Much of my work this week has focused on the ‘Clutch’ statistic kept here, attempting to shed light or help the confusion surrounding its meaning and usage to dissipate. A great discussion took place in the comments section at my post ‘All About Clutch’ wherein it was suggested that the best hitters in the league will struggle to post high clutch scores because, essentially, they would be so high up the performance chart that there would be no higher ground to which their games could be raised. The inverse would then be true for poorer hitters; since their games were so low much more room exists for game-raising performance.

The major confusion stemmed from the fact that a player with a .333 BA in situations with a high leverage index could be less clutch than one with a .225 BA in the same situations. The way the clutch statistic works is that it measures a player against himself, comparing production to what that production would be in a context-neutral environment. Clearly, I would rather have the .333 guy up to bat in a crucial situation and, because of that, heads begin to spin when it is realized that the .225 guy could have a higher clutch score because in all others he hit .200; the .333 guy posted the same BA in all situations, therefore failing to raise his game.

With this in mind I decided to do a little digging in order to see if this generally holds true. I took the qualifying major league players from 2000-2007, first found the average WPA/LI, and then calculated the average clutch score for those with above average WPA/LI as well as the average clutch score for those with below average WPA/LI. Keep in mind that, in the results below, BA refers to the average clutch for below average WPA/LI with AA meaning the same for above average:

2000: 1.15 WPA/LI, -0.10 BA, 0.07 AA
2001: 1.39 WPA/LI, 0.05 BA, -0.10 AA
2002: 1.38 WPA/LI, -0.02 BA, -0.19 AA
2003: 1.15 WPA/LI, 0.03 BA, -0.32 AA
2004: 1.20 WPA/LI, -0.06 BA, -0.25 AA
2005: 1.15 WPA/LI, 0.01 BA, -0.27 AA
2006: 1.07 WPA/LI, 0.22 BA, -0.13 AA
2007: 0.98 WPA/LI, 0.03 BA, -0.14 AA

As you can see, other than in 2000 and 2007, the average clutch score for those with below average WPA/LI was much better than their above average colleagues. Not to say that their clutch scores were earth-shatteringly spectacular, but, rather just much higher and more indicative of game-raising performance. Deciding to go a little deeper, I looked at the top and bottom 10% in each year to see if the results differed:

2000: 0.06 BA, -0.25 AA
2001: 0.03 BA, -0.54 AA
2002: 0.05 BA, -0.87 AA
2003: 0.02 BA, -0.39 AA
2004: -0.20 BA, -0.11 AA
2005: -0.01 BA, -0.46 AA
2006: 0.16 BA, 0.21 AA
2007: 0.34 BA, -0.27 AA

Here we get very similar results; those in the bottom 10% of WPA/LI generally post much higher clutch scores than those at the top. 2004 and 2006 are the exceptions to this “rule” but even they do not differ too heavily; they actually come within ten points of each other whereas every other year is vastly different in the average clutch scores.

Based on these results it would seem that, yes, the players with below average performance are more likely to post higher clutch scores because they have more room to work with, so to speak. I would still rather take, with much confidence, those in the top 10% of WPA/LI in crucial situations, even though the clutch statistic, in its current state, will debit their performance for having nowhere to go really but down.

Now, to clarify the above paragraph, after some tests, there is no correlation between WPA/LI and Clutch, meaning that it is not a concrete rule that all good players will post lower clutch scores and vice versa. From these results, though, it does seem that those with a higher WPA/LI have more opportunity to post lower clutch scores.

In case you have not heard yet, Astros pitcher Shawn Chacon and general manager Ed Wade found themselves entangled in a verbal-turned-physical altercation yesterday. The incident, which took place prior to the game, stemmed from some combination of Chacon’s play, the manager’s office, and dinner. For a recap of the actual event, watch the video below:

Now, Chacon mentioned that he hopes this does not prevent him from pitching in the major leagues again, yet I’m wondering why he is pitching in the major leagues right now. Here’s a comparison between his Marcel for this year and his actual numbers:

Marcel: 1.44 K/BB, .266 BAA, 1.50 WHIP, 73.7% LOB, 4.69 ERA, E-F of -0.41
Actual: 1.29 K/BB, .267 BAA, 1.51 WHIP, 72.7% LOB, 5.04 ERA, E-F of -0.64

Marcel did a pretty darn good job of showing where his numbers would hover around and they really are not that good. His LOB rate is right around league average meaning he has not really been unlucky at all or due to regress. His K/BB is 3rd worst in the NL; his HR/9 is 5th worst; his FIP is 3rd worst; and his BB/9 is 7th worst.

