I hope you all have had as much fun dissecting opposite field splits this week as I have. Today, we take one more look with another odd example: Ichiro Suzuki. Ichiro’s style is so different from anything else that we’ve seen in United States baseball that projection systems still have issues nailing down a forecast for him.

A major part of that is that Ichiro has a definite ability to get more hits on balls in play than other major league hitters. As ground balls have a higher BABIP, his roughly 2.3:1 GB:FB ratio is part of that. Still, ground balls only fall in for hits about 24% of the time on average, and Ichiro’s .357 career BABIP is well above that. How do we account for this?

Naturally, we look at his pull-push splits. Looking specifically at balls hit the other way, Ichiro’s .327 wOBA to left field is good, but not terribly impressive. With the average lefty push split at .316, that makes Ichiro only about two runs above average per 200 balls – approximately how many he hit to left field last season.

What makes him amazing is that he manages this with a microscopic amount of power. Ichiro’s career ISO of .112 is certainly below average, but it’s not terrible. When he goes the other way, though, his ISO is only .047, nearly 100 points below the lefty-to-left average, in large part due to a 0.2% HR/FB. That’s not a typo – Ichiro is essintially the anti-Ryan Howard when it comes to opposite field hitting, as he has only hit 1 opposite field home runs in his career, and that’s out of 1663 batted balls.

However, unlike the typical hitter, Ichiro actually hits more ground balls to the left side than fly balls. His speed out of the box and a roughly 4:3 GB:FB ratio to the left side results in a high infield hit percentage – exactly 20% – and a BABIP over 60 points above the typical lefty push split. This is wildly different from most hitters, regardless of handedness, as the fly ball is about 2 to 2.5 times more likely for the average hitter when going the other way. That’s how Ichiro manages to get around his lack of power and remain a productive hitter even to the left side, and this highly elevated BABIP to the left side is a large part of his high career BABIP.

Ichiro will turn 37 in October. He has maintained his speed throughout his career, a key to his success pushing the ball. It will be interesting to see if this kind of magic can hold up as his career continues. He’s shown no sign of slowing down, in any sense of the word, and I certainly don’t expect any downturn in 2010.

Over the last couple of days, I’ve been discussing opposite field hitting. One name that has come up both in my head as I considered this issue, as well as in the comments section, is that of Ryan Howard. Howard has earned a living – and the biggest arbitration payout in MLB history – by blasting home runs over the left field fence at Citizens Bank Park.

Howard somehow manages to get fantastic extension on balls on the outer half of the plate, allowing him to unleash the full brunt of his mammoth power on any pitch around the strike zone. When we see a hitter like Howard so consistently showing power to the opposite field, it seems apparent that he is doing something different from other hitters in the league.

In general, the reason that most hitters aren’t very productive when hitting the ball the other way is that despite the high fly-ball rate we see to the opposite field, it’s rare for these balls to leave the yard (3% for LHBs), and many of them don’t even escape the infield (14.5% for LHBs). This makes the fly ball, generally a decent result because of the possibility of home runs and extra bases, a very poor result.

When we look at Howard’s career, we see that when he goes the other way, he actually hits more fly balls than the rest of the league’s left handed batters. For his career, Howard has hit a whopping 71.6% of pushed balls in the air, about 19% more than his southpaw peers. This would signal disaster for a normal hitter, as it would mean more infield flies and softly hit outfield flies.

For Howard, it has historically meant lots of home runs. Over his career, 27% of the fly balls he has hit to left field have left the park. This is partially just a function of his mammoth strength, as his 52% HR/FB rate on pulled balls is just under double the league average. There does appear to be more to it, however, as his 27% rate is 9 times higher than the LH average. Part of it probably has to do with Citizens Bank Park, but likely not enough to consider this kind of power as anything but amazing.

The other thing that makes him particularly successful when utilizing left field is an ability to avoid the infield fly. Last year, Howard didn’t hit a single infield fly to the left side in 76 chances, the third season in which he’s accomplished this feat. This is the key to poor performance to the opposite field, as the average LHB hits 14.5% of his fly balls to the infield. With a 52% overall fly rate, that means that around 8% of an average lefty’s pushed batted balls are basically automatic outs, as the BABIP on infield flies is microscopic. That means that even when Howard isn’t knocking the ball over the left field fence, it still has a chance of falling for a hit, and in the outfield, where there’s also a significant chance of extra bases.

