Moving right along on our look at the ten best offensive plays of the season, we find ourselves ensconced in a summer affair between the Yankees and Blue Jays, when Jason Giambi and his memorable moustache loomed large. On June 5th, Chien-Ming Wang squared off against Dustin McGowan in what turned out to be a huge come from behind win at Yankee Stadium. Though the Yanks got out to an early 2-0 lead, a Melky Cabrera error, a two-run single by Matt Stairs, and a two-run double from Lyle Overbay combined to give the Jays a 7-2 lead when the top of the fifth finally came to its close. From there, the game graph below beautifully illustrates what transpired:

The Yankees slowly inched their way back, scoring two in the bottom of the fifth on a Bobby Abreu groundout and Alex Rodriguez sacrifice fly. Now trailing 7-4, they held the Blue Jays in check in the top of the sixth, before a two-run homer off the bat of Wilson Betemit brought them within one run. The game remained 7-6 in favor of the Jays until the top of the ninth inning. Entering the frame, the Yankees had just a 17.1% probability of winning the game.

Alex Rios singled. Scott Rolen singled as well. Matt Stairs then uncorked a ground rule double, scoring Rios, and extending the lead to 8-6. At this juncture, the Yankees were reduced to a 3.4% probability of winning! Farnsworth went onto escape what had become a bases loaded jam without further damage, increasing the Yankees expectancy to a mere 10% on the nose.

BJ Ryan entered the game, looking for the save, and immediately retired Derek Jeter on a groundout. After Bobby Abreu lined out to centerfield, the Yankees had a 1.6% probability of winning this game. 1.6%! Alex Rodriguez then singled, and advanced to second base on a defensive indifference. Just 5.1% now. Hideki Matsui singled A-Rod home, cutting the score to 8-7, and doubling their expectancy to 10.4%. In stepped Jason Giambi.

This should have been Jorge Posada’s spot in the order, but he had been lifted earlier for pinch-runner Shelley Duncan. Giambi was coming off the bench to deliver in a crucial spot. With Matsui on first base, Giambi did just that, by launching a walkoff two-run homer into the stands. The Yankees would win the game, having just a 10.4% likelihood of doing so as Giambi entered the batters box. While the sixth biggest play of the season resulted in an expectancy swing of 83.0%, Giambi’s home run vastly exceeded Velez’s triple, with a WPA of .896; in other words, his home run increased their chances of winning by 89.6%.

Yankee Stadium may be no more, and this may have been the first year in forever that the Yankees missed the playoffs, but they had at least one extremely memorable moment this past season, and it happened to be the fifth biggest offensive play of the season.

Today, Michael Young was named the Gold Glove winner for the American League at shortstop, a selection that rivals some of the worst picks the managers have ever made. Young is, by pretty much every defensive metric out there, one of the worst defensive shortstops in the game. He’s a second baseman playing out of position, and his lack of range shows every time a ball is hit up the middle.

However, this column isn’t about the Gold Gloves. They’ve been a joke of an award for years, and most people realize that by now. Instead, this is about the amazing ability of the mainstream media, along with people in the game, to totally ignore the collapse of Young’s value over the last three years.

In 2005, Young was a pretty terrific player, even with the poor defense. He hit .331/.385/.513 in 732 plate appearances, combining quantity with quality to post a 2.50 WPA/LI. Even knocking 10 to 15 runs off his total for his lack of range, he was still an all-star quality player, because the bat was that good.

That’s the player he’s still remembered as – an offensive force at a premium position. It hasn’t been true for three years, however.

In 2006, he .314/.356/.459, still good by shortstop standards, but a pretty substantial drop in offensive value nonetheless. His WPA/LI fell to 0.86, meaning he was about 1.6 wins worse as a hitter than the season before. However, because he accumulated 217 hits, the drop in production mostly went unnoticed. In fact, before the next season began, Young was given a 5 year, $80 million contract extension that covered 2009 to 2013. The Rangers saw him lose a substantial portion of his value, and reacted by giving him a massive contract that covered his age 33 to 37 seasons.