Using the ‘last 3 calendar years’ parameter and setting the qualifying cutoff at those with 180+ IP in that span, here are Chacon’s ranks amongst all pitchers–SP and RP–since he was a reliever last year:

K/9 – 185 of 263
BRAA – 188 of 263
HR/9 – 209 of 263
WHIP – 218 of 263
WPA/LI – 227 of 263
BB/9 – 241 of 263
FIP – 253 of 263

Based on his controllable skills just ten pitchers given the chance to pitch as often, if not more, have been worse, and yet it took a physical altercation with his GM to get him off the mound? Perhaps I’m being too harsh, but regardless of his “good start,” I would have very little, if not no, confidence with him in my starting rotation. Maybe the Astros can use this as an excuse to get rid of a low-risk signing that does not appear to offer even medium reward.

While writing and researching this post it is still hard to believe, for this baseball fan at least, that the Tampa Bay Rays are currently 45-31, a full fourteen games over .500. Not to say I didn’t expect them to be good but their turnaround has been remarkable and very fun to keep tabs on. In looking over some of their statistics I came across this interesting little nugget: Andy Sonnanstine leads the AL in E-F, at 1.53.

E-F, or ERA-FIP as you may have seen at The Hardball Times, does just what the title suggests: it subtracts the FIP from the ERA in order to see which pitchers have been lucky or unlucky with regards to their earned run barometer and controllable skills measure. Sonnanstine has a 4.85 ERA yet a 3.32 FIP. That FIP ranks 8th best in the league and the only other E-Fs higher, in all of baseball, belong to Bronson Arroyo and Ian Snell; their ERAs are 6+ right now.

Adding to my interest level are Sonnanstine’s numbers last year: a 5.85 ERA and a 4.26 FIP, resulting in a 1.59 E-F. So, two years running now Andy has posted an ERA over 1.5 runs worse than his controllable skills (BB, K, HR) would suggest. It didn’t even matter that this year’s ERA is a full run lower. Not surprisingly, his .348 BABIP is the highest in the AL, and his 63.8% LOB rate is the second lowest in the league. For comparison’s sake, the AL average LOB rate at this juncture is 72.36%.

Due to this lack of luck, his win probability metrics have taken some serious hits. Andy’s -0.39 WPA ranks 5th worst in the league while his -0.34 WPA/LI registers 8th from the bottom. Despite one of the best measures of controllable skills in the league, he has statistically been one of the worst contributors to success. Whereas Aaron Harang has been unlucky in terms of his W-L barometer, Sonnanstine has been unlucky in a number of different areas yet currently holds an 8-3 record.

Sonnanstine has been unlucky thus far in terms of the numbers largely out of his control but don’t tell that to his W-L record, which is good enough to introduce himself to plenty of fantasy owners out there.

One of the best parts of this site is the accessibility of David Appelman and his willingness to improve and/or update the site to feature more statistics and new parameters for those numbers. The newest addition to the Fangraphs statistical team is calendar year rankings. By going to the leaders page you can now sort not only by month or last 7/14/30 days, but also by the last 1, 2, or 3 calendar years.

For instance, did you know that Ryan Howard, with 145 home runs, has the most in the last three calendar years? Or that Alex Rodriguez ranks second, with 131, fourteen less than Howard?

How about the best and worst WPA counts for hitters in this same span?

BEST
1) Albert Pujols, 18.68
2) Lance Berkman, 17.49
3) David Ortiz, 17.29
4) Vladimir Guerrero, 12.57
5) Ryan Howard, 11.88

WORST
5) Jose Lopez, -3.59
4) Yuniesky Betancourt, -3.73
3) Jack Wilson, -3.86
2) Brandon Inge, -4.24
1) Ivan Rodriguez, -4.93

Hmm. Of the worst five contributors over the last three calendar, two are from the Tigers and two are from the Mariners. In terms of context-neutral wins (WPA/LI), Pujols and Berkman switch places; Berkman’s 17.34 comes in ahead of Pujols’s 16.69.

How about starting pitchers and WPA?

BEST
1) C.C. Sabathia, 9.06
2) Johan Santana, 8.92
3) Roy Halladay, 8.89
4) Brandon Webb, 8.67
5) John Smoltz, 7.91

WORST
5) Dave Bush, -1.94
4) Carlos Silva, -2.79
3) Livan Hernandez, -3.46
2) Jason Marquis, -3.64
1) Matt Morris, -7.83

Wow. Numbers 2 and 3 combine for -7.10 and Morris still comes in 7/10 of a win worse than them. In terms of WPA/LI, Johan reclaims his spot atop the throne with a 10.77, a full 1.60 wins ahead of second-place Brandon Webb’s 9.17. Santana also has the best K/BB (4.45) in this span, as well as the highest LOB% at 78.7%.

