As has been written before, Royals outfielder David DeJesus is the sort of player who tends to fly under the radar because he does no one thing exceptionally well, but he does a number of things at an average or above-average level. He’s been about a 3 WAR player most of his career, and has accumulated almost that much value already in 2010. DeJesus probably isn’t an average center fielder any more, but runs saved in left or right field count, too. Despite having only average-ish power and being a terrible basestealer, DeJesus has a .344 career wOBA (.290/.361/.429). At 30, DeJesus is having a career year in 2010 offensively, with a .379 wOBA (.329/.397/.466). That probably is not his true talent level, but ZiPS’ rest-of-season projection is bullish nonetheless: .299/.369/.444 (.358 wOBA). One good test to see if a sports journalist has a clue is whether he or she says “David DeJesus is a fourth outfielder on a good team.” By my calculations, those people think that a fourth outfielder is someone whose true talent level over a full season is (conservatively, based on current projections) about 3 WAR. Draw your own conclusions.

Given DeJesus’ subtle combination of skills, it is ironic that the poorly-constructed-but-“official” Elias Rankings might somehow catch on to his value. According to the latest “reverse engineered” Elias Rankings at MLB Trade Rumors, if free agency started today, DeJesus would be Type A, meaning that if the Royals were to offer him arbitration and he turned it down then signed with another team, the Royals would get the signing team’s first round pick in the 2011 draft as well as supplemental pick.

This is particularly interesting because DeJesus is one of the Royals’ best trading chips due both to his value on the field and his team-friendly contract: $4.6 million for all of 2010 with a $6 milllion club option for 2011 (with a $500,000 buyout). Assuming DeJesus is only owed about two million dollars over the rest of the season and (using the conservative 3 WAR full season estimate) is projected to be worth about 1.5 wins at four million dollars per win, that’s four million dollars of surplus value this season. Assuming the team is smart and picks up the option, a half-win decline to 2.5 WAR for 2011 and inflation to about $4.5 million per win, that’s another five million dollars of surplus. Nine million dollars surplus could fetch something like good (if non-elite) prospect and perhaps some filler, and again, that’s based on a conservative estimate of DeJesus’ value.

But if DeJesus ends up a Type A free agent, that potentially adds an interesting wrinkle. In a Kansas City Star article from last month discussing DeJesus, several possible courses of action are mentioned, including trading DeJesus, picking up the 2011 option and keeping him, picking up the 2011 option and trading him in the offseason, and declining the option and then offering him arbitration in hopes he would turn it down and sign with another team, thus netting the Royals draft compensation. This last possibility is what interests me here.

It is an intriging suggestion, but ultimately, it is something the Royals should not do for two reasons. First of all, Victor Wang’s research on Type A compensation (summarized here) values average Type A compensation at about six million dollars. Assuming the Royals could make a fair trade (there is little point in analyzing possible screw-jobs) now at the conservatively-projected above surplus of nine million, the draft pick compensation wouldn’t hold up. Indeed, it is not clear that the draft pick compensation would even be more valuable than picking up DeJesus’ option and trading him in the offseason.

The second reason the arbitration-offer route is a bad idea is that DeJesus would be very likely to accept it. DeJesus is a good player that could help a lot of teams, but he isn’t a top-level talent like Matt Holliday was or Carl Crawford will be. He’s more like Orlando Hudson — a good player, but not good enough that teams are willing to overlook the draft pick they would have to give up to sign him. In each of the last two offseasons, Hudson ended up signing deals below his market value because teams were conscious of giving up the draft pick. DeJesus and his agent have no doubt noticed this, and realize they are likely to get a larger award in arbitration than free agency. If the Royals offer arbitration and DeJesus accepts, they not only don’t get the draft picks, but they would end up paying more in the arbitration award than they would have if they had picked up the option. Moreover, this would further reduce the surplus value (and thus potential return) DeJesus would have on the 2011 trade market.

DeJesus’ Type A status may bring send images of draft picks floating through the heads of Royals fans and officials. But given the likely outcome of that decision combined with the team’s current state, Kansas City should be looking to trade DeJesus now, as his value will never be higher.

Last week, a rumor circulated that the Philadelphia Phillies were exploring the trade market for right fielder Jayson Werth. I have no idea how much truth there is to this, and just to make things clear from the start, as long as the Phillies are in contention, I don’t think they should trade Werth. For a good take on the credibility of the rumor and the mess the Phillies have made for themselves in the outfield, see Rob Neyer’s blog post from last week. Hypothetically, though, how valuable would Werth be if the Phillies were to shop him?