Clearly, Texas thought he was more like his ’05 performance than his ’06 performance, and would rebound in ’07. He didn’t – Again, he hit racked up 200 hits, but his line fell to .315/.366/.418, losing even more of his power, and again seeing his WPA/LI decline, this time to 0.73. For two years, he’d be an above average (but not great) hitter, even while posting one of the highest averages in the league.

In 2008, the average deserted him, as he fell to .284/.339/.402, and his WPA/LI fell to -0.60. For the first time since 2003, he was a below average hitter. For a guy who is a pretty significant liability defensively, his value is built on his bat, and when that disappears, he becomes a problem.

Michael Young heads into 2009 with $80 million guaranteed to him over the next five years. To justify that salary, he’d have to be an all-star caliber player, worth approximately three wins more than a replacement level shortstop.

In reality, projections for Young in ’09 have him as slightly below average with the bat, as he comes in about -5 runs or so. The position adjustment for shortstop is about +10 runs, so that puts him back up above average, but he gives all of that right back with his poor defense, where he usually ranks as a -15 or so defender. Finally, we have to add 20 runs to convert from average to replacement level, leaving us with the following:

-5 offense + 10 position adjustment – 15 defense + 20 replacement level = +10 runs.

Michael Young’s current skillset makes him worth about one win above a replacement level shortstop, the kind you could get floating around on waivers. One win. The Rangers are going to pay him $16 million for that one win, and hope like crazy that the decline doesn’t continue at its current rate.

Meanwhile, most of baseball just continues to believe that Young is a premium player, the kind of guy winning teams are built around. It’s just not true – he’s not even league average at this point in his career.

Don’t believe the hype. Michael Young just isn’t very good.

The Graduate: Chris Perez | Born: July 1985 | Right-Handed Pitcher

The former supplemental first-round pick made his highly-anticipated MLB debut in 2008 and held his own. In 41.2 innings, Chris Perez allowed 34 hits and posted rates of 4.75 BB/9 and 9.07 K/9. He gave up his fair share of fly balls, with a GB% of just 38.7. His fastball averaged out at 95.2 mph during his stay in the Majors. He relied on it a little too much though – three-quarters of the time, with his slider coming in next at 24.6%. Perez is considered the Cardinals’ closer of the future.

The Riser: Jess Todd | Born: April 1986 | Right-Handed Pitcher

Jess Todd has done nothing but post solid pro numbers. The former college reliever has acclimatized well to the rigors of starting in pro ball. In less than two full seasons, Todd made it to Triple-A and held his own in four starts. He spent the majority of the year in Double-A where he allowed 79 hits in 103 innings. Todd posted rates of 2.10 BB/9 and 7.08 K/9. He has a solid fastball in the low-90s, a slider and a developing change-up.

The Tumbler: Colby Rasmus | Born: August 1986 | Outfielder

It’s not completely fair to list Colby Rasmus in this category. Yes, he had a disappointing season, but the outfielder was playing at Triple-A at the age of 21. He also struggled with injuries that should be fully cleared up by the start of 2009 with no residual affect. Rasmus hit .251/.347/.396 with an ISO of .145 in 331 at-bats. His batting average has dropped each of the last three seasons – from .310 to .275 to .251, which is cause for concern. On the plus side, his rates of 12.9 BB% and 21.8 K% are on par with those during his breakout 2007 campaign – which suggests he was not completely over-matched.

The ’08 Draft Pick: Niko Vasquez | Born: February 1989 | Shortstop

Niko Vasquez was select out of a Nevada high school in the third round of the 2008 amateur draft. He slipped a bit in the draft after an inconsistent prep season that left a lot of scouts wondering if he could play shortstop in pro ball. Defensively in pro ball, he was steady with 11 errors made in 63 games and average range. Vasquez had no issues with his bat in his pro debut. At Rookie Ball, he hit .317/.401/.462 with a .144 ISO in 208 at-bats. Vasquez posted rates of 12.2 BB% and 25 K%. He was promoted to A-ball for a late-season, 11-game stint and struggled with a line of .128/.209/.154.

