As David just announced, he’s unveiled some new team pages with all kinds of fantastic data. It’s just a treasure trove of sortable data, leading to the following kinds of revelations – the Texas Rangers, as a pitching staff, threw fastballs 68.9% of the time. This is, by far, the most in the league – the next highest rate is the Mets at 65.8%. The average ML team threw fastballs 60.6% of the time, so the Rangers were just over two standard deviations from the mean.

Can someone in Texas teach these guys to throw a breaking ball or a change-up once in a while? I understand that pitching coaches like to establish the fastball, but at some point, you might want to look around, say “hey, this isn’t working” and try to get them to throw something soft once in a while.

This is essentially basic game theory – it doesn’t matter how good you think your pitching staff’s fastballs are, because if the other team knows that they’re going to see a steady diet of hard stuff, they’re going to just wait for it and swing from the heels when they read fastball coming out of the pitcher’s hand. Even if you throw 95, an expected fastball is going to get turned around a lot more often than not.

Keeping hitters off balance is a huge part of pitching. The Rangers were the most predictable team in baseball in terms of pitch selection, and while it’s not fair to claim that it was the main reason why they gave up more runs than anyone else in baseball, it almost certainly didn’t help.

Note to Jon Daniels – how about finding a pitching coach who believes in balls that bend?

Over the last few years, I’ve written an annual piece for USSMariner detailing “free agent landmines”, the guys who might tempt you into giving them a contract that will almost immediately blow up in your face. Among the players that we’ve identified ahead of time as disasters-in-waiting have been Carlos Silva, Barry Zito, Matt Morris, and Jarrod Washburn, all of whom signed regrettable contracts that looked bad from the get go. Of course, in both 2005 and 2007, the Mariners picked a pitcher off the list of guys I tried to convince them to avoid and gave him huge money, so I’ve been given a front row seat to just how badly these contracts can screw up your franchise.

So, who are the free agent landmines this winter – the guys who may look appealing but are simply not going to be worth the money they’ll command? Here’s the top candidates.

Kyle Lohse, RHP, Cardinals – signed for 4 years, $41 million

Okay, I’m cheating a bit, because the Cardinals already stepped on this mine, getting fooled by his legitimately good 2008 performance into thinking that Lohse might actually repeat his home run prevention, which is just a really bad bet. Rather than learning that pitchers are wildly inconsistent and you can get 200 good innings without making a long term commitment to a mid-rotation starter, the Cardinals took Lohse’s 2008 season as evidence that he had improved his talent level dramatically and that he was worth keeping. Not a good idea.

Orlando Cabrera, SS, White Sox

Cabrera’s one of those interesting guys that is simultaneously overrated and underrated – he’s not as good as his reputation with casual fans and teams who value batting average and clutch reputations, but he’s better than what the statistical community has generally noticed, combining just slightly below average offense with a solid glove at shortstop and staying remarkably healthy.

However, Cabrera turns 34 in a few weeks, and his power has been eroding for three years running. His ISO of .096 in 2007 was the lowest of his career until 2008 came along, where he posted a .089 – these are the only two seasons in his career where he’s posted an ISO under .100. During his heyday with the Expos/Red Sox/Angels, O-Cab had above average power for a middle infielder, and his combination of high average and gap power allowed him to be a fairly productive hitter, even with the low on base rates. Now, with the power eroding, he’s turning into a singles-only hitter, and that makes him a pretty volatile offensive player.

For a contender who needed a one or two year stopgap at shortstop, Cabrera could be a decent fit, but his reputation as a winner and clutch performer, plus the fact that he has the skills that are most often overvalued, will lead to him looking for a 3-4 year deal that will be an absolute killer by the end.

