This is the fourth installment in a series of articles detailing Matt Cain’s starts. Based on the quality of his games pitched and his decisions or no-decisions earned, Cain’s 2007 was the unluckiest season of at least this decade. Seeing as the Giants have a bleak outlook this trend should continue.

His first three starts followed an extremely simple pattern of: good, bad, good. In pure Cain fashion, he did not receive a decision in either good game but earned the loss in his poorly pitched game. To get caught up on his season visit any of the following links:

• Cain Watch #1
• WPA, 4/1/08
• Cain Watch #2
• WPA, 4/7/08
• Cain Watch #3
• WPA, 4/12/08

He made his fourth start on April 18th, a game in which bad luck never had a chance to interfere due to Cain’s poor performance. His line of 3.2 IP, 8 H, 9 ER, 3 BB, 4 K led to the following lopsided game graph:

For the season, Cain is averaging the following rounded numbers per start: 5 IP, 4 H, 4 ER, 4 BB, 5 K. There has been quality as he has had two very good starts; however, his bad starts have had much more of an effect on his season to date. Let’s compare this to last April, when, through four starts, Cain had the following averages: 7.1 IP, 2.8 H, 1 ER, 3 BB, 5 K. The only stagnant number is the strikeouts; everything else is worse now than a year ago. So what’s the difference?

He is throwing 57% first-pitch strikes, which is the same as last year and higher than his previous two years, but his overall percentage of strikes has dipped from 63% to 60%. Batters are swinging at 73% of his pitches, down from the 75% last year, however they are making contact 84% of the time; last year the contact rate was at 81%. Putting this together, Cain is throwing a lower percentage of strikes while maintaining his rate of first-pitch strikes, but batters are swinging less and making more contact. This helps to explain why his baserunners allowed have increased.

I’m currently building my own Pitch FX database and will begin to incorporate his data in that area into future looks at his starts. His next start is scheduled for April 23rd, when he will face-off against Greg Maddux for the second time this season, this time at the spacious Petco Park. His flyball and groundball percentages have lowered this year while his line drive percentage has risen. Though he has not given up a ton of home runs in his career, three in his first four starts shows some susceptibility; limiting his walks will help reduce two-run and three-run home runs to those of the solo variety. If he cannot rebound from this start and get onto some type of consistency track then luck will not be a factor in what will amount to a poorly pitched season.

The Cleveland Indians entered the season with a a rotation that they felt could be the strength of their ball club. With a dominating lefty and emerging sinkerball right hander, they felt they had found the elusive 1-2 punch that so many teams were looking for. The back of the rotation was less stable as no one really knew what to expect from the guys who didn’t have the same power stuff as the frontline guys.

Well, through the first several weeks, the Indians find themselves being carried by a dominating lefty and an emerging sinkerball right hander, trying to pick up the slack for the rest of the rotation. Interestingly, however, the script has flipped – Cliff Lee and Jake Westbrook are ones that are pitching like Cy Young candidates while C.C. Sabathia and Fausto Carmona struggle to find their groove.

Lee, in particular, is having a pretty remarkable beginning to the season. A southpaw with a fastball that sits around 89 and a decent curveball, he’s always been able to get an average amount of swings and misses, but has struggled with inconsistent command. As a flyball pitcher, he’s been prone to giving up the longball as well, and the combination of allowing walks and home runs isn’t really one that leads to consistent success.

So, after a disastrous 2007 season where he lost his rotation spot and found himself in Triple-A, Lee has apparently decided to just stop walking people.

Through 23 innings of work, he’s issued just two free passes. In looking at his Baseball Reference pitch summary data, his strike percentages are essentially unchanged from last year, however. From the raw data, it’s hard to see that Lee is doing anything differently, even though the results are vastly superior. If this early season performance represented a sustainable leap forward, we’d be able to see it in the types of pitches he was throwing. Right now, it looks like Lee’s pretty much throwing like he’s always thrown, but just getting better results from it.

While the Indians have to be happy with how he’s performed, they’d also be wise to not count on the belief that Lee has taken a real step forward, and instead expect his results to begin to more closely match up with his skillset.

Last season, the Phillies employed a season-long strategy in which Pat Burrell would play six or seven innings before a defensive replacement helped rest his ailing feet. Usually coming in the form of speedster Michael Bourn, the strategy often worked to perfection; a natural centerfielder, Bourn could cover more ground and get to more balls. Those against the move argued that the Phillies shaky bullpen would give up many leads; in doing so, the Phillies were likely to have Chase Utley and Ryan Howard followed by Bourn in crucial situations, rather than Burrell.