This ridiculous fly ball split actually makes Howard a much more productive hitter going to the left side and up the middle, where he has similar numbers, as opposed to when he pulls the ball. His .626 wOBA to LF and .565 wOBA to CF eclipse a still stellar .451 wOBA to RF (these numbers are so far above his career wOBA of .396 because it excludes strikeouts). All the ground balls that Howard hits to the right side (57% of GBs) nullify his power, making LF and CF his areas of best results.

Perhaps this suggests that it would be better to pitch Howard inside. I’m not so sure, as his HR/FB rate to right field is still insanely high, and allowing him to turn on an inside pitch with regularity would probably just result in more home runs. The truth is that Howard is just a power machine, no matter where he hits it, and that’s what has set him apart from the rest of the league.

Yesterday, I covered why Tony Bernazard’s strategy of emphasizing opposite field hitting is a bad idea. The report which broke the story mentioned that this strategy had surfaced at the MLB level. If so, we should be able to examine the profiles of Mets hitters and see if this strategy actually affected their production, and if so, if it was positive or negative.

However, when we deal with pull-push splits, we’re purposefully reducing the size of our data set, leading to the type of issues that we encounter with batter-pitcher splits, although not at quite the same magnitude. Toss in the issues that the Mets had with injuries, and it becomes even harder to establish solid conclusions. With only David Wright reaching the 600 PA mark, we will be dealing with both players without an established level of major league production as well as small sample sizes.

As mentioned yesterday, power, as measured by ISO, is much, much lower when the ball is hit to the opposite field. As such, one possible effect of this strategy would be a team-wide drop in ISO. Although the Mets team ISO did drop by about 20 points from 2008 to 2009, this can be almost entirely attributed to the loss of talent due to injury. We can still look at individual players. Here are David Wright, Fernando Tatis, and Carlos Beltran’s ISO numbers for their career.

Clearly, this trio had a power dip in 2009. This is consistent with the idea that power dips when more balls are hit to the opposite field. However, there are multiple factors at work here. Park factors are not accounted for, and Citi Field appears to play as a pitcher’s park. Beltran lost much of his year to injury and barely accrued 300 PAs. Tatis also did not reach 400 PAs, and also spent much of 2007 and 2008 in the minor leagues, meaning we don’t have full data as far as his trends go. We also miss the effects of aging.

The power dips for Beltran and Tatis are unsurprising given their respective ages of 32 and 34. Tatis actually pulled more pitches in 2009 than he did in 2008. Beltran had a lower pull rate as a LHB relative to 2008, but a similar one as a RHB. It doesn’t seem to be enough to definitively say that it affected his power significantly. Either way, given all the factors at work here, it is pretty easy to dismiss front office strategy as a reason for decline, at least with these two.

With Wright, it’s not so clear. He’s a young player a should have been entering his peak in 2009, and yet his ISO dropped off a cliff. In this case, we do indeed see a large difference in his splits. In 2009, he was nearly even in L/C/R hitting, whereas his pull rate was about 1.5 times his up-the-middle rate and 1.6 times his push rate in 2008. He did perform better according to wOBA on balls hit up the middle and to right field in 2009, but that seems to be entirely a function of high BABIPs, as there was still minimal power to be found in either split. It seems safe to claim that Wright did not pull as many pitches in 2009 and that this drop in pull rate is at least partially responsible for his drop in power.

A claim that we can’t make, however, is that the Mets strategy is to blame for Wright’s drop in power and productivity in 2009. Even though we see data that suggests a decreased pull rate resulted in less power, we don’t know that it was intentional or merely noise. If it was intentional, we don’t know if it was merely a change in approach brought about by a slump or if it was brought about by management. This doesn’t change the intelligence of the strategy – we just can’t make blanket statements about its effects on the 2009 Mets, due to the sample sizes and other mitigating factors at work.