Manny Ramirez, OF, Los Angeles

I know, Manny’s the hero who saved the Dodgers, spending the last two months of the season doing a pretty good Babe Ruth impression. He carried Los Angeles to the playoffs, and showed that his bat is still alive and kicking, that Manny Being Manny can still be quite valuable. That doesn’t change the facts, however, that Manny turns 37 next summer and he’s already such a terrible defender that he deserves to be a full time DH. 2008 was also his best season since 2002, so if you’re re-signing him expecting to get that kind of performance again, you’re going to be disappointed.

The Marcel projections for 2009 have Ramirez being worth about 15 runs above an average hitter, based on a .305/.419/.548 line in 527 PA. Notice the plate appearance total – at Manny’s age, and with his history of knee problems (real or not), you can’t expect him to play a full season. You have to adjust for the fact that he’s occasionally not going to be available, and that hurts his real value. If we put Ramirez’s +15 runs compared to an average hitter into context, that makes him an above average DH, but not a superstar – more of a +3 win player, not that different in real value from guys like Mark Ellis or Orlando Hudson.

Of course, Manny’s got name value and the slugger tag going for him, and those guys always get overpaid. Scott Boras is making noise about a six year contract at something like $20 million per year, but you’d have to believe that Manny was a +4 win player and wouldn’t decline at all in his late-30s/early-40s for that to make any kind of sense. He’s not even a +4 win player right now, and he’s not likely to get better with age. A fair offer for Manny’s value is more like 3 years/$45 million, but he’s going to get way, way more than that, making him one of the biggest landmines out there.

Yesterday, it came out that Andruw Jones would like to be traded from the Los Angeles Dodgers. After he hit .158/.256/.249 in his first season in La-La land, the feeling is certainly mutual. His ridiculously horrible performance earned him a -1.56 WPA/LI in just 238 plate appearances, ranking 4th worst in the majors despite only playing about two months worth of baseball. It was one of the worst seasons we’ve seen in a long, long time.

However, thanks to the two year deal the Dodgers gave Jones last winter, they still owe him approximately $22 million, covering his $15 million 2009 salary and the $7 million they still owe him as part of his signing bonus. Considering how poorly he played in 2008, and the general negative feelings about his work ethic, it wouldn’t be easy to move him even if he was only owed half that amount. Finding a team that wants to take a shot on him, and is willing to pay part of his salary, is going to be a challenge.

However, the name value will probably still pique the interest of at least a few GMs. Is there anything left to be interested in? Can we chalk up his ’08 results to just a lot of bad luck?

In a word, no.

Last year, Jones significantly down on the amount of strikes he swung at (going from 71% to 62%), but despite being more selective, he actually made less contact (72% in ’07, 69% last year). That’s a bad combination – if you start letting more strikes go by, you should theoretically increase your contact rate, because you’ve hopefully reduced the amount of hard to hit pitches you’re swinging at. Jones, apparently, was staring at the ones he could hit, and still flailing miserably at the ones he couldn’t.

This resulted in a drastic jump in his strikeout rate, which ballooned to 36.4%. That’s a K rate reserved for the swing-from-the-heels slugger types, such as Ryan Howard and Jack Cust. You can survive with a 36% strikeout rate if you’re hitting the crap out of the ball when you make contact, but Jones didn’t do that either.

Hid line drive percentage was just 13.4%, and he managed only 12 extra base hit all season. His ISO of .091 would fit in well with David Eckstein’s career marks.

And, just for fun, he failed to steal a base for the first time in his career.

Add it all up, and in 2008, Jones was something like a compilation of Ryan Howard‘s contact abilities, David Eckstein‘s power, and Jack Cust‘s speed, mixed with Nomar Garciaparra‘s health, and Carlos Beltran’s contract.

Good luck trading that, Ned.

