Last season, the Phillies employed a season-long strategy in which Pat Burrell would play six or seven innings before a defensive replacement helped rest his ailing feet. Usually coming in the form of speedster Michael Bourn, the strategy often worked to perfection; a natural centerfielder, Bourn could cover more ground and get to more balls. Those against the move argued that the Phillies shaky bullpen would give up many leads; in doing so, the Phillies were likely to have Chase Utley and Ryan Howard followed by Bourn in crucial situations, rather than Burrell.

Said proponents of leaving Burrell in the game could not deny that Bourn’s defensive prowess definitely helped the Phillies. Bourn was shipped to Houston in the Brad Lidge deal and so So Taguchi (yes that was planned) signed with the team to serve a similar role.

The problem thus far has been Taguchi’s inability to field his position in replacing Burrell. Add on the facts that Burrell has been posting gaudy numbers and the Phillies bullpen is still suspect and the move does not look good. Taguchi has only recorded one error on the season but there have been three other plays he should have made and did not. That accounts for four plays in his ten leftfield replacements that were not made. The plays in question have not necessarily been terrible but ones that a fan/manager/sane person would definitely expect to be made by a defensive upgrade.

In last night’s Phillies/Mets game, Taguchi misplayed a tough fly ball in the eighth inning, poorly timing his dive/slide. The ball bounced off of the front of his glove, allowing Raul Casanova to slide safely into second. Though the play ultimately did not result in a run it definitely did nothing to ease the pressure placed on the shoulders of JC Romero, now in the midst of his second inning of work. Here’s a graph of the game:

While it is not very likely Burrell would have produced different results if still in the game, Taguchi has not done a very good job as a defensive replacement. Looking at the Phillies likely 7th-9th inning pitchers we get the following:

• 7th: JC Romero – GB% increased from 57-63 % from 2005-2007
• 8th: Tom Gordon – career GB/FB of just 1.27
• 9th: Brad Lidge – career GB of 39.6 %, career FB of 38.6 %

Since Romero is primarily a ground ball pitcher it would make more sense to let Burrell stay in the game for the seventh inning, especially if his batting position is nearby in the offensive half of the inning. If Romero stays in for the eighth inning, like last night, it would not necessarily hurt to leave Burrell in as well due to his vast offensive advantage over Taguchi. With Gordon or Lidge on the mound it would make more sense to look for a defensive replacement but preferably one that would provide a significant upgrade. Nineteen games into this season Taguchi has not lived up to expectations.

I was watching ESPN Classic the other day and got caught into back to back episodes of Stump the Schwab. Loving sports trivia as much as I do it became an impossible feat to change the channel, no matter how corny Stuart Scott’s jokes can get. In between the episodes, though, an interesting thought crept into my head: Who exactly is this Schwab-guy and what possible job would require him to know that much about sports?

Though relatively little information on the Schwab can be found online, a simple combination of his ESPN and Wikipedia biographies provides enough information to answer the above question. Howie Schwab, a graduate of St. Johns, began his career as the editor-in-chief of College and Pro Football Weekly; he also frequently contributed information to The Jodie Mac Show on WFAN. In 1987, ESPN hired him as a freelance researched and, by 1995, he had skyrocketed the employment ladder to become the coordinating producer for ESPN.com.

He does everything from working for Dan Patrick’s radio broadcasts to informing anchors and analysts of certain statistics and facts. In fact, he is the one responsible for the “Did You Know” facts that, unless I’m going a bit senile at 22 yrs old, have not been on the air recently.

When it comes to baseball knowledge, I really became impressed with him when he displayed knowledge of the past. Naming players like Pud Galvin and Kid Nichols in his answers as well as recalling Darren Lewis’s errorless streak shows a breadth of knowledge about somewhat obscure particulars. Granted I’m a big Kid Nichols fan but not many know about his efforts and contributions to the early days of baseball. One question relating to baseball I messed up on, despite swearing I was right, was with this question: “Who scored the winning run when the Dbacks beat the Yankees in the 2001 World Series?”