The ’09 Sleeper: Nick Additon | Born: December 1987 | Left-Handed Pitcher

Nick Additon was no where near the prospect radar coming into the 2008 season, despite solid debut numbers in 2007. He was originally signed by the Cardinals as a 47th round selection out of a community college. Additon has a below-average fastball, but the southpaw has a plus-change-up and excellent control. In A-ball in 2008, he allowed 92 hits in 119 innings of work. He posted rates of 2.65 BB% and 8.17 K/9. He also received a late-season promotion to High-A where he posted a 0.50 ERA in three starts. Double-A will be the true test for Additon.

Up Next: The New York Yankees

For the most part, the clutchiest plays of 2008 came in the form of walkoff home runs, and why not? These are usually the most dramatic plays, and WPA is appropriately defined by Dave Studeman as “the story stat.” Thus far, we have seen Jason Michaels, Josh Hamilton, Nate McLouth, and Nick Swisher go deep to compile the seventh through tenth biggest offensive plays of the year, but spot number six belongs to Eugenio Velez of the Giants. Velez, the rookie second baseman with plenty of speed, broke the home run mold in his huge play. The graph for the game, which took place on September 10, is below. Notice how you can barely even see his name register:

Actually, this graph makes the big spike appear like it belongs to Chris Young, not Velez, since Eugenio’s play is hidden in the upper portion. The game saw a matchup of Brad Hennessey and Dan Haren, which remained scoreless through two innings. In the third, Stephen Drew smacked a solo home run to give the Snakes a 1-0 lead. In the bottom portion of the same inning, Velez hit a two-run double to give his Giants the 2-1 lead. Foreshadowing?

The score would remain 2-1 until the ninth inning, when things really went haywire. The Diamondbacks began the frame with a 16.1% probability of winning the game. Brian Wilson, the Giants closer, entered the game and began by issuing a free pass to Chris Snyder. Alexander Romero came in to pinch-run, and Augie Ojeda sacrificed him into scoring position. Tony Clark followed with a walk, before Jeff Salazar relieved him on baserunning duties. Stephen Drew then flew out, meaning the Diamondbacks had runners on first and second with two outs. Their win probability was a mere 14% at this point.

Chris Young delivered a two-run triple, blowing the save for Wilson, and putting the Snakes ahead 3-2. Adam Dunn flew out to end the frame, but the damage was done. DBacks closer Brandon Lyon then entered, hoping to avoid the same fate as Wilson. The Giants had just a 19.8% shot of winning the game at this juncture. Following a Pablo Sandoval groundout, Bengie Molina singled. He, of course, was pinch-run for. Travis Ishikawa then grounded out, advancing the runner to second. Lyon walked Aaron Rowand to literally set up the exact same scenario that Wilson found himself in during the top half of the inning.

Velez stepped in and, after taking two strikes to go behind in the count 0-2, hit a two-run triple of his own, winning the game for the Giants in the process. With just a 17% probability of winning as his plate appearance began, the sixth biggest play of the season saw an expectancy swing of 83%, just barely ahead of the 82.9% in the seventh play. This was definitely a wild game, as not only did both closers blow saves in the ninth inning, they did so by giving up two-run triples!

A continuation of the series of retrospectives looking back at the regular season and how teams fared. They will be presented, from first to last, in order of their run differential as given by the BaseRuns formula and adjusted for strength of schedule, which I feel is the best measurement of a team’s actual talent level.

Number Twenty: Oakland Athletics

As the Tigers dominated at the plate and failed on the mound and in the field, the Athletics excelled on the mound and in the field and failed miserably at the plate. Oakland projected to score only 650 runs, 30 fewer than any other American League team. However, they were also one of just seven teams to project out to less than 700 runs allowed and came in fourth overall at 683. All in all, while it wasn’t impressive overall, it was a good showing given the expectations coming into 2008 and the moves made by GM Billy Beane to re-shape the team for the future.

The trading of Nick Swisher and Dan Haren had most expecting the Athletics to dwell in the cellar. Those who saw Oakland’s pitching and defense as being enough to overcome a dismal offense were rare, but that’s just what they did, hanging around through the trading deadline. That they were still within shouting distance come that time makes Beane’s commitment to his rebuild all the more noteworthy. Faced with the pressure of unexpected quasi-contention, Beane didn’t back off and took the opportunity to trade the finally healthy Rich Harden at a good price to the Cubs. A week later, Beane would trade Joe Blanton to Philadelphia for some more minor league talent.

