Last night in Cleveland, two struggling young All-Stars took the hill to try to get their 2008 campaigns back on the right foot. As the graph below shows, only one succeeded.

Fausto Carmona was able to throw strikes for the first time all year, finding positive results by getting his “turbo sinker” over the plate and inducing ground ball outs. This was the Carmona that Indians fans got used to last year and were counting on for the upcoming season.

However, Justin Verlander wasn’t as lucky. As we documented the other day, he’s lost quite a bit of velocity on his fastball this year, which has hurt him quite a bit. The trend continued tonight, as he sat between 89-93 with his now hittable fastball and even added a new wrinkle – an inability to throw strikes. His line for the night: 5 innings, 7 hits, 5 runs, 4 walks, 2 hit batters, and 1 strikeout.

This goes beyond theories of Detroit wanting him to throw more two seam fastballs or getting him to throw slower to make it through an entire season – there’s something wrong with him right now. He’s not pitching at 80% effort, then dialing it up to an extra gear when he needs it – he’s just throwing 92 MPH fastballs and occasionally hitting the strike zone. After tonight’s performance, he now boasts a 7.03 ERA supported by 12 walks and 14 strikeouts in 24 1/3 innings. It’s no longer early for Justin Verlander – Detroit should be legitimately worried about their ace. If they can’t get him throwing 95 with regularity again, getting trounced by Cleveland could become a regular occurrence.

Back on April 3rd, I witnessed quite the odd series of events in the tenth inning of a Braves/Pirates matchup, ultimately resulting in Braves reliever Chris Resop coming into pitch, then moving to leftfield, then returning to pitch. Based on the looks I saw develop on the faces of the players involved, I was not the only one a tad confused as to exactly what was happening.

Mike Hampton had been scheduled to make his first start since 2005 but, as expected, this did not happen. A decision was made just prior to the game to scratch Hampton from the start and it was soon learned he would be placed on the disabled list. Since the umpires were already out on the field when the decision was made, the start of the game had to be delayed to allow replacement starter Jeff Bennett time to warm-up. Bobby Cox, after using seven pitchers in this seesaw game, and fulfilling his promise to give Peter Moylan the day off, was left with just Resop and Royce Ring as extra innings rolled around. The goal was for Resop to go the distance unless a crucial lefty-lefty matchup presented itself.

Resop began the frame by walking speedster Nyjer Morgan. Luis Rivas then sacrificed Morgan to second and Jason Bay walked; Morgan advanced to third on a passed ball. With runners on and lefty Adam LaRoche coming up, Cox decided to make his move. Matt Diaz came in from leftfield, Chris Resop went to leftfield, and Royce Ring came into pitch. Ring promptly struck LaRoche out, serving his LOOGY purpose. Ring came out, Resop came back into pitch, and Gregor Blanco replaced Resop in leftfield. As fate would have it, Resop gave up what would turn out to be the game-winning single to Xavier Nady as soon as he came back in. This proved to be the first time in eighteen years that an NL player both pitched and played the field in the same inning.

In that instance, the first game of a doubleheader between the Cubs and Mets, Les Lancaster accomplished the same feat. The day prior, June 12th, the Cubs got waxed 19-8, a game that saw the bullpen get used so heavily that even Doug Dascenzo, an outfielder, pitch. So we have pitchers playing the outfield and outfielders pitching in this article. In the 6th inning of the June 13th game, Cubs starter Jeff Pico had two outs, with one on, and an 8-5 lead when Les Lancaster came into relieve him. Lancaster made quick work of Mark Carreon to end the inning.

When Les trotted out to the mound for the seventh inning, however, things did not go as he planned. He gave up four singles while retiring just one batter; with the lead now just 8-6, and lefties coming up, Lancaster was replaced by Paul Assenmacher. Les moved to leftfield, though, so he could come back into the game. Assenmacher walked a batter and gave up two singles, handing the lead to the Mets. Lancaster came back into pitch and took the brunt of the Mets offense, lasting until the ninth inning. In two separate pitching stints that game, Lancaster’s line: 2.2 IP, 8 H, 9 ER, BB, K. His ERA ballooned from 3.79 to 5.02.

Another incredibly interesting story along similar lines took place on July 22, 1986, again in a game involving the Mets. The Mets roster was in shambles following a usage of relievers and the ejections of Ray Knight and Kevin Mitchell after a brawl. In the tenth inning, Gary Carter replaced Knight at third base while Jesse Orosco and Roger McDowell alternated between pitching and playing the outfield. Unlike the Resop, Lancaster, and Assenmacher examples, this one actually paid off as Orosco and McDowell combined to give up four hits and no runs in four innings of relief work. Orosco even caught a fly ball as Tony Perez hit a liner right into his glove in rightfield.