One of the more interesting nuggets to pop up in the blogosphere was this piece from John Harper in the New York Daily News on Monday. Outlined in that article is the recently fired Tony Bernazard’s strategy for Mets hitters. Simply put, the strategy is to hit the ball to the opposite field.

To put it bluntly, this strategy is downright stupid, and for a multitude of reasons. Our splits data reveal a telling story. Here are the averages among all players for the 2009 season:

Looking at the two “pull” rows (L to Right, R to Left), we see markedly higher power, even though lefties tend to get more hits to center field. Pulling the ball does result in far more ground balls than fly balls, whereas pushing the ball has an opposite effect. Normally, fly ball hitters are better, as fly ball hitters have more power.

That’s not true in this case, as about 10 times as many fly balls leave the park when pulled as opposed to pushed. Add in the fact that more ground balls fall in for hits than in-play fly balls do and it’s clear that pulling the baseball leads to far better offensive results than pushing the ball. According to wOBA, the difference between pulling and pushing comes to about 43 runs for left handed batters and a whopping 73 runs for righties – this is perhaps a result of shifts employed against left handed sluggers, but that is a topic for another time.

Pulling the ball is not going to work every time. Many of the pulled ground balls that we see are easy outs to the shortstop or second baseman on balls on the outer half of the plate that should be hit to the opposite field. Mechanically, however, it just doesn’t make sense to make pushing the ball the other way a general strategy on more than just outside pitches, especially for MLB hitters who already have tremendous plate coverage abilities.

In order to generate the kind of power needed to produce runs in the major leagues, the hips need to be able to open up and “lead the hands to the ball,” creating power through bat speed. Try and swing a bat without moving your hips, and then let your hips rotate as part of the swing – the difference is clear. Removing the hip turn takes away the power of the lower body. The action of rotating the hips drives the bat towards the pull side of the field, resulting in a pulled ball. That’s why pulled balls are generally hit more powerfully. This is particularly true on inside pitches, which allow for more extension of the arms and rotation of the hips prior to contact as they are closer to the batter’s body.

On the other hand, to hit the ball the other way, the rotation of the hips has to come after the point of contact. Since this rotation is coming later, the bat speed won’t be as high. This also results in a deeper optimal point of contact, and thus the ball will be hit to the opposite field. It’s necessary to make this sacrifice on outside pitches, as early rotation would either result in poor contact or a miss, as the ball is farther away from the batter’s body.

Essentially, to focus on hitting the ball the other way is to sacrifice power, both in the sense of home runs and in the sense of speed off the bat. The amount of weak ground balls hit to the pull side may decrease, but we would expect to see more infield fly balls to the push side (as supported in the split data) and fewer home runs overall (again, supported by the split data). Although with certain individuals, this strategy may win out, it will almost certainly lose at the team level, where the hitters as a whole will profile as close to average.

Regardless of your point of view, a scouting or mechanics perspective or a data-oriented perspective, there is simply nothing there to support this strategy. The fact that a team in the most competitive baseball league in the world would consider this strategy not only as a team-level strategy but also as an organizational philosophy is mind-blowing. The fact that Tony Bernazard’s idea became Mets dogma is indicting of the upper management as a whole. With good, smart leadership, this strategy is never even discussed, much less employed.

Lance Berkman has been nothing short of a star in his time with the Houston Astros. Since 2000, Berkman has made five all-star teams and finished in the top five in MVP voting four times. This praise is supported by five seasons of 6.0+ WAR and 43.2 total WAR since we began calculating win values in 2002. This puts him 4th among hitters, behind only Pujols, Rodriguez, and Bonds – all surefire hall of famers.

Berkman’s future is now in doubt, however, as the Astros, mired in a rebuilding period and with current owner Drayton McLane attempting to find a buyer, may decline his $15 million 2011 club option. The 34 year old first baseman suggested that if the option is not picked up that he would choose not to return to Houston on a different deal and would instead test the free agent market.

Certainly there would be teams that could use Berkman either as a 1B or as a DH. Berkman’s defense has not been an issue thus far, but he is certainly not elite, and any long term deal would likely end with a DH role, given his age. The man can still hit – his worst wRC+ came in 2007, and that was at a still stellar 135, and he is capable of putting up numbers in the 160s, as he showed in 2008. As a hitter of that caliber, Berkman probably has a few good years left in him at the least, and should be a coveted asset come the 2010-2011 winter.