Some would be tempted to connect the dots between those trade and Oakland’s subsequent falling off the map performance wise, but the seeds for that collapse were already sewn when the team was constructed. That’s why Beane was correct in not deviating from his planned course of action. Furthermore, though the A’s went just 2-19 over a span from July 12 to August 8, the main culprit was the offense not the now depleted pitching. The aforementioned offense was abysmal, scoring just 3.4 runs per game in July and a shocking 2.7 runs per game in August. It was that, not the loss of Harden and Blanton, that killed them.

Billy Beane has done a commendable job building up Oakland’s farm system over the past 12 months but he also needs a large portion of that farm system to produce because right now the hitting talent at the major league level is contemplating filing for endangered species protection. Beane did get off to a good start by locking up Mark Ellis to a deal that is so favorable to Oakland the MLBPA must be throwing a hissy fit. Next on the winter check list will be his annual bargain free agent hitter signing (Jason Giambi?) and the possible trading of Huston Street to a team wanting to avoid the price tags of Brian Fuentes and Francisco Rodriguez.

One of my favorite moments in baseball this decade occurred when Bobby Abreu broke all home run derby records in Detroit, garnering thunderous applause from hordes of fans who, quite honestly, had probably never heard of him before. Watching Josh Hamilton’s performance in the 2008 derby, however, seemed to dwarf that moment. Putting on that display at Yankee Stadium, complete with his overly discussed past personal issues, was definitely a highlighted moment of this past season. About a week prior to the derby, Hamilton put that beautiful swing to use to deliver the seventh biggest swing in win expectancy from an offensive standpoint.

As you can see, the game took place on July 9, against the Angels. In case this moment has yet to click for you, this was the highly publicized game during which Josh Hamilton hit the walkoff home run against Francisco Rodriguez. Without exaggerating, I probably saw the highlight fifteen times from July 9 until the end of the month. Granted, the play itself was pretty amazing to watch develop.

The game was knotted at 2-2 until Juan Rivera hit a two run home run in the seventh inning. This put the Halos up 4-2, and the score would remain the same until the bottom of the ninth. Rodriguez entered the game and, at that juncture of the season, had posted a 1.88 ERA and .538 OPS against in 41 appearances. He had also recorded 35 saves out of his record-breaking saves total.

At the start of the frame, the Rangers had a 13.3% probability of winning. Ramon Vazquez led off with a walk, increasing the expectancy to 23.7%. K-Rod promptly fanned Ian Kinsler to bring it back down to 14.4%. Frank Catalanotto then grounded out, advancing Vazquez to second base. Despite having a runner in scoring position, in trailing by two runs, with two outs, the Rangers had a 6.4% probability of winning the game. Had Hamilton’s big play come next, it would have been, by far, the top play of the year. What actually followed was an RBI single to leftfield off the bat of Michael Young, increasing their chances to 12.6%.

Young then stole second base with Hamilton at the dish, which resulted in a jump to 17.1%. Then, on a 3-1 count, Hamilton demolished the ball, hitting a walkoff two-run homer. The play, which saw a swing in win expectancy of 82.9%, was the seventh biggest of the season. K-Rod didn’t necessarily have a breakdown afterwards, preventing a run from scoring in each of his next seven outings, but Hamilton’s home run definitely helped cap off an extremely impressive first half for a player with an extremely interesting story.

Earlier this week, the Elias Sports Bureau released the official rankings that determine a player’s free agent rating, classifying him as a Type A or Type B free agent. Depending on the classification, different levels of compensation are awarded if the player refuses an arbitration offer and signs with another team.

Now, let’s just be honest – the Elias Ratings are horrible. The fact that MLB still uses them is laughable. Almost everyone reading this site could create a better rating system for evaluating major league players in about five minutes. But, this is what MLB chooses to use, for whatever reason.

Every year, however, the horribleness of the system screws over a decent enough player by categorizing them as a Type A free agent, thus requiring any team that wants to sign them to forfeit a high value draft choice. For these players, interest in offering them a contract nosedives as soon as they’re offered arbitration by their original club, and essentially limits their options to taking a one year deal to return to where they ended the previous season or try to take such a bargain contract that another team will view it as worth surrendering the pick for.