Yesterday, we looked at Mark Ellis‘ new contract and how it makes it likely that he’ll end up being the best bargain of the 2009 free agent crop. Well, let’s take a look back a year later and see who (so far) has been the best signing from last winter. Here are the contenders:

Mike Cameron: 1 year at $7 million with $10 million team option for 2009

Signed to provide some outfield defense at a bit of power, Cameron exceeded expectations for the Brewers, having a terrific season at age 35 and helping push Milwaukee into the playoffs. Injuries and a suspension limited him to just 120 games, but that makes his 1.42 WPA/LI all the more impressive when you consider he racked it up in just 508 plate appearances. When you combine average to above average center field defense with a bat that’s worth 1.5 wins over an average hitter, you have a +4 win player. Based on Cameron’s 2008 performance, he was worth between $15 and $20 million on the free market, or more than twice what he actually made. Toss in the team option that now looks like a no-brainer, and Cameron was truly one of the best signings of the winter.

Milton Bradley: 1 year at $5.5 million

Like Cameron, Bradley missed about a quarter of his team’s games, but his excellence when he did play makes up for the lack of quantity. He racked up 3.33 WPA/LI in 510 plate appearances as one of the American League’s best hitters. Because he DH’d, he didn’t offer much defensive value, but he still comes out as a +4 win player compared to a replacement level designated hitter. Like Cameron, teams should have paid about $15 to $20 million for Bradley’s 2008 season, when he made a fraction of that. Even if Texas doesn’t re-sign him for 2009, they’ll pick up a couple of draft picks as compensation for him leaving, and get the benefit of an excellent season and some long term help for the franchise.

Kyle Lohse: 1 year at $4.25 million

Lohse was the clear bargain of the pitching crop, being one of the last to sign and putting up 200 innings with a 3.78 ERA. Considering how expensive pitching is on the free market, the Cardinals saved a ton of money by forgoing the long term contract types and dumpster diving with Lohse. If we assume that a replacement level starting pitcher would allow approximately 6.0 runs per game, that’s about 133 runs allowed over a 200 inning season. Lohse allowed 88 runs in his 200 innings, a 45 run advantage, which works out to about 4.5 wins. We have to adjust that down a bit, however, because replacement level starters don’t throw 200 innings per year (they get replaced by higher quality relievers), so we factor about half a win out. That puts Lohse right at +4 wins.

Interestingly enough, Cameron, Bradley, and Lohse all offered up very similar win totals for their respective clubs. Cameron was the most expensive, but also offers a 2009 team option which has quite a bit of value. Bradley will either re-sign with Texas or net them compensation for leaving, while Lohse’s performance fooled the Cardinals into giving him a brutal 4 year, $41 million extension. You could make an argument for any of the three, but I’m going to go with Mike Cameron as the 2008 free agent bargain of the year, since he will continue to provide value in 2009 for the Brewers.

And now the real fun begins – with the preliminary contests out of the way, Tampa Bay and Philadelphia are set to kick off the final matchup of the season, the 2008 World Series. Before this fall classic gets underway, let’s take a look at some of the keys to the series that won’t get covered by the big networks.

The Phillies whack lefties around pretty good.

If you just think of the Phillies as Chase Utley, Ryan Howard, and a bunch of role players, this might seem counter-intuitive. However, it’s true – the Phillies are a significantly better offensive team against LHPs than RHPs. For the year, they hit .255/.330/.426 against right-handed pitching, compared to .257/.337/.464 against left-handed pitching. Part of this is because Utley hits southpaws pretty well, but they also have some good right-handed bats in Pat Burrell, Shane Victorino, and Jayson Werth.

Because of that, it’s unlikely that last night’s hero, David Price, will be pitching in the 9th inning of too many World Series games. I think we’ll see a good bit of him going after Utley and Howard in late game situations, but Joe Maddon is smart enough to realize that Price isn’t the best pick against the good RH bats that Philly can run out there.

Cole Hamels and Jamie Moyer both have reverse platoon splits.

Because both of Philadelphia’s left-handed starters have exceptional change-ups, they’re both tremendous against right-handed hitters. The change-up is the pitch that best neutralizes opposite-handed hitters, and Hamels and Moyer both feature change-ups as their out pitch. Over Moyer’s extensive career, LHBs have a 30 point OPS advantage. In Hamels much more brief time in the majors, LHBs have a 70 point OPS advantage.

