Scott Boras is well known for the books he produces to sell his free agents to perspective buyers. This year, he may have even outdone himself. According to the New York Times, Boras’ book on Oliver Perez includes a chapter “One Of The Five Best Left-Handed Starting Pitchers.”

Seriously. Oliver Perez. Scott Boras actually wants people to take him seriously, and he’s calling Perez one of the five best lefty starters in the game. Scott, just a question, but which of these pitchers do you think Perez is better than?

CC Sabathia
Johan Santana
Cliff Lee
Cole Hamels
Randy Johnson
Scott Kazmir
John Danks
Jon Lester
Mark Buehrle
Jamie Moyer
Joe Saunders
Andy Pettitte
Ted Lilly

No, really, I’d love to see the argument that Perez is better than any one of those 13, and those are just the guys where there’s absolutely no chance Perez is better. You can’t make a non-laughable case that Perez is better than any of those guys. You just can’t. There’s a litany of other guys with good arguments that they’re as good or better than Perez too, and in reality, he’s probably more like a top 25 LH starter

Perez is, at best, an average starting pitcher. His career FIP of 4.67 by his great season in 2003 that doesn’t look like it will ever be repeated. He’s one of the most extreme flyball pitchers in the game and his command sucks – he can only survive by racking up a ton of strikeouts, but those decline as a pitcher ages faster than command improves.

Forget the Sandy Koufax comparison – Boras will be lucky if Perez figures out how to become the new Ted Lilly, which is basically his best case scenario. Anyone spending money on Perez thinking that they’re getting a guy with a front of the rotation ceiling is fooling themselves – or being fooled by Scott Boras.

Word trickled out this morning that the Houston Astros had re-signed LaTroy Hawkins to a one year deal for $3.75 million. That seamed a bit cheap to me, given what pitchers are getting in free agency these days, so I took a closer look at Hawkins’ numbers to see if I was missing something. What I found was one of the strangest outliers I’ve ever seen.

Check out Hawkins’ batted ball graph:

Look at that ridiculous spike in GB% during 2007. His whole career, Hawkins has been an average groundball guy, but in 2007, he became the relief pitching version of Brandon Webb, just without all the strikeouts. It wasn’t a small sample size thing, either – Hawkins faced 225 batters in 2007 while pitching a full year in relief for the Rockies. Out of nowhere, with seemingly no explanation, his GB% jumped from 44% to 63% in a single year.

As you’ll notice from the graph, the trend didn’t continue in 2008, as his GB% fell back to 46.1%. He offset the lack of groundballs by returning his strikeout year to 2005 levels, posting a 6.97 K/9. His 3.28 FIP in 2008 was the best he’s posted since 2003.

So what happened? GB rates have extremely high year to year correlations, and they normalize very quickly. You just don’t see huge swings in groundball rates from year to year like this. The odds of it being random variation are extremely slim. It is much more likely that Hawkins changed his approach in some way during the ’07 season, decided he didn’t like the results, and scrapped it for 2008. However, I haven’t been able to find any evience that this is true.

So, Rockies/Astros fans, what have you got? What happened to LaTroy Hawkins in 2007, and why didn’t it carry over to 2008?

Today, Michael Young was named the Gold Glove winner for the American League at shortstop, a selection that rivals some of the worst picks the managers have ever made. Young is, by pretty much every defensive metric out there, one of the worst defensive shortstops in the game. He’s a second baseman playing out of position, and his lack of range shows every time a ball is hit up the middle.

However, this column isn’t about the Gold Gloves. They’ve been a joke of an award for years, and most people realize that by now. Instead, this is about the amazing ability of the mainstream media, along with people in the game, to totally ignore the collapse of Young’s value over the last three years.

In 2005, Young was a pretty terrific player, even with the poor defense. He hit .331/.385/.513 in 732 plate appearances, combining quantity with quality to post a 2.50 WPA/LI. Even knocking 10 to 15 runs off his total for his lack of range, he was still an all-star quality player, because the bat was that good.

That’s the player he’s still remembered as – an offensive force at a premium position. It hasn’t been true for three years, however.

In 2006, he .314/.356/.459, still good by shortstop standards, but a pretty substantial drop in offensive value nonetheless. His WPA/LI fell to 0.86, meaning he was about 1.6 wins worse as a hitter than the season before. However, because he accumulated 217 hits, the drop in production mostly went unnoticed. In fact, before the next season began, Young was given a 5 year, $80 million contract extension that covered 2009 to 2013. The Rangers saw him lose a substantial portion of his value, and reacted by giving him a massive contract that covered his age 33 to 37 seasons.

