Last night, the Blue Jays beat the Yankees 8-4 in their final home game of the season. It was also the last home game for legendary Toronto manager Cito Gaston, who is set to retire after the season. Pre-game ceremonies made for an emotional send-off.

It was also an appropriate goodbye to Gaston in a baseball sense. It has been said (I don’t remember by whom) that the plate approach of the 2010 Blue Jays resembles nothing more than every hitter swinging at the first pitch they think they can drive as if he were in the Home Run Derby. Given that the 2010 Jays are (depending on how you round) currently “on pace” to displace the 1997 Mariners with the highest team isolated power in baseball history, it was fitting that the Blue Jays hit three home runs for Gaston’s Toronto farewell, setting a new franchise record for home runs in a season. Travis Snider, wearing an eyeblack mustache in tribute to Gaston, broke the old record with a 400-foot shot to right field to lead off the bottom of the first. In the second inning, catcher John Buck hit his 20th home run of the season with an opposite-field solo homer that just cleared the wall. Aaron Hill finished yet another Derby at the Rogers Centre with a three-run bomb to left in the fifth. The only thing that would have made it better (other than Jose Bautista hitting three more jacks) would have been if all three homers had been solo shots, given the Blue Jays’ power-without-walks offense this season.

Bautista’s big season is in itself an nice accompaniment to Gaston’s retirement, not in how it relates to Gaston’s distinguished career as a manager, but in how it relates to Gaston’s career as a player. The Bautista story is well-known so I won’t go through it again. It has certainly been fun to watch Bautista’s monster shots fly out of the park (unless your team was the victim, of course). After never having put up more than 2 wins above replacement in a season, Bautista current stands at 6.7 WAR for 2010. His .421 wOBA for the year is 82 points higher than the next closest season.

But until last night, I never realized the curious parallel between the playing careers of Gaston and Bautista. In parts of 11 seasons with three different teams (he had two different stints with the Braves), Gaston (who played all three spots in the outfield at different points in his career) accumulated a mere 3.9 WAR. His .313 wOBA (.256/.298/.397) was actually league average for his career (100 wRC+), but TotalZone sees him as as a poor fielder for his career at -63 runs. Gaston never was worth one WAR in a season, and several seasons, despite a decent amount of playing time, ended up below replacement… except for his 1970 season with the Padres. That year Gaston hit .318/.364/.543 for a .400 wOBA (153 wRC+). In 1969, the year before his big season, Gaston hit for a .267 wOBA (.230/.275/.309) in 419 plate appearances. In 1971, the year after, he had a .295 wOBA (.228/.264/.386). His next best season came six years later as a bench player for the Braves, and it was only a .355 wOBA. In no other season did he have a a better than .330 wOBA.

Check out this incredibly difficult to read comparative WAR graph comparing “nth best” seasons by WAR. The green line is Gaston, the orange line is Bautsita. (Click here for a larger version.)

Interesting. If one wants to talk about “seasons out of nowhere,” off the top of my head I can’t think of any more out of nowhere than Gaston’s 1970 given both what came before and after — including Bautista’s. It points out (again) how subject to unpredictability and randomness player performance can be. This isn’t to postulate a Gaston-esque career path for Bautista; I don’t expect him to have a .420 wOBA next season, but I think he’ll do better than the .339 he put up in 2009. I simply think that after looking at Gaston’s monster 1970 against the rest of his playing career, Bautista’s own unforeseeable explosion in 2010 is a fitting tribute to his retiring manager.

The Tampa Bay Rays clinched a spot in the American League playoffs last night, ending a bitter drought. It isn’t over yet — there are 18-month-olds who have never seen a Rays pennant winner (that is what a certain left-handed ace should be embarrassed about), but it is an essential step. Ahem.

Although the Rays have done a good job of run-prevention overall (and much credit here must go to their excellent fielders), questions remain about their starting pitching heading into the playoffs. As in previous posts about the Twins’ and Rangers’ playoff rotations, in addition to listing certain 2010 stats for each pitcher, I will also refer to CHONE’s updated pitcher projections (both CHONE’s neutralized component “nERA” as well as FIP derived from the stat lines) to get a sense for each pitcher’s “true talent.” There is still some ambiguity as to exactly who will be in the playoff rotation (Niemann/Davis) and what order they will go in (Shields/Garza), and I’m not claiming to know for sure, so take the “ordering” with a grain of salt; that’s not the focus of the post. And keep in mind this is just about the starting rotation compared with other playoff teams, not an evaluation of the team as a whole. Starting pitching is important, but it isn’t the whole story.

1) David Price CHONE 4.02 nERA , 4.16 FIP
2010: 4.4 WAR, 3.44 FIP, 4.01 xFIP, 3.32 tERA, 2.73 ERA

In 2010, Price has shown signs of being the ace the Rays need. His strikeout rate has been excellent and he has cut down on the walks from 2009. Still, he isn’t as good as his ERA, and his xFIP likely indicates good fortune on fly balls. His CHONE “true talent” projection might irk some, but one can’t simply focus on the current season while ignoring prior performance. Price is a tremendous young pitcher, but just as a closer look at his numbers shows that he shouldn’t win the Cy Young award, they also show that it would be premature to say that he’s one of the top aces in the playoffs. Nonetheless, he gives the Rays a good chance to win every time he takes the mound, no matter who the opponent.

