Jazz Chisholm Jr.’s first full season in the major leagues was somehow both a success and a disappointment. League average offensive production from someone who only hit Double-A in 2019, with solid defense to boot? That’ll get you 2 WAR in just over 500 plate appearances, an impressive showing. He cranked 18 homers as well – all in all, a statistically solid debut.

On the other hand, he did it in a way that looked nothing like his minor league numbers. Chisholm’s intrigue had always stemmed from his sneaky power. Despite his diminutive frame – he’s listed at 5-foot-11, but I’d take the under – he put up impressive raw exit velocities and excellent home run numbers. He hit 25 homers in just 501 plate appearances in 2018, then followed it up with another 21 in 458 plate appearances in ’19. Those are serious numbers, and it’s no accident that Eric Longenhagen graded Chisholm’s raw power as a 60 on the 20-80 scale.

Despite his 18 bombs, though, he didn’t really display the thump he’s capable of. It’s not that he didn’t have the raw power we thought he did – he posted an 84th percentile maximum exit velocity – but quite frankly, he just hit too many grounders. You can look at his minor league GB/FB ratios, compare it to last year, and see the change:

Aside from a brief and grounder-heavy rookie ball debut, Chisholm has avoided putting the ball on the ground. You can’t hit a home run on a grounder, no matter how hard you try. That’s how he ended up with average isolated power in 2021 despite his prodigious pop. He just couldn’t elevate, plain and simple.

This season, that’s in the past. He’s come out firing on all cylinders, hitting .295/.337/.611 with six homers in his first 105 plate appearances. He’s probably not going to keep hitting .295, but he probably will keep up his power output, because he’s back to doing what he used to do best: getting the ball in the air with great regularity. His groundball-to-fly ball ratio is back down to 0.76, his 30.6% groundball rate is the 12th-lowest in the majors, and he’s elevating and celebrating as well as he ever did in the minors.

Call it rocketed-ball science: if you have Chisholm’s power, putting the ball in the air is the best thing you can do. In his major league career so far, when Chisholm can’t get the ball in the air (which I defined as launch angles of five degrees or below), he’s hitting .252 with a .289 slugging percentage, good for a .237 wOBA. That’s awful – and that’s when he puts the ball in play. That’s when the good results are supposed to come.

When he gets above the five degree mark, good things start to happen. He’s hitting .421 with an .870 slugging percentage. If you’re a wOBA person, that works out to .531. That’s the good stuff – the kind of premium production on contact scouts expected out of Chisholm. This isn’t some “oh, he’s just on a hot streak in 2022 that’s the majority of his production” nonsense, either; cut 2022 out, and he’s hitting .412 with an .848 slugging percentage.

Think my five degree cutoff was arbitrary? It absolutely was! Let’s do it again at 10 degrees. Under 10 degrees, Jazz is hitting .327 with a .375 slug. At 10 or more, he’s batting .388 with an .881 slug. No matter how you slice it, when he can keep himself from hitting the ball into the ground, good things happen.

So why doesn’t he do it all the time? Because of pitching, basically. You don’t get to hit off a tee and launch moon shots (named after Wally Moon, thanks Effectively Wild!) all day. Pitchers want grounders or whiffs, and where they locate the ball has a lot to do with what happens after hitters connect.

The lower the pitch, the higher your chances of hitting a grounder, obviously. Even as he’s made strides at putting the ball in the air, Chisholm is hitting grounders on 41.7% of his batted balls when he makes contact in the lower third of the zone. That number stood at 55.3% last year.

Make contact in the middle third, and what kind of hitter you are does more to determine the outcomes. Last year, Chisholm stayed on the ground on exactly 50% of his batted balls that were in the middle third of the strike zone height-wise. This year, that’s down to 35.7%. By the time you get to the upper third, you almost can’t help but elevate. Chisholm hit grounders on 30.2% of his batted balls that originated from the upper third of the strike zone last year, right around league average for that area of the zone. This year, that’s down to 10%.

In other words, Jazz is finding a way to put everything in the air again, like he always has. The question, then, should be what happened last year. As it turns out, he had a few stretches of productive air contact, but spent a few months with some absurdly high groundball rates, torpedoing the whole operation:

I’ll be honest with you: I can’t completely explain this one. It’s not like he’s fixing it with approach, at least not entirely. Sure, he’s swinging more at pitches in the upper third of the zone, but he’s swinging more at pitches in the lower third as well. More of his contact has come in the lower third of the zone this year, in fact.

I can speculate, though. I watched a giant pile of at-bats from the peak of his grounder-heavy spell last year and tried to pick something out that could explain the change. This is extremely non-scientific, but here, watch him hit a grounder on August 31 last year on a fastball right down the pipe:

Now, for a baseline, here he is hitting a grounder on a fastball right down the pipe this April:

Is that difference in swing responsible for the huge change in groundball rate? I’m hesitant to pin it all on that. But he clearly looks less comfortable in the first clip; he’s bouncing around, his hands are meaningfully higher at pitch release, and his lower body looks to me like it’s slightly out of sync at the point of contact.