Werth’s journey from Toronto to Los Angeles to Philadelphia makes for an interesting story, but I’m more interested in the present, in which Werth remains a somewhat under-appreciated star. Werth’s wOBA is over .380 for the fourth season in a row, and ZiPS rest-of-season projections projects a .384 wOBA (.276/.371/.500) over the rest of the season (CHONE’s July Update projects a very similar .273/.368/.491). In the 2010 run environment, that’s about a +30 hitter. Although Werth’s UZR numbers have gone down in 2009 and 2010, I still estimate him to be about a +10 right fielder over a full season. Taken together, +30 offense +10 fielding -7.5 position + 20 NL replacement level = about a 5 WAR player over a full season. Assuming he was traded now, with about half a season left, that’s 2.5 wins. Moreover, Werth is only being paid seven million dollars this season. Assuming four million dollars per marginal win, that’s about $6.5 million dollars in surplus value over the rest of the season. That could fetch a very good major league rental (depending on how much money does or doesn’t get thrown in by each team), or a solid (non-elite) prospect in a trade.

But wait, there’s more! Werth’s contract is up after the season, and he will almost certainly be a Type A free agent, meaning that if whichever team has him after the season offers him arbitration (which they should) and he turns it down (also likely) and signs with another team, the first team would get the signing team’s next first round draft pick plus supplemental pick. Victor Wang’s research on prospect and draft pick trade valuation (summarized by Sky Kalkman here) shows that the average value of Type A compensation is about $5.5 million. Whichever team has Werth at the end of the season (likely) gets that value as well, which nearly doubles Werth’s projected surplus value from the $6.5 million to $12 million. Prospects aside, this draft pick compensation boosts Werth’s value beyond his current performance and salary, and perhaps the Phillies could conduct a fair trade in which they add a player that helps their team even more than Werth over the remainder of the season, given that Werth’s value extends beyond his performance. This is an intriguing possibility… in principle.

Still, as I wrote at the beginning, barring an insanely favorable offer or an unforeseeable collapse that puts them out of contention, the Phillies should not go out of their way looking to trade Werth. For one thing, despite their current injury problems, Philadelphia is an old team built to win now, so unless they are willing to abandon that, they are not in a position to be looking to give up an outstanding player like Werth for prospects. More importantly, though hypothetically they might actually get a better “win now” player than Werth, in reality, it is hard to see it happening. The reason is obvious: only contending teams are looking to acquire a half-season rental like Werth, and although he has value beyond his projected performance/salary, in a fair trade, a contending team is not going to give up more current value for less current value plus a draft pick.

Jayson Werth is a very valuable player. For the Phillies, that value is best spent by keeping him around.

Overview

The Tigers have exceeded the expectations of many (including myself) in 2010 by not only winning, but by being in the thick of the AL Central race, going back-and-forth with the Twins this week for the divisional lead. Yes, they’ve outplayed their run differential by 3 games, but those wins are “in the bank.” Some regression is to be expected, so the Tigers should be looking to make marginal improvements to improve their chances.

Buy or Sell

Although the Tigers aren’t as talented as the Twins, they’ve managed to stay with them so far. They also have an older roster that isn’t going to get any better (as a group) than they are now, so they really should go for it. There are some areas they can improve to can better their odds of making the playoffs a fair bit without crippling themselves for the future.

While relievers are often overvalued in relation to how much they can help in a partial season, in the Tigers’ case they could probably help themselves more than most teams given how thin their bullpen is beyond closer Jose Valverde, especially after Joel Zumaya’s season-ending injury. There should be plenty of sellers this season with relievers available that won’t cost the Tigers much in terms of talent or money; it shouldn’t be difficult to improve on the likes of Eddie Bonine, Brad Thomas, Ryan Perry, et. al.

Staff ace Justin Verlander projects to pitch better the rest of the season and Max Scherzer is coming around after a rough start to the season, but the Tigers could improve the middle and back of their starting rotation relatively cheaply. Jeremy Bonderman should be adequate if he can stay healthy, but with Rick Porcello in the minors after terrible struggles and Armando Galarraga returning to the reality of being Armando Galararaga, this is an area the Tigers should look at. They probably aren’t in a position to trade for one of the big name starters out there, but adding another league average starter to go every fifth day could potentially add a couple of wins down the stretch without mortgaging the future.

The situation with the non-pitchers is a curious one: they have a few good players and one great one (Miguel Cabrera), but then they also have some mediocre role players like Brandon Inge and Ramon Santiago who could be improved upon, but are good enough that it probably wouldn’t be worth the wins that would be added given what it would cost to do so at in-demand positions like third base and shortstop. Barring an opportunity for a trade they can’t pass up, Detroit should be looking to proactively maximize the talent they have. Austin Jackson‘s post-April offensive performance is a good reminder that while Brennan Boesch’s BABIP-fueled contributions are “in the bank,” they aren’t likely to continue, and they should be ready to give more of Boesch’s playing time to Ryan Raburn (who’s a much better hitter than he’s shown so far this season), for example. Another idea along these lines would be to give Scott Sizemore another chance at second base (that was cut short at barely over 100 PAs in part because of bad luck on BABIP) and give Boesch’s at-bats to newly-minted “second baseman” Carlos Guillen, a good hitter whose fragile health the Tigers should be looking to preserve. If Sizemore could hit adequately, this would also improve their infield defense.

On the Farm

Beyond the Box Score’s pre-season aggregate farm system rankings had the Tigers’ system at #21. Jacob Turner and Casey Crosby are young pitchers with a lot of upside that the Tigers shouldn’t be looking to move. After that, there are some useful parts and some long-term potential. Some of the useful parts are decent enough and yet aren’t so great that the Tigers should be afraid to move them in the right offer (e.g., Wilkin Ramirez).

