From their divisional championship in 2000 through of their last playoff appearance 2006, the Oakland Athletics had the second best regular season winning percentage and run differential in the major leagues, behind only the Yankees. Expanding the scope to include the non-winning seasons of 2007-2009, they still have the third best winning percentage and run differential in the American league for the Decade of the Aughts, behind only New York and Boston. Are the As prepared to return from their exile from contention after three years of mediocrity?

While Oakland’s current team doesn’t feature standouts like its excellent teams of the early 00s (although Zombie Eric Chavez lingers on as perhaps the highest paid backup 1B/3B in baseball history), like the 2006 team, the team has an even distribution of average and above-average starters. The only projected weak spot around the diamond is at shortstop, but even there, neither Cliff Pennington nor Adam Rosales is a replacement level scrub. The longstanding 3B problem (due to Chavez’s injuries) has been resolved for the moment with Kevin Kouzmanoff, who isn’t anything special with the bat or glove, but is a league average player or perhaps a bit better. Injuries and age have taken their toll on second baseman Mark Ellis, but his excellent glove makes him valuable. At first base, Daric Barton may have disappointed in the past, but he’s still only 24, the projection systems still like his offense, and he’s a slick fielder. The underrated Kurt Suzuki is a real asset at catcher. Despite Jack Cust’s down year in 2009, both ZiPS and CHONE still have confidence in his ability to produce at the plate, and should he or Barton fail, the As’ #1 prospect, power-hitting 1B/DH Chris Carter, might be ready to step in. Along with the Mariners, the As sport one of the most obvious “three center fielder” outfields in baseball. Coco Crisp, Rajai Davis, and Ryan Sweeney would each probably be above-average in center field; despite less-than-intimidating bats, the gloves are good enough that all three project as above-average players. Injuries are a concern with all three, but reserves Gabe Gross (yet another defensive standout) and Travis Buck could start for many teams. Moreover, the As’ #2 prospect, outfielder Michael Taylor, is just about ready for the big leagues.

Although the offense should be better in 2010, the strength of this team still lies (and will need to lie) in run prevention. The fielding should be excellent, but the pitching has to do its part. Free agent signee Ben Sheets is a wild card, given his injury history and (if one puts weight in such things) his Spring Training performance, but even if he isn’t the #2 pitcher the projection systems see, the As aren’t totally reliant on him. 22-year old Brett Anderson is likely their best starter, and Dallas Braden and Justin Duchsherer also projecting as above-average. Relief pitching is a major strength; Brad Ziegler, Andrew Bailey, and Michael Wuertz are all good relievers, and if Joey Devine can come back from his injury, this could be one of the best bullpens in baseball.

The As are far from perfect, but few teams outside of the AL East come close. The As’ starters may not be able to match up with Seattle’s Felix Hernandez and Cliff Lee, but their offense is probably a bit better than the Mariners’. They don’t have the offense of the Angels or the Rangers, but they will field better than the Angels and pitch better than the Rangers. The As have a lot of young players, so there is a lot of volatility in their projections — perhaps they’ll only win 70, or perhaps youngsters like Anderson, Carter, and Taylor will carry them to 90 wins. I’m probably higher on the As’ current chances than other FanGraphers, and I’m not saying they’re the best team in the AL West, the most evenly matched division in baseball. But from this pre-season vantage point, it’s a four-team race that the As have a non-trivial chance of winning.

The Texas Rangers are considering moving reliever C.J. Wilson into their starting rotation, and he has done nothing but impress them this spring. Of course, one shouldn’t put undue (i.e., any) weight in spring training performances, but there are other ways of gauging whether Wilson might make a decent starter.

I first want to make clear that I’m not going to address two important issues: 1) How much of an increase in workload Wilson may or may not be able to handle, and 2) whether or not Wilson is more valuable in the rotation than in the bullpen. I will just be focusing on his chances of making the transition performance-wise (other than endurance).

How good would Wilson be as a starter? CHONE projects him to have a 3.70 FIP in 2010, and ZiPS projects him for 4.17 — an average of about 3.94. Both of those projections are based on Wilson’s performances as a reliever, and as a general rule one estimates that a reliever will be one run per 9 innings pitched worse as a starter. A 4.94 FIP isn’t replacement level, but even in Texas’ hitter-friendly home park, that’s nothing to get excited about other than as a stopgap or back-of-the-rotation type.

There are other reasons to be doubtful. For his career, he has pretty big platoon splits, posting a 3.39 FIP (3.36 xFIP) versus lefties, and a 4.58 FIP (4.26 xFIP) versus righties. While relievers can be put into games so as to maximize their platoon advantage, this is not the case for starters, and most of the time, hitters would have the advantage against Wilson.

Finally, while pitch-type linear weights don’t tell us everything about the quality of a Wilson’s repertoire (for example, sequencing), they do tell us something. Of Wilson’s primary offerings the last few seasons, only his fastball has been clearly above average, and this is important for starters, who have to face batters more than once.

The factors cited above tell against the likelihood of Wilson being very good as a starter. However, projection is always a tricky business, particularly in the case of pitchers, whose true talent is generally subject to more changee than that of hitters. Moreover, there are some interesting recent developments in Wilson’s case. So, with all the usual caveats, two things stand out to me from Wilson’s 2009. First, while Wilson has always been a favorable groundball/flyball ratio (a good thing anywhere; even if sometimes the ball goes towards Michael Young that’s better than it going out of the park), in 2009, he took it to a new level, at 2.25. Second, in 2009, Wilson’s platoon split was remarkably even: 2.81 FIP (3.60 xFIP) versus lefties, and 2.94 FIP (3.05 xFIP) versus righties.

Normally, I’d be pretty skeptical, primarily because it relies on just one year of data (and from a reliever-sized sample, at that). But there might be something more at work here. Some of the Rangers’ pitchers (including Wilson) have added a cutter. Again, usually I’d be wary — “adding a new pitch” is right up there with “in the best shape of his life” for Spring Training stories. But in Wilson’s case, it has some substance. According to his pitch types, his pitch use and selection changed in 2009. While he threw about the same number of changeups as before, he seems to have thrown his fastball less in favor of more sliders and cutters. While earlier I said that over multiple seasons the fastball was his only consistently effective pitch, there is the possibility that adding a cutter and throwing more sliders might have increased the overall effectiveness of his pitches (other than the still below-average changeup). The cutter, in particular, might help explain his greatly improved platoon splits in 2009.

I don’t have a firm conclusion. At first glance, we wouldn’t expect Wilson, a capable reliever, to be that effective as a starter. However, if the new cutter has not only helped his platoon issue but has expanded his repertoire so that he can to get through the order more than once (and perhaps get even more groundballs), then — provided he can handle a starter’s workload over a full season — the Rangers might have something more than just a stopgap starter on their hands.*

* Thanks to David Appelman and pitch f/x expert Mike Fast for their helpful responses to my emails on this subject. Neither of them, of course, should be held responsible for any mistakes and/or misguided analysis in this post.

There’s something here. It’s unlikely much will come of it for reasons I’m sure Dave Cameron will cover later today… And that has to be incredibly frustrating for my boy Michael Jong and that one Marlins fan (or was it a homeless person who visited a Salvation Army shop with slim pickings?) I saw in Arizona… that has to be about it, right? It’s not like ownership has even earned that.

It’s too bad. The Marlins have a good core put together by a smart front office working with one hand tied behind their back. Let’s get the obvious out of the way: Hanley Ramirez is the best shortstop in baseball, and he’s only 26. ‘Nuff said. Dan Uggla’s defense, unlike Ramirez’s, appears to still be pretty bad at second, but his bat is still pretty good, and he’s an above average player. The corner infield is less inspiring, particularly with Jorge Cantu (and okay hitter but a dreadful fielder) still at third base, while something like a younger version of Cantu, Gaby Sanchez, patrols the area around first. Sanchez may just be holding down the fort until the team feels Logan Morrison is ready (and that may be soon). All three are competent, none are inspiring (although Morrison is just 22 and thus has a fair bit of upside). The outfield is good, too. The redoubtable Cody Ross was never great in center field, his defense is a plus in the corners and overall he’s probably about an average player or a bit better. Left fielder Chris Coghlan, another good young bat from the farm, would probably be playing second base this season if the club had been able to trade Dan Uggla (or moved him to third) as they wished. Anyway, Coghlan hits and fields well enough to be above average overall in left field. The long-awaited Cameron Maybin will be getting his first full-time shot in center field, and while some analysts aren’t as high on his immediate stardom as others, it seems to me he’ll get there soon enough, and with that bat and glove, it’s hard to see him being any worse than above average in 2010. In John Baker and Ronny Paulino, the Marlins have two decent catchers.

It’s the pitching that will get them. 26-year old Josh Johnson is a legitimate ace, or close to it, and the Marlins were forced by the mean-old MLBPA to extend him for four years. Isn’t there any mercy in the world for classy art dealers? Ricky Nolasco is also above average, and may still be more than that. After that, it gets pretty ugly, unless you think Anibal Sanchez and Andrew Miller are going to shock everyone and fulfill the promise they seemed to have long ago. As for the bullpen, well, you get what you pay for.

The frustrating thing about the Marlins is that with good, young players like Ramirez, Maybin, Coghlan, Johnson, and others all under contract or club control, they should be able to contend; even on their small budget, there has to be enough money left over to add a couple of non-terrible relievers, and/or another starting pitcher. Yes, the Phillies are very, very good, but with a bit of effort the Braves would be within striking distance. The Marlins could have a reasonable chance a wildcard spot (and maybe more), especially with the Nationals floundering and the Mets being the Mets. As it is, the Marlins will probably be around .500 this year, maybe a bit better, maybe a bit worse.

Jeffrey Loria should thank his lucky stars every day that Donald Sterling is around.

Late to the party as usual, for the past few weeks I’ve become more and more interested in pitch-type linear weights for hitters.* In particular, I was curious as to what they might reveal about which hitters are particularly good at hitting particular kinds of pitches. For example, we sometimes call certain hitters “fastball hitters.” I’ve heard one of particular minor leaguer who shall remain nameless who hasn’t been called up because he allegedly has a “slider-speed bat” (given the dearth of other players in that particular organization that can hit the slider, you’d think that would be seen as a good thing…). And so on.

I thought that it would be interesting to look at differentials in linear weight values between pitches for different hitters. I found some interesting stuff, but I want to avoid the illusion than pretend that I’ve “discovered” anything at this point, so I’ll begin with a post (or two) about an individual . In the spirit of Dave C.’s earlier “questions” posts, this is the beginning of a conversation (and I hope to get more in-depth later) rather than the conclusion of a study. For today, I want to talk about Jimmy Rollins‘ recent problems against the fastball against the backdrop of his continued success against changeups.

* If you haven’t already read Dave Allen’s clear and excellent explanation of how pitch type linear weights work, I strongly recommend that you do so.

While Rollins is still a good player overall, there’s not denying that 2009 was a down year offensively, as he put up a mere .316 wOBA after a very good .357 in 2008 and an excellent .378 in his 2007 MVP campaign. This is well known. There could be different reasons for it (which may all have roots in age-based decline), for example, bad luck on balls in play. But what also stands out are his pitch-type linear weight values against fastballs and changeups.*

* Those of you who dutifully read Dave’s article already know that the linear weights are by count, there is the chance, of course, that recently Rollins is only falling behind on fastballs then crushing them later, but that seems pretty unlikely, and for simplicity we’ll be ignoring that possibility for now.

Over the last three seasons (2007-2009), Rollins has been +6.3 against fastballs, and +22.8 against changeups during the same period. As one might expect, during that time his best season against fastballs was 2007, when he was +10.7. He was even better in 2006, at +20.4. However, he’s been in (apparent) decline against fastballs since 2006 and 2007, sporting a -1.8 in 2008 and a -2.7 in 2009. His rates per 100 fastballs bear out the decline as well: from 0.58 in 2007 to -0.12 to -0.17.

In contrast, Rollins continues to be consistently good against change-ups. While prior to 2007, his numbers against changeups where generally unimpressive, in 2007 he smashed them for +13.3, and while he hasn’t been as good (against much of anything) since then, while he numbers against fastballs dropped off, in 2008 he was still +4.5 (+1.29/100) against changeups, and in 2009 +5.0 (+1.36/100). More interestingly, of the good hitters I looked at (bad hitters are terrible against most everything), Rollins had one of the biggest “gaps” in his numbers between fastballs and changeups. I’m curious as to what this means.

Obviously, players typically lose ability as they age, but I’m curious if the linear weights tell us something specific about how that works for hitters. I apologize for ending with questions, but that’s better than presumptuous answers. I want to know if readers a) have any insight (even educated guesses) into what’s going on with Rollins in particular and/or b) want to see more stuff on this. Is Rollins “sitting changeup” more often as he gets older? Maybe, I don’t know for sure from the data I have. It would be easy to say he’s doing this because he’s aware that he’s “lost bat speed,” but to me, that is also a leap — “bat speed” is a useful scouting term, but it is too quick to infer anything about that that from the data I’m looking at. Perhaps an aging study can be done down the road using this or other data. I don’t know what this means right now, but I’m interested to see if we can find out.

While the Pirates’ wholesale commitment to rebuilding is commendable, the current major league team is still one of baseball’s worst. However, being in the National League Central means that the Pirates are not only likely to win more than 70 games for the first time since 2004, but also have a good chance to finish out of last place for the first time since 2006 (thank you, Houston Astros!).

As a group, the Pirates’ position players project as around average, partly due to their smart strategy of buying low on former top prospects whose value has dropped for whatever reason. Homegrown center fielder Andrew McCutchen is the only player here that has real star potential; at only 23, he’s a very exciting young player who is good at the plate and in the field. The rest are much less impressive, but outside of the failed-former-prospect competition between Bobby Crosby and Ronny Cedeno at shortstop, there aren’t any gaping holes. Ryan Doumit is a poor defensive catcher, and his bat isn’t all that great, but that’s still good enough to be at least an average catcher. Second baseman Akinori Iwamura is virtually the definition of league average. Andy LaRoche isn’t the stud he looked like he might become as a prospect for the Dodgers, but he has an adequate bat and a decent glove at third base. In left field, former top Nationals/Mets prospect Lastings Milledge projects as about average, and at 25, he still has some upside (whatever that means). 2009 surprise Garrett Jones projects as around average in right, and reserve outfielders Ryan Church, Brandon Jones and Brandon Moss are quality role players. Former Seattle catching prospect Jeff Clement will start at first, and while his bat isn’t anything special there, if he really bombs, the Pirates can always move Jones back to first and put Church, B. Jones or Moss* in the outfield full-time without losing too much.

* I realize that one of B. Jones or Moss may not survive the roster crunch.

If the nonpitchers are average-ish, the pitching as a whole is… not. Paul Maholm is the only pitcher on staff who projects as clearly above average, and could help a lot of teams, but he’s certainly no ace. At 28, he’s probably as good as he’s going to get. Charlie Morton is a bit younger (26) and looks like a capable #3 starter, and 27-year-old lefty Zack Duke is about league average as well. Ross Ohlendorf, Jeff Karstens, Daniel McCutchen and the rest are back-of-the-rotation fodder who will feature all-too-prominently in 2010, and none of them are particularly young. As Bill Simmons might write, if Octavio Dotel is your best reliever, that means Octavio Dotel is your best reliever. The rest of the group isn’t sub-replacement level, but they’re pretty bad, and things could get ugly once Dotel (better suited to middle relief at this point) is traded.

In a strange way, the terrible bullpen is a sign of the front office’s smarts. Yes, it will be hard to watch, but the 2010 (and 2011) Pirates aren’t anywhere close to contention, and no amount of overspending on, say, Brandon Lyon or Jose Valverde would have changed that. A decent bullpen can be constructed much more quickly than a rotation or a group of position players. As for the former, each pitcher is going to be at least one rotation slot higher than they can handle; as for the latter, they should be a respectable group, with a one star-in-the-making, some former top prospects who could still surprise, and solid role players. A mid-70s win total isn’t out of the question, given the divisional opponents, and while that’s hardly something to get excited about, at least the Pirates haven’t compromised their future (by trading away prospects or signing onerous contracts) to attain sub-mediocrity.

Considering only current ability to win rather than value relative to salary, if one looks at the Royals’ roster long enough, focusing in the decent rotation, the closer, and a couple of young (-ish) position players with upside, one might convince oneself that this is a decently talented team. One would be wrong. The Royals currently have one of the worst major league rosters in the American League (thank you, Blue Jays rebuild!).

The starting rotation is actually pretty good. After the monstrous Zack Greinke, there is a sizable drop-off, but not to the depths. Gil Meche isn’t as good he was a couple of seasons ago, but he’s likely better than 2009, and may still be a decent #2 starter. Injuries are a serious concern for Meche, however. Injuries also loom over sabermetric darling Brian Bannister, who might be a marginal #3 starter. Luke Hochevar is unlikely to live up to the expectations generated by being the #1 overall pick in 2006, but he has a non-trivial chance of being above-average. The #5 spot is a question mark, but that is the case for many teams.

The two losers of the epic Kyle Farnsworth–Kyle Davies–Robinson Tejeda battle royale for the #5 spot will end up in the bullpen. While each might be worth (another) try in the rotation, Davies and Tejeda profile better as relievers, and Farnsworth profiles better as an object lesson in what kind of player not to sign to a multi-year deal. Joakim Soria’s value, like that of most closers, is quite exaggerated, but he is one of the best relievers in the game, and keeps this group from being dreadful. For the ‘pen in front of Soria, the Royals have to hope some combination of Davies, Tejeda, and Carlos Rosa combined with the sunk costs of Kyle Farnsworth and Juan Cruz turns into something useful in middle relief.

If the rotation looks like it could be above average (provided good health), and the bullpen looks mediocre-but-passable (mostly due to Soria), the position players look absolutely dreadful. Billy Butler, Alex Gordon, and David DeJesus are the only players projected to be above average, and while Butler can’t defend or run, Gordon isn’t the next George Brett, and DeJesus bothers people who think that defense in the corner outfield spots doesn’t matter, they are good players that could help most teams. It would be unfair to blame the Royals’ failures on Butler and Gordon not becoming superduperstars. I’ve run the numbers – if Butler and Gordon turned into Mark Teixeira and Alex Rodriguez, the 2010 Royals still wouldn’t project as a .500 team. The Royals have other useful pieces such as Alberto Callaspo, Chris Getz, and perhaps Rick Ankiel. However, far too much playing time and/or roster space is slated for players who are nearly worthless (Scott Podsednik and Jason Kendall), completely worthless (Yuniesky Betancourt and Willie Bloomquist) and worse than worthless (Jose Guillen). Yes, the Royals could (and should) better utilize stopgap role-players like Josh Fields, Kila Ka’aihue, Mike Aviles, Mitch Maier, and Brayan Pena, but a couple more wins