2) James Shields CHONE 4.09 nERA , 4.06 FIP
2010: 2.3 WAR, 4.27 FIP, 3.69 xFIP, 4.45 tERA, 5.04 ERA

Who had the better game: Pitcher A, who pitched six innings, struck out seven, walked two, and got 10 ground balls, six fly balls, and two liners; or Pitcher B, who pitched 6.2 innings, struck out three, walked three, and got seven ground balls, 11 fly balls, and three liners? It has to be Pitcher A, right? Both games were this past Sunday, and Pitcher A got the loss after giving up 5 earned runs, while Pitcher B got the all-important win and gave up no runs. Pitcher A is James Shields, and Pitcher B is Bruce Chen. That pretty much sums up Shields’ season.

Yes, his ERA is terrible, but Shields leads all qualified pitchers in HR/FB ratio. In other words, Shields is probably having more than his share of bad luck (witness his career rate of 11.8%), and he’s only 40th among the same group in FB% — below David Price, which explains why Shields’ xFIP is better than Price’s. Shield’s walk rate is up, but it is still excellent at 2.22 per 9 IP, and his K rate has jumped to 8.44 per 9 IP. Despite his batted-ball profile being about the same as usual, he has by far the highest BABIP of his career. This isn’t to say that Shields is a great pitcher (read this for a deeper look into a possible cause of his home run problems this season), but both this season’s peripherals and CHONE’s projection indicate that he’s probably a very good #2.

3) Matt Garza CHONE 4.23 nERA , 4.28 FIP
2010: 1.7 WAR, 4.53 FIP, 4.56 xFIP, 4.67 tERA, 3.92 ERA

The rich man’s Armando Galarraga! It’s a joke, but there is an element of truth to it, as his no-hitter masks a mediocre season. It isn’t clear whether Garza or Shields will pitch second in the rotation, but I think Shields is the better pitcher. Garza has the better ERA, but Shields has the better FIP, xFIP, and tERA this season. Garza’s HR/FB rate doesn’t indicate he has had bad luck, and he isn’t much of a groundballer. He doesn’t give up many walks, but his K rate this season is unexceptional after being over eight per nine innings last season. Garza is a decent pitcher, but he should not be expected to dominate.

4) Jeff Niemann CHONE 4.42 nERA , 4.56 FIP
2010: 1.0 WAR, 4.75 FIP, 4.41 xFIP, 4.51 tERA, 4.49 ERA

Niemann has been battling shoulder trouble, and it isn’t clear yet whether he or Wade Davis will be the Rays fourth starter. Whatever the reason, Niemann has taken a step back this season after a good 2009. His K rate improved, but is still below average. In 2009, he primarily succeeded by not giving up home runs and walks; and while, like Shields, his home run problems this season are at least partly a random fluctuation, his walk rate going up combined with unexceptional strikeout and groundball skills doesn’t make up for it very much. Still, if he’s healthy, he’s certainly a better #4 option than the likes of Nick Blackburn and Tommy Hunter, and arguably even A.J. Burnett at this point.

5) Wade Davis CHONE 4.85 nERA , 4.97 FIP
2010: 0.9 WAR, 4.83 FIP, 4.86 xFIP, 4.61 tERA, 4.14 ERA

Davis probably disappointed a good chunk of Rays fans with his first full season in the majors. Whether or not those expectations were realistic is a question for another time. Davis generated neither gaudy strikeout nor groundball numbers this season, and his walk rate this season has been average-ish. While his numbers taken together put him in the same category with the aforementioned Hunter and Blackburn, I think his superior strikeout ability and youth puts him a small step ahead of them at the moment (and a larger one for the future). The Rays probably don’t want to depend on Davis in the playoffs, but that could be said of every other team and their #4 starter, and if Niemann is ready to go, they won’t have to, anyway.

Most teams in baseball would love to have the Rays’ rotation (or their entire team, for that matter), but it doesn’t stand out as much in the playoff field. The Rays’ starters aren’t “severely outclassed” or anything like it, but the rotation isn’t a particular strength relative to the other teams. Of the AL playoff teams, the Rays’ rotation is probably the least likely to carry them through the playoffs if their offense has trouble producing or if the bullpen falters. They do have a bit more depth than the other teams. The main difference is that Price isn’t obviously that one dominating pitcher like Cliff Lee, Francisco Liriano, or (at least in the past) CC Sabathia. But (pardon the cliché) anything can happen in one game, especially when a young star-in-the-making combines an outstanding group of fielders.

This past weekend the Rangers clinched the AL West, their first division championship since 1999. Many things have gone well for the Rangers this season, and while a full look back will be worth doing after the playoffs, this post, like Friday’s on the Minnesota Twins, is a forward-looking post about their starting rotation going into the American League playoffs.

The simplistic take on past Rangers teams has been “good hitting, bad pitching.” This has always been at least a bit problematic in the past because the Rangers’ home park has tended to exaggerate both their hitters’ prowess and their pitchers’ futility, at least when looking at raw stats. This season, they’ve hit well, but their pitching has taken a step up. One season’s stats don’t tell the whole story, so while I’ll list each player’s 2010 statistics, I’ll also include numbers from the most recent update of CHONE’s pitcher projections (using CHONE’s context-neutral component nERA and also a FIP I derived from the stat line) to give a sense of each pitcher’s current “true talent.”

