their expected level of production for 2010.

It isn’t just individual players performances, either. Last year, the Phillies had a LOB% of 75.0% despite a pretty mediocre 4.36 FIP as a team. They stranded a ton of base runners, something that is not an easily repeatable skill. They could pitch much better, thanks to the addition of Roy Halladay, and still give up more runs than they did a year ago.

This applies across the board. Injuries, clutch hitting, variance in run distribution – all of these are subject to extreme amounts of regression, and they all had a significant impact on how some teams performed last year, both in terms of “raw” wins and losses and things like runs scored and runs allowed. You cannot just look at a team’s prior year won loss record – or even their pythagorean record – make some adjustments for the off-season transactions, and presume that’s a good enough estimator of true talent for the 2010 team.

However, it’s done all the time. I’m not just talking about mainstream writers here – you’ll see this kind of “analysis” on pretty much every blog and commentary about baseball, sabermetric or otherwise. For whatever reason, it’s become acceptable to just plug in the new guys numbers in place of the old guys numbers and call it a day, pretending like everything else from last year is not going to change at all.

That’s lazy and it’s wrong. Don’t do it.

It is not very controversial to state that “Moneyball” was a divisive book. Michael Lewis wrote some things that can only be interpreted as denigrating to the scouting community, painting a picture of an out-of-touch collection of old men being replaced by smarter, better analysts. It should have been no surprise that people who considered themselves scouts, or had a lot of respect for the profession, were offended by some of the stuff Lewis wrote.

I wonder how different the book would be if it written today, though, because we are currently in the midst of a market correction based on statistical analysis agreeing with long held scouting beliefs. Defense is at a premium while high strikeout sluggers are struggling to find offers, and this charge is being led by the “smart teams” that Lewis would espouse are doing things the right way.

The Mariners focus on defense under Jack Zduriencik is a well known story by now. But, they aren’t the only ones heading that direction. The Boston Red Sox signed Mike Cameron to replace Jason Bay and have made their interest in Adrian Beltre well known. The A’s signed Coco Crisp and currently have an outfield with three center fielders penciled in as starters. Defensive specialists Adam Everett, Alex Gonzalez, Jack Wilson, Placido Polanco, and Pedro Feliz have all signed, while the guys who provide value with their bats are still sitting on the market.

The teams that use statistical analysis the most are doing what their scouts have been recommending for years. Stats geeks are validating the insights of scouts. If Lewis was following the game right now, documenting stories from inside a “smart” front office, the tone would have to be dramatically different, even if the point was still the same – good teams spend money on undervalued assets.

Timing really is everything. That Lewis chose to write the book when on base percentage was undervalued created a division between stats and scouting that simply would not exist if the book was written today. With the new found appreciation for defense and its place in a player’s total value, stats and scouts agree more than they disagree at the moment.

Perhaps the subtitle for the sequel to Moneyball should be “Why The Fat Scout Was Right All Along”.

Failing to find a taker for Derek Lowe, the Braves went to Plan B today, trading Javier Vazquez to the Yankees for Melky Cabrera, Arodys Vizciano, and Mike Dunn. The reaction to this deal on Twitter has not been kind to Atlanta, with most people concluding that the Yankees got Vazquez for peanuts.

I’m not so sure. Melky Cabrera may not have superstar upside, but he’s a quality young player with little projection required. He posted a .331 wOBA last season, making him roughly a league average hitter, and he didn’t turn 25 until August. He’s got good contact skills and gap power, and it wouldn’t be surprising to see some of his doubles turn into home runs as he ages.

Defensively, he’s below average – but not terrible – in center, and he’d make for a quality defensive corner outfielder if that’s where the Braves choose to use him. All told, he’s roughly a league average player, with upside to develop into something a bit above average.

That has value, especially as a young player who will make far below his market value this year.

But it’s not Cabrera who makes this deal work for Atlanta – that’s Vizcaino, an underhyped 19-year-old who destroyed A-ball as a teenager. The classic projectable teenage arm, Vizciano throws a mid-90s fastball with a hard breaking curve, and has proven nearly unhittable in his brief professional career. He’s not close to the majors, but he’s a significant upside bet for Atlanta long term.

Vazquez is a quality pitcher and the Braves will miss him, no doubt, but they saved roughly $8 million in salary (once you account for Melky’s arbitration award), added a league average outfielder and one of the best young arms in baseball. Perhaps it isn’t the price that top flight starters used to command, but when viewed in today’s market, this is a pretty decent deal for Atlanta. This is a significantly better return than what Philadelphia got for Cliff Lee, for instance.