I said Craig Counsell, in my head, and the contestant even commented, “I know this unfortunately because I’m a Yankees fan and that image has been embedded in my head… Craig Counsell.” Stuart Scott then proceeded to, with an odd look, say that it was Tony Womack. I’m not sure if this was correct as the Schwab also had a look of “this is wrong” on his face. Looking at the box score/play by play shows that Jay Bell scored the winning run, with Womack advancing to third and Counsell advancing to second. Odd.

I read not too long ago that he is given the categories in “The Schwab Showdown,” the final round of his contest, in advance; not the questions but the categories in which questions are derived. Despite how annoying his television persona can be, does him being given the categories lessen his “ability” for anyone? Or do you still feel, regardless of that, his freakish knowledge is unsurpassed? Unlike one of my favorite shows from the past, Beat the Geeks, the questions the Schwab gets are on the same level as those posed to the competitors; on the former the Geeks would be given much harder questions than the contestants. I’m curious to hear your thoughts on this. It isn’t like the movie Quiz Show where questions and answers are given in advance but, still, knowing the categories in advance and not being asked tougher questions than the contestants seems a bit easier. Despite this, it isn’t as if he does not know anything, but do you feel his ability is lessened by these assertions?

This past Tuesday former all-star pitcher Jose Lima was released by the Kia Tigers of the Korean League following a few starts reminiscent of his 2005 and 2006 major league seasons. Lima, always known more for his personality than his on-field performance, suggested this would signal the end of his baseball career. The idea of a baseball world without Jose Lima, as evident in the video below, almost brought Jim Rome to tears—at least relative to what tears for Jim Rome equates to.

Being a fan of Lima’s while growing up I decided to take a look at his career, which got off to a rocky start with the Tigers in 1994. From 1994-96 he pitched in 153 innings, giving up 183 hits and 25 home runs. He had an ERA of 6.24 in that span and a WHIP of 1.48. He joined the Astros in 1997 in a blockbuster trade (Lima, Brad Ausmus, CJ Nitkowski, Trever Miller, and Daryle Ward for Doug Brocail, Brian Hunter, Todd Jones, and Orlando Miller) and, on the surface, had a below average year out of the bullpen. In 75 innings of work he gave up 44 runs; however, based on his FIP of 3.92 this was a pretty solid year. With a very impressive K:BB of 3.94 and just nine home runs allowed, Lima pitched himself into the Astros rotation the following year.

Making 33 starts in 1998 Lima went for 233.1 innings and a 16-8 record. He cut down on his hits per inning and allowed under one walk per game en route to a 1.12 WHIP and 5.28 K:BB. His 3.70 ERA translated to a 4.15 FIP—still very respectable. The major blemish on his season came in the form of home runs: He allowed 34 in what would begin a four-year span accompanied by a total of 147 surrendered dingers.

1999 proved to be his best season as he made the all-star team and garnered serious Cy Young Award consideration. In 35 starts and a career high 246.1 innings, Lima went 21-10 with a 3.58 ERA, 3.83 FIP, even cutting his home run count down; in two more starts he allowed four less home runs. His K:BB, however, dropped by over a full point, dipping from 5.28 to 4.25. Though 4.25 is still a darned good ratio it would soon prove to be the beginning of the end to Lima’s previously solid control rates. He went from one of the top seasons in 1999 to, without a doubt, one of the worst in 2000.

In 33 starts he surrendered a ridiculous 48 home runs, just two off Bert Blyleven’s record of 50. His K:BB plummeted from 4.25 to 1.82 as his WHIP ballooned to 1.62. He went from an ERA and FIP of 3.58 and 3.83 to 6.65 and 6.18. 2001 became all too similar as his numbers slightly improved but still fell into the category of very poor. Luckily, the Astros found a taker prior to the end of the season and shipped him back to Detroit in exchange for Dave Mlicki.

2002 brought with it some controversy as a frustrated Lima blamed manager Luis Pujols for some of his struggles. After not being used for 27 days Lima came into face the red-hot heart of the Royals batting order. Lima claimed Pujols put him in these situations to embarrass him, which did not make sense to him because, as only Lima could say, “..it’s not like I hit on his wife or anything!”

The Tigers soon released Lima, prompting this quote for the ages: “If I can’t pitch on this team—the worst or second-worst team in baseball—where am I going to pitch? If I can’t start on this ballclup I must be the worst pitcher on Earth.” According to his numbers, maybe not Earth, but definitely America.