This won’t matter as much in setting the line-ups (there’s almost no way Joe Maddon goes with the left-handed bats of Cliff Floyd or Gabe Gross, who have been strictly platooned for a good reason), but it does change the landscape of what we expect from the three key LH bats in the Rays line-up. Carlos Pena, Carl Crawford, and Akinori Iwamura don’t hit lefties all that well, which is a pretty big reason why the Rays have struggled somewhat against southpaws this year. However, Hamels and Moyer aren’t your typical lefties, and there’s a decent chance that those three could outperform expectations when facing the two change-up masters.

Watch out for Fernando Perez.

Call it a hunch, but I think we might see a bit more of the speedy outfielder from the Rays who hasn’t been used as much more than a pinch-runner to date. With Gross struggling in the playoffs, don’t be surprised if the switch hitting Perez makes a start or two in order to maximize the defensive value in the outfield. The kid can really cover some ground, and he’s got a bit more pop in his bat than you might expect from looking at him.

It’s official – not even Mark Ellis knows how valuable he is. Yesterday, he gave up free agency to re-sign with the A’s on a contract that guarantees him $11 million over two years. Not per year, total. $5.5 million per year, or basically the same contract that Octavio Dotel received last winter.

Now, Dotel’s a decent enough reliever, but Ellis is just so much more valuable than this. He’s the poster boy for just how undervalued defense is in today’s MLB economy. From 2006 to 2008, the Fielding Bible’s +/- system has ranked him at +13, +19, and +26 plays above an average defensive second baseman. He’s been one of the best defensive players at the position since getting to the big leagues, and his outstanding work with the glove has been one of the big reasons why the A’s have been so good at preventing runs from scoring while shuffling through no-name pitchers.

Going forward, we can project Ellis to be worth something like 15 runs above an average defensive second baseman. To contrast that with his offense, considering that most observers would say that he had a poor year with the bat (.233/.321/.373), he was worth about six runs less than a league average hitter this year. Even if we assumed that his offense wasn’t going to rebound at all (a bad assumption, given his underlying skills and .249 BABIP in 2008), his package of offense + defense are still worth about 10 runs above an average second baseman. With replacement level set at about two wins below average, and 10 runs equaling a win, it’s fair to say that Mark Ellis is about a +3 win player compared to replacement level.

Last year, there were a few +3 win position players who hit free agency. Torii Hunter got $90 million for five years, Aaron Rowand got $60 million for five years, and Mike Lowell gave the Red Sox a discount, signing for just $37.5 million over three years. The going rate for a +3 win position player was about $15 million per year, which is pretty much in line with the $5 million per win that we’ve seen teams pay in free agency.

Mark Ellis just signed for about $1.67 million per win. This is one of the best free agent bargains in the history of baseball. In an environment where Ellis’ skillset was properly valued and he had a desire to test the market, he should have gotten about three times what he signed for.

As we head into free agency, one of the things we can be pretty sure of that pitching is going to be expensive. Even when you’d think teams would learn from examples such as what the Cardinals were able to do with Kyle Lohse (signed for $4.25 million just before the season started, turned in a solid season), that same team turns around and gives Lohse $41 million to be the exact same guy they got for 1/10th of that the year before.

Free agent pitching is the bubble that just won’t burst. Mike Hampton couldn’t bust it. Barry Zito couldn’t bust it. Carlos Silva couldn’t bust it. Teams are going to spend a lot of money on mediocre pitching, leaving the smart teams to mostly look elsewhere.

So, smart teams, I’ve got a suggestion. Call the Tigers about Nate Robertson.

Yes, the same Nate Robertson who just posted a 6.35 ERA for the Tigers last year, and is owed $17 million over the remaining two seasons on his contract. I know, $7 million this year and $10 million next year for a guy coming off the worst year of his career doesn’t sound like a wise investment, but there might not be a better buy-low candidate this winter.