This year, the glaring example of a guy who got hosed by the Elias Rankings is Damaso Marte.

Despite his struggles in the Bronx, Marte’s a pretty lefty setup guy, able to get hitters from both sides of the plate out and missing a lot of bats. The Yankees, with their endless supply of cash, will almost certainly offer Marte arbitration. If he takes it, they get a solid enough setup guy without a long term commitment. And if he doesn’t, they’d get a pick either in the 16-30 range (if he signs with a winner) or the 40-55 range (if he signs with a rebuilding club) for next year’s draft.

There are quite a few teams that Marte could help as a late inning setup man, but how many are going to be willing to surrender a top 50 pick in order to give him a multi-year deal? I’d venture to go with none.

Had Marte been classified as a Type B free agent, he’d probably have several two or three year offers to consider, perhaps from cities he might enjoy pitching in other than New York. However, because Elias decided that he’s good enough to be a Type A, and MLB teams realize that the system is stupid, Marte’s probably looking at a one year deal to remain with the Yankees.

Perhaps next year he’ll pitch poorly enough to be a Type B, which will actually grant him real free agency for a change. Hey, MLB, your free agent system is completely broken, and in the case of Damaso Marte, has taken true free agency away from him. Why don’t you do something about it?

The Graduate: Matt Joyce | Born: August 1984 | Outfielder

For the third season in a row, Detroit received an unexpected contribution from a young outfielder. Matt Joyce did his best Brent Clevlen/Ryan Raburn (Who also plays the infield) impressions in 2008… and Detroit can only hope he doesn’t follow their subsequent leads during his return engagement in 2009 (Both players fell on their faces in their second MLB seasons). This past season, Joyce hit .252/.339/.492 with 12 homers in 242 at-bats. He posted rates of 11.4 BB% and 26.9 K%. His .240 ISO was well above average for his minor league career, although he has shown more power each season. At worst, he should be a productive fourth outfielder.

The Riser: Rick Porcello | Born: December 1988 | Right-Handed Pitcher

The Tigers managed to give away just about every prospect in the system – save for Rick Porcello (Who thankfully wasn’t eligible to be traded last winter due to draft/minor league service time). Despite not pitching in his draft season due to signing late, Porcello was fast-tracked to High-A ball as a teenager and posted a 2.66 ERA in 24 starts. He allowed just 116 hits in 125 innings pitched and posted rates of 2.38 BB/9 and 5.18 K/9. The lack of strikeouts is obviously a concern, but Porcello has excellent stuff and is just learning how to get pro hitters out. Even so, don’t be surprised to see him in Detroit in the second half of 2009. The Tigers organization is not afraid to rush young players, and Porcello is that good.

The Tumbler: Michael Hollimon | Born: June 1982 | Shortstop

Michael Hollimon showed an intriguing mix of power and speed in his first three pro seasons but things went very, very wrong for him in 2008. Despite making his MLB debut in 2008, he hit just .211/.306/.420 in 331 at-bats in Triple-A. He posted rates of 12.9 BB% and (ugh) 32.9 K% in 2008. He failed to hit double-digits in stolen bases for the first time in full-season ball but posted an ISO of .208. After the season, it was announced that Hollimon – already 26 with limited MLB experience – would miss much of 2009 after undergoing surgery on the labrum in his non-throwing shoulder.

The ’08 Draft Pick: Ryan Perry | Born: February 1987 | Right-Handed Pitcher

Detroit took a number of hard-throwing college relievers in the 2008 draft in the hopes of having them move quickly through the system to compensate for a lack of existing depth. Ryan Perry is considered the best of the bunch. Unfortunately, he did show some rough edges in his pro debut in High-A ball. He allowed 15 hits and seven walks in 11.2 innings, despite also striking out 12 batters. Perry’s fastball can reach the upper-90s but it lacks movement. His slider, when it’s on, has been compared to Brad Lidge’s breaking ball.