2003 and 2004 saw Lima appear to improve though the numbers were a bit deceiving. Though he went 8-3 for the Royals in ’03 he had just a 1.23 K:BB and a 1.45 WHIP. In 2004 he went 13-5 with the Dodgers, but his ERA of 4.07 translated to a 5.24 FIP. While his 1998-99 seasons were of high quality, 2003 and 2004 were more likely closer to his bad seasons regardless of his 21-8 combined record. In 2005 he posted a 6.99 ERA, the highest of all-time for any pitcher with 30+ starts. Ironically, his FIP was over one point lower, at 5.89.

After separate stints with the 2006 Mets, Lima’s major league baseball career was over. He had been given more chances due to succes in the past and a bulldog personality but had not been particularly effective since 1999. His career was fun to watch as you could tell he really loved to play and always took time to interact with fans. He is the kind of player that many fans, myself included, wish had more talent because of the personality.

Without trying to get too sentimental as the career of someone I grew up with ends, I will always remember Lima for his 2004 playoffs shutout against the Cardinals. The Dodger crowd went crazy and as he kneeled to thank the heavens it was clear he meant every bit of the thankfulness. Many other heavenly salutes come off as going through the motions, like the high-five following a free-throw in basketball. While I generally dislike this godly praise, Lima’s reaction will forever be entrenched in my mind.

Unfortunately for baseball fans, especially those who root for the teams he stunk on, Lima’s talent came nowhere near the level of his personality. While “Lima Time” is now officially over it more likely ended six to eight years ago. Still, though, it was never a dull ride. Bbbbbelieve it!

Brewers reliever Brian Shouse is a late bloomer. Graduating from Bradley University in 1990 he debuted in the big leagues with the Pirates in 1993 albeit for just six mostly ineffective games. For the better part of the 1993 season up until 2002, Shouse shuffled around farm systems, playing for minor league affiliates of the Pirates, Orioles, Red Sox, Diamondbacks, Mets, Astros, and Royals. His only other major league experience came with the Red Sox in 1998 as he struggled in only seven appearances prior to a demotion to Pawtucket.

In 2002, nearly ten years after his major league debut, Shouse found himself appearing in 23 games for the Kansas City Royals. While the numbers were subpar–15 hits, 10 runs, and 9 walks in 14.1 innings—he has been on a major league roster ever since.

He was terrific out of the bullpen for the Rangers in 2003 and 2004, going for 105.1 IP in 115 games; he struck out 74 while walking 32 as well as posting a 3.08 ERA and 1.23 WHIP. After a shaky 2005 and just six games in 2006, Shouse was sent to the Brewers for Enrique Cruz and cash. Since arriving in Milwaukee he has been stellar and consistent out of the bullpen. In 2006 he stranded 42 of 56 inherited runners and allowed his own runs in just 10 of his 59 appearances. His ERA of 3.97 may not come off as flashy but specialist relievers can have their numbers vastly changed with one or two bad appearances; since they are usually only in for one out, giving up one run looks much worse in 0.1 IP as opposed to 1.0 IP. In fact, take away an August 29th outing against the Astros, wherein he surrendered four runs, and Shouse finishes 2006 with a 2.91 ERA for the Brewers, allowing just 25 percent of inherited runners to score.

In 2007, Shouse built on his success the previous season by posting this line: 73 G, 47.2 IP, 46 H, 16 ER, 14 BB, 32 K, 3.02 ERA, 1.26 WHIP. On top of that he he allowed just 18 of 78 inherited runners to score. Those numbers are a little skewed as well because eight of those 18 scored in Shouse’s final five appearances. Up until September 16th Shouse had stranded 58 of the 68 runners he inherited.

This year, Shouse has made eight appearances, allowing just one run and five baserunners in 6.1 innings. He has stranded all 11 inherited baserunners, with a .159 BABIP. Shouse truly makes the best of what he has to work with as he primarily throws a 79-80 mph fastball and a 72 mph slider.