1) Cliff Lee, CHONE: 3.29 nERA , 3.16 FIP
2010: 6.6 WAR, 2.66 FIP, 3.28 xFIP, 2.75 tERA, 3.29 ERA

I’d call Lee the other forgotten AL Cy Young candidate, except I just remembered that what a player does in May and June doesn’t count for awards voting. But hasn’t Lee been a lot worse in Texas, anyway? Let’s see, his K/9 rate is slightly higher. His walk rate has doubled all the way up to over one per nine innings, and his HR/FB rate skyrocketed to almost league average. His xFIP in Seattle was 3.21; in Texas, it is 3.35. Whatever might be going on with Lee’s back, it looks to me like he’s basically the same pitcher as he was in Seattle, except he forgot not to let his HR/FB ratio regress to the mean when moving from one of the best pitcher’s parks in the league to one of the most hitter-friendly parks. Since 2008, Cliff Lee been one of the best pitchers in baseball. Of the likely AL playoff starters, only Francisco Liriano and CC Sabathia really match up with Lee.

2) C.J. Wilson, CHONE: 3.13 nERA,* 3.53 FIP*
2010: 4.2 WAR, 3.58 FIP, 4.23 xFIP, 3.78 tERA, 3.15 ERA

I include the asterisks because it looks like CHONE is still projecting him as a reliever. I’m not sure how CHONE or other projection systems handle reliever-starter switches, and obviously it needs to be accounted for. The (very) general rule is to add one to a reliever’s FIP/ERA to see what he would produce as a starter. That is a only a general guideline, though, and Wilson has outperformed all but the loftiest expectations of his transition into a starting role. Wilson walks a lot of batters, and his 4.23 xFIP reflects some good fortune on fly balls (5.1% HR/FB ratio, the league average this season is about twice that). However, Wilson strikes out a lot of hitters and keeps the ball on the ground enough to make it work.

3) Colby Lewis, CHONE: 3.47 nERA , 3.48 FIP
2010: 4.4 WAR, 3.52 FIP, 3.94 xFIP, 3.51 tERA, 3.72 ERA

Lewis has probably been better than Wilson; he has a better FIP, xFIP and tERA. Lewis hasn’t quite had Wilson’s good fortune on fly balls (although Lewis certainly hasn’t been unlucky) , and that’s a bit more of a problem because he’s a flyball pitcher. However, he has a very good walk rate and a higher 2010 K/9 rate than any of the other starters on Texas’ staff.

4) Tommy Hunter, CHONE: 4.83 nERA , 5.07 FIP
2010: 0.7 WAR, 5.02 FIP, 4.75 xFIP, 5.20 tERA, 3.83 ERA

…and then there’s Tommy Hunter. Yes, his ERA is good this season, and yes, xFIP indicates he’s has some bad luck. But he’s basically the Rangers’ version of Nick Blackburn. I guess Hunter strikes out a few more hitters than Blackburn, but he also walks more and gives up more fly balls. Basically, he’s an acceptable back-of-the-rotation starter during the regular season who a team really shouldn’t want to count on during the postseason.

The good news for Rangers fans is that Texas may not have to start Hunter in the Divisional Series, as the team is considering pitching Lee on short rest. As far as I can tell, the Rangers are the only team in the American League with three starters each over 4.0 WAR so far this season. Assuming Lee is healthy (and I doubt the Rangers would consider pitching him on short rest if they didn’t think so), the combination of Lee, Lewis and Wilson may be the best “top three” in the AL playoffs.

With the playoffs right around the corner, certain playoff-bound rotations in the American League are shaping up in curious ways. so over the next week or so I’ll be taking a brief look at each of them as they head for the post-season.

I’ve briefly listed some of each player’s current-season stats, and since we’re interested in how these players are likely to perform in the playoffs, I’ve also included some numbers from CHONE’s August projections update. I’ve listed CHONE’s nERA, which is (I believe) a component ERA neutralized for context, and also a FIP that I derived from the projected lines.

Thanks to NBC Hardballtalk’s Aaron Gleeman for sharing his thoughts on the Twins likely’ playoff rotation for me, although he shouldn’t be held responsible for my inevitable mistakes.

1) Francisco Liriano CHONE: nERA 3.66, FIP 3.61
2010: 6.3 WAR, 2.44 FIP, 3.08 xFIP, 2.73 tERA, 3.44 ERA

Remember back in the pre-season when there were rumblings that the Twins were thinking of moving Liriano to the bullpen? Ahem. Most of the AL Cy Young Angst indignation is for the sake of Felix Hernandez, and its justifiable, but spare a moment of for Liriano (Cliff Lee, too), who has been somewhat forgotten. But about the playoffs: CHONE’s projection may seem conservative, but the program doesn’t know how much the past seasons’ performance was influenced by Tommy John recovery or not, and neither do I. I would tend to give a bit more weight on the current season, but that’s an non-expert opinion. A left-handed groundball machine with tons of strikeouts? Yes, please. With all due respect to David Price and CC Sabathia, I think that the only other playoff starter in the AL playoffs as good as Liriano right now is Cliff Lee (assuming Lee’s back is in working order).

2) Carl Pavano CHONE nERA 4.30, CHONE FIP 4.14
2010: 3.2 WAR, 3.92 FIP, 4.00 xFIP, 4.10 tERA, 3.60 ERA

If the Twins face the Yankees, would the Yanks be looking for revenge on Pavano, or Pavano on the Yankees? While Pavano isn’t a strikeout machine, he rarely walks a hitter and keeps the ball on the ground, which will be doubly helpful given Minnesota’s terrible outfield defense. He’s somewhere around league average as a pitcher, but given the condition of some of the other playoff rotations, he isn’t a liability.