These are just three examples of why baseball will forever be the most interesting and strategic sport. And, to tie everything together, Roger McDowell is currently the pitching coach for the Braves. I can only guess he experienced a wicked case of deja vu on April 3rd, thinking back to his similar experience over twenty years ago.

The Minnesota Twins have been producing quality starting pitchers for years. From front of the rotation aces in Johan Santana and Francisco Liriano to useful innings eaters like Brad Radke, Carlos Silva, Scott Baker, and Boof Bonser, as well as a nifty trade chip in Matt Garza, there is seemingly never a shortage of quality pitchers taking the hill up in Minneapolis. It’s been a strength of the organization and the backbone on which a perennial division contender was built.

Well, it looks like they’ve done it once again. After losing Santana and Silva this winter, they handed a rotation spot to Nick Blackburn, a former 29th round selection in the 2001 draft who turned himself into a prospect through a volume of minor league success. As we can see from the pitch type data available here on FanGraphs, Blackburn’s stuff isn’t overpowering; he throws a 92 MPH fastball, an 88 MPH cut fastball (the pitches labeled as sliders are probably also cut fastballs), and a 75 MPH curveball, along with one or two change-ups per game. None of these pitches are a true knockout pitch, which is part of the reason his strikeout rates aren’t particularly high, and he wasn’t taken seriously as a prospect before 2007.

Through three starts, however, Blackburn is solidifying himself as a legitimate major league starting pitcher. Below are the two graphs that tell the story of his skillset and why it works.

Through his first 17 innings of 2008, Blackburn has shown impeccable command (less than two walks per nine innings) and pounded the zone with sinkers (60% groundball rate). While this isn’t as sexy as blowing hitters away with 96 MPH fastballs or a power curve, the combination of throwing strikes and getting ground balls is a proven winner. This is the Aaron Cook/Jake Westbrook path to success – pound the strike zone with pitches at the knees, don’t put anyone on base without making them swing, and let your infielders do the work.

Blackburn’s minor league data suggests that he probably won’t keep getting groundballs at quite this rate, and he’s unlikely to post an ERA below 4.00 this year, but he’s clearly showing that he’s got enough movement on his sinker and command of three pitches to keep hitters off balance and succeed as a pitch to contact starter. Chalk up another success story for the Twins pitching development machine.

Last year, Kyle Kendrick finished fifth in NL Rookie of the Year voting, following a successul 3/5 season with the Phillies. His performance supremely aided a depleted starting rotation and he was expected to be a key cog in their plans this year. Due to his low strikeout count and high home run total, Kendrick’s 3.87 ERA translated to a 4.90 FIP. All of the projection systems pegged him to experience a severe regression in 2008 and, after his first two starts, said systems hit the nail on the head. After his first two starts, Kendrick had lasted only 7.1 IP, surrendering 12 hits and eight walks while striking out just one batter. With an ERA of 6.14, a WHIP hovering near the 3.00 mark, and a ghastly K:BB of 0.13, Kendrick seemed primed for a sophomore slump.

Prior to last night’s game against the Astros, manager Charlie Manuel told broadcaster Chris Wheeler that Kendrick had to stay out of “hafta’ counts” to be successful. Inquiring what that meant, Manuel told Wheeler that Kendrick had to avoid counts wherein he would “hafta'” throw a strike. Manuel continued to say that, because Kendrick’s stuff is not overpowering, he needed to get ahead of batters; when he got himself into counts of 2-0, 3-1, or 3-0 batters could wait and rake. Coming into this start, here are Kendrick’s numbers against in these counts:

• After 2-0: 7 PA, 1-4, 2B, 2 BB, K, SF
• After 3-1: 8 PA, 0-3, 4 BB, SF
• After 3-0: 2 PA, 0-1, BB, K

And here are his numbers when throwing a first pitch strike: 22 PA, 5-18, 3 2B, 4 BB, 4 K.

From these numbers it appears that batters did not necessarily feast on Kendrick in these counts; however, he gave up two sacrifice flies and walked seven batters, which greatly contributed to his 11 surrendered runs on the season (5 earned). Of the 44 batters he faced first pitch strikes were thrown to just 22 of them, 50 percent.