The ’09 Sleeper: Brandon Hamilton | Born: December 1988 | Right-Handed Pitcher

Brandon Hamilton’s selection out of high school in the 2007 draft was overshadowed by Porcello, but he is also a very promising pitcher. Hamilton began the 2008 season in extended spring training and then received a promotion to A-ball and allowed 34 hits in 32.1 innings. He struck out 22 hitters, but his control deserted him and he allowed 28 walks. Hamilton was then demoted to Rookie Ball where he pitched in nine games. He posted a 1.97 ERA and allowed 27 hits in 38.2 innings. He walked 13 batters and struck out 42. He should open 2009 back in A-ball, if healthy.

Up Next: The St. Louis Cardinals

There are a few signs that winter is upon us; the weather turns cold, it gets dark earlier, and the Yankees spend a lot of money. You can add these events to death and taxes, and this year should be no different.

With Jason Giambi, Andy Pettitte, Mike Mussina, Carl Pavano, Bobby Abreu, and Ivan Rodriguez all having their contracts expire, the Yankees lost about $86 million in committed salaries from the end of the ’08 season. $86 million.

Some of that will get redistributed to players already on the roster, such as raises for Alex Rodriguez, Xavier Nady, Robinson Cano, and Chien-Ming Wang. However, even if the Yankees just maintain a $205 million payroll (a $5 million decrease from 2008), they’ll still have about $65 million to spend even after taking care of the guys already under contract.

What can they buy for $65 million this winter? How about CC Sabathia and Andy Pettitte to fill the rotation with a side of Mark Teixeira to play first base? Or if Sabathia decides he doesn’t want to pitch in New York, they could try to get both A.J. Burnett and Ryan Dempster for a similar cash output.

Or, they could take a flyer on Ben Sheets‘ health and use the money saved on the rotation to go after Manny Ramirez, who could team with Teixeira to return their line-up to the most fearsome in the game.

Regardless of which way they decide to head, and who ends up taking their money, it seems clear that the Yankees are going to land at least two big name free agents this winter, and it could easily be three or four. There’s no doubt that Scott Boras has his eye on the Bronx as a cash cow for the free agents he represents, and we’re likely going to see some big money press conferences in the next few months.

The Evil Empire is about reload.

Moving right along in our look at the top ten offensive swings in win expectancy, we find ourselves at spot number eight, which happens to involve another member of the Pittsburgh Pirates. They might not know how to win, but apparently they know how to win big. The eighth biggest offensive play of the season took place on April 14, when the Pirates visited the Dodgers. Hiroki Kuroda took on Zach Duke, and both delivered somewhat stellar performances. Duke failed to strike out a batter but still recorded a quality start, and Kuroda had finished his first three starts with a 5.0 K/BB and 2.89 ERA. Still, Kuroda’s outing was not enough to end with a victory for the Dodgers. The game graph is below:

The Pirates took an early lead thanks to a two-run home run off the bat of Jose Bautista, but the Dodgers slowly crawled back into the game. Shockingly, their first run came on the heels of an Andruw Jones groundout, meaning that Andruw Jones did, in fact, do something productive. Kuroda then helped his own cause later in the game with an RBI double to knot the game at two.

In the sixth inning, Xavier Nady hit an RBI double of his own to propel the Pirates to a 3-2 lead. In the next half inning, James Loney and Blake DeWitt delivered RBI singles of their own to put the Dodgers in front for the first time at 4-3. When the ninth inning rolled around, the Dodgers led by the same score, and closer Takashi Saito entered the game. At this juncture, the Pirates had a 14.5% probability of winning the game. Doug Mientciewicz flew out to start the frame, reducing their expectancy to 7.8%. Jose Bautista followed with a single, before Saito struck out Luis Rivas. With two outs, and a runner on first base, the Pirates’ win expectancy was just 7.1%.

Adam LaRoche singled to centerfield, moving pinch-runner Brian Bixler up to second base. With two outs and runners on first and second, their win expectancy rose to just 13.2%. Nate McLouth then stepped up to the plate. He took ball one, but on the second pitch, launched a three-run dinger into orbit. The Pirates took the 6-4 lead, but unlike the previous two plays documented, his was not a walkoff hit. Their win expectancy rose by 79.6%, from 13.2% to 92.8%. In the bottom of the ninth, Matt Capps recorded a 1-2-3 save, capping (pun totally intended) quite the unexpected result in this ballgame.