Is Berkman worth $15 million, though? It’s very close. At $3.5MM per win, his 3.6 WAR CHONE projection puts him at $12.6MM for a one year deal. A 4 WAR season, which I would predict for Berkman, would run at $14MM. With his age and the Astros’ current position on the win curve, he probably isn’t worth the money to them. At the trading deadline, the Astros could probably pull in a decent haul of prospects for him, a much better use of that asset.

As far as Berkman’s next contract goes, there isn’t a very good analog to Berkman in this year’s free agent class. Berkman is probably better than anyone that hit the market this winter, and even at 35, he should be able to get a contract that pays him into the middle of the decade. A fair market value would probably be a 4 year, $50MM contract, taking into account the discounts players typically give for longer term deals. However, Berkman does have “money skills,” with loads of HRs and RBIs, and may command something above Jason Bay‘s deal (4/$66MM) and maybe something similar to John Lackey’s new contract (5/$82.5MM).

The question is how Berkman will handle aging. If he can defy nature into his late 30s and possibly his early 40s and remain a star slugger, he could be worth every penny of a large contract and even make a run at the Hall of Fame. If not, his career could end much like that of Albert Belle – derailed by injury – or Mo Vaughn – simply unable to sustain production in his later years.

As a fan of the Milwaukee Brewers, I spent the last two seasons subjected to watching Jason Kendall, owner of possibly the league’s worst swing, penciled into the lineup for 150 games per season. It’s bad enough watching a player bat .240, but when that player has no power nor speed and a just plain aesthetically displeasing swing, it makes it even more painful.

Kendall has a good defensive reputation, but I think that it is certainly questionable at this point in his career. His CS% fell to 20% in 2009, and it just seems that too many runners were attempting to steal off of him in 2008, leading to his 43% season that suggested that he was a premiere defender behind the plate. Really, it is only this defensive reputation that is keeping him in the league, as his only two redeemable qualities are the fact that he can play catcher for 150 games and that he gets hit by a ton of pitches.

That’s because Kendall just plain can’t hit. His fantastic years with Pittsburgh are quite simply a thing of the past; since leaving the steel city Kendall’s wRC+ hasn’t eclipsed 100, and over the last 3 seasons it hasn’t exceeded 80. He has no power, and that means almost all of his fly balls are outs, keeping his BABIP and thus triple slash stats all low. What keeps his hitting value just high enough is the fact that he takes a ridiculous amount HBPs each year. This isn’t something that’s started since his decline, either – he’s had at least 9 HBP per season every year of his career, which is 4 more than the average hitter accrues per 600 PAs.

So how much value has Kendall added with his HBPs? Let’s just look at last season. In 2009, Kendall was hit by 17 pitches in 526 PAs. The average hitter in the NL would’ve been plunked by 4.57 pitches in that amount of playing time. Since the linear weight for the HBP is about +.39 runs, that means that Kendall’s HBPwRAA was 4.84 runs – that is, Jason Kendall added about half a win above average through his propensity for getting hit by pitches. In both 1997 and 1998, Kendall was hit by 31 pitches – his HBPwRAA for those seasons comes out to roughly 10 runs each, or a full win just from HBPs.

Without those 5 runs in 2009, Kendall falls even closer to replacement level – even without taking into account his poor throwing ability. It won’t make Kendall any more fun to watch, but at least Royals fans can at least take heart in the fact that all those HBPs he takes have allowed him to tread water just above replacement level.

Since 1998, three things have been constant: death, taxes, and Livan Hernandez starting at least 30 Major League Baseball games. Hernandez, despite bouncing between eight teams in these 12 seasons, is the only pitcher to accomplish this rather daunting feat. It appears that Hernandez will get a chance to continue his wondrous streak in 2010, as the Nationals have added him on a minor league deal with an invitation to spring training and a shot at a starting rotation slot.