Budget

For all the off-season hand-wringing about their budget, the Tigers 2010 payroll is about $134 million dollar, according to Cot’s. Big contracts for Verlander, Cabrera, Guillen, and likely Ordonez (if the Tigers keep winning, his 2011 option will vest, although that hardly seems as devastating as it did the last time it happened) are still on the books for 2011, but Bonderman’s $12.5 million, Johnny Damon’s $8 million, and Brandon Inge’s $6.6 million, among others, are coming off the books. If the Tigers payroll stays at about the same level, they should have some leeway in that regard in 2011.

Overview

Despite losing seven of their last ten, the Minnesota Twins are still in first place in the American League Central. The Tigers and Chicago White Sox have cut the Twins’ lead in the division to 0.5 and 1.5 games, respectively. As Joe Pawlikowski wrote earlier today, the Twins should not panic. They remain the most talented team in the division. However, the Twins have real competition at the moment, and should be looking to make improvements where they can at a reasonable cost.

Buy or Sell

The Twins should be looking to buy, but carefully. They do not have many obvious needs among their position players. The biggest “hole” is probably another middle infielder who can play third base. Nick Punto’s glove largely makes up for his helplessness at the plate, but this is one place the Twins could use a real upgrade. Brendan Harris will return to his replacement-level self soon enough and Danny Valencia, at least at this point, doesn’t have the bat/glove combination to be a real improvement over Punto. While the Twins can probably get by with Punto at third, both shortstop J.J. Hardy and second baseman Orlando Hudson having injury problems already this seasons. If Minnesota can obtain a decent third baseman it would allow Punto to fill in at third, second, and short when needed rather than having to resort to replacement-level scrubs like Harris and Matt Tolbert if another rash of injuries hits.

Another good idea might be trying to obtain a decent fourth outfielder, since Denard Span is Minnesota’s only competent defender out there — one shudders to think what might happen if he gets hurt. To be fair, a Michael Cuddyer–Delmon Young–Jason Kubel outfield (in whatever positional combination) might finally beat out the Matt Garza-and-Jason Bartlett-for-Delmon Young,*-Brendan Harris-and-Jason Pridie trade in terms of Twins-related Unintentional Comedy value.

* No, Delmon Young being about league average so far this season does not come close to making up for it. The fact that he’s being praised for an average performance only accentuates the hilarity of that trade. It is a credit to the Twins front office that they’ve been able to work around it.

To the surprise of no one who understands the value of relievers, the Twins have weathered the loss of Joe Nathan quite nicely. Jon Rauch and Matt Guerrier are good if unspectacular, and while the Twins could use another decent bullpen arm, they don’t have to make a desperation move.

The starting pitching has been strong, with a FIP under 4. Francisco Liriano, Scott Baker and Carl Pavano head up a rotation good enough to compete with any other in the Central, but a) things are really close, and b) they could improve it. If they could replace Nick Blackburn’s innings with a league average starter, or perhaps even (given the right trade circumstances) Cliff Lee or Roy Oswalt, Minnesota could really widen the gap between themselves and their divisional competitors, not to mention set themselves up with a strong playoff rotation.

On the Farm

According to Beyond the Box Score’s pre-season aggregate farm system rankings, the Twins have the 12th best farm system in the major leagues. They have some very high upside position players like Aaron Hicks, Ben Revere, and Miguel Sano in various levels of the system, as well as their usual bevy of potential middle-of-the-rotation strike throwers. Danny Valencia has a chance to be an adequate starting third baseman down the road. Their most obvious prospect trading chip is catcher Wilson Ramos, who is probably a league average catcher at worst, and maybe much more than that. More importantly, he might be the most “blocked” player around baseball at the moment. The Twins shouldn’t give him up for just anything, but they should be shopping him for the right deal. If they crave an impact pitcher, Minnesota will have to give up more than just Ramos. It’s tough to imagine them trading Hicks or Sano, but if the right offer is on the table, flags fly forever…

Budget

At about $98 million dollars, the Twins are hardly the small payroll team of the past, thanks to the taxpayer generosity. They don’t have much money coming off the books in 2011, and Joe Mauer is getting a big raise. There are also decisions about options and/or arbitration raises to be made for players like Michael Cuddyer, Jason Kubel, and J.J. Hardy, among others. Moroever, unless Hudson (free agency) and Hardy (arbitration) are retained, the Twins will probably have to replace them with free agents. So unless they plan on raising their payroll significantly in 2011 (and they may very well, I don’t know), any pieces they acquire in trade this season probably shouldn’t require them to commit to much more money in 2011.

After the 2008 season, the Kansas City Royals traded Leo Nunez to the Florida Marlins for Mike Jacobs, who was to become a key part of the Royals 2009 push for the AL Central title. There is no need to re-visit the fate of Kansas City’s aspirations. The Marlins apparently aren’t happy with how their own 2010 playoff push is going, firing manager Fred Gonzalez and some coaches today. I suppose owner Jeffrey Loria feels like being forced by the union and MLB to actually spend money entitles him to expect greatness from those under him. I leave that discussion for someone else.