His WPA of 0.34 comes down to a WPA/LI of 0.28 due to his appearances largely coinciding with baserunners allowed by other pitchers. Despite this, Shouse has allowed just 32 of 145 inherited runners to score throughout his Brewers tenure, just 22 percent. In fact, of non-closer relievers with at least 120 games in the span of 2006-2008, Shouse ranks tied for seventh in percentage of inherited runners scored. Not too shabby for a near 40-year old with just about 14 years of minor league experience.

Whether or not this will continue is left to be seen but this 39-yr old lefty who failed to find a secure major league home until the age of 35 is definitely doing all he can to show why he belongs.

Back on April 3rd, I witnessed quite the odd series of events in the tenth inning of a Braves/Pirates matchup, ultimately resulting in Braves reliever Chris Resop coming into pitch, then moving to leftfield, then returning to pitch. Based on the looks I saw develop on the faces of the players involved, I was not the only one a tad confused as to exactly what was happening.

Mike Hampton had been scheduled to make his first start since 2005 but, as expected, this did not happen. A decision was made just prior to the game to scratch Hampton from the start and it was soon learned he would be placed on the disabled list. Since the umpires were already out on the field when the decision was made, the start of the game had to be delayed to allow replacement starter Jeff Bennett time to warm-up. Bobby Cox, after using seven pitchers in this seesaw game, and fulfilling his promise to give Peter Moylan the day off, was left with just Resop and Royce Ring as extra innings rolled around. The goal was for Resop to go the distance unless a crucial lefty-lefty matchup presented itself.

Resop began the frame by walking speedster Nyjer Morgan. Luis Rivas then sacrificed Morgan to second and Jason Bay walked; Morgan advanced to third on a passed ball. With runners on and lefty Adam LaRoche coming up, Cox decided to make his move. Matt Diaz came in from leftfield, Chris Resop went to leftfield, and Royce Ring came into pitch. Ring promptly struck LaRoche out, serving his LOOGY purpose. Ring came out, Resop came back into pitch, and Gregor Blanco replaced Resop in leftfield. As fate would have it, Resop gave up what would turn out to be the game-winning single to Xavier Nady as soon as he came back in. This proved to be the first time in eighteen years that an NL player both pitched and played the field in the same inning.

In that instance, the first game of a doubleheader between the Cubs and Mets, Les Lancaster accomplished the same feat. The day prior, June 12th, the Cubs got waxed 19-8, a game that saw the bullpen get used so heavily that even Doug Dascenzo, an outfielder, pitch. So we have pitchers playing the outfield and outfielders pitching in this article. In the 6th inning of the June 13th game, Cubs starter Jeff Pico had two outs, with one on, and an 8-5 lead when Les Lancaster came into relieve him. Lancaster made quick work of Mark Carreon to end the inning.

When Les trotted out to the mound for the seventh inning, however, things did not go as he planned. He gave up four singles while retiring just one batter; with the lead now just 8-6, and lefties coming up, Lancaster was replaced by Paul Assenmacher. Les moved to leftfield, though, so he could come back into the game. Assenmacher walked a batter and gave up two singles, handing the lead to the Mets. Lancaster came back into pitch and took the brunt of the Mets offense, lasting until the ninth inning. In two separate pitching stints that game, Lancaster’s line: 2.2 IP, 8 H, 9 ER, BB, K. His ERA ballooned from 3.79 to 5.02.

Another incredibly interesting story along similar lines took place on July 22, 1986, again in a game involving the Mets. The Mets roster was in shambles following a usage of relievers and the ejections of Ray Knight and Kevin Mitchell after a brawl. In the tenth inning, Gary Carter replaced Knight at third base while Jesse Orosco and Roger McDowell alternated between pitching and playing the outfield. Unlike the Resop, Lancaster, and Assenmacher examples, this one actually paid off as Orosco and McDowell combined to give up four hits and no runs in four innings of relief work. Orosco even caught a fly ball as Tony Perez hit a liner right into his glove in rightfield.

These are just three examples of why baseball will forever be the most interesting and strategic sport. And, to tie everything together, Roger McDowell is currently the pitching coach for the Braves. I can only guess he experienced a wicked case of deja vu on April 3rd, thinking back to his similar experience over twenty years ago.