From watching the starts it was evident Kendrick either got behind batters and struggled to recover or got ahead of hitters and proceeded to nibble until he lost them. Manuel told Kendrick to attack the batters and, last night at least, he surely did. Here is last night’s breakdown of his performance:

• After 2-0: 1 PA, L-9
• After 3-1: 1 PA, K
• After 3-0: Never had a 3-0 count
• After 0-1: 17 PA, 3-17, HR, 4 K

Kendrick really changed his approach, throwing a first pitch strike to 17 batters; as mentioned before he had done this just 18 times in his prior two starts. He only found himself in “hafta’ counts” twice and neither effected him. The game graph is below and his end line looked like: 7 IP, 4 H, 2 ER, 1 BB, 5 K.

He threw 68 strikes out of 96 pitches, a much higher strike percentage than his previous two starts–91 strikes and 74 balls in 165 pitches prior to last night. Ironically, he lost the game as Roy Oswalt finally regained his form. If the Phillies seriously want to contend, Kendrick will need to build on this rather than let it be a positive outlier in a mostly negative season.

After three terrific performances to start the year, Tim Hudson finally turned in a stinker last night, giving up four runs on six hits in just three innings of work as the Marlins topped the Braves 6-5. Things had to have looked a little off in the first inning for Hudson, even though he retired the side in order. Hudson got a line out and then a couple of fly ball outs in the first frame, but that’s just not Tim Hudson’s game. When the ball is going in the air, he’s doing something wrong. It’s not a coincidence that he allowed seven fly balls to just two ground balls in his worst start of the season. This is a theme in Atlanta. Here are the pitchers the Braves have run out this year for 10 or more innings, along with their respective GB%:

Tim Hudson: 24 IP, 62.3%
Jair Jurrjens: 18 1/3 IP, 50.0%
Jeff Bennett: 13 2/3 IP, 63.4%
Tom Glavine: 11 1/3 IP, 48.6%
John Smoltz: 11 IP, 57.1%

The league average ground ball rate is 44%. The Braves, as a team, have a ground ball rate of 53%. Not surprisingly, they’ve also allowed just nine home runs to date, which is one of the main reasons they’ve been able to keep runs off the board. Atlanta has quietly been collecting extreme ground ball pitchers for the last several years, picking up undervalued assets such as Bennett and Peter Moylan to complement a rotation of guys who pound the bottom of the strike zone.

With a staff of sinker ball strike throwers, the Braves have the makings of a pitching staff that could give the National League fits this year. While they may stand at 5-9 currently, they’ve shown enough in the first few weeks of the season that New York and Philadelphia should be getting a little nervous about their friends down south. A pitching staff that can induce this many ground balls is a pitching staff they can win with.

Taken directly from the FanGraphs Glossary, WPA is the difference in win expectancy (WE) between the start of the play and the end of the play. That difference is then credited/debited to the batter and the pitcher. While venturing to a website like this implies prior knowledge of WPA I always like to err on the unknowing side. Since baseball is zero-sum game, everything positive is cancelled out by something negative; a home run is very positive for the hitter but equally negative for the pitcher. Due to this, the WPA of a winning team in any given game will add up to +.500; that of a losing team will be -.500.

Keeping this in mind, let’s take a look at this afternoon’s Diamondbacks/Giants game:

The matchup of Brandon Webb and Barry Zito ultimately resulted in a 4-1 Diamondbacks victory and, according to WPA, it was pretty much all due to Brandon Webb. The former Cy Young Award winner went for 8 IP, 3 H, 1 ER, 2 BB, 5 K, and a pitching WPA of +.337. On top of that, as evidenced by the graph above, Webb also added a two-run single. His hit put the DBacks ahead 2-0 and turned out to be the biggest play of the game; the WPA for the single play was +.165. Since the hit proved to be so significant Webb ended with a batting WPA of +.210.

Add both of them up and Webb’s WPA comes to +.547. As mentioned at the start, the net sum WPA of a winning team will be +.500.

Webb not only shut the Giants down for eight innings of great pitching but added the biggest offensive play of the game; the LI of his at bat was 2.96. Of course, watching the game or highlights of it would explain that it was not a laser sharp single, but the fact is that the blooper fell in, two runs scored, and that was all Webb needed.