The Yankees get better, of course, but you already knew that. Don’t hate this deal for Altanta – they’ll come out of it okay as well.

We’ve seen some really good moves and some really bad moves this winter, but by and large, every move has at least been fairly easy to understand. Even the Brandon Lyon contract isn’t confusing – Ed Wade overvalues middle relievers and got fooled into thinking Lyon is good by his low ERA. It’s a terrible contract, but it’s pretty easy to see what happened.

Now, though, we have our first head-scratcher of the winter. The A’s are reportedly on the verge of signing Coco Crisp to a one year, $5 million deal. Now, Crisp is a decent player – he’s racked up +15.7 WAR in 832 career games, averaging about 2.7 WAR per 600 plate appearances. He’s a very good defensive outfielder and has been about a league average hitter for most of his career. That’s a good combination.

Overall, the whole package is worth about +1.5 to +2 wins over a full season. For $5 million, the A’s are seemingly getting a pretty good value relative to market rates in previous years. And, there’s not much risk, given the short term nature of the deal.

So, why doesn’t this signing make sense? Because the A’s already have two copies of this exact player type, and no shortage of outfielders looking for at-bats. Let’s start with the Crisp clones, Rajai Davis and Ryan Sweeney.

UZR loved both last year, giving Davis a +11.9 rating in about 2/3 of a season in center field, while Sweeney got a +15.5 in half a season of right field and another +6.8 in 1/3 of a season in center field. They’re both terrific defenders in the outfield, even if they aren’t as good as their 2009 numbers imply. And they are both essentially close to league average offensive players.

They offer the same skills that Crisp does, only for a fraction of the cost. Adding him to the group gives the A’s three outfielders with the same basic skill set. It is possible, I guess, that this group will be the starting outfield for Oakland in 2010, and they’ll attempt to put the best outfield defenders in baseball behind their pitching staff. But if that is the plan, what do they do with Scott Hairston, Aaron Cunningham, Travis Buck, and the newly acquired Michael Taylor?

Hairston, after all, wasn’t free – they just traded several prospects to get him over the summer, and while he wasn’t very good after the trade, the A’s are supposed to be an organization that doesn’t react to small sample sizes. It seems like a waste of resources to pay the price they paid to get him if he’s only going to serve as the right-hand portion of an outfield platoon.

You could make a pretty good case that Buck, Cunningham and Taylor could use more time in Triple-A, but they’re all close to major league ready. Do they need a full year in the minors? Probably not. But the Crisp acquisition makes it nearly impossible for any of them to start the year in Oakland, and barring multiple trades, they’ll likely be spending most of the year in Sacramento.

It seems like a trade of either Davis or Sweeney must be in the making. But then, there’s the issue of what you’ll get for this player type, as the entire reason you got Crisp for a decent salary is that the market doesn’t value these guys high enough. If the team that may be trading for either of the two defensive specialists was in the market for that kind of player, why didn’t they just sign Crisp themselves?

It’s just weird. Perhaps Billy Beane has a master plan that has yet to be fully revealed, but at this point in time, this signing is a head scratcher.

The Cubs have spent most of the winter trying to extract some value from Milton Bradley. Today, they gave up on that pursuit, and traded him for Carlos Silva instead.

This isn’t to say that Silva is definitely going to be terrible. Moving to the National League can do wonders for a pitcher, especially one who pounds the strike zone with mediocre stuff. Silva is not that different from Jeff Weaver, who has found success with the Dodgers the last few years. There are scenarios in which Silva could help the Cubs, especially if they use him as a middle reliever and don’t let him face LH hitters very often.

But, he is not unique. There are a lot of reclamation projects who could offer limited upside if they prove healthy, and most of them will sign minor league contracts this winter. If the Mariners had cut Silva outright, he would not have gotten more than the league minimum. He is a replacement level pitcher, even though there are scenarios where he could pitch better than that.

The motivation for this deal from the Cubs’ perspective was cash, plain and simple. The Mariners are sending $9 million to the Cubs along with Silva, which covers the difference in salary and an extra $6 million, which will almost certainly be split into $3 million per year over the life of Silva’s contract. So, for 2010 and 2011, the Cubs save a little bit of money versus just having to eat his contract and release him.