Last year, Kyle Kendrick finished fifth in NL Rookie of the Year voting, following a successul 3/5 season with the Phillies. His performance supremely aided a depleted starting rotation and he was expected to be a key cog in their plans this year. Due to his low strikeout count and high home run total, Kendrick’s 3.87 ERA translated to a 4.90 FIP. All of the projection systems pegged him to experience a severe regression in 2008 and, after his first two starts, said systems hit the nail on the head. After his first two starts, Kendrick had lasted only 7.1 IP, surrendering 12 hits and eight walks while striking out just one batter. With an ERA of 6.14, a WHIP hovering near the 3.00 mark, and a ghastly K:BB of 0.13, Kendrick seemed primed for a sophomore slump.

Prior to last night’s game against the Astros, manager Charlie Manuel told broadcaster Chris Wheeler that Kendrick had to stay out of “hafta’ counts” to be successful. Inquiring what that meant, Manuel told Wheeler that Kendrick had to avoid counts wherein he would “hafta'” throw a strike. Manuel continued to say that, because Kendrick’s stuff is not overpowering, he needed to get ahead of batters; when he got himself into counts of 2-0, 3-1, or 3-0 batters could wait and rake. Coming into this start, here are Kendrick’s numbers against in these counts:

• After 2-0: 7 PA, 1-4, 2B, 2 BB, K, SF
• After 3-1: 8 PA, 0-3, 4 BB, SF
• After 3-0: 2 PA, 0-1, BB, K

And here are his numbers when throwing a first pitch strike: 22 PA, 5-18, 3 2B, 4 BB, 4 K.

From these numbers it appears that batters did not necessarily feast on Kendrick in these counts; however, he gave up two sacrifice flies and walked seven batters, which greatly contributed to his 11 surrendered runs on the season (5 earned). Of the 44 batters he faced first pitch strikes were thrown to just 22 of them, 50 percent.

From watching the starts it was evident Kendrick either got behind batters and struggled to recover or got ahead of hitters and proceeded to nibble until he lost them. Manuel told Kendrick to attack the batters and, last night at least, he surely did. Here is last night’s breakdown of his performance:

• After 2-0: 1 PA, L-9
• After 3-1: 1 PA, K
• After 3-0: Never had a 3-0 count
• After 0-1: 17 PA, 3-17, HR, 4 K

Kendrick really changed his approach, throwing a first pitch strike to 17 batters; as mentioned before he had done this just 18 times in his prior two starts. He only found himself in “hafta’ counts” twice and neither effected him. The game graph is below and his end line looked like: 7 IP, 4 H, 2 ER, 1 BB, 5 K.

He threw 68 strikes out of 96 pitches, a much higher strike percentage than his previous two starts–91 strikes and 74 balls in 165 pitches prior to last night. Ironically, he lost the game as Roy Oswalt finally regained his form. If the Phillies seriously want to contend, Kendrick will need to build on this rather than let it be a positive outlier in a mostly negative season.

Taken directly from the FanGraphs Glossary, WPA is the difference in win expectancy (WE) between the start of the play and the end of the play. That difference is then credited/debited to the batter and the pitcher. While venturing to a website like this implies prior knowledge of WPA I always like to err on the unknowing side. Since baseball is zero-sum game, everything positive is cancelled out by something negative; a home run is very positive for the hitter but equally negative for the pitcher. Due to this, the WPA of a winning team in any given game will add up to +.500; that of a losing team will be -.500.

Keeping this in mind, let’s take a look at this afternoon’s Diamondbacks/Giants game:

The matchup of Brandon Webb and Barry Zito ultimately resulted in a 4-1 Diamondbacks victory and, according to WPA, it was pretty much all due to Brandon Webb. The former Cy Young Award winner went for 8 IP, 3 H, 1 ER, 2 BB, 5 K, and a pitching WPA of +.337. On top of that, as evidenced by the graph above, Webb also added a two-run single. His hit put the DBacks ahead 2-0 and turned out to be the biggest play of the game; the WPA for the single play was +.165. Since the hit proved to be so significant Webb ended with a batting WPA of +.210.

Add both of them up and Webb’s WPA comes to +.547. As mentioned at the start, the net sum WPA of a winning team will be +.500.