But looking back at the 2008-2009 off-season, from the standpoint of the spendthrift Marlins, Nunez’s best attribute at that time was probably that he had one more pre-arbitration season left, and that they could get him for Jacobs, a replacement level player they were likely going to non-tender. Sure, Nunez had been a half-win reliever in 2008 with a 3.77 FIP, but while his 3.62 tERA looked good, his 5.13 xFIP was less than impressive. In 2009, while Jacobs (unsurprisingly to to nearly everyone everyone except the Royals’ “braintrust” and, it must be said, a number of FanGraphs commentators) was awful in Kansas City to the tune of -0.5 WAR, Leo Nunez didn’t exactly light it up in 2009, either, putting up -0.8 WAR. One could still say that the Marlins “won” the trade given the salary differential from the two, but this clearly wasn’t what they were expecting. Nunez wasn’t completely horrible, as his xFIP was 4.41, but a 4.91 tERA showed he was getting hit hard, his strikeout rate wasn’t making up for the big flies, and, frankly, given Florida’s usual budgetary methods, the predictable outcome would have been a non-tender rather than let Nunez head to arbitration. Florida obviously saw something they liked, however, and settled with Nunez for $2 million dollars.

Thus far in 2010, the Marlins’ faith in Nunez has been amply rewarded, we he’s put up almost one win already. What caught my eye, however, wasn’t simply Nunez’s good performance so far — after all, pitcher performance varies more year-to-year than hitters, and given the small samples we get of reliever performance in single seasons, great changes are to be expected from season-to-season since we only get a glimpse of their true talent. What grabbed my attention was how firmly Nunez seeming “transformation” is supported by his peripherals.

Beginning with the “dumb” stat, ERA: Nunez currently sits at 2.43. Over not even 30 innings, a lot of pitchers could do that. That is actually higher than his FIP, at 2.33. Nunez has had good FIPs before, partly on the basis of his luck on flyballs. He has been lucky with HR/FB rate this season, at only 4.0%, but even when normalizing that, his xFIP is still an impressive 3.04, and that’s mainly because of one of the most impressive and radical changes to Nunez’s peformance: after having about a 40% GB rate and about a 43% FB rate in 2008-2009, in 2010 Nunez has ramped up his ground ball rate to 52.6%w and his fly ball rate is down to 32.1%. All this explain why his tERA is an amazing 2.11 in 2010.

That isn’t all. In 2008, Nunez simply didn’t strike that many batters out (4.84/9). He increased that to 7.86 in 2009, but also upped his walk rate to 3.54. In 2010, he has lowered his walk rate down to 2.12, while increasing his K rate to 8.80, a career high if he keeps it up. Combining that with his newly-found groundball tendency, it’s as if Nunez looked at his 2009 in the offseason, wasn’t happy, and simply decided, “well, that didn’t work, maybe I’ll try striking out more guys, walking less, and, while I’m at it, I’ll keep half the balls in play on the ground. Maybe that will work.” I’m sure Brian Bannister has talked about it in one of the 27 interviews he’s given over the last few seasons, but Nunez is actually making it happen.

All of this is in an extremely small sample of course (not quite 30 innings), but keep in mind that it isn’t as if Nunez had a huge sample of last year’s performance, either, at about 70 innings. Using simple 5/3/2 weights for seasons, at about 42 innings we’d weight Nunez’s 2010 equal to his 2009 in terms of projecting his true talent, so he’s getting close. And there is evidence (other than the results he’s getting) that he’s changed his approach. His BIS pitch-types indicate that he’s throwing fewer fastballs and sliders in favor of many more change-ups, which has made his fastball and (especially) his change-up more effective. Whether he can continue with this success throwing almost 46% change-ups is something to watch.

We don’t know exactly what the Marlins saw in Nunez, but whatever it was, the made the right decision, and it is a credit to their talent evaluators. FanGraphs currently values Nunez’s 2010 performance alongside or greater than that of more well-known relievers such as Rafael Soriano, Billy Wagner, Francisco Rodriguez, Grant Balfour, Jose Valverde, Mariano Rivera, and Joakim Soria. Even if he can’t keep it up, he’s more than earned what the Marlins are paying him this season.

Overview

The Chicago White Sox have a .500 record at the moment, which by itself would seem to leave them in an ambiguous spot regarding the immediate future. Sure, their run differential indicates they “should” only be 32-36, but we aren’t here to talk about the past. The standings are a bit less ambiguous, with the White Sox five-and-a-half games behind the first place Twins, and three back of the second place Tigers.

Buy or Sell?

Although in principle the White Sox are close enough that “anything could happen,” it seems pretty clear to me that the White Sox should be selling (and recent comments by General Manager Kenny Williams seem to indicate that he thinks so, too). Yes, they have some good players, but, well, the 2010 Astros didn’t happen overnight. This isn’t to say that the 2011 White Sox are going to be the worst team in baseball if something isn’t done, but it’s a possibility. Some painful choices need to be made, and the sooner that happens, the sooner the White Sox can be back in the mix, and the odds of them making them playoffs this season are too slim to take the chance.