Said proponents of leaving Burrell in the game could not deny that Bourn’s defensive prowess definitely helped the Phillies. Bourn was shipped to Houston in the Brad Lidge deal and so So Taguchi (yes that was planned) signed with the team to serve a similar role.

The problem thus far has been Taguchi’s inability to field his position in replacing Burrell. Add on the facts that Burrell has been posting gaudy numbers and the Phillies bullpen is still suspect and the move does not look good. Taguchi has only recorded one error on the season but there have been three other plays he should have made and did not. That accounts for four plays in his ten leftfield replacements that were not made. The plays in question have not necessarily been terrible but ones that a fan/manager/sane person would definitely expect to be made by a defensive upgrade.

In last night’s Phillies/Mets game, Taguchi misplayed a tough fly ball in the eighth inning, poorly timing his dive/slide. The ball bounced off of the front of his glove, allowing Raul Casanova to slide safely into second. Though the play ultimately did not result in a run it definitely did nothing to ease the pressure placed on the shoulders of JC Romero, now in the midst of his second inning of work. Here’s a graph of the game:

While it is not very likely Burrell would have produced different results if still in the game, Taguchi has not done a very good job as a defensive replacement. Looking at the Phillies likely 7th-9th inning pitchers we get the following:

• 7th: JC Romero – GB% increased from 57-63 % from 2005-2007
• 8th: Tom Gordon – career GB/FB of just 1.27
• 9th: Brad Lidge – career GB of 39.6 %, career FB of 38.6 %

Since Romero is primarily a ground ball pitcher it would make more sense to let Burrell stay in the game for the seventh inning, especially if his batting position is nearby in the offensive half of the inning. If Romero stays in for the eighth inning, like last night, it would not necessarily hurt to leave Burrell in as well due to his vast offensive advantage over Taguchi. With Gordon or Lidge on the mound it would make more sense to look for a defensive replacement but preferably one that would provide a significant upgrade. Nineteen games into this season Taguchi has not lived up to expectations.

The Toronto Blue Jays released disgruntled designated hitter Frank Thomas this afternoon, several days after deciding that he wouldn’t be a regular in their line-up anymore. Thomas was unhappy with that decision and made sure the team knew about it, so they made the decision to part ways.

The initial reaction to this may be something of a surprise, since there are several MLB teams who Thomas would represent an upgrade at DH for. However, once you begin to look at his contract, the picture becomes a bit clearer. Thomas has a $10 million option for 2009 that vests if he receives 376 plate appearances this season (based on a 1,000 PA threshold over the ’07-’08 seasons combined). The Blue Jays, obviously, had no interest in paying him $10 million next year (no other club wants to either), so their options essentially included turning him into a part time player or releasing him. They tried the former and Thomas threw a fit, putting two and two together to realize that his benching was more about money and less about performance.

By releasing Thomas, they save themselves from having him on the hook next year, but also cost themselves a major league hitter in a season where they are trying to contend in the A.L. East. While Thomas got off to a slow slart, his overall skillset is essentially the same; his BB% and K%, and HR/FB% are all essentially the same, and four of his ten hits have gone for extra bases. Here are his patience, contact, and batted ball charts:

He’s still a flyball, power hitting, right-hander with a good eye at the plate and good enough contact rates – the early results are based on a ridiculously low rate of getting balls in play to find holes.

Thomas’ speed makes him unlikely to post a BABIP of league average or higher, but his current rate is unsustainable. The ball will start finding holes, and Thomas’ production will rebound much closer to last year’s performance. The first several weeks of his season don’t give us any real reason to expect Thomas to continue to struggle like this.

It will be interesting to see who bids on his services as a free agent. Since he was released, the Blue Jays contract does not carry over to the new team that signs him, and the vesting option is no longer an issue. Teams like the Mariners, A’s, and Yankees should all be interested in his services, and it wouldn’t be that surprising to see a small bidding war break out for The Big Hurt. While the contract the Jays gave Thomas nullified his trade value, there will still be teams interested in adding that bat to their line-up.

Jed Lowrie made his debut on April 15th for the Red Sox. He started at third base in place of the injured Mike Lowell and went 1-4 with 3 RBIs that tied a 61 year old record for most RBIs in a Red Sox debut. Baseball America listed Lowrie as the 5th top prospect in the Red Sox organization for 2008. Although he started at third base in his debut, he typically plays shortstop, which is where he got his second start.