It has been reiterated recently that instead of using current seasonal statistics to evaluate players it would be much more accurate to use a rolling projection. While these calendar statistics do not necessarily weight the past any differently they do allow us to see which players have been good enough recently so as to trounce atypical poor early performance.

Amongst the several great win probability statistics kept here is one simply titled ‘clutch.’ The number measures how well players perform in previously defined clutch situations relative to how they would have performed in a context-neutral environment. It has confused some and come into question from others recently so I thought I would take this time to break it down and try to clear up any confusion or doubts.

The stat is calculated by subtracting the WPA/LI from the WPA/pLI. Now, WPA/LI is an already calculated measure freely available all throughout this site. WPA/pLI, however, would have to be manually calculated by dividing the overall WPA by the average leverage index. As an example let’s use Pat Burrell and his current numbers. Burrell has the third best clutch score in the game at 1.35. He has a WPA/LI of 2.51, a WPA of 4.08, and a pLI of 1.06.

4.08/1.06 = 3.85 and 3.85-2.51 = 1.34. The 1.34 vs. 1.35 is nothing more than a rounding discrepancy. This measures how much better Burrell performed in high leverage situations than all others. If he posted a .900 OPS in crucial plate appearances but an equal OPS in all others, he is not considered clutch. And why should he be? Sure, he posted great numbers in high LI game states but he did not raise his game at all.

This brings me to the first major point: Clutch has different definitions and to understand this statistic we need to be on the same page. No matter how important the media makes clutch performance out to be, it does not refer to performing well with the game on the line. Instead, it refers to performing well in these types of situations relative to all others. The statistic can be summed up by the question, “Does the player raise his game in important situations?” If not, he is not clutch, no matter how great his numbers are in high leverage plate appearances.

The second major point is that being clutch or not being clutch is NOT the same as being good or not being good. You do not need to raise your game in crucial situations to be a great player and those who do raise their games are not necessarily the most talented. A player with a .200 BA that hits .300 in crucial situations is, and should be, considered more clutch than someone with a .333 BA in all situations. The .333 is a better BA but it is not clutch because it did not constitute a raising of the game.

As I pointed out this morning, just 3 of the 33 NL MVP winners from 1974-2007 finished in the top ten in clutch. Barry Bonds, who won the award from 2001-2004, had clutch scores ranging from -0.49 to -1.14 from 2001-2003, and I better not hear anybody discuss those seasons not being insanely productive. His negative clutch score just means that he did not post a 1.980 OPS (exaggeration) in high leverage situations. His high leverage OPS was likely higher than everyone else’s but this statistic works to measure a player against himself since, after all, clutch refers to raising your individual game, no matter how high that game generally turns out.

I hope this clears up some confusion but I have a feeling the vast differences in definitions of this skill/phenomenon/whatever you call it will continue to generate confusion. The media has relied on clutch to the point that we are now mistaking it for good or bad performance. This is incorrect. Clutch means raising your game, not being a good player.

The end of each season brings with it a few certainties: eight teams make the playoffs, one team wins the world series, and we are likely to argue or debate about which player’s performance merits the Most Valuable Player award. Some years house less debates than others but the award’s definition is so ambiguous that there are usually a few players that meet the loose “criteria.” By definition, the MVP award was spawned from the idea back in 1922 to honor the player “who is of greatest all-round service to his club and credit to the sport during each season; to recognize and reward uncommon skill and ability when exercised by a player for the best interests of his team, and to perpetuate his memory.”

Now, in 21st century language, this translates to the player who was most valuable to his team; the player who, if removed from his team, would hinder the success of the team the most; the player the team cannot live without. From a statistical standpoint this would seem to refer to which player contributed the most wins to his team. Luckily, we have a statistic for that here, known none other as WPA.

I decided to look at the win probability statistics for all years currently on Fangraphs (1974-2007) in order to see if the definition of MVP has held true, as well as see the average total and rank for a few of these statistics. The stats in question are WPA, WPA/LI, and Clutch. WPA/LI refers to context-neutral wins and so the different game states comprising plate appearances are not taken into account. Clutch, which I will discuss a bit more in-depth later tonight, measures a player’s performance in high leverage situations against his performance in all others.

