Devised originally in response to a challenge issued by viscount of the internet Rob Neyer, and expanded at the request of nobody, NERD scores represent an attempt to summarize in one number (and on a scale of 0-10) the likely aesthetic appeal or watchability, for the learned fan, of a player or team or game. Read more about the components of and formulae for NERD scores here.

Most Highly Rated Game
New York AL at Los Angeles AL | 19:05 ET
Eovaldi (82.1 IP, 98 xFIP-) vs. Shoemaker (78.2 IP, 101 xFIP-)
The introduction of the wild-card game to baseball’s postseason format in 2012 has problematized slightly what precisely one means when saying that a club has “reached” or “qualified for” the playoffs. Technically, that wild-card game is denoted as a playoff contest. For the team that loses it, however — and for that team’s supporters — the pleasures typically associated with postseason baseball are incredibly short-lived. For that reason, the component of NERD team scores that accounts for a club’s playoff odds — which component is weighted more heavily in direct proportion to the proximity of those playoffs — is informed not by the relevant club’s overall playoff odds, but rather by the club’s odds of reaching the divisional series. Specifically, the closer to 50% a team’s odds of qualifying for the divisional series, the greater positive influence over that team’s NERD score — the logic being that such a club is playing the highest-leverage games in the league.

One finds, in the Yankees and Angels, two of the three clubs in closest proximity to that 50% mark. Regard, the seven clubs within 20 points or less of same:

New York currently possesses the least certain future with regard to the postseason. Pittsburgh trails them by only a slight amount. And then the Anaheims’ divisional-series odds of 37.8% place them third. While it’s probably fair to say that winning or losing this particular game is not of the greatest urgency to either the Yankees or Angels, it’s also accurate to say that urgency is most present in this encounter of all those present on today’s schedule.

Readers’ Preferred Broadcast: Los Angeles AL Television.

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Baseball has seen many changes in the past 100 years. Some changes are significant enough, retrospectively, to define an era. There was the Deadball Era from roughly 1901 to 1919, characterized by an emphasis on pitching, defense, and a low run-scoring environment. The Liveball Era began in 1920, ushered in by Babe Ruth, cleaner baseballs that were easier for batters to see, and rule changes like banning the spitball. When the offense started to overpower the game, more changes were made to temper that environment, like the introduction of the ground-rule double in 1931. Before that, a ball that bounced on the field and over the fence was considered a home run.

There’s Jackie Robinson’s debut in 1946, and the following years when African-Americans finally were permitted to play in the majors. There’s expansion, the lowering of the pitcher’s mound, the introduction of the designated hitter in the American League, free agency, more expansion, newer ballparks, PEDs, testing for PEDs, and an ever-expanding strike zone — all marking the beginning of other, overlapping eras. And then there’s the sabermetrics revolution — using advanced statistical modeling and analysis to construct rosters, manage bullpens, and deploy extreme defensive shifts.

All of these changes in baseball and yet, for the last 100 years, the offensive hierarchy among defensive positions has remained pretty much the same. First basemen, right fielders, and left fielders produce more offense than the average player; catchers, second basemen, and shortstops produce less. It was that way in 1914, in 2014, and in nearly every season in between. Clean ball, dirty ball, higher mound, lower mound, PEDs, no PEDs — whatever the conditions in the game and on the field, first basemen, left fielders, and right fielders have dominated on offense.

Let’s examine more closely this relationship between offensive skill and defensive position — both the historical averages and outlier seasons.

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We keep learning more about baseball. Every year, we learn things we didn’t know. Every year, we have new data to back up things we might’ve already suspected. The level of knowledge is ever-increasing. You’d think that might make baseball analysis easier. The more you know, the more you should be able to say, right? It’s true, now we can say more — and we can say more with data. But if anything, all this knowledge is making everything more complicated. The more we learn about the game, the more we learn about the gray areas. The more we learn about the gray areas, the more we have to hedge against making strong, conclusive statements.

So it’s more complicated to do player analysis, and it’s more complicated to do transaction analysis. At least, it’s more difficult to assign the winner and the loser of a transaction. There are generally too many different things at play. I think it’s notable, then, when strong conclusions are still reached. It’s notable to me when the analytical community comes down strongly on one side of something, because situations are grayer than ever. It must mean something when a firm consensus is reached despite all the complexities.

With decreasing frequency do writers come out strongly against a given transaction. So it’s worth reflecting on the trade that sent Doug Fister from the Tigers to the Nationals. That one didn’t make any sense. That was a pretty clear steal, on the Nationals’ part. Everybody agreed the Tigers didn’t get enough. I know, because I was one of them. The deal looked terribly lopsided at the time, which is something we don’t get to experience so much anymore.

And you know what? It probably was lopsided. The Tigers probably didn’t get enough. The trade legitimately sent waves through the industry. But you have to look at where we are now. Regardless of whether this could’ve been predicted: Robbie Ray looks like he might be emerging. Ray’s talent is coming to the surface.

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