Alex Serrano debuted on April 16th for the Angels in the top of the 9th inning of a 2-3 game. He allowed 1 hit and struck out 1 in a scoreless inning. In AAA last season, Serrano struck out 46 batters and only walked 10 in 69+ innings of work.

German Duran got the start at third base in his debut for the Rangers on April 17th. He had 3 plate appearances and struck out in all of them. He was called up to fill a roster spot for the injured Marlon Byrd. John Sickels over at Minor League Ball projects Duran will have a long career as a “really good bench guy“.

David Purcey made his first major league start for the Blue Jays and allowed just 2 hits and 1 run in 4.1 innings of work. He also allowed an uncharacteristically high 7 walks. In AA last year, he allowed just 16 walks in 62+ innings of work. The Mockingbird did a full writeup on his Pitchf/x data and uncovered a mid 90’s fastball with good movement.

I was watching ESPN Classic the other day and got caught into back to back episodes of Stump the Schwab. Loving sports trivia as much as I do it became an impossible feat to change the channel, no matter how corny Stuart Scott’s jokes can get. In between the episodes, though, an interesting thought crept into my head: Who exactly is this Schwab-guy and what possible job would require him to know that much about sports?

Though relatively little information on the Schwab can be found online, a simple combination of his ESPN and Wikipedia biographies provides enough information to answer the above question. Howie Schwab, a graduate of St. Johns, began his career as the editor-in-chief of College and Pro Football Weekly; he also frequently contributed information to The Jodie Mac Show on WFAN. In 1987, ESPN hired him as a freelance researched and, by 1995, he had skyrocketed the employment ladder to become the coordinating producer for ESPN.com.

He does everything from working for Dan Patrick’s radio broadcasts to informing anchors and analysts of certain statistics and facts. In fact, he is the one responsible for the “Did You Know” facts that, unless I’m going a bit senile at 22 yrs old, have not been on the air recently.

When it comes to baseball knowledge, I really became impressed with him when he displayed knowledge of the past. Naming players like Pud Galvin and Kid Nichols in his answers as well as recalling Darren Lewis’s errorless streak shows a breadth of knowledge about somewhat obscure particulars. Granted I’m a big Kid Nichols fan but not many know about his efforts and contributions to the early days of baseball. One question relating to baseball I messed up on, despite swearing I was right, was with this question: “Who scored the winning run when the Dbacks beat the Yankees in the 2001 World Series?”

I said Craig Counsell, in my head, and the contestant even commented, “I know this unfortunately because I’m a Yankees fan and that image has been embedded in my head… Craig Counsell.” Stuart Scott then proceeded to, with an odd look, say that it was Tony Womack. I’m not sure if this was correct as the Schwab also had a look of “this is wrong” on his face. Looking at the box score/play by play shows that Jay Bell scored the winning run, with Womack advancing to third and Counsell advancing to second. Odd.

I read not too long ago that he is given the categories in “The Schwab Showdown,” the final round of his contest, in advance; not the questions but the categories in which questions are derived. Despite how annoying his television persona can be, does him being given the categories lessen his “ability” for anyone? Or do you still feel, regardless of that, his freakish knowledge is unsurpassed? Unlike one of my favorite shows from the past, Beat the Geeks, the questions the Schwab gets are on the same level as those posed to the competitors; on the former the Geeks would be given much harder questions than the contestants. I’m curious to hear your thoughts on this. It isn’t like the movie Quiz Show where questions and answers are given in advance but, still, knowing the categories in advance and not being asked tougher questions than the contestants seems a bit easier. Despite this, it isn’t as if he does not know anything, but do you feel his ability is lessened by these assertions?

This past Tuesday former all-star pitcher Jose Lima was released by the Kia Tigers of the Korean League following a few starts reminiscent of his 2005 and 2006 major league seasons. Lima, always known more for his personality than his on-field performance, suggested this would signal the end of his baseball career. The idea of a baseball world without Jose Lima, as evident in the video below, almost brought Jim Rome to tears—at least relative to what tears for Jim Rome equates to.

Being a fan of Lima’s while growing up I decided to take a look at his career, which got off to a rocky start with the Tigers in 1994. From 1994-96 he pitched in 153 innings, giving up 183 hits and 25 home runs. He had an ERA of 6.24 in that span and a WHIP of 1.48. He joined the Astros in 1997 in a blockbuster trade (Lima, Brad Ausmus, CJ Nitkowski, Trever Miller, and Daryle Ward for Doug Brocail, Brian Hunter, Todd Jones, and Orlando Miller) and, on the surface, had a below average year out of the bullpen. In 75 innings of work he gave up 44 runs; however, based on his FIP of 3.92 this was a pretty solid year. With a very impressive K:BB of 3.94 and just nine home runs allowed, Lima pitched himself into the Astros rotation the following year.