3) Brian Duensing CHONE nERA 4.36, CHONE FIP 4.41
2010: 1.9 WAR, 3.51 FIP, 3.99 xFIP, 2.73 tERA, 2.19 ERA

The 2010 stats mix in about 45 innings of relief with about 75 of starting, but Duensing has been a very pleasant surprise for the Twins’ rotation given the injuries to Baker and Slowey. CHONE doesn’t think he’s nearly as good as his current season line, and that is understandable, but while his strikeout rate isn’t impressive, the lack of walks and groundball rates are. Duensing might turn into a pumpkin, but a team could do much worse for an injury replacement.

4) Nick Blackburn CHONE nERA 4.83, CHONE FIP 4.72
2010: 0.5 WAR, 4.96 FIP, 4.68 xFIP, 4.96 tERA, 5.23 ERA

I’d be more concerned about having to start Blackburn than Duensing. The good groundball rate is there, but it doesn’t make up for the Horacio Ramirez-esque strikeout rate. Having a guy like Blackburn as your #4-#5 starter is okay in the regular season, but is a real weak spot going into the playoffs. He’s been better in August and September, but I’m unconvinced. Thankfully for the Twins he’ll only have to start once during a series barring something unforeseen.

The Question Marks:

Scott Baker CHONE nERA 4.10, CHONE FIP 4.11
2010: 2.5 WAR, 3.94 FIP, 4.03 xFIP, 4.15 tERA, 4.52 ERA

I still think Baker is the Twins’ second-best pitcher when healthy, and if he can’t start in the playoffs it’s a blow to the Twins, especially if Slowey can’t go either, as would mean the Twins have to hope Duensing will keep it up and for the other pitchers to dominate the non-Blackburn starts. Baker’s not a dominating pitcher, and his flyball tendency plays into the Twins’ defensive weakness, but he has a good K rate and avoids walks. He’s a better match for other teams #2 and #3 starters than Pavano and Duensing when he’s healthy, but health is his issue at the moment.

Kevin Slowey CHONE nERA 4.38, CHONE FIP 4.27
2010: 2.3 WAR, 3.94 FIP, 4.48 xFIP, 4.08 tERA, 4.18 ERA

Slowey is sort of a poor man’s Baker (flyball pitcher, fewer Ks, but also fewer walks). Duensing’s emergence takes some of the sting out of Slowey’s injury issues, but as said above, if Baker can’t go either, that means Nick Blackburn is probably starting a playoff game at some point.

In summary, while injuries have taken their toll on the Twins, Pavano is no slouch, Duensing has held his his own, and Liriano has been as good as any pitcher in the American League this season. Other rotations have had their problems too, and if Baker can get healthy, the Twins’ rotation stacks up against other playoff teams better than it has in years.

Last night, the Rockies, pushing for a playoff spot and just out of the lead in the National League West, suffered a tough loss to the Arizona Diamondbacks, a team that’s been “playing for pride” for months. The loss dropped Colorado to 2.5 games back in the divisional race with only 12 games left to play. In the top of the ninth inning, down 3-1, the Rockies’ batters due up were the red-hot Troy Tulowitzki, veteran Melvin Mora, and Rockie (Rocky?) for Life Todd Helton. Wait, what? Melvin Mora? Surely the right-handed hitting Mora wouldn’t bat against the right-handed pitcher Juan Gutierrez? Maybe the Rockies’ bench is a bit thin due to injuries, but while Helton has had a down season, he has the platoon advantage… Mora is only playing because of Ian Stewart’s injury. Colorado manager Jim Tracy wouldn’t let Mora bat, not with this being the Rockies’ last chance in a key game, right? After Tulowitzki struck out, Mora did indeed go up to bat and struck out swinging; then Helton fouled out to end the game. Did Tracy make a mistake in not pinch-hitting for Mora in such a crucial game?

Mora has actually been fairly useful for the Rockies this season, offsetting his poor fielding with slightly above-average hitting (104 wRC+), which is pretty decent for a somewhat cheap bench player. Of course, for this situation we need more than current performance; we want “true talent.” For that, I’ll refer to CHONE’s August 29 updated projections, which I’ve translated to wOBA (using last season’s weights and leaving out SB/CS as they aren’t relevant for potential PH/platoon situations). Mora is currently a .330 wOBA hitter according to CHONE. Mora’s career (well, 2002-present) platoon split is not that big — .354 wOBA vs. LHP, .351 wOBA vs. RHP. When estimating his platoon skill with reference to his .330 wOBA CHONE projection, his expected wOBA vs. RHP is .326, and vs. LHP .339. Tracy would want to pick a batter expected to have a better than .326 wOBA in this situation, obviously.

On the Rockies bench at the time were two obvious candidates (the others all being either right-handed and/or terrible, and Ryan Spilboroughs having already been in the game): Jason Giambi and Seth Smith. I say “maybe three” because one could make a case for Chris Iannetta, as he’s a pretty good hitter, but a) he’s right handed, b) I’m not sure he was available given recent injury problems, and c) the pinch-hitting penalty eliminates his chances of likely being helpful in this situation anyway.

The key is c): the pinch-hitting penalty. Research has shown that hitters typically have a much more difficult time hitting off the bench than normal, so we expect their wOBA to be about 10% lower in these situations.

So in Giambi’s case, while CHONE projects a .357 wOBA, off the bench, we’d expect him to be a .321 hitter. After estimating his platoon skill, we’d expect him to be about a .328 hitter versus RHP. CHONE projects Smith projects at .368 wOBA, which is .331 after the PH penalty, and after adjusting for the platoon advantage, comes out to .333.