The White Sox do have some dead weight on their roster. Juan Pierre wouldn’t bring much of anything in a trade even if the White Sox paid what they owe on his salary (only part of it, since the Dodgers are picking up the rest). Even if Mark Teahen were healthy at the moment, he’s owed the prorated remainder of $14 million dollars through 2012, and is working on his third season in a row of replacement-level performance.

If the White Sox act on their more valuable veterans now, they don’t necessarily have to move their good young pitchers. Gavin Floyd might have some decent value on the trade market, and John Danks certainly would, but although the White Sox should listen on all of their players, they don’t necessarily have to move these two valuable pieces if they start getting good value for the older players.

The key to getting value back for many of their veterans will be a willingness for the White Sox to send along money, since these players do not have much surplus value beyond their contracts. I am surprised that A.J. Pierzynski is still on the team, given that his no trade rights only recently vested. He’s had a terrible season so far, but his projected performance indicates a player who could help many teams. Paul Konerko is having an excellent season in the last year of his contract — again, the White Sox would probably have to send along a large chunk of money to get some value back, but he should certainly be on the block. Mark Buehrle is signed through 2011 at $14 million dollars, and although he’s slowing down, the Sox could probably get something back for him if they sent along a chunk of his salary.

There are various good bullpen pitchers on the Sox roster that could be discussed: Bobby Jenks and Matt Thornton come to mind, but in the space I have hear, it’s worth going over two harder cases. First, Jake Peavy is still a good pitcher, and the White Sox paid a lot to get him. But he’s been struggling a bit with injury concerns, and they might want to wait and see how he plays a bit more and find out whether he might be part of their future or to show other teams he’s worth looking into. Alex Rios is a different case: as I’ve discussed before, he’s proving to be worth every bit of the money he’s owed through 2014. The problem is that he probably won’t be worth much more than that, and other teams may be hesitant to take on enough salary for his trade value to be worth it to the White Sox. In any case, if they do things right with the other players, he might be part of a future contender anyway. They should keep their ears open, though.

Andruw Jones has come back to earth and probably wouldn’t bring back more than a trinket, but Alexei Ramirez has flown under the radar so far this season. No, he hasn’t hit well so far this season, but ZiPS RoS sees it as a temporary condition, and he fields well at shortstop. He’s signed for only $1.1 million dollars through 2011, a great value for the Sox, but if they don’t think they’ll contend in 2011, a league-average shortstop making $1.1 million dollars could bring back a very good return from the right team.

On the Farm

The White Sox’ farm system was 26th in Beyond the Box Score’s aggregate farm system rankings, having been depleted through trades and less-than-inspired drafting. There is some talent there that could help soon: Daniel Hudson is a good pitcher, Tyler Flowers a promising offensive catcher, and between Dayan Viciedo and Brent Morel a third baseman should be in there somewhere. There are other helpful players, but not enough in either upside or depth. That is why the older players on the major league roster need to be traded — in order for these few good prospects to potentially have some company on a White Sox team that has a chance to contend.

Budget

According to Cot’s, the White Sox Opening Day payroll this season was $103 million dollars. They aren’t shy about spending, but as I’ve written above, that willingness to pay should, for now, go into willingness to pay sizable chunks of the salaries for veterans that they trade away in order to get back a decent return.

Oakland first baseman Daric Barton is having a nice season under the radar, hitting for a .360 wOBA (.283/.390/.418) and playing good defense. It’s not a superstar performance, and a good OBP with little power and fielding, especially at first base, aren’t going to get him a lot of national publicity, but it is valuable nonetheless.

Something about Barton’s 2010 has caught the eye of someone outside of Oakland, however: his nine sacrifice bunts. It begins with this article by Susan Slusser, in which not only were Barton’s bunts discussed, but praised, as it turns out he’s doing it “on his own.” It is part of a typical “prospect finally living up his potential’ piece for a local paper, but it was Joe Posnanski who declared this excitement over Barton’s (praised, if uncommanded) bunts The Day Moneyball Died. Rob Neyer offered a half-hearted defense of Oakland General Manager Billy Beane’s seeming acquiescence to this tactic as perhaps Beane wanting to “zag” when everyone else was “zigging.”

I have no idea what is going on, or even if it is significant. Maybe Barton is engaging in a little game theory, given that he hasn’t shown a great deal of power yet, and is trying to get the infielders to further play in against him. That is a bald speculation, however, and Barton is not much of a groundball hitter (which bodes well for his future power potential, of course). And while sacrifice attempts sometimes increase run expectancy during a plate appearance, it looks like Barton is “succeeding” far too often for that to be the plan.

Perhaps Barton has taken on some other wisdom from sabermetrics and is actually in situations where a bunt increases win probability (WPA) and/or run expectancy based on the base/out state (RE24). Well, FanGraphs has the tools to find out, so we’ll go to the play-by-play logs.