Using just the National League for now, I recorded the WPA, WPA/LI, and Clutch, as well as the league ranks, for all MVPs from 1974-2007. The only exceptions were Chipper Jones in 1999, since we don’t currently have that year recorded, and Willie Stargell’s co-award in 1979; according to the league leaders page he didn’t even qualify that year. After calculating the average scores and ranks, here are the results:

WPA: 6.10, Rank: 3.88
WPA/LI: 6.11, Rank: 3.48
Clutch: -0.15, Rank: 19.69

A few things initially stand out. First, the average WPA and WPA/LI are virtually identical. Second, the average rank for MVPs in these categories is between 3rd and 4th. Lastly, the average clutch score is negative.

Of the 33 NL MVPs recorded, 14 finished #1 in WPA; 15 were #1 in WPA/LI; and nobody finished #1 in clutch. In fact, just 3 of the 33 finished in the top ten, the highest being Steve Garvey’s second place rank in 1974 (the other two were Kirk Gibson as #8 in 1988 and Bonds as #6 in 2004). So, despite the hoopla surrounding clutch ability prevalent in today’s mainstream media, it has not necessarily translated into MVP success.

Now, of the 17 players who won the award while posting negative clutch scores, 13 finished 1st-4th in WPA while finishing 1st or 2nd in WPA/LI. The only negative clutch scores that did not were the following players, with their WPA and WPA/LI ranks in parenthesis:

1987: Andre Dawson (19,11)
1991: Terry Pendleton (9,7)
2000: Jeff Kent (7,7)
2005: Albert Pujols (5,2)

Of those with positive clutch scores, 7 of 16 finished 5th or lower in WPA, 6 of 16 finished 5th or lower in WPA/LI, and just 3/16 were in the top ten in clutch.

The highest WPA in this span belongs to (guess who?) Barry Bonds, with a 12.63 in 2004. In fact, from 2001-2004, Bonds averaged 10.79 wins contributed. All four of those seasons ranked in the top four, with Ryan Howard’s 8.10 in 2006 being the only other above eight wins. The lowest two WPA scores came with Dawson’s 1987 season (2.84) and Jimmy Rollins last year with a 2.69. The highest WPA/LI totals were Barry Bonds 2001-2004 and fifth place happened to be Bonds in 1993. Again, the lowest belonged to Jimmy Rollins.

It appears that clutch has not factored into NL MVP voting since at least 1974 and that those with great all around numbers/win contributions have been more than capable of winning the award while seeing a decline in their performance during high leverage situations. I tried to see if anyone this year matched up with the average ranks but the results were not too strong. Lance Berkman is currently 1st in WPA, 1st in WPA/LI, and 15th in clutch, which was the closest. When we get closer to the end of the season it should be interesting to see which players come closest to these averages, if not exceeding them.

Without checking, can you name the top five players with the highest OPS totals from the beginning of last season until right now, with at least 100 games played? On second thought, this won’t work as well as I had planned, since there is no way for me to know who you named. In that case, I’ll just list them:

Chipper Jones, 1.058
Alex Rodriguez, 1.056
Barry Bonds, 1.045
Albert Pujols, 1.028
Milton Bradley, 1.015

Yes, Milton Bradley ranks fifth behind these four surefire (in my book, at least) Hall of Fame players with regards to offensive production via OPS. Bradley and his 2.16 WPA currently ranks third in the AL behind only Manny Ramirez and teammate Josh Hamilton. Additionally, he has a 2.81 WPA/LI that leads the league and an equal 2.81 REW that ranks second behind Hamilton’s 2.83.

In 64 games this season he has a .332/.452/.627 slash line—good for an OPS of 1.079—as well as a .295 ISO and .384 BABIP. Astonishingly, each component of that slash line ranks atop the American League leaderboard. His .332 BA is tied with Alex Rodriguez, and his OBP/SLG come in ahead of everyone else in his league.

When the Padres acquired him last season Bradley provided a spark and energy that came close to propelling the team into the playoffs. If not for a freak injury suffered at the hands of his manager, they might have played into October. Here are Bradley’s 2008 numbers stacked up next to his 2007 numbers with the Padres:

2007 w/SDP: 42 GP, 45-144, 11 HR, 30 RBI, 23 BB, 27 K, .313/.414/.590
2008 w/Tex: 64 GP, 73-220, 15 HR, 48 RBI, 47 BB, 54 K, .332/.452/.627

All told, since July 8th, 2007, Bradley has a .324/.439/.613 line in 106 games, complete with 26 HR, 78 RBI, and a 1.052 OPS. The guy may have some personality issues and he may have struggled to find a “home” throughout his career thus far, but this guy can flat out rake.