While the “penalty” means that pinch-hitting for the platoon advantage is rarely as beneficial as fans think it is, in this case, it does appear that the Rockies would have had a better chance by having Smith or Giambi hit for Mora. But let’s not got crazy — over 700 PA, a .328 wOBA is worth less than two runs over a .326, or barely a thousandth (~0.0017) of a run per PA. Given the margin of error in projections, not pinch-hitting Giambi for Mora is hardly a ridiculus decision. There is a bigger gap between Smith and Mora: over 700 PA, a .333 wOBA is worth about 4 runs than a .326, but that’s still less than a hundreth of a run (~0.0058).

It is fair to say that given the game and season situation that Tracy should have pinch hit Seth Smith for Melvin Mora. Once we take a closer look at the numbers, however, the advantage gained wouldn’t have been as big as one might think.

I don’t care about the Manager of the Year award. If fired Royals manager Trey Hillman won it this year it would be fine with me. In fact, I’ll start the campaign now: Hillman for 2010 American League Manager of the Year!

But seriously, folks… if Ron Gardenhire wins Manager of the Year, I’m fine with it. If he doesn’t, that’s fine with me, too. I don’t care. If he does win, I know that it will drive many saber-oriented Twins fans crazy, as I’ve read many of their criticisms of his decisions. You can find enough of those around if you look around the ‘net. I’m not here to say that Gardenhire is a bad manager. I don’t really know.

That last sentence is key to my post, as a couple of my favorite saber-friendly writers seem to think that a lack of knowledge about whether “Gardy” helps the Twins win or not redounds in his favor. Joe Posnanski writes:

I think Ron Gardenhire is the best manager in baseball. I think that not based on what we see but what we can’t see.

Commenting on Posnanski, Rob Neyer blogs:

Managers make moves that don’t make sense, based on the numbers we’re looking at … but we often don’t have all the numbers…. If we did have absolute knowledge, Gardenhire might look better than we think.

Posnanski’s appeal to our lack of knowledge either way is more obvious, but it is also present in Neyer’s strange thought about the “absolute knowledge” we don’t have — we “don’t know everything” going on with the Twins, so Gardenhire must be making more of a difference than other managers. I’m not going to criticize Gardenhire, but rather to point out the obvious problem with this claim.

To be fair, Neyer does make some other points (although doing so cuts against his “we don’t know” claim). He notes that the Twins have historically had a low payroll (although he also notes they don’t this year [thanks to the taxpayers’ largesse towards the impoverished Twins owners], which sort of makes the point irrelevant when considering 2010), but what does that have to do with Gardenhire? It was their front office that signed Jim Thome and Orlando Hudson and traded for J.J. Hardy. When the A’s were winning despite a low payroll in the first half of the decade, did everyone credit Art Howe? Yeah, I think they did — wasn’t that what Moneyball was all about, how Billy Beane was a mere figurehead and Howe was the real mastermind behind Oakland’s success?

Some will say that Gardenhire should get credit for the Twins’ winning despite injuries to Joe Nathan and Justin Morneau. The Twins were heavily favored to go to the playoffs long before the season started, and when Nathan went down I (incoherently) predicted that certain writers would use it as an excuse to give Gardenhire credit even though the best closers don’t matter all that much. Over the last three seasons, Nathan has averaged about 2 WAR. This season Jon Rauch has been worth 1 WAR. Obviously, a brutual loss. As for Morneau, he’s actually been worth 5.3 WAR this season — a career best. The “R” (“replacement”) in WAR accounts for the playing time element. Maybe Gardenhire saw this coming, and came up with the great idea of asking Morneau to hit for a Bondsian .446 wOBA in the short time he did have. “Strawberry, hit a home run!” “Okay, Skip.” “Ha-ha! I told him to do that!”

Going through these arguments (and there are others) distracts from my main point regarding the Poz/Neyer quotes, however. In both of them, it is asserted that we can’t say that Gardenhire isn’t a key to the Twins because we don’t know/don’t have all the information. Taken on its own, it is a fallacious argument from ignorance. “I’m asserting something without argument, and it’s your job to disprove it.” I’m not even claiming that they necessarily need numbers to back it up (it would be nice, of course). The problem is that just asserting that “we don’t know why the Twins are having success, so it must be due to Gardenhire” isn’t a valid argument. What would Neyer and Posnanski say to someone who claimed that the reason the Yankees are winning this season despite Derek Jeter’s season is because of Jeter’s “intangible” leadership? Hey, Jeter’s around, the Yankees are winning, there must be some connnection, right? We don’t know, but it would be “prudent” to be open to the possibility, right? How is that any more baseless than asserting that Gardenhire must be doing something we can’t see in the numbers or in his tactics? Maybe there are other managers around baseball who have helped their teams even more than Gardenhire has; how should we select which manager has done the best at things we don’t know about?

Maybe Gardenhire is making a difference. Maybe he isn’t. But the proper inference from “we don’t know” isn’t “he probably is,” but rather “we don’t know.”

2010 has been miserable for the Orioles. The vaunted young position players have been disappointing as a group, and no Orioles position player has reached three WAR yet this season. In particular, Adam Jones‘ incipient superstardom looks to be on hold yet again, as he’s not even at two WAR yet. The pitchers have been even worse. However, for those people who see ERA as the go-to pitching stat, Jeremy Guthrie (3.74 ERA over 190 innings so far) might seem to be a “bright spot” in this otherwise wasted season.