Clearly, Texas thought he was more like his ’05 performance than his ’06 performance, and would rebound in ’07. He didn’t – Again, he hit racked up 200 hits, but his line fell to .315/.366/.418, losing even more of his power, and again seeing his WPA/LI decline, this time to 0.73. For two years, he’d be an above average (but not great) hitter, even while posting one of the highest averages in the league.

In 2008, the average deserted him, as he fell to .284/.339/.402, and his WPA/LI fell to -0.60. For the first time since 2003, he was a below average hitter. For a guy who is a pretty significant liability defensively, his value is built on his bat, and when that disappears, he becomes a problem.

Michael Young heads into 2009 with $80 million guaranteed to him over the next five years. To justify that salary, he’d have to be an all-star caliber player, worth approximately three wins more than a replacement level shortstop.

In reality, projections for Young in ’09 have him as slightly below average with the bat, as he comes in about -5 runs or so. The position adjustment for shortstop is about +10 runs, so that puts him back up above average, but he gives all of that right back with his poor defense, where he usually ranks as a -15 or so defender. Finally, we have to add 20 runs to convert from average to replacement level, leaving us with the following:

-5 offense + 10 position adjustment – 15 defense + 20 replacement level = +10 runs.

Michael Young’s current skillset makes him worth about one win above a replacement level shortstop, the kind you could get floating around on waivers. One win. The Rangers are going to pay him $16 million for that one win, and hope like crazy that the decline doesn’t continue at its current rate.

Meanwhile, most of baseball just continues to believe that Young is a premium player, the kind of guy winning teams are built around. It’s just not true – he’s not even league average at this point in his career.

Don’t believe the hype. Michael Young just isn’t very good.

Earlier this week, the Elias Sports Bureau released the official rankings that determine a player’s free agent rating, classifying him as a Type A or Type B free agent. Depending on the classification, different levels of compensation are awarded if the player refuses an arbitration offer and signs with another team.

Now, let’s just be honest – the Elias Ratings are horrible. The fact that MLB still uses them is laughable. Almost everyone reading this site could create a better rating system for evaluating major league players in about five minutes. But, this is what MLB chooses to use, for whatever reason.

Every year, however, the horribleness of the system screws over a decent enough player by categorizing them as a Type A free agent, thus requiring any team that wants to sign them to forfeit a high value draft choice. For these players, interest in offering them a contract nosedives as soon as they’re offered arbitration by their original club, and essentially limits their options to taking a one year deal to return to where they ended the previous season or try to take such a bargain contract that another team will view it as worth surrendering the pick for.

This year, the glaring example of a guy who got hosed by the Elias Rankings is Damaso Marte.

Despite his struggles in the Bronx, Marte’s a pretty lefty setup guy, able to get hitters from both sides of the plate out and missing a lot of bats. The Yankees, with their endless supply of cash, will almost certainly offer Marte arbitration. If he takes it, they get a solid enough setup guy without a long term commitment. And if he doesn’t, they’d get a pick either in the 16-30 range (if he signs with a winner) or the 40-55 range (if he signs with a rebuilding club) for next year’s draft.

There are quite a few teams that Marte could help as a late inning setup man, but how many are going to be willing to surrender a top 50 pick in order to give him a multi-year deal? I’d venture to go with none.

Had Marte been classified as a Type B free agent, he’d probably have several two or three year offers to consider, perhaps from cities he might enjoy pitching in other than New York. However, because Elias decided that he’s good enough to be a Type A, and MLB teams realize that the system is stupid, Marte’s probably looking at a one year deal to remain with the Yankees.

Perhaps next year he’ll pitch poorly enough to be a Type B, which will actually grant him real free agency for a change. Hey, MLB, your free agent system is completely broken, and in the case of Damaso Marte, has taken true free agency away from him. Why don’t you do something about it?

There are a few signs that winter is upon us; the weather turns cold, it gets dark earlier, and the Yankees spend a lot of money. You can add these events to death and taxes, and this year should be no different.

With Jason Giambi, Andy Pettitte, Mike Mussina, Carl Pavano, Bobby Abreu, and Ivan Rodriguez all having their contracts expire, the Yankees lost about $86 million in committed salaries from the end of the ’08 season. $86 million.