Making 33 starts in 1998 Lima went for 233.1 innings and a 16-8 record. He cut down on his hits per inning and allowed under one walk per game en route to a 1.12 WHIP and 5.28 K:BB. His 3.70 ERA translated to a 4.15 FIP—still very respectable. The major blemish on his season came in the form of home runs: He allowed 34 in what would begin a four-year span accompanied by a total of 147 surrendered dingers.

1999 proved to be his best season as he made the all-star team and garnered serious Cy Young Award consideration. In 35 starts and a career high 246.1 innings, Lima went 21-10 with a 3.58 ERA, 3.83 FIP, even cutting his home run count down; in two more starts he allowed four less home runs. His K:BB, however, dropped by over a full point, dipping from 5.28 to 4.25. Though 4.25 is still a darned good ratio it would soon prove to be the beginning of the end to Lima’s previously solid control rates. He went from one of the top seasons in 1999 to, without a doubt, one of the worst in 2000.

In 33 starts he surrendered a ridiculous 48 home runs, just two off Bert Blyleven’s record of 50. His K:BB plummeted from 4.25 to 1.82 as his WHIP ballooned to 1.62. He went from an ERA and FIP of 3.58 and 3.83 to 6.65 and 6.18. 2001 became all too similar as his numbers slightly improved but still fell into the category of very poor. Luckily, the Astros found a taker prior to the end of the season and shipped him back to Detroit in exchange for Dave Mlicki.

2002 brought with it some controversy as a frustrated Lima blamed manager Luis Pujols for some of his struggles. After not being used for 27 days Lima came into face the red-hot heart of the Royals batting order. Lima claimed Pujols put him in these situations to embarrass him, which did not make sense to him because, as only Lima could say, “..it’s not like I hit on his wife or anything!”

The Tigers soon released Lima, prompting this quote for the ages: “If I can’t pitch on this team—the worst or second-worst team in baseball—where am I going to pitch? If I can’t start on this ballclup I must be the worst pitcher on Earth.” According to his numbers, maybe not Earth, but definitely America.

2003 and 2004 saw Lima appear to improve though the numbers were a bit deceiving. Though he went 8-3 for the Royals in ’03 he had just a 1.23 K:BB and a 1.45 WHIP. In 2004 he went 13-5 with the Dodgers, but his ERA of 4.07 translated to a 5.24 FIP. While his 1998-99 seasons were of high quality, 2003 and 2004 were more likely closer to his bad seasons regardless of his 21-8 combined record. In 2005 he posted a 6.99 ERA, the highest of all-time for any pitcher with 30+ starts. Ironically, his FIP was over one point lower, at 5.89.

After separate stints with the 2006 Mets, Lima’s major league baseball career was over. He had been given more chances due to succes in the past and a bulldog personality but had not been particularly effective since 1999. His career was fun to watch as you could tell he really loved to play and always took time to interact with fans. He is the kind of player that many fans, myself included, wish had more talent because of the personality.

Without trying to get too sentimental as the career of someone I grew up with ends, I will always remember Lima for his 2004 playoffs shutout against the Cardinals. The Dodger crowd went crazy and as he kneeled to thank the heavens it was clear he meant every bit of the thankfulness. Many other heavenly salutes come off as going through the motions, like the high-five following a free-throw in basketball. While I generally dislike this godly praise, Lima’s reaction will forever be entrenched in my mind.

Unfortunately for baseball fans, especially those who root for the teams he stunk on, Lima’s talent came nowhere near the level of his personality. While “Lima Time” is now officially over it more likely ended six to eight years ago. Still, though, it was never a dull ride. Bbbbbelieve it!

When I saw the Rockies score in the top of the 14th inning, I called it a night. And when the clock struck 3 AM on the East coast, our live Win Probability called it a night. So if you missed it, here’s the complete 22 innings of Win Probability goodness. You may never see this many points crammed into one of these graphs again.

On Saturday, April 12th, the Rays promoted highly touted prospect Evan Longoria to the major leagues and handed him their third base job after placing Willy Aybar on the disabled list. Six days later, the Rays have announced that they’ve signed Longoria to a six year, $17.5 million contract with team options that could make the deal worth as much as 9 years and $44.5 million. Longoria now has more guaranteed years of pay than hits in the big leagues.