The problem with looking solely at WPA in this case is that Webb’s single came with the bases loaded so he could not have knocked in the runs without his teammates doing their part to get on base. This is where WPA/LI comes in. The stat also goes by the nickname “context neutral wins” and tracks the contributions with the Leverage Index aspect removed. It is not calculated by dividing the overall WPA by the overall LI but rather dividing the WPA and LI of every single play and then adding everything together. With regards to this particular game, and Webb’s single in particular, the WPA and LI were high because the situation existed as a result of others getting on base. Webb had nothing to do with them reaching base and so using WPA to determine whether or not he single-handedly beat the Giants would not necessarily be accurate; the WPA/LI would determine exactly what he individually contributed to the game.

Looking at the WPA and LI of each play in this game, Webb’s WPA/LI from a pitching standpoint adds up to +.328, not much different than the +.337 WPA. His hitting, however, lessens quite a bit due to the context that padded his batting WPA. From a context neutral standpoint, his batting WPA/LI comes to +.067. Though still qualifying as a positive contribution it is much less than the +.210 WPA. Overall, adding them together, Webb’s WPA/LI for this game was +.395. While he did not single-handedly beat the Giants he would definitely win the Game MVP award for contributing much more to his team’s victory than anyone else.

So far, Andruw Jones hasn’t had the start to his Dodger career that anyone would have hoped for. His .149/.259/.234 line would make him a decent hitting pitcher, but as an $18 million dollar per year slugging outfielder, it’s pretty miserable. Is there something we can see in the graphs here that might give us an idea of why he’s struggled out of the gates?

The batted ball distribution in 2008 shows two clear changes from his career norms; a nearly 20% uptick in ground ball rate, which corresponds to declines in flyball and line drive rates. Instead of lifting the ball and driving it, Jones is hitting the ball on the ground at a rate that would categorize him as a slash-and-dash hitter who uses his speed to try to leg out infield singles. Perhaps 10 years ago, he might have been able to make that work, but not anymore. He relies on his abilities in the box to get him on base, and he’s just not capable of creating offense while he’s pounding the ball into the dirt.

The sample is still small enough, so we shouldn’t jump to any conclusions about this being a definite change in skills. However, if you’re looking for a sign that Andruw is breaking out of his slump, look for him to get the ball in the air – when he starts getting lift in his swing again, the results will follow naturally.

I posed this in the comments thread of the Appreciating Pat Burrell article but feel it is an important enough question to merit its own post. In an NPR interview, author Dan Gordon discusses the psychology of die-hard fans in an effort to promote his new book, Your Brain on Cubs. Towards the 31-minute mark of that interview Gordon says something interesting: He essentially says that Cubs fans are able to stay dedicated because they have come close many times to the World Series and so the fans know how sweet it will be when the team eventually wins a championship.

I want to combine this thought with something I heard last year on the radio and bring forth a question. Quite simply, would you rather be a fan of a team like the Marlins or the Giants? Not necessarily the specific teams or how they look in 2007 and 2008, but would you rather be a fan of a perennial contender for eight years or a team that would win two world series in that span and be below average the other six years?

The Giants had a winning record every season between 1997 and 2004, finishing in either first or second place; their average record in that span was 92-70. They made the playoffs four times and were within two games of either the division or the wild card in three of the other four seasons. The Giants made the playoffs or fell just short in seven of the eight years in that span. The Marlins, on the other hand, had winning records in just three of those eight years. In 1997 and 2003, when they won the world series, they won 92 and 91 games respectively; in 2004, a year removed from their second championship, they went 83-79, just barely breaking .500. Their average W-L in that span is 77-85.

Now let’s revisit the question posed at the start of the post. Strip away what we currently know about the Giants and Marlins: The actual teams are irrelevant and we need to focus on the type of team each is to answer properly. Would you rather be a fan of a team that would go 92-70 each year and give you a shot at the playoffs and/or world series, but not necessarily win a championship? Or would you rather be a fan of a team that would go 77-85 every year, but would step it up to 90+ wins just twice and win the world series in both of those seasons?

On the one hand you have the idea of winning two championships which, I’ll admit, I’ve never felt as a Phillies fan. Then again, on the other hand, you have the idea of whether or not you would even watch your team if they went 77-85 or worse in several consecutive seasons. For instance, I know that last year, I cared less about what the Phillies did in the playoffs than I did that they simply got into the playoffs. I’m curious to hear thoughts on which team would have a bigger Web-fandom.

Last night, Philadelphia was witness to a pair of comebacks. First, the one that will get headlines.