If you’re reading this, you probably know that ERA is not considered to be a first-call pitching stat around here. FanGraphs uses FIP when calculating Wins Above Replacement in an attempt to avoid the problem of giving pitchers credit or blame for the fielders behind them and batted ball luck. It’s not perfect, but it is more stable from season-to-season than ERA/RA. FanGraphs has Guthrie at 2.1 WAR currently, which is helpful, of course, but if that’s a team’s bright spot… His decent rating is mostly due to his endurance, given his number of innings pitched, as his 4.39 FIP is actually below average (FIP is always scaled so that it is equal to league ERA, which is currently 4.10). While Guthrie does “eat innings,” the differential between his ERA and FIP indicates he’s likely been the beneficiary of good fortune regarding the fielders behind him and some batted ball luck (.265 BABIP). But even that FIP is a bit deceptive, as Guthrie has had a career-best 7.8% HR/FB ratio this season. xFIP accounts for this by normalizing his HR/FB ratio to league average, which puts his xFIP at 4.90 — the fifth-worst among qualified starters in baseball this season. If we widen the net a little further, we find his xFIP to be about the same as less bright spots such as David Bush, Kyle Kendrick, Brian Bannister, and Tommy Hunter.

Guthrie’s main skill is that he doesn’t walk hitters, and his 2.23 BB/9 is the lowest of his career. Guthrie’s strikeout rate has never been impressive, but 2010 is his second season in a row with strikeout rate under five per nine innings. While Guthrie is getting more hitters to swing at pitches outside the zone than ever before (27.6%), this probably reflects the overall higher O-Swing percentage in the league more than an improvement on Guthrie’s part — he’s still below average. Moreover, when he does get hitters to swing at pitches outside the zone, they’re making contact with those pitches at a greater rate than before. Pitchers with Guthrie’s stuff usually survive by getting good groundball rates (which FIP doesn’t take into account), but Guthrie has never been exceptional at getting grounders, despite his this season’s improvement over 2009.

This sort of thing isn’t atypical for Guthrie. In his 2007 and 2008 seasons his ERA was much better than his FIP and xFIP. In 2009 his luck “evened out,” as it were, as his 5.04 ERA was relatively close to his 5.31 FIP and and 5.22 xFIP. One season isn’t a great indication of true talent on its own, but when looking at Guthrie’s 4.90 xFIP, it isn’t that surprising coming off of a 4.54 in 2008 and a 5.22 in 2009, and is probably a decent indication of his “true talent.” While Guthrie’s straight FIP of 4.39 is the best of his career, his 4.41 FIP and 4.53 FIPs in 2007 and 2008 came in seasons where the league average was 4.47 and 4.32, respectively. This season, the league average is 4.10, making his performance that less valuable than it might appear to be.

Guthrie was an excellent waiver pickup by the Orioles in 2007, and gave them a couple of decent years at the league minimum. Even after his poor showing in 2009, it was a low-risk move for Baltimore to offer him arbitration given his previous performance and the reasonable likely award (they settled without a hearing). Given his overall WAR of 2, it was a decent investment, and the Orioles have had success when he has started, at least in terms of preventing earned runs. However, once taking into account his poor strikeout rate, his good fortune on balls in play, HR/FB ratio, his age (Guthrie will be 31 in April), and the Orioles’ place in the “success cycle,” the notion that Guthrie will be part of the next contender in Baltimore seems far-fetched, however shiny his ERA may appear. Even if the Orioles keep Guthrie around in order to “stabilize the rotation” (whatever that means), a closer look at his performance this season shows him to be a very faint bright spot, indeed.

When B.J. Upton made his seemingly long-awaited full-season major league debut in 2007 at 22, he did not disappoint. Although he didn’t settle in full-time defensively at center field until the following season, his 2007 offensive performance was tremendous. Upton hit for average (.300), stole 22 bases, displayed good plate discipline (11.9% walk rate, 19.1% O-Swing), and perhaps most exciting given his age, showed very good power, with a .209 ISO and 24 home runs. A 22-year-old center fielder putting up a .387 wOBA (.300/.386/.508) seemed to be destined for superstardom.

Upton’s 2008 season was still excellent overall, as he put up 4.6 WAR while playing well in center field, improving his walk rate, lowering his strikeout rate, and stealing 44 bases. However, his power seemed to disappear, as his ISO dropped to .128 and he hit only nine home runs. Many attributed this to a shoulder injury during the season, and given that he excelled in almost every other area (.354 wOBA [.273/383/.401]), there was little reason to worry. However, in 2009, the power drought (only 11 HR, .132 ISO) continued, and coupled with a declining walk rate and a lower BABIP, Upton limped to a .310 wOBA season (.241/.313/.373).

Upton might have been seen as settling in as good defensive center fielder with an okay-ish bat, but it is easy to forget that he was only 25 to start the 2010 season. Whatever other problems he (allegedly) has had, the power has been fairly close to his 2007 level. While a low BABIP (.299) is responsible for a keeping his wOBA down to .342 (.236/.324/.427), that’s still a good number in the current offensive environment, and notably for the purposes of this post, his ISO is back up to .190 with 17 home runs.