Some of that will get redistributed to players already on the roster, such as raises for Alex Rodriguez, Xavier Nady, Robinson Cano, and Chien-Ming Wang. However, even if the Yankees just maintain a $205 million payroll (a $5 million decrease from 2008), they’ll still have about $65 million to spend even after taking care of the guys already under contract.

What can they buy for $65 million this winter? How about CC Sabathia and Andy Pettitte to fill the rotation with a side of Mark Teixeira to play first base? Or if Sabathia decides he doesn’t want to pitch in New York, they could try to get both A.J. Burnett and Ryan Dempster for a similar cash output.

Or, they could take a flyer on Ben Sheets‘ health and use the money saved on the rotation to go after Manny Ramirez, who could team with Teixeira to return their line-up to the most fearsome in the game.

Regardless of which way they decide to head, and who ends up taking their money, it seems clear that the Yankees are going to land at least two big name free agents this winter, and it could easily be three or four. There’s no doubt that Scott Boras has his eye on the Bronx as a cash cow for the free agents he represents, and we’re likely going to see some big money press conferences in the next few months.

The Evil Empire is about reload.

Wrapping up the review of my favorite moments of 2008, let’s go back to April 24th – the season was only a few weeks old, and we were still trying to figure out what was different than previous years. The Diamondbacks were 16-6 and looking like the best team in baseball while the Orioles were the upstart of the AL East, but obviously, neither of those things would hold true throughout the entire season.

However, there was one guy making a bold statement that 2008 was a turning point in his career, and on April 24th, he continued to shout from the rooftops that we should all notice the difference. Here’s the graph from that game.

And here’s the relevant performance from that game:

C Lee: 9 IP, 3 H, 0 R, 0 BB, 9 K, .608 WPA

In his fourth start of the season, Cliff Lee tossed a complete game shutout, dominating the Royals and almost guaranteeing himself the Pitcher Of The Month award for April. After that start, his season line stood as follows:

31 2/3 IP, 11 H, 2 R, 1 ER, 2 BB, 29 K, 0.28 ERA, 1.61 WPA

Following that game, opposing hitters had a line of .109/.125/.139 against Lee, a ridiculous .264 opponents OPS. He was pounding the strike zone, missing bats, and limiting hard contact – only two of the 11 hits he had given up had gone for extra bases. The 14.5 strikeouts for every walk didn’t hurt either.

This was the kind of stretch that bad pitchers just can’t have. It was a thoroughly dominating series of four starts that should have illustrated to us that Lee simply wasn’t pitching with the same level of talent that we had assumed he had going into the season. He tried to tell us, as firmly as possible, that he’d taken a big step forward. Some of us didn’t listen – here’s what I wrote the day before he made the start against KC:

While the Indians have to be happy with how he’s performed, they’d also be wise to not count on the belief that Lee has taken a real step forward, and instead expect his results to begin to more closely match up with his skillset.

Whoops. As mentioned yesterday, the unlikely things that come to be are often the most fun, and Lee’s maturation into a legitimate ace was both unlikely and a lot of fun to watch. It’s good to be reminded every once in a while that players can make drastic changes in their skills. As the cliche goes, that’s why they play the games.

Continuing on in our look at our best memories from 2008, which kicked off this afternoon.

First off, here’s the graph for moment #2.

Not that exciting. No big spikes, no late game comebacks. Not much drama at all, really. Except, there was one play that made this game a lot of fun, especially for those of us who had the misfortune of following the Mariners all season long.

The two most important parts are to the left – J Santana pitching and F Hernandez hitting. These two are otherwise known as Johan Santana and Felix Hernandez, two of the best pitchers in baseball. Oh, and they both happen to be Venezuelan.

This was a match-up of the best pitcher in the country’s history against the best arm that Venezuela had ever produced. Johan, the Cy Young ace, matching up against Felix, the ace in the making. They’d pitched against each other before, but this time, in a National League park, they’d have to actually face each other.

Of course, being a couple of guys who spent their entire careers up through 2007 in the AL, neither one was exactly an experienced hitter. Johan was 8 for 31 with Minnesota, while Felix was 1 for 8. A couple of bad hitters facing all-star pitchers made the mano a mano matchup a little less likely that we’d get some real drama, but great memories are made from unlikely scenarios, and this one was no different.

In a season of misery, it’s hard to describe how much fun it was watching Felix hit a grand slam home run off of Johan Santana. These are the kinds of things that you laugh at when they happen in movies, but there he was, wearing a huge grin as he rounded the bases. He’d just made the Mariners 30 percent more likely to win the game, and he wasn’t even pitching at the time. The youngster upstaged the ace on his home turf in the grandest way possible.

Of course, since this was the 2008 Mariners’ season, a few innings later Carlos Beltran would slide into Felix’s ankle in a play at the plate, shoving him from the game and putting him on the disabled list. Even our joyous moments only lasted about an hour.

This week, here on FanGraphs, we’re going to be looking at some of our favorite events from the 2008 season. While this one is a series of events, in total, it’s one of the more amazing things I’ve ever seen on a baseball field, and it didn’t get the recognition it deserved. Check out this stretch from Lance Berkman’s Play Log:

If you got tired of counting up the hits, that’s 18 hits in 23 at-bats. From May 4th to May 10th, the Astros played six games, and Berkman stepped to the plate 29 times, reaching base safely in 24 of them. His line for that stretch: .783/.827/1.434, for a robust 2.262 OPS. His WPA over those 29 plate appearances: 1.49. Even taking leverage out of the equation, his WPA/LI was 0.97 – he was worth nearly a win more than an average hitter in six games.

The stretch included eight straight at-bats with a hit, as well as a totally separate stretch where he reached base in six straight plate appearances. At no point during those six games did he make outs in consecutive trips to the plate.

He terrorized three teams and 16 pitchers (including Ben Sheets, Derek Lowe, and Chad Billingsley), swinging the hottest bat anyone had at any point in 2008. For six glorious days, Lance Berkman was the best hitter anyone has ever seen. This will go down as one of the best weeks anyone has ever had in the history of the game, and we were all around to see it.

For most of the past week, I’ve been looking at some guys who I would target as potential free agent bargains this winter. Wrapping it up, let’s take a look at the All Free Agent Bargain Team, position by position:

Catcher: Dave Ross
First Base: Ben Broussard
Second Base: Orlando Hudson
Shortstop: Rafael Furcal
Third Base: Joe Crede
Left Field: Rocco Baldelli
Center Field: Ryan Langerhans
Right Field: Juan Rivera

Starting Pitcher: Derek Lowe
Starting Pitcher: Randy Johnson

Relief Pitcher: Jeremy Affeldt

There’s actually a pretty decent crop of buy low opportunities this winter. No matter what your team needs, there’s a couple of options that won’t cost an arm and a leg. From pitchers to put your team over the top, middle infielders to add both offense and defense, or guys with some power who can turn on a fastball, smart GMs will be stocking their roster with these guys over the winter, and reaping the rewards in 2009.

Yesterday, the Kansas City Royals acquired Mike Jacobs from the Florida Marlins for reliever Leo Nunez. The Marlins, always in cost-cutting mode, weren’t particularly interested in taking Jacobs to arbitration this winter, and with a team full of bad defenders, opening up first base to hide one of them seems like a pretty good idea. Plus, Nunez’s sparkly 2.98 ERA and 94 MPH fastball have them thinking that he could be a potential late inning reliever. Even though they’re wrong on that count (Nunez’s combination of lots of fly balls and no strikeouts make him a pretty lousy reliever), moving Jacobs before he costs them too much money makes sense for Florida.

But from the other perspective, why on earth does Kansas City want Jacobs? Yes, his power is appealing, and he’s better than his .299 OBP in 2008 would suggest, but even as a .270/.330/.490 guy (which is basically what Marcel has him projected at for 2009), he’s just barely better than a legue average hitter. If we call him +5 runs offensively, then subtract 10 runs for the position adjustment, he’d be a -5 run player if he played league average defense. But he doesn’t – he’s one of the worst defensive first baseman in the game, racking up +/- ratings of -12, -10, and -27 the last three years. Even if we consider 2008 to be an outlier, we’d have to estimate his defensive value at around -10 runs compared to an average first baseman, which we then add to his previous -5 rating, and all of the sudden, Jacobs is about 15 runs worse than a league average first baseman.

That’s replacement level, or just barely above it. Bad defenders who can put up an .800 OPS in the majors are just not that hard to find. All Kansas City had to do was look internally. They already have a similar player in Ryan Shealy, plus Kila Ka’aihue, and Billy Butler, so Jacobs just adds a fourth power hitting DH type to the Royals roster. And, to top it off, he’s going to be the most expensive of the group while potentially being the least productive.

I know the Royals are trying to put a competitive team on the field to draw fans, but this isn’t the way to do it. If Dayton Moore keeps trying to patch the roster with guys like Jacobs and last year’s Jose Guillen signing, he’s just going to prolong the mediocrity. This isn’t how you build a winner.