The Phillies had a dramatic come from behind win last night despite trailing 3-0 heading into the bottom of the 9th inning. They won a game where their Win Expectancy hit 4.4% with just three outs to go, with Pedro Feliz playing the role of hero after his game winning double down the line scored Geoff Jenkins. Sharing in the heroes spotlight will be Pat Burrell, who hit a game tying home run just two batters before the game ended. Burrell’s blast and Feliz’s double are the moments that Phillies fans will remember from this game for the rest of the year.

However, the inning started with a comeback of its own, and one that won’t get nearly as much attention. Chris Snelling hit a home run to right field to make it a 3-1 ballgame, starting the rally that would lead to the Phillies win. And while a solo home run might not seem like much, it was a triumphant moment for people like me who have been rooting for Snelling for the better part of ten years. And really, anyone who knows any part of his story should be rooting for this kid. The former Mariner prospect’s career has been derailed by injuries, but he hasn’t lost the quirky personality or love for baseball that made rational analysts form the Cult of Doyle.

In an era where media conglomerates won’t stop telling us what is wrong with baseball, Chris Snelling launching a ball into the right field seats is everything that is right about baseball. Long live Doyle.

The DL bound Joe Borowski has apparently had soreness in his right triceps that the Indians staff decided to let him pitch through for weeks. I guess that helps explain his 18.00 ERA and super slow fastball.

Despite leading the AL with 45 saves last year, he also led it in blown saves with 8 and his ERA of 5.04 was by far the highest of any closer last year. He did have pretty decent peripherals though, with a K/9 of nearly 8 and a BB/9 of 2.33. His season was mainly marred by an extremely high .348 BABIP and a pretty sub par LOB% of 68.4%. Typically both of these will regress toward the league averages in following years.

The main problem with Borowski is that he’s a bit of an extreme fly ball pitcher and will be prone to giving up home runs. Last year he allowed 9, which was just 4 home runs shy of Al Reyes‘ reliever leading 13.

So the question is, if Borowski is out for an extended period of time, who will get his job?

Rafael Betancourt is the obvious choice. He had a gaudy K/BB of nearly 9 last year, and a 1.47 ERA in 79+ innings of work. He also entered games in high leverage, non-save situations last season with a gmLI of 1.78. Borowski entered games in slightly higher leverage situations with a gmLI of 1.94. Even though he has an ERA over 5 this year, his strikeouts and walks are almost identical to last year, so there’s probably not much to worry about.

Rafael Perez had nearly as great a season as Betancourt did in 2007. He struck out over a batter an inning and had a BB/9 of just 2.23, which led him to a career low 1.78 ERA. This year his ERA is over 8 and he’s allowed a few more walks then he should. But, he’s only pitched 4 innings this year and allowed his only 4 earned runs in one of his appearances so definitely take those numbers with a grain of salt.

Masa Kobayashi has had a solid season so far with a with a 2.08 ERA and 3 strikeouts and 1 walk in 4+ innings. He amassed over 200 saves in Japan, and technically has more career saves than anyone on the Indians. Kaz Sasaki and Takashi Saito had zero problems stepping right into the closer roles when they first arrived in the majors.

Finally, there’s Jensen Lewis who last year had a 34/10 strikeout to walk ratio in 29 innings pitched with a 2.15 ERA. This year, it appears to be more of that same excellence, though his K/9 is down to 8 from 10, but small sample size and all that….

Here’s how they’ve been utilized this year so far, according to gmLI:

Joe Borowski – 1.86
Jensen Lewis – 1.61
Rafael Perez – 1.48
Rafael Betancourt – 1.27
Masa Kobayashi – 0.23

Borowski should have the highest gmLI as the closer and does. Oddly enough, Jensen and Perez have entered the game in higher leverage situations than Betancourt has, despite his reputation as a fire putter-outer. Kobayashi is clearly not used in confidence, but there are only so many high leverage situations and he just hasn’t had the opportunity with such an overall excellent bullpen.

Judging from tonight’s game, Betancourt was being “saved” to close out the game and was not utilized in a tie game in the 8th. Nor was he used in the 7th with the Indians up 2-1 and the Red Sox threatening with a man on 1st and 2nd.

So for the moment, it looks like Betancourt is going to get to close out games, but the Indians have a pretty stellar bullpen and I think if needed any of these guys could handle the closer job.

When Borowski comes back and if he’s healthy, chances are he’ll be given a shot to reclaim his role as closer. And while he’s not as bad as he’s often made out to be, he really is one of the worst options in what appears to be a very stacked Indians bullpen.