Is this real improvement, random variation, or simply Upton finally getting his swing back after 2008’s shoulder problems? The shoulder issue is something we’ll have to set aside, but maybe we can get a bit of lead on the other two, beginning with Upton’s batted ball data. In 2007, Upton had a 19.8% Home Run-to-Fly Ball Ratio, but in 2008 that dropped to 7.4% and in 2009 to 6.8%. While his 2008 flyball rate dropped down to 30.6% from 37.6%, he still had trouble getting fly balls out of the park in 2009 despite the increase in flies to 40.3%. This season, Upton has increased his flyball rate to 42.7%, and more of them have gone out of the park — 11.9%. This is perhaps demonstrative of a change in approach.

Moreover, other data suggests that Upton has never been terribly lucky with regard to home runs. I don’t know the most recent Hit Tracker averages, but I believe that about a third of all home runs across baseball are “Just Enoughs” — that is, just barely cleared the fence. If a player has more than that number of “Just Enough” homers, they are probably getting a lucky. In 2007 only 7 of Upton’s 24 home runs were “Just Enough” homers, in 2008 3 of 9, and in 2009 3 of 11. Upton doesn’t seem to have had much luck on that score in previous seasons, or in the current season, when only 3 of Upton’s 17 home runs so far have been “Just Enoughs.” He’s hitting those homers with authority.

There are other legitimate concerns about Upton’s offense, of course — strikeouts aren’t horrible in themselves, but they remain high for Upton and might reflect a growing problem making contact. The less contact a player makes, the less chances he’ll have to hit one out of the park. These contact problem might also be related to a more aggressive plate approach — while Upton’s walk rate and O-Swing percentages remain above average, he’s swinging at more pitches outside the zone than ever before (24.9% O-Swing vs. 18.9% career). Still, whether it’s due to a change in approach, a finally healed shoulder, or a combination of the two, fans of the Rays have to be happy to see B.J. Upton’s power returning to previous levels, and there are indications that it might continue to do so.

Although wOBA is demonstrably superior to OPS as a “go to” all-in-one offensive stat, the good old “three slash” (batting average/on-base percentage/slugging) is still useful, as a way to briefly describe offensive performance, if not to value it. From it, one can get an idea of much (or how little) a player relies on batting average to get on base, how much power a player displayed, and so on.

One sort of three-slash line that usually stands out to me is when a player’s OBP is greater than their SLG. It “looks funny” to me. Let’s take a look at which qualified players have an OBP > SLG so far this season and see how offensively valuable they are. So without further ado, if the season ended today, here are the members of the 2010 OBP>SLG club, ranked in ascending order from those with the smallest OBP-SLG gap.

Just made it in: Cesar Izturis (.234/.275/.274, .248 wOBA), Nyjer Morgan (257/.317/.316, .286, ), Ryan Theriot (.277/.325/.324, .292 wOBA). All three of these players just snuck in with an OBP one point higher than their SLG, and all three are having terrible seasons at the plate.

6. Brett Gardner (.280/.388/.379, .360 wOBA). Many people thought that Gardner could play, but few envisioned him as a five win player in 2010. We’ll save the proper pats-on-the back and a full analysis of Gardner’s value until after the season. While most thought that Gardner would be an excellent defender (and he has been) with potentially a non-terrible bat, few thought he’d be almost 17 runs above average on offense. It’s hard to be bad offensively with an OBP near .390, no matter how little power is involved. Given his speed, his BABIP isn’t excessive, either, and he has excellent strike zone judgment (18.3% O-Swing) and contact rate (90.5%). He’s definitely pulled off Nyjer Morgan’s 2009; now if he can just avoid Morgan’s 2010…

5. Yunel Escobar (.258/.339/.329, .306 wOBA). Bobby Cox’s favorite shortstop has had a serious power outage this season, posting by far the lowest ISO of his career (.071). His OBP is also down, but given that his walk rate so far is actually the highest of his career, this is likely the result of his career-low BABIP (.284). Batted ball analysis is difficult, and there doesn’t seem to be a huge difference in his raw numbers — slightly fewer line drives and flies, and more ground balls. He still fields well, and given that he’s very likely much better at the plate than a .306 wOBA, Atlanta might be regretting this trade for a while.

4. Jason Kendall (.256/.318/.297, .278 wOBA). [INSERT JOKE HERE]

3. Juan Pierre (.273/.339/.314, .308 wOBA). Look, the guy has been terrible offensively. Even after including the steals, he’s about 10 runs below average. He has no power, and doesn’t walk much despite decent knowledge of the strike zone. This might be Brett Gardner’s future. But if you believe UZR, he’s been almost 10 runs above average in left field, about 1.4 WAR player. That’s better than critics of the White Sox’ acquisition of Pierre (including me) expected.

2. Chone Figgins (.249/.333/.294, .295 wOBA). Figgins’ 2009 was one of the better OBP>SLG offensive seasons of recent times, but 2010… well, he pretty much represents everything that went wrong for the 2010 Mariners. Even if he’d played average second base (he hasn’t), he’d still be a massive flop given this offensive production and paycheck. Figgins’ strike zone judgment is still good (20.6% O-Swing), but is actually signficantly worse than his previous seasons, although that translated into only slightly worse strikeout and walk rates. Figgins has always lived and died by his BABIP, and while there’s probably some degree of bad luck going on in 2010, there’s a chance he’s losing what little ability he used to have to drive the ball.