Here are Robertson’s FIPs since 2004, when he became a full-time starter:

2004: 4.52
2005: 4.73
2006: 4.72
2007: 4.65
2008: 4.99

Yes, 2008 was his worst year, but by a pretty small margin. A .3 FIP difference over his career norms would translate out to about seven extra runs per season. A seven run dropoff is far more marginal than what the perception of Robertson’s collapse is, considering how bad his results were in 2008.

Robertson pitched mostly the same as he’s always pitched, but due to a remarkably worse defense (importing Miguel Cabrera and moving Brandon Inge off third will do that to you), his results made it look like his skills fell apart. In reality, he’s still the same league average starter he’s always been, and in this market, $17 million over two years is a bargain for a league average starter.

One of the main points that the statistical community has been trying to drive home for years is the availability of useful role players for practically nothing. When teams spend big money on below average players simply because they have a track record of success, they’re throwing money away, because comparable (or better) players can literally be claimed on waivers.

We get yet another example today, when Ryan Langerhans was outrighted off the Nationals 40 man roster. When you are outrighted off of a roster, you have to be placed on waivers, giving every team in baseball a chance to claim you for the waiver fee cost of $25,000. Every team in baseball decided they’d pass at picking him up for $25,000.

Langerhans isn’t a star, and he won’t be the best player on anyone’s team, but the idea that every major league team looked at him and said “meh, he can’t help us” is pretty crazy. In 139 plate appearances with the Nationals last year, he hit .234/.380/.396, an offensive performance built on a lot of walks and a bit of power. Even with the low batting average, he was an above average hitter, posting a WPA/LI of 0.21. When you get on base 38% of the time, you’re helping your team at the plate.

Now, Langerhans isn’t likely to repeat his .380 OBP next year, but he’s racked up 1141 plate appearances in his major league career and has a career .713 OPS. He’s totaled -1.51 WPA/LI during the equivalent of two full big league seasons, meaning that, on average, he’s been a little less than one win below an average hitter over a full season of play. Colin Wyers recently ran a set of 2009 Marcel Projections, which basically confirms this assessment – it has Langerhans as a .238/.346/.385 hitter and about 10 runs below an average hitter for next year.

Now, if he was a 280 pound, defense challenged first baseman, you could easily explain why no one was interested in carrying him. But Langerhans is a pretty terrific defensive outfielder, consistently showing off well above average range and tracking down fly balls in the gaps. He’s something like a league average defensive CF, or a +10 to +15 run guy while playing a full year in either LF or RF.

As a center fielder, Langerhans ability to get on base and cover ground could be a real benefit to a team, even just as a part-time player. The fact that he cleared waivers continues to show that MLB teams undervalue this skillset. Some smart team would do well to sign Langerhans to a league minimum salary this winter and let him serve as their fourth OF – he’ll provide some nice production for no cost expended.

Over the last few day, word has leaked out of San Diego that the Padres will be willing to talk to teams that might be interested in Jake Peavy this winter. More importantly, since Peavy has a blanket no-trade clause, was his agent’s statements that Peavy would be willing to accept a trade to certain contenders in the National League, paving the way for real trade discussions to take place.

Peavy, the 2007 NL Cy Young winner, will certainly draw interest. Over the last few years, he’s established himself as one of the game’s best pitchers, and he’s got an All-Star track record despite being just 27 years of age. He’s also under contract through 2012 (with a team option for 2013), so he wouldn’t be a one year rental or require an extension, like most big name pitchers who become available before they hit free agency.

So, an ace entering his prime signed up for the next four (or five) years is on the market – everyone should be falling all over themselves to give up the farm for Peavy, right? Maybe not.

Despite his shiny 2.85 ERA, 2008 was pretty clearly the worst Peavy has pitched since 2003, which was his first full year in the majors and the year before he broke out into an established front line starter. Let’s take a closer look at his performances from 2004 to 2008, using the graphs available here.