Unfortunately for Chicago, this was probably the best they could do. They can allocate that $3 million to Marlon Byrd to replace Bradley in the outfield and hope that Silva finds the NL to his liking. But, there’s no question, this brings a conclusion to the Bradley signing that makes it a total and utter disaster.

From the Mariners perspective – what else is there to say? Jack Zduriencik is a genius. If Seattle isn’t the favorite in the AL West yet, they’re really close, and they aren’t done. The Angels, Rangers, and A’s should be scared stiff.

The signing of Nick Johnson by the Yankees is a good move for New York, for all the reasons Jack talked about this morning. But, for players like Russ Branyan, Jim Thome, and Vladimir Guerrero, it is bad news indeed.

As Brian Cashman noted earlier in the off-season, he ran into a designated hitter looking for a job no matter where he turned. The market is saturated with good hitters who can’t play the field, and unfortunately for them, the National League doesn’t use a DH. So, their options are limited to AL teams who don’t already have a designated hitter in the fold.

The Yankees were a potential landing spot for DH types, especially left-handed ones looking to exploit the right field wall in New Yankee Stadium. However, New York signed a first baseman to take that spot, decreasing the supply of available jobs for defensively challenged players without taking any DH types off the market.

Johnson’s signing, along with Matsui’s deal in LA, also sets something of a price ceiling for guys with limited defensive value. That Johnson and Matsui were not able to get more than $6 million as the best of the bunch in this player type limits the bargaining power that the lesser players have. Not only are the jobs diminishing quickly, but they’re going to have to take $2 to $4 million in order to land one.

There aren’t many DH jobs left available. If I was the agent for any of the aging sluggers with no defensive value, I’d be trying everything I could to land a job in Baltimore or Texas as quickly as possible. This game of musical chairs is going to leave several good hitters standing around, trying to figure out what they’re going to do with their lives after baseball.

When the Angels signed Hideki Matsui to be their DH and maybe a part time outfielder, it seemed like a pretty good fit on the surface. As RJ noted at the time, Matsui brings a left-handed bat to a team that could use one, and he should still be a productive hitter in 2010. On a one year contract for just over $6 million, he’s not a bad deal. However, I wonder what effect this move will have on the rest of the roster.

As we saw in October, Mike Scioscia sees value in having Jeff Mathis behind the plate. Mike Napoli played 18 games at designated hitter a year ago as the Angels worked his bat into the line-up without making him squat behind the plate. Napoli was the most commonly used DH for the Angels besides Vladimir Guerrero.

With Matsui on the roster, that option is pretty limited. They could use Napoli as Matsui’s platoon partner, using him at DH when a lefty is on the hill, but is Scioscia goinig to want to limit himself to only using Mathis against southpaws? Keep in mind that Mathis started 78 games in the regular season a year ago and then essentially became the starting catcher in the ALCS.

I find it unlikely that Scioscia would scale back Mathis’ role this year, given his preference for his skills behind the plate. So, while Matsui offers the potential of a productive DH, I have to wonder what the opportunity cost associated with having him on the roster is. If Napoli’s playing time is cut significantly as a result, did the Angels really get that much better?

Matsui certainly provides depth, and Napoli’s injury history suggests that perhaps they couldn’t afford to count on him playing regularly, but after losing John Lackey and Chone Figgins and then losing out on the Roy Halladay sweepstakes, the Angels could use a premium player more than they could use multiple solid players. Especially with the moves being made in Seattle and Texas, the AL West appears to be up for grabs – Anaheim fans should be hoping that their new DH doesn’t take too much playing time from Napoli, or else their one off-season move so far won’t do much to keep the other teams from nipping at their heels.

Last year, bad defensive outfielders got a rude awakening in free agency, as Adam Dunn, Pat Burrell, and Bobby Abreu learned first hand that teams were beginning to value defense at positions besides catcher and shortstop. There were too many lumbering sluggers available, and the excess supply drove prices down for all of them.

This year, the hurt is landing on second baseman. Between teams who want to trade their incumbent away (Dan Uggla, Luis Castillo, Jose Lopez) and some talented free agents looking to get paid (Orlando Hudson, Felipe Lopez, Placido Polanco), the market was flooded with available second baseman. It didn’t help when Kelly Johnson was non-tendered by the Braves. Polanco is the only one of the seven who has found a new home, and he had to switch positions to land his deal with Philadelphia.