1. Elvis Andrus (.273/.354/.312, .308 wOBA). Andrus is still a very valuable player to the Rangers, given his youth, defensive skills, and price tag, but this is a bit of a let down after his surprisingly (given his prior minor league numbers) non-horrible 2009 at the plate. Yes, even for a player who is supposed to be a defensive specialist, a .308 wOBA while playing in the Rangers’ launching pad is bad, especially the .038 ISO. It is difficult to find much “bad luck” in the numbers for Andrus, and while he’s still extremely young (he just turned 22 a couple of weeks ago), the Rangers may have to settle for a good-glove, no-hit shortstop, as even a .354 OBP can only make up so much for a total lack of power.

Of these players, only Gardner has been an above-average contributor offensively in 2010, and none of the others are even close (Escobar’s true talent is probably better than he’s shown this season). On-base percentage is still more important that slugging, but unless it is really high, it can’t make up for everything. It hasn’t always been the case, historically, that most OBP>SLG hitters did poorly, and in the future, I’ll take a look at the best OBP>SLG seasons (and careers) of all time.

I’m loathe to discuss the (alleged?) rift between Tony LaRussa and Colby Rasmus. My personal opinion is that the young center fielder should be playing every day, but I don’t have the desire, energy, or efficiency to cover every relevant issue. Joe Posnanski’s take is predictably enjoyable, in particular emphasizing reasons why many people are, well, sick of LaRussa. I imagine that’s a common sentiment, which is why it was good to see it acknowledged in Tim Marchman’s thoughtful “pro-LaRussa” post. One phrase in Marchman’s writeup particularly caught my eye:

Colby Rasmus is a really talented young player who can’t hasn’t hit lefties…

This raised the hackles of many people out there who quickly checked the numbers and pointed out that Rasmus has actually been pretty decent against lefties this season — 102 wRC+ (.323 wOBA) in 102 plate appearances, or a slightly above average hitter. However, he was absolutely dreadful versus southpaws in 2009, with a 28 wRC+ (.218 wOBA) over 115 PA. Despite a good overall line, a .256 career wOBA versus left-handed pitching is absolutely dreadful. But observed performance and true talent are two different things. Does Rasmus really have a problem hitting lefties?

As Marchman acknowledges in the comments to his post, 217 career plate appearances versus lefties doesn’t establish much (I assume that’s why Marchman has “can’t” crossed out in the quote above) — one should regress a left-handed hitter’s observed split against 1,000 plate appearances of league average to get an estimate of his actual platoon skill. After doing so, the estimate of Rasmus’ “true” platoon split still isn’t very encouraging. Using the ZiPS RoS .329 wOBA as a overall baseline, he projects as a .339 wOBA hitter versus RHP and a .297 wOBA hitter versus LHP. Even bumping that projection up to .340, he still only projects as a .307 wOBA hitter versus LHP. I’m not sure if platoon issues are one of the reasons LaRussa has sat Rasmus so often (and Rasmus has actually played seven of the last eight games, so this whole brouhaha may be about over), but if it is,
there’s reasonable evidence to suggest that in this case LaRussa might not be asleep at the wheel.

But back up for a moment: when we say that we need to regress against 1,000 PA of league average performance by LHH against LHP, that means that at 1,000 PA of observed PA vs. LHP, a hitter’s platoon skill is estimated to be “exactly” between midpoint between league average and his observed performance. This sort of regression is the right way to do things, particularly for minimizing error when doing projections for numerous players, but it also means that from just 217 PA, we really know very little about Rasmus’ platoon skil — the estimate is based much more on league average than on observed performance. So let’s dig a bit deeper.

The Book-derived method I use to estimate splits is based on major-league data, so it isn’t clear how platoon skills displayed in the minor leagues translate to the majors. Nonetheless, given the paucity of Rasmus-specific major league plate appearances vs. LHP to go on, let’s take a look at his minor league numbers. A quick glance at Rasmus’ player pages at Minor League Splits (which doesn’t use wOBA) reveals that he actually hit lefties quite well in the minors: .275/.371/.455 versus .278/.364/.496 for righties. That’s a pretty small split. More specifically: in AAA in 2008, he only hit .255/.347/.353 versus lefties, but given that his OPS versus RHP was .250/.347/.417, that’s still a small split for a left-handed hitter. At AA Springfield in 2007, He had a larger split (.839 OPS vs. LHP and .958 vs. RHP), but again, that isn’t a terribly big split for a lefty, and he had almost the same OBP versus LHP (.379) as righties (.381).

As for the major leagues, one should be cautious when splitting up his miserable 2009 and better 2010 because it is already a very limited sample. Of course, as soon as bloggers bring up “small sample size” we almost always go on to talk about the sample anyway, and I’m no different. In 2009 Rasmus pretty much did everything horribly versus left-handed hitters, although his .187 BABIP does seem to be quite unlucky. I’m not ready to say (particularly given the minor league numbers) whether Rasmus “learned” something about lefties between 2009 and 2010 or whether it is just regression, but there is obvious improvement almost across the board. His line drive rate versus LHP and RHP is the same (19%). His walk rate versus lefties (8.8%) is above the overall league average (8.5%). The power versus righties has improved, and while Rasmus is being criticized for his high overall 2010 strikeout rate (33%), his K rate versus lefties (29.7%) is actually better than his K rate versus righties (34%).

On its own, this breakdown of a small sample some of Rasmus’ split peripherals by season doesn’t tell us much. However, given the platoon skill he displayed in the minors, it does suggest that 2010 might be more reflective of his abilities against lefties than 2009. I don’t know what issues Tony LaRussa has with Colby Rasmus, but a careful look at the numbers suggests that concerns about Rasmus’ ability to hit left-handed pitching are overblown.