As I write this, Bill Plaschke’s “Pierre-dar 2008” is informing him something wonderful has just happened. You see, it appears that Juan Pierre has been one of the clutchiest players this season. As of this minute he ranks seventh in the entire MLB with a 0.93 clutch score. Directly ahead of him is teammate Russell Martin and his 0.98.

For his career, Pierre has a clutch score of 4.70. All told, his career WPA of 0.66, WPA/LI of -4.01, and REW of -0.24 are pretty ugly for someone who makes as much as he, but his clutch score is rather impressive. In that same span, 2000-2008, here are the clutch scores of a few others:

David Ortiz: 2.83
Derek Jeter: 1.39
Albert Pujols: -1.13

The usual knocks on Pierre’s game have not dissipated but I never foresaw myself typing the title this post possesses. In case the clutch score confuses, it compares a player to himself, measuring how well he performs in high leverage situations to how well he performs in all situations. If a player has a .333 batting average in important situations but a .333 in all situations, he would not be considered clutch. He would be a good, solid player, but not a clutch one.

In that regard, while Pierre is nowhere near as productive as the aforementioned three, his career has consisted of more productive game-raising results than all three combined. I never thought those words would ever escape my type-mouth.

I’ll start by just asking you to watch this video, of Staten Island Yankee pitcher Pat Venditte as he faces off against Astros prospect Ralph Henriquez. As a brief preface, I will leave you with this: Henriquez is a switch-hitter and Venditte is a switch-pitcher! Yes, you read that correctly. Take a look at this epic matchup:

The crowd absolutely ate this up, the announcers seemed utterly befuddled, and Henriquez/Venditte literally looked like they wanted to fight each other after a bit. Equally interesting is whether or not the umpire made the correct call or not. Initial discussions at Baseball Think Factory discussed how the NAPBL—National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues—rulebook calls for the pitcher to first make a decision as to his handedness; afterwards, the batter can switch sides until he has two strikes.

Another take on the situation, apparently from a different NAPBL rulebook, says that the batter and pitcher can each switch places one time during the plate appearance.

Pete Abraham, at the Lohud Yankees Blog, asked veteran umpire Charlie Reliford about the situation to which Reliford replied the only rule is that, once the pitcher is on the mound, the batter cannot switch sides.

So, in summation, assuming Charlie Reliford is not senile or incompetent, major league baseball will literally have to change its rulebook should Pat Venditte ever make it to the show.

Close to halfway through this regular season, those everyone pegged for success back in the beginning of the calendar year can be found atop most pitching leaderboards: Cliff Lee, Joe Saunders, Shaun Marcum, and Edinson Volquez. A fifth pitcher, however, has been performing at quite the high level as well despite the lack of similar publicity.

His name is Aaron Cook and, for those unfamiliar with his work, he pitches for the Colorado Rockies. Through 15 starts, Cook is 10-3 with a 3.29 ERA, 3.99 FIP, and 1.27 WHIP. In 104 innings of work he has allowed 105 hits and 27 walks to go along with his 50 strikeouts. The ERA, FIP, WHIP, and his 1.85 K/BB are all career highs for Cook; while the season has plenty of life remaining, his current numbers appear to be better than any of his past work.

A notorious groundball pitcher, his percentage of such balls in play has actually decreased overall from 2005 until now. Though essentially stagnant between 2006-2007, he has thrown a lower percentage of grounders and line drives, replacing them with flyballs in this four-year span.

One reason for his success is his somewhat vast increase in runners stranded. Last year, when he posted a 4.12 ERA, 4.58 FIP, 1.34 WHIP, and 1.39 K/BB, he had just a 68.1% LOB rate. This year it has jumped to 75.8%. All told, he is allowing a smaller percentage of runners to reach base and then stranding a much higher percentage of them.

His 2.21 WPA ranks 2nd in the NL behind just Volquez while ranking 5th in the entire MLB behind Lee, Saunders, Marcum, and Volquez. His 1.14 WPA/LI ranks 10th in the NL and, the only clutchier starting pitcher than Cook has been Vicente Padilla (1.13 for Padilla, 1.09 for Cook). Additionally, his 13.13 BRAA and 1.30 REW rank 9th in the NL.

Coming into this season many pegged, and rightly so, Jeff Francis as the Rockies ace. Close to the halfway mark Cook has been one of the best in baseball, let alone his own team, while Francis has struggled.