Webb not only shut the Giants down for eight innings of great pitching but added the biggest offensive play of the game; the LI of his at bat was 2.96. Of course, watching the game or highlights of it would explain that it was not a laser sharp single, but the fact is that the blooper fell in, two runs scored, and that was all Webb needed.

The problem with looking solely at WPA in this case is that Webb’s single came with the bases loaded so he could not have knocked in the runs without his teammates doing their part to get on base. This is where WPA/LI comes in. The stat also goes by the nickname “context neutral wins” and tracks the contributions with the Leverage Index aspect removed. It is not calculated by dividing the overall WPA by the overall LI but rather dividing the WPA and LI of every single play and then adding everything together. With regards to this particular game, and Webb’s single in particular, the WPA and LI were high because the situation existed as a result of others getting on base. Webb had nothing to do with them reaching base and so using WPA to determine whether or not he single-handedly beat the Giants would not necessarily be accurate; the WPA/LI would determine exactly what he individually contributed to the game.

Looking at the WPA and LI of each play in this game, Webb’s WPA/LI from a pitching standpoint adds up to +.328, not much different than the +.337 WPA. His hitting, however, lessens quite a bit due to the context that padded his batting WPA. From a context neutral standpoint, his batting WPA/LI comes to +.067. Though still qualifying as a positive contribution it is much less than the +.210 WPA. Overall, adding them together, Webb’s WPA/LI for this game was +.395. While he did not single-handedly beat the Giants he would definitely win the Game MVP award for contributing much more to his team’s victory than anyone else.

I posed this in the comments thread of the Appreciating Pat Burrell article but feel it is an important enough question to merit its own post. In an NPR interview, author Dan Gordon discusses the psychology of die-hard fans in an effort to promote his new book, Your Brain on Cubs. Towards the 31-minute mark of that interview Gordon says something interesting: He essentially says that Cubs fans are able to stay dedicated because they have come close many times to the World Series and so the fans know how sweet it will be when the team eventually wins a championship.

I want to combine this thought with something I heard last year on the radio and bring forth a question. Quite simply, would you rather be a fan of a team like the Marlins or the Giants? Not necessarily the specific teams or how they look in 2007 and 2008, but would you rather be a fan of a perennial contender for eight years or a team that would win two world series in that span and be below average the other six years?

The Giants had a winning record every season between 1997 and 2004, finishing in either first or second place; their average record in that span was 92-70. They made the playoffs four times and were within two games of either the division or the wild card in three of the other four seasons. The Giants made the playoffs or fell just short in seven of the eight years in that span. The Marlins, on the other hand, had winning records in just three of those eight years. In 1997 and 2003, when they won the world series, they won 92 and 91 games respectively; in 2004, a year removed from their second championship, they went 83-79, just barely breaking .500. Their average W-L in that span is 77-85.

Now let’s revisit the question posed at the start of the post. Strip away what we currently know about the Giants and Marlins: The actual teams are irrelevant and we need to focus on the type of team each is to answer properly. Would you rather be a fan of a team that would go 92-70 each year and give you a shot at the playoffs and/or world series, but not necessarily win a championship? Or would you rather be a fan of a team that would go 77-85 every year, but would step it up to 90+ wins just twice and win the world series in both of those seasons?

On the one hand you have the idea of winning two championships which, I’ll admit, I’ve never felt as a Phillies fan. Then again, on the other hand, you have the idea of whether or not you would even watch your team if they went 77-85 or worse in several consecutive seasons. For instance, I know that last year, I cared less about what the Phillies did in the playoffs than I did that they simply got into the playoffs. I’m curious to hear thoughts on which team would have a bigger Web-fandom.

This is something I began over at Statistically Speaking but it makes more sense to continue here at Fangraphs. Giants pitcher Matt Cain had an historically unlucky season in 2007, posting statistics similar to, if not better than, most NL starting pitchers. And yet, at the end of the season, all he had was a 7-16 record with no true consolation prize. Via my Net Luck Rating statistic–which measures the quality of decisions and no-decisions by evaluating each start as a separate commodity–it was the unluckiest season of the decade. Based on the quality of his starts and his frequency of well-pitched games Cain would have gone 16-7 in his decisions if pitchers were awarded wins for every well-pitched decision and losses for every poorly pitched decision.

Based on how bleak the outlook appears for the Giants I have every reason to believe the string of bad luck will continue. That being said I have decided to track each of his starts. To read the recaps of his first two starts, click any of the links below:

• Cain Watch #1
• WPA, 4/1/08
• Cain Watch #2
• WPA, 4/7/08

Cain’s third start of the season proved to be the perfect example of his lack of luck. Here is the graph of the game:

To recap, Cain pitched 6.2 innings, surrendering three hits and two earned runs; he also walked three and struck out five. At the time of his departure in the seventh inning Cain had a 5-2 lead. Oh, and do you see that little red dot in the graph above in between the sixth and seventh innings? If so, you read correctly: Matt Cain also hit a home run in this game.

After Cain’s departure, Jumpin’ Jack Taschner (it’s a fun nickname, admit it) hit Rico Washington before Merkin Valdez got Ryan Ludwick to fly out. After seven full innings the Giants led 5-2. Some Tyler Walker, Brad Hennessey, and Erick Threets action later and the Giants found themselves extra-inning losers by a final score of 8-7. Sigh. Poor Matt Cain.

In terms of WPA, Cain contributed .286 in the pitching department and .190 in the hitting department; for the game that adds up to an accumulative WPA of .476. Considering that the winning team will add up to a .500 and that the Giants eventually lost the game, the team had to do a lot wrong to lose. A cursory scan of the bullpen WPA for the game supports that: Threets chimed in with a -.292, Walker with a -.318, and Hennessey with a -.434. The efforts of these three not only erased Cain’s efforts but doubled over in the negative direction.

This was definitely a game Cain should have gone onto win but will go down as a too-familiar great start but no-decision. For the season, Cain is now at: 3 GS, 16.2 IP, 13 H, 6 ER, 12 BB, 15 K, 3.24 ERA. Based on his WPA, Clutch, and WPA/LI Cain is currently very comparable to Johan Santana. Despite pitching well in two games, and poorly in the other, he is 0-1. The saga continues.

In dealing with a vast amount of injuries over the course of the 2007 season the Phillies were forced to get creative in the transactions department. They took flyers on pitchers like Jose Mesa, Kane Davis and Kyle Lohse and reverted to their farm system to call up the likes of Kyle Kendrick and Mike Zagurski. Their most productive move involved claiming JC Romero off of waivers from the Red Sox on June 22nd.

The former Twins and Angels reliever kicked off his 2007 campaign with Boston, appearing in 23 games and stranding 13 of his 15 inherited runners. Unhappy with his penchant for giving up walks the Red Sox put him on the waiver wire. Desperately seeking bullpen help the Phillies quickly snatched him up.

Romero was in uniform on June 29th, a day consisting of a day/night doubleheader between the Phillies and Mets. Due to a depleted starting rotation–Freddy Garcia hurt, Jon Lieber hurt, Brett Myers now the closer–the Phillies called on waiver claim JD Durbin to pitch in game one. Durbin struck out the side in the first inning but gave up six runs over 4.2 innings en route to a loss. He definitely did not live up to his nickname – “The Real Deal.”

The nightcap, also resulting in a Phillies loss, saw Romero make his debut: a one inning performance equipped with a hit, two walks, and two strikeouts.

The next day, June 30th, saw the Phillies end their four-game set with the Mets; again they lost. The starting pitcher in this game was the recently called up prospect JA Happ. Being in attendance of this game I witnessed Happ struggle, giving up five runs in just 4+ innings. Following 2.2 solid innings from Ryan Madson, Romero made his second Phillies appearance by striking out Carlos Delgado to end the seventh inning.

If you have not noticed, the Phillies debuted three pitchers in a 27-hour span named JA, JC, and JD. Regardless of how tremendous Romero proved to be down the stretch–36.1 IP, 15 H, 5 ER, 20/26 inherited runners stranded, and the 6th best Clutch score for relievers with 40+ games–have you ever heard of a name coincidence as insane as this? Three new pitchers all debuting within two days of games, for the same team, with name abbreviations of JA, JC, and JD.