This move isn’t terribly interesting, but I find Hernandez’s streak to be fascinating. We’ve seen so many hall of fame quality pitchers in the major leagues since 1998, and the one pitcher that has managed to combine durability with enough skill to remain relevant is Livan Hernandez. Yes, the very same Hernandez that has managed 19.6 WAR since 2002, nearly equivalent to Kenny Rogers (missed all of 2007, retired after 2008) and Freddy Garcia (23 starts since 2006).

Clearly, there is value in consistency. Teams must love knowing that they can plug Livan into a starting slot and rest assured that he will give them 180+ innings, even if they’re not particularly strong of late. His FIP hasn’t been below 4.00 since 2004 and last year’s 4.44 FIP was downright resurgent after a terrible 2007 with the Diamondbacks and a merely poor season split between Minnesota and Colorado in 2008.

It’s not like he was an ace in years prior to our win-value era, either. His best single-season FIP came in Florida’s 1997 World Series run, and that was at 3.57 – respectable, but not necessarily at ace level, and it only came in 17 starts. Livan has been living on pitching to contact and allowing just few enough HRs and BBs to stay in the league. His workmanlike performance has Rally placing him all the way down at 473rd among all pitchers in terms of career WAR, despite this remarkable durability.

And yet somehow, Livan keeps on plugging along. His fastball velocity is all the way down to 84-85 MPH average velocity, and yet he somehow manages to get major league hitters out. Here’s to longevity, and good luck to Livan Hernandez on continuing his streak.

Thanks for the input in the comments section yesterday. As spring training develops, we may see more and more out of options players either hit the trade market or battle for starting spots. Here are the two guys that I picked out among the pitchers as the most interesting targets for today.

SP Dustin McGowan, Blue Jays

In 2008, Dustin McGowan was a big part of a pitching staff that ranked #1 in the Major Leagues in WAR. Although his traditional stats didn’t look like much, McGowan had done a great job of suppressing fly balls and therefore home runs, keeping his FIP below 4.00 in both 2007 and 2008. In the 270 IP he had compiled in those two years, McGowan put up a 6.2 WAR, making him a legitimate #2 or #3 starter in most rotations. A shoulder injury and a knee injury derailed McGowan for all of 2009, and now it remains to be seen if he will be ready for the 2010 season.

There’s a large cast of characters competing for the starting jobs in Toronto, including Ricky Romero, David Purcey, Jesse Litsch, Shaun Marcum, Marc Rzepcynski, Dana Eveland, Scott Richmond, Brett Cecil, and Shawn Hill. Given that others in this group aren’t out of options, I would predict that McGowan starts the season with the Jays. If McGowan can make a full recovery, he should be a valuable asset to either a young, rebuilding Jays team or another team willing to deal for a starting pitcher.

SP Charlie Haeger, Dodgers

Everybody loves knuckleballers, from Hoyt Wilhelm to Tim Wakefield; from Charlie Hough to R.A. Dickey. Charlie Haeger has a chance to be the next one in what seems like a dying breed. CHONE projects Haeger at roughly 1.0 WAR, putting him in roughly the same boat as Eric Stults (also out of options), Giancarlo Alvarado, and Russ Ortiz, all of whom could compete for the 5th starter spot in Los Angeles.

Haeger’s only had 53 IP worth of opportunities in the major between 4 stints and 3 teams. His big issue in the majors has been poor control – 33 walks in those 53 innings – and he has a 5.26 ERA and 6.03 FIP to show because of it. In those same 4 years and over 600 minor league innings, Haeger’s overall BB/9 rate is closer to 4. Although he doesn’t strike out too many batters, numbers like that in the majors could work for Haeger. Home runs haven’t been an issue in the minors (although they have in the majors), and he’s shown an ability to suppress BABIP, never having allowed a full-season BABIP over .296 in the minors. Only more MLB innings will tell us if he these positive minor league indicators can translate to the show.

Maybe I just want to be indulged and see another knuckleballer in the major leagues, but I would really like to see Haeger in some sort of ML role by the start of the season. His production deserves a spot in somebody’s starting rotation.