April 11 vs. the Angels, Barton bunted twice. The first time was in the first inning with one and one out. The WPA for the plate appearance was -0.017 and the RE24 was -0.22. The second time was in the eighth inning, in a near-identical situation: Rajai Davis got on first, stole second, and Barton bunted. Barton’s WPA was -0.010, the RE24 was again -0.22.

April 17 vs. the Orioles, Barton again bunted Rajai Davis over from second to third. WPA: -.010, RE24: -0.19.

April 30 vs. Blue Jays, Barton advances Cliff Pennington to third with a bunt with no one out. WPA: -0.15, RE24: -0.19.

May 15 vs. Angels, Barton again bunts Pennington from second to third with none out in the first innging. WPA: -0.17, RE24: -0.22.

May 23 vs. Giants, eighth inning, none out, Barton sacrifices Rajai Davis from first to second in a 1-0 game. WPA: -0.007, RE24 -0.21.

May 26 vs. Orioles, Barton moves Davis over to second with a first inning, no out bunt. WPA: -0.019, RE24: -0.23.

May 28 vs. Tigers, Barton bunts Davis from second to third with none out. WPA: -0.015, RE24: -0.19.

June 11 vs. Giants, Barton bunts Mark Ellis from second to third with none out in the first inning. WPA: -.013, RE24: -0.16.

From the standpoint of straight up run expectancy based on base/out states (RE24), all of these bunts are obviously bad ideas. Of course, it is well known that in certain game states sacrifice bunts can increase win expectancy, and the point of the game is to win, after all. Yet in not a single case did Barton make the right decision. The first inning bunts with none out are especially atrocious, of course. I realize there is a chance for a sacrifice fly when moving a runner from second to third, but it’s pretty funny when it’s Rajai Davis — there’s a guy who need the extra help getting home on a single!

But even late in the close game of May 23, with the As up 1-0 on the Giants, when one might think adding “just one” in the eighth could be a good idea, the WPA for Barton’s sacrifice was negative (if ever so slightly) at -0.007. So even the “best” of Barton’s bunts was a bad idea.

Daric Barton is helping the As this season at the plate and in the field. Maybe he’s playing games with the infielders. But while some might hail his play as the Right Way and a lack of selfishness for a good young hitter, the primary thing he’s been sacrificing (against his intentions) is Oakland’s chances to win games.

Overview

This post could easily be three words long, but I assume that the premise of the “What the X Should Do” series is to assume the place of the front office, so… I know it’s hard to believe, but the Royals are out of 2010 contention this season. They need to look to the future, but it is difficult to figure out when that “future” might actually begin, and thus what current players might and might not be part of it.

Buy or Sell

Clearly, the Royals should sell, but whom? The Royals aren’t young: the only player under 26 among the regulars and starting pitchers is Billy Butler. As will be discussed below, there’s no significant help coming from the farm system (other than from players who should already be up like Alex Gordon and Kila Ka’aihue — both 26) this season or next. The most optimistic possibility for significant help from the minors is 2012, and while that seems unrealistic to me, it at least gives us a place to start: the Royals should be looking to get value for any player on their roster that is not likely to have value for them in 2012.

The Royals have plenty of players that will not be helpful in 2012 or after, but a sizable chunk of them are useless (or close to it) now. Scott Podsednik is Juan Pierre without the glove. Jose Guillen has hit decently this season, but once you narrow his options to AL teams (he can only DH, despite recent appearances in RF), then narrow that to contenders… and after that, well, there’s still his massive salary (prorated portion of $12 million dollars remaining this season). Both were hot to start the season, and if they can’t get a C- prospect for either of them with the Royals picking up their entire salaries now, they never will. Both are currently sucking up playing time better given to others, and should simply be released. Well, if Podsednik can’t be traded he might be useful off the bench “just in case” fellow ill-fated outfield acquisition Rick Ankiel doesn’t return to full health soon. The Royals might as well keep Ankiel around to up his numbers a bit in case of a waiver trade (he has no value at the moment), although he should not be allowed to block Alex Gordon or even Mitch Maier. Gil Meche is a slightly different case, and is on the DL at the moment, but even if he wasn’t, his 2009 and 2010 performance, as well as his contract, gives him little or no value on the market without the Royals picking up a significant portion of his salary. Some other Royals might have a bit of value, but not enough to be helpful to the Royals other than as a salary dump: Kyle Farnsworth, Willie Bloomquist, and Captain 92%.

The Royals do have some players that they should move in expectation of getting something helpful back. Brian Bannister is 29, his recent performances don’t inspire confidence, and by the time 2012 comes around he won’t be worth his likely arbitration award, but he’s still under team control, and might be a useful #4 starter somewhere else. David DeJesus, one of the more underrated players in baseball, has significantly more value. He plays good defense on the outfield corners, can probably still play passably in center, and is having the best offensive season of his career. He has a very club-friendly contract ($4.7 million in 2010, with a $6 million club option for 2011, a bargain for a 3-win player). While he can help a team now, and the Royals don’t need to be (re-)signing any 30+ players for their next contender. He won’t bring back a future star, but he could bring back another (young and cost-controlled) David DeJesus-type: an above-average regular. The longer they wait, the less they will get back.

One intriguing piece is closer Joakim Soria, who has a club-friendly contract through 2011 with club options for 2012-2014. It is a good deal for the team, but relievers are rarely worth more than two wins a season, and the Royals should be at least check if they can get more value for him on the market for the 2012-and-after seasons.

There is something special on the roster. As I wrote above, the “2012” scenario is exceedingly optimistic, but it remains in the minds of many fans because it is the last season of Zack Greinke’s current contract. Greinke has been up and down this season, but his 5-win 2008 and 9-win 2009 are still relevant. Unless the Royals can realistically contend in 2012, the club needs to be open to trading Greinke. They have time to be picky (and don’t have to trade him this season), but the sooner they move him, the more they can get for him. Even if one thinks he is “only” a five-win pitcher, he’s being paid like a sub-3 win pitcher for the remainder of his contract, and that value could bring back an impressive haul.

Now, if even 2013 seems unrealistic for contention, then all bets are off. If that is the case, the Royals don’t have to trade the following players, but the team should be open to seeing what value they can bring back: Alberto Callaspo (for sure), Chris Iannet– I mean Alex Gordon (still potentially good, despite the organization’s efforts to scapegoat, bury, and devalue him), and Billy Butler (unless they can extend him to an Adam Lind-type contract).

On the Farm

Prior to the season, Beyond the Box Score’s aggregate farm system rankings had the Royals at #6, and since then Mike Moustakas and Eric Hosmer have actually started to live up to their draft status, and the pitching continues to impress. That being said, it must be kept in mind that other than raking 26-year-old “prospects” Alex Gordon and (maybe) Kila Ka’aihue in AAA (being blocked by all that super talent on the big club), none of the impact prospects are above AA, which is why the 2012 scenario is so unlikely.

Budget

Say what you want about Dayton Moore (and I have), but along with putting together a good farm system, he has also done well in convincing ownership to increase the budget significantly (which is the main reason the farm system has improved). The Royals’ major league payroll is currently around $75 million dollars and probably won’t go much higher in the near future. While Guillen, Ankiel, Willie Bloomquist, and Kyle Farnsworth will be coming off the books after the season, the Royals have a number of players due for arbitration raises such as Gordon, Butler, Callaspo, Bannister, as well as contractual raises for players like Greinke and Soria, so there won’t be much money as one might think for Dayton Moore to make his typically shrewd free agent signings.*

* Props to Dan Szymborski.

Overview

Both the 2008 and 2009 seasons seemed hopeful for Cleveland at the outset (I certainly thought both of those teams would do well), but fell apart rather quickly, with the team trading a homegrown ace (CC Sabathia in 2008 and Cliff Lee in 2009) in both seasons to bolster their farm system. As of this morning, the Indians are at the bottom of the standings, but unlike the previous two seasons, 2010 was acknowledged to be a rebuilding year. The trades of those earlier seasons have significantly added to the team’s young talent, and the real question is how far off Cleveland is from contending after 2010.

Buy or Sell?

The answer is “Sell.” Cleveland may not have the big prizes as in the past, but this is to the organization’s credit, as those prizes have already brought in much of their current hope for the future. Some of their veterans are (realistically speaking) currently untrade-able: Travis Hafner and his contract are in Cleveland to stay, and even if the front office had been inclined to see what they could get back for Grady Sizemore this season (and given his team-friendly contract, it’s not clear that they should), his surgery nixed that option.

He’s not Sabathia or Lee, but Fausto Carmona isn’t a bad trade chip. No one should expect him to return to his 2007 form, but in 2010 he has gotten the walks under control. ZiPS RoS projects a 4.58 FIP for him going forward, and, while not spectacular, that does have value for a contender needing to shore up the middle or back of their rotation. Carmona is only guaranteed the prorated remainder of $4.9 million this season and $6.1 million in 2011, and his contract includes club options for 2012-2014 that could potentially add value to this deal. Worse pitchers go for more money on the free agent market, so if Cleveland feels that a) the young pitching in their system will be ready by next season and/or b) Carmona won’t be good enough to justify his place in the rotation when the club is ready to contend, they can probably get decent value for him on the trade market. He likely wouldn’t bring back a future superstar, but probably something still quite useful.

There are other pieces here, but none that have as much value. Jake Westbrook has similar value on the field to Carmona, but given his past health problems and being owed much more money ($11 million guaranteed in 2010, the last year of his contract), doesn’t have much value on the trade market. While ZiPS has faith in Kerry Wood’s ability going forward, his past and present health issues, his dreadful performance so far in 2010, and big contract ($10.5 million in 2010) means that he doesn’t have much value, either.

The Indians do have positional role-players that could potentially help teams. Jhonny Peralta isn’t a defensive wizard, and probably has about a league-average bat, but there are teams who could use him, and he has a (you guessed it) very team-friendly contract with a club option for 2011. Smart and inexpensive off-season acquisitions Austin Kearns and Russell Branyan have shown they can both still play, and while they wouldn’t bring much back, Cleveland should at least see what they can get for these two older players who aren’t under contract for next season.

On the Farm

Beyond the Box Score’s pre-season aggregate farm system rankings placed Cleveland’s system at #3 in the majors, and acclaimed catcher prospect Carlos Santana made his debut just this past Friday. Among others, Michael Brantley should be ready to start by next season at the latest, Matt LaPorta should be back at some point this season, and Lonnie Chisenhall is an exciting young third baseman. There is also good reason to think that Justin Masterson won’t be the only young pitcher with promise in the rotation in 2011 or 2012. Prospects fail, of course, and every team could use more depth in the minors, but Cleveland has as much or more talent on the farm than most other teams in the majors.

Budget

Cleveland’s payroll dropped significantly from 2009 to 2010, and probably shouldn’t be expected to go higher in 2011. While there are arbitration raises coming, as well as contractual raises for Hafner, Sizemore, and other players like Carmona (if he is still around), big contracts like those of Westbrook and Wood are coming off the books, so there is a chance that the team might have a bit of money to spend on free agents if they decide that their young talent (potentially supplemented by this season’s trades) is ready to make a run in 2011. Cleveland’s present may be bleak, but the front office has set themselves up well for the future, and it will be interesting to see if that future arrives in 2011 or later.

On Wednesday, I wrote about measuring the runs a player costs his team by grounding into (or avoiding) the double play. If you haven’t, I recommend taking a look at that post if you’re interested in the methodological details. Today I’ll discuss the players who have been the best at avoiding the double play ranked by the runs they’ve cost saved their team relative to average (0.35 runs above/below average per GiDP opportunity — average is around 11%) in 2010, then go over a few interesting points in conclusion to both discussions.*

* For today’s post I’m using the most recent data from Baseball-Reference’s situational leaderboards, so things “on top” (or bottom, depending on your perspective) have changed since then, although not much.

There are a number of hitters at around +1.4 runs, and between no double plays (in fewer oppportunities than the leaders below) and four percent grounded into per opportunity. In no particular order: Adam Dunn, Curtis Granderson, Hideki Matsui, Justin Morneau, Carlos Pena, Cody Ross, Josh Willingham, and Chris Young.

The second best player in GiDP runs saved is Carl Crawford, who is 0-45 in DP situations so far, +1.75 runs. He’s been excellent at it throughout his career, but this is also a a bit ironic given that Crawford is perceived as a great leadoff man (although he hasn’t always been used that way). It is well-established that, on average the lead off spot sees the fewest DP opportunities (runner on first with less than two outs). Of course, Crawford has been seen as a lead off man because of his speed, particularly his basestealing ability. But as The Book also notes, having a great basestealer leading off is a bit of a flawed strategy, since most teams have good hitters (usually with good power) hitting behind him; does Evan Longoria really need Crawford’s help in moving along the basepaths? As with most things batting-order related, it’s a tiny difference over a season (and in 2010, Crawford hasn’t led of at all, maybe Joe Maddon read something co-authored by his biggest fan?), but it is interesting to note. As an aside, The Book also mentions that the third spot sees the most GiDP chances on average, which is why good hitters like Joe Mauer and Billy Butler might not fit well in that spot in the order.

Josh Hamilton leads the league in GiDP runs saved so far this season, at +2.1, and over his career, he’s been about as good as Crawford. It’s a nice addition to the mini-comeback season he’s had. I’m guessing it’s the tattoos.

Three (promissory?) notes in conclusion two these two posts:

a) I don’t think it needs to be said (but I’ll say it anyway) that these are just “leaderboards” for the current season, not estimations of true talent (“projections”), although the leaders/trailers so far have been players one would expect give past performance (Billy Butler and Joe Mauer having problems, Hamilton and Crawford doing well). I might mess around with projections after the season, right after I finish all that other stuff I want to do but don’t have time to do.

b) It is interesting, but not entirely surprising, that low-strikeout players not known for their wheels (Butler, Mauer, Pablo Sandoval, Ivan Rodriguez) have been the worst so far these season, and while there are some speedsters up top (Crawford, Granderson) there are also some slow guys who strike out a lot like Dunn and Pena (Granderson and Young, among others, also strike out a good deal). This small sample with regard to both time and number of players doesn’t prove anything, but it suggest to me that while speed is an important factor in double play avoidance, taking pitches might also be a factor. Of course, to get the full measurement of cost/benefit here, we’d have to also measure the linear weights of productive outs and groundouts in general above and below average to see what the strikeout guys might be missing out on, too.

c) It is also curious that the handedness of the leaders and trailers is in line with some initial findings by MGL (who shouldn’t be blamed for anything I write here, obviously). Of the players having the most problems so far from Wednesday’s post, all are right-handed hitters except for Pablo Sandoval and Joe Mauer, who are themselves atypical hitters (Sandoval for his success while swinging at everything, Mauer for his preference for the opposite field). Almost all of today’s leaders are left-handed. This requires much more study, but it suggests that handedness matters, and that when projecting GiDP skill, that regression by hitter-handedness might be a good idea.