The strikeout rate, which had held extremely steady from 2004-2007, showed a noticeable decline this year, dropping to 8.60 this year, down from his customary 9.50 range. A loss of a strikeout every game isn’t the end of the world in isolation, but when it’s combined with a simultaneous increase in walk rate and home run rate, like we see in the last two charts, it’s cause for concern. His FIP of 3.60 reflects the downgrade in his underlying skills, and shows that he pitched worse last year than he did in 2006, when his ERA was much higher. He was able to keep runs off the board by stranding a ton of runners (his 82.2% LOB% was second highest in baseball), but LOB% isn’t nearly the solid foundation to run prevention that striking batters out, limiting walks, and keeping the ball in the yard is.

Recently, the boys over at StatCorner.com unveiled tRA*, which is FIP with a whole lot of extra regressions on batted ball types and park adjustments and such, and gives a pretty good indicator of how well a pitcher actually pitched, stripping out a lot of the noise that gets included in a pitcher’s final results. Peavy’s tRA* for 2008 was 4.41, putting him just behind Aaron Cook and Paul Maholm among NL starters. Not exactly the kind of company you expect to see Peavy included with, eh?

Peavy simply wasn’t as good in 2008 as he was from 2004 to 2007. He was still a good pitcher, but he wasn’t the earlier versions of Peavy that we’d seen. He was worse in almost every meaningful category. And he spent a few weeks on the disabled list with elbow problems to boot. He returned from those and pitched well, so it’s unlikely that he’s already sustained a serious injury that will prevent him from pitching, but it’s another red flag in a season that raised several even without the health concerns.

Peavy’s contract calls for him to earn $9 million next year before a $52 million guaranteed extension kicks in for 2010-2012. Any team acquiring Peavy would be on the hook for at least $61 million over the next four years, and if the team option for 2013 was picked up, it would be $79 million over 5 years. Even in today’s marketplace, that’s frontline starter money. For the last four years leading up to this one, Peavy was certainly a frontline starter, but his 2008 performance has to raise questions over whether he will continue to pitch at that level going forward?

The Padres seem to believe that now is the time to sell high. If 2008 Peavy was a sign of things to come, they’re probably right, and potential suitors for Peavy might want to consider alternative options before giving up a ton of prospects for a guy with some real question marks.

“Pitching wins championships.”

“The difference between good teams and great teams are the little things.”

“Hitting behind the runner, making productive outs, and playing team baseball are the keys to winning.”

If you’ve ever watched a baseball game with the sound on, you’ve heard one of these cliches mentioned, and probably have heard them a few thousand times. Well, the Tampa Bay Rays are trying to make sure you know that they’re total and utter crap. Want to know the best way to make the World Series? Hit the ball really, really far.

The Rays connected for three home runs in Tuesday night’s game, putting five runs on the board in the first three innings and chasing Tim Wakefield from his start early on. Those longballs now give the Rays 16 home runs in eight playoff games. Their October home run pace would put them on track for 305 over a full season – the major league record for home runs in a season is 264, by the 1997 Seattle Mariners. The Rays are blowing that rate out of the water.

Evan Longoria and B.J. Upton have led the charge, combining for 10 of the 16 round trippers, but Carlos Pena has added a pair as well, and Akinori Iwamura, Cliff Floyd, Rocco Baldelli, and Willy Aybar have each hit one out. This team wide power fest allowed the Rays to send the White Sox back to Chicago and given them a 3-1 lead in the ALCS over Boston, putting the Cinderella story of the year one win away from the World Series.

They’re not doing it by hitting behind the runner. They’re not doing it with bunts. They’re not taking the extra base, making productive outs, or playing for one run. They’re hitting the ever loving crap out of the baseball, and proving that Big Ball will get you to the Big Dance. Toss the cliches out the window – when your team has a .535 slugging percentage in the playoffs, you’re going to win.