I’m absolutely not a hitting coach. I wouldn’t take what I’m saying here as gospel. But if you asked me which hitter was more likely to do damage, I’d take the one who stayed still, kept his hands lower, and looked more balanced on his follow-through.

He’s doing other things too, of course. He’s making far more contact over the heart of the plate (61% of his batted balls this year compared to 50% last year), and those are easier pitches to hit. He’s more aggressive over the heart of the plate in general – 78% swing rate this year against 70% last year – while chasing fewer breaking balls outside the strike zone. The more you do that, the more you get pitches to hit.

It’s not resulting in more walks, but that might change. Challenging Chisholm is a tricky proposition; he still swings and misses quite a bit in the zone, but he does a ton of damage when he connects. The equation was a lot easier last year, when he was putting the ball on the ground far too often. Now, you’re liable to watch a jog around the bases if you get too comfortable with throwing him pitches in the zone. Thus far, pitchers haven’t given in. They’re getting their strikeouts, but Chisholm is turning plenty of those in-zone pitches into souvenirs.

Of course, he can hit home runs outside the zone too. Just ask Mark Melancon, Chisholm’s latest victim:

I’d like to have a better answer for you. I’d like to give you one simple statistic that explains Chisholm’s new form. I don’t have one, though. I think it’s a confluence of many things. He’s swinging at better pitches. He looks more locked in at the plate. He’s returning to his old batted ball distribution – maybe this has basically been him the whole time. Whatever it is though, it boils down to this: when Chisholm is rolling, he’s got top-shelf power and the batted ball distribution to take advantage of it. Only time will tell if he can keep it up, but things look pretty rosy in Miami at the moment.

As offense dips down, it was bound to happen. Reid Detmers of the Angels threw the first solo no-hitter of the year last night, facing only 28 batters as he beguiled the Rays’ lineup for nine innings. But this no-hitter wasn’t filled with drama, or even short on offense. The Angels put up 12 runs, powered by a two-homer game from Mike Trout. One of baseball’s unique charms is that the two halves of the game are disconnected; you can have a tense chase of a no-hitter on one side and silly season on the other. Silly season? Well, let’s get right to it.

Top of the Early Innings

Detmers didn’t exactly roll out of bed dealing. After a first-pitch ball, he laid one in there, and Yandy Díaz tagged it for the hardest-hit ball that anyone on either team managed all game. Luckily, it was into the ground and straight at shortstop Andrew Velazquez. Wander Franco followed with another hard-hit grounder, and Harold Ramirez ended the inning with a sinking liner right at left fielder Brandon Marsh.
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Liam Hendriks got shelled last night. After it looked like the White Sox had put the game away — they led 8–2 after the bottom of the eighth inning — the Guardians made things interesting by stringing together hits, errors, and walks to trim the deficit to 8–4. With two outs, Tony La Russa called for Hendriks, who promptly surrendered a single and a grand slam to tie the game.

It was the the first blemish on what otherwise would have been a sterling week for Hendriks. From May 2 to May 7, he’d been an absolute workhorse, making five appearances in six days without allowing a run. We’ll probably never know whether Monday’s game — his sixth in eight days — was affected by fatigue; Hendriks wouldn’t likely admit that even if it were the case. But it’s reasonable to wonder whether something could have gone differently, somewhere in the sequence of events, that gave the White Sox a better chance of hanging on last night.

Six games in eight days is an effective cap on reliever usage these days. No reliever has thrown seven games in eight days in the past three years; six games in eight days has happened 23 times over that same stretch. Hendriks himself accounts for three of those, with the rest a hodgepodge mix of closers and low-leverage middle relievers and Raisel Iglesias as the only other pitcher with multiple entries.
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Before the 2020 season, I wrote a series of articles that looked at how much control batters and pitchers exerted over various outcomes: home runs, strikeouts and walks, fly balls, that kind of thing. I found the conclusions helpful, if mostly as expected: batters have more to say about home runs and line drives, but both sides have input on strikeouts, walks, grounders, and fly balls.

I decided to apply the same methodology – which I’ll detail below – to check on something that I thought I already knew the answer to: do pitchers exert any control over barrel rate, and how much do hitters do the same? Barrels are essentially batted balls hit extremely hard and at dangerous angles; I think they’re a great way of thinking about hard contact.

There’s already been plenty of research on the year-over-year stability of batter barrel rate. There’s been plenty on the fact that pitchers don’t do the same. Here’s a preview of my findings: I didn’t find anything that disputes that. I still think it’s useful confirmation, however, and I’m also pretty proud of the method. Thanks to Tom Tango, there’s even a rough rule of thumb to use if you want to estimate future barrel rates. Without further ado, let’s get to it. Read the rest of this entry »

Michael King is really good. If you’ve been following the Yankees or the American League this season, you probably already knew that. He’s carving hitters up, to the tune of a 0.51 ERA over 17.2 innings so far. He’s striking them out (39.7% strikeout rate) and avoiding walks (4.8% walk rate). He’s doing it in long stints (six of his eight appearances have lasted two or more innings), but he’s excelled in short bursts too.