Meanwhile, the Marlins are still struggling to find a good deal for Uggla, who they assumed would be a hot commodity. The Mets would like to sign Hudson, but have to trade Castillo first, and there’s no market for his services. The Mariners have made no secret of the fact that Jose Lopez is available, but other teams are apparently not fond of him for the same reasons Seattle would like to move him. And there has been nary a rumor about Felipe Lopez, despite the fact that he’s coming off a +4.6 win season.

The news just got worse for these guys yesterday. The Dodgers, one of the few teams actively looking for a second baseman, signed Jamey Carroll to a two year, $4 million contract, and will let him and Blake DeWitt split time at the position. Like the Tigers, they preferred to go young and cheap as opposed to paying for a name player at the position.

Now, you have to wonder where any of these guys are going to land. The Giants would probably take one of these guys if they came at a bargain, but might require them to shift to third base if they aren’t as good defensively as Freddy Sanchez. Perhaps the Cubs may get involved, but they seem unlikely to hand out more than a one year deal to anyone, given their stated plan of shifting Ryan Theriot across the bag once young Starlin Castro proves ready for the big leagues.

Who else is really looking for a second baseman? The Twins, perhaps, but certainly not on a significant contract, and they may prefer a third baseman instead. Just looking at the demand for the position and the supply of players currently available, I’m guessing that Uggla, Johnson, and Felipe Lopez may have to end up switching positions in order to find a new home. For the Mariners and Mets, they’re probably stuck with the guys they already have. This is just not the year to be trading a second baseman.

In the last four months, I’ve written two posts with a similar point – a team traded Cliff Lee and got a mediocre return at best in terms of prospects. First, Cleveland’s Mark Shapiro made the decision to trade Lee to Philadelphia at the deadline for an uninspiring package of players, a decision that looked even more questionable given how well Lee pitched for the Phillies. But now, Ruben Amaro has followed in his footsteps, trading Lee away for a trio of okay-but-not-great prospects.

So, I have to wonder what is going on here? It’s impossible to believe that both Shapiro and Amaro failed to do their homework, trading Lee away without surveying the market and weighing available offers. They obviously are both interested in making the best deals they can, and with a player of Lee’s stature, I have to believe they did significant due diligence before pulling the trigger.

So, our options here are believe that two General Managers are lazy/incompetent and failed to extract the best return possible for their team when trading him, or that the market for Cliff Lee is just not very good. Let’s just agree to reject option A out of hand, as neither Shapiro or Amaro are lazy or stupid. That leaves the second option – that this really was the best both teams could do.

What, then, is wrong with Cliff Lee in the eyes of major league GMs? Over the last two years, he’s third in baseball in innings pitched, sixith in ERA, third in complete games, has issued the third fewest walks, and allowed the sixth fewest home runs. His 2.96 FIP is third best in baseball since the beginning of 2008, better than Roy Halladay’s 3.02. Even his 3.62 xFIP, which adjusts for his low HR/FB rate, is 3.62 – the equal of Felix Hernandez.

He’s spent most of the last two years pitching in the American League, so there’s not a worry about the adjustment coming over to tougher competition. He destroyed the post-season, pitching one of the best games in World Series history against a great Yankee line-up. He’s left-handed and has three good pitches, including a devastating change-up that is among the best in the game.

I don’t get it. The Brewers gave up more for two months of CC Sabathia than the Phillies gave up for 1 1/2 years of Lee or that the Mariners gave up for 1 year of Lee. Lee is Sabathia’s equal, or really close to it. Yet twice, he’s been put up for trade and the response has been fairly blah.

You can’t argue that this is what pitchers of this quality go for. The difference in prospects that it required to acquire Lee and Halladay is staggering, and is not all explained by the $6 million in cash Toronto sent to Philly or the extension that Halladay agreed to. The Angels were reportedly willing to give up the moon for Halladay, but apparently had no interest in making a similar offer for Lee, letting him go to a division competitor while surrendering nothing that would help them in 2010.

The only thing that makes sense to me is that teams are still a bit skeptical of Lee’s rapid rise to greatness. And while we’re the first ones to point out that you want to make decisions on large samples, Lee’s thrown 450 innings over the last two years and racked up +13.8 wins in that time. You can’t fluke your way into that kind of performance.

It will be interesting to see what happens when Lee hits free agency next year. He is clearly expecting to get paid like a top tier starting pitcher, but major league GMs apparently do not see him as one. They should. He is.