Following on the heels of extensions for Troy Tulowitzki and Chris Young, more and more teams are showing willingness to offer their young talent long term security in exchange for significant cost savings in the future. It used to be that organizations wanted to see players establish themselves as proven major league talent before they rewarded them with long term contracts, but as these clubs become more confidant in their ability to project future performance before a player even reaches the major leagues, they’re parlaying that information into a competitive cost savings.

That isn’t to say there is no risk involved in signing a player like Longoria while we still have incomplete information about his abilities. The Rays used a similar tactic in 2006 when they locked up Rocco Baldelli, and that hasn’t worked out as well as they would have liked. However, decisions to extend a young player aren’t made on a micro level, but instead, organizations tend to focus on securing a group of players to hedge their risk. By signing both Baldelli and Crawford to long term deals, they were able to secure a highly valuable outfielder at a below market rate without having to know in advance which of the two was the one that was going to develop as hoped. Likewise, by signing Carlos Pena, James Shields, and now Longoria to multi-year contracts at the same time, the team is securing a minimum level of future performance while hedging against inflation.

In several years, these deals are going to reap big rewards for the franchises willing to take on some risk today. The current market values of these long term contracts for pre-arbitration players is skewed heavily in favor of the franchises, and as more teams understand the economic payoff that comes with making these kinds of deals, this strategy will continue to rise in popularity.

It will be interesting to see how happy these players are in four to five years, however, when they’re drastically underpaid relative to the salaries of the times. MLB generally hasn’t had to deal with contract holdouts due to their guaranteed contracts, but with a wave of potential all-stars signing away the primes of their careers at below market rates, these teams could have an interesting dilemma in the future.

Brewers reliever Brian Shouse is a late bloomer. Graduating from Bradley University in 1990 he debuted in the big leagues with the Pirates in 1993 albeit for just six mostly ineffective games. For the better part of the 1993 season up until 2002, Shouse shuffled around farm systems, playing for minor league affiliates of the Pirates, Orioles, Red Sox, Diamondbacks, Mets, Astros, and Royals. His only other major league experience came with the Red Sox in 1998 as he struggled in only seven appearances prior to a demotion to Pawtucket.

In 2002, nearly ten years after his major league debut, Shouse found himself appearing in 23 games for the Kansas City Royals. While the numbers were subpar–15 hits, 10 runs, and 9 walks in 14.1 innings—he has been on a major league roster ever since.

He was terrific out of the bullpen for the Rangers in 2003 and 2004, going for 105.1 IP in 115 games; he struck out 74 while walking 32 as well as posting a 3.08 ERA and 1.23 WHIP. After a shaky 2005 and just six games in 2006, Shouse was sent to the Brewers for Enrique Cruz and cash. Since arriving in Milwaukee he has been stellar and consistent out of the bullpen. In 2006 he stranded 42 of 56 inherited runners and allowed his own runs in just 10 of his 59 appearances. His ERA of 3.97 may not come off as flashy but specialist relievers can have their numbers vastly changed with one or two bad appearances; since they are usually only in for one out, giving up one run looks much worse in 0.1 IP as opposed to 1.0 IP. In fact, take away an August 29th outing against the Astros, wherein he surrendered four runs, and Shouse finishes 2006 with a 2.91 ERA for the Brewers, allowing just 25 percent of inherited runners to score.

In 2007, Shouse built on his success the previous season by posting this line: 73 G, 47.2 IP, 46 H, 16 ER, 14 BB, 32 K, 3.02 ERA, 1.26 WHIP. On top of that he he allowed just 18 of 78 inherited runners to score. Those numbers are a little skewed as well because eight of those 18 scored in Shouse’s final five appearances. Up until September 16th Shouse had stranded 58 of the 68 runners he inherited.

This year, Shouse has made eight appearances, allowing just one run and five baserunners in 6.1 innings. He has stranded all 11 inherited baserunners, with a .159 BABIP. Shouse truly makes the best of what he has to work with as he primarily throws a 79-80 mph fastball and a 72 mph slider.

His WPA of 0.34 comes down to a WPA/LI of 0.28 due to his appearances largely coinciding with baserunners allowed by other pitchers. Despite this, Shouse has allowed just 32 of 145 inherited runners to score throughout his Brewers tenure, just 22 percent. In fact, of non-closer relievers with at least 120 games in the span of 2006-2008, Shouse ranks tied for seventh in percentage of inherited runners scored. Not too shabby for a near 40-year old with just about 14 years of minor league experience.

Whether or not this will continue is left to be seen but this 39-yr old lefty who failed to find a secure major league home until the age of 35 is definitely doing all he can to show why he belongs.