If you’ve watched King pitch lately, what he’s doing won’t be a surprise to you. His new breaking ball – a slider/curve thing he learned from Corey Kluber last year – is the star of the show. It’s a horizontally-sweeping curveball, or perhaps a slider with unique spin characteristics, or perhaps… look, maybe you should just see one:

For all the buzz around the sweeper, which the Yankees call a “whirly”, that’s not what King is doing. He’s throwing a curveball – he gets quite a bit of transverse spin on the pitch, which most sliders don’t, and uses Kluber’s curveball grip. Due to his low-slot delivery, however, “downward” break relative to his hand works out to more or less horizontal movement. Take a look at the direction of the spin he imparts on his pitches at release:

The blue lines are what we’re after – for a righty, that’s pure glove-side spin. You can think of it as sidespin. But look at his fastballs – sidespin in the other direction. How does that work? You can try it for yourself at home. Put your arm out straight sideways, then bend your elbow at 90 degrees, so that your hand is up above your head. Imagine an arrow pointing straight down from the bottom of your palm towards your forearm. If you impart spin on the ball that makes it move in the direction of that arrow – downward from the palm – it will break nearly straight downwards. Read the rest of this entry »

At FanGraphs, our headline WAR number for pitchers is based on FIP. Because of that, and because people enjoy debating and arguing, there’s a yearly refrain that you’ve probably heard. “FanGraphs pitching WAR only considers (X)% of what a pitcher does, how can that be used for value?” No one would dispute that year-one FIP does a better job of estimating year-two ERA than ERA does – or at least, not many people would – but the discussion around whether FIP does a good job of assigning year-one value is alive and well.

One reason for this view is pretty obvious. FIP considers home runs, strikeouts, walks, and hit batters to estimate pitcher production on an ERA scale. Our WAR does some fancy stuff in the background – it treats infield fly balls, which virtually never fall for hits, as strikeouts, and it adjusts for park and league. In the end, though, it’s estimating pitcher value using just three (well, actually four — HBPs always draw the short straw) outcomes. There are a lot of other outcomes in baseball!

In 2021, roughly 39% of plate appearances ended in a homer, strikeout, walk, hit batter, or infield pop up. One thing you could think, in recognition of that fact, is that FIP-based WAR doesn’t consider enough of a pitcher’s production. You wouldn’t use 40% of a hitter’s plate appearances to calculate their WAR, so why do it for pitchers? But that doesn’t actually make sense, as David Appelman pointed out to me recently. Assuming “average results on balls in play” is actually going to be pretty close for every pitcher, by definition. Read the rest of this entry »

Who’s the best reliever in baseball? There are multiple ways to go about answering that question. You could pick the guy with the lowest projected ERA; that’s Josh Hader, with Emmanuel Clase, Liam Hendriks, and Taylor Rogers close behind. You could pick the guy with the best reputation; I’d go with Hendriks or Hader, but if you’re a giant Raisel Iglesias or Aroldis Chapman fan, I wouldn’t hold it against you.

If you want to look at what’s happening on the field, though, the best reliever in baseball is clearly Ryan Helsley. It’s not “probably Ryan Helsley.” It’s not “Ryan Helsley is in the conversation.” It’s just Ryan Helsley. He’s been absolutely dominant to start the year, so dominant that I’m not sure I have the right words for it.

If you follow the NL Central, you’ve surely heard of Helsley. He’s been in the majors for parts of the last four seasons as a flamethrowing reliever, and that part isn’t changing. He topped out at 103 mph this weekend, the kind of heat that makes Pitching Ninja sprint to his computer and search for the right emoji (he used fire, if you’re keeping score at home). But that pitch reduces Helsley’s performance to “he throws hard sometimes,” which undersells him to a comical extent.
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Last week, when I was waxing poetic about Jeff McNeil’s ability to wait for a good pitch and then drop it into left for a single, I made an offhand mention to the player with the best swing decisions of 2021: Mike Tauchman, who doesn’t even play in the major leagues anymore. Then I moved on.

That wasn’t an accident. It’s what we in “the business” (no one calls it this) like to think of as a preview. I got multiple texts (another pro writer tip: “multiple” sounds better than “two”) from friends this weekend asking where the whole list of hitters was. That list is right here!

As a quick refresher, the idea here is to take every swing decision a hitter makes and compress them into one number. Every hitter who saw at least 50 pitches in each of the four attack zones (heart, shadow, chase, waste) is on the list. I took each of those rates and gave them league-average production for those decisions. The result looks like this, stated in terms of run value per 100 of the relevant zone/decision combination (take a waste pitch, say, or swing at a pitch in the shadow zone):

From there, I assumed a league-average percentage of pitches in each zone. Combined with each hitter’s swing rates, that let me produce an overall run value assuming an average rate of pitches in each zone.

Here’s a quick guide on how to interpret these numbers. For each hitter, there are three numbers. The first two are just the same statistic said different ways. The first metric, “RV/100,” is how many runs above or below average each hitter on the list would be, per 100 pitches, if they got exactly average results on every zone/decision combination. The higher the number, the better positioned a hitter is to succeed, by taking tough pitches and swinging at good ones.
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