3B Jake Fox, Athletics

Fox’s hitting ability isn’t in doubt. Even in what was considered a rough stint with the Cubs, Fox managed to hit 11 HRs and posted a .208 ISO despite a mere .274 BABIP. Fox was roughly and average hitter last year, and his minor league numbers suggest the ability to put up slightly above average numbers at the major league level. His two weaknesses – walk rate and defense – likely pushed the A’s to retain Jack Cust at the DH position and acquire Adam Rosales and Kevin Kouzmanoff to go along with Eric Chavez at 3B.

With Cust on the team, if Fox doesn’t show some improvement with the glove in the spring, it’s hard to imagine Oakland having the room for another poor defender. Hitters of Fox’s caliber will have value to some team at some position, and so look for Fox to find his way on to a ML roster by midseason if not by opening day.

OF Wladimir Balentien, Reds

Balentien is another guy who has shown prolific power in the major leagues. With the rise of Michael Saunders in left field and Balentien underperforming in Seattle, the Mariners were forced to jettison the 25 year old outfielder last season. Outside of some home runs, though, Balentien has been poor in the major leagues so far, compiling a terrible wOBA of .285 in his first 559 PAs. Balentien’s solid minor league numbers – two seasons in AAA with .370+ wOBAs – give hope for breakout. CHONE expects a huge power surge and a .358 wOBA in Cincinnati next season.

The question is if he can make the big club. His major league numbers, as mentioned, are very discouraging, and he’s certainly behind Drew Stubbs and Jay Bruce on the depth charts. Chris Dickerson and the newly re-signed Jonny Gomes probably will make the team as well. That leaves Balentien in a fight with Laynce Nix for the 5th outfielder spot, meaning that with a poor spring, Balentien could find himself job-hunting again. I wouldn’t count on it, though, as Balentien could be a major piece in a potentially resurgent Reds lineup.

Now, I leave it to you guys. Who else do you find interesting that’s out of options and could potentially find themselves struggling for a 25-man roster spot? Let’s see who you think of in the comments, both among position players and pitchers. These could be some under-the-radar story lines in the spring that should be fun to watch unfold.

It’s hard to believe that pitchers and catchers have already reported and Johnny Damon is just now reaching a deal. Scott Boras has finally managed to find a home for his client, and, unsurprisingly, that home will be in Detroit. Damon will receive $8 million for his services – a hefty sum compared to what the Yankees were reportedly offering, but peanuts compared to what he was hoping for.

Some say that Scott Boras hung him out to dry, but the truth is that a multi-year, $10+ million market simply wasn’t going to be there for a player like Damon. Teams have taken note of Damon’s poor arm, and his bat simply wasn’t good enough to be worth more than $10MM in a market that pays $3.5MM per win. CHONE projects him for 3.0 wins with what looks like a very questionable defensive projection of +10 R/150 G. Knocking that down to +2.5 – his career UZR/150 in LF and a tad higher than what his -9 UZR/150 in CF would suggest – leaves him at 2.3 WAR. That puts the deal at $3.5MM/WAR, or almost exactly market value.

Looking at the team side of the deal, Damon should be a decent fit. Between the three outfield spots, there are probably about 2100-2200 plate appearances available, leaving plenty of playing time for Damon, Magglio Ordonez, Carlos Guillen, Austin Jackson, and Ryan Raburn. This should be a decent outfield, as Ordonez and Damon are both above average players and Raburn is near average. Guillen should rebound and, as Dave showed, could be a sleeper this year. Jackson remains a question mark, but this outfield will provide some punch.

The problem is that even with Damon on board, this team is nowhere near a contender. Major middle infield and starting pitching issues look like too much to overcome, and both the Twins and White Sox look clearly better than the Tigers right now. As it stands, the Tigers will probably need some luck to clear .500, and their playoff chances, with or without Damon, look bleak.

When evaluating this deal, there’s one main question to be asked: are the roughly two wins provided by the Damon signing worth eight million dollars to the Tigers, even if they’re eventually irrelevant to this year’s playoffs? It’s hard to answer that question without knowing the details of the Tigers’ budget. Wins, even at the lower end of the curve, do correlate to ticket sales, and teams obviously need whatever revenue they can get. Detroit won’t be handcuffed down the road by this contract. As long as this deal isn’t the reason that Detroit is inactive in the international free agent market or passive in the draft, this deal can only improve their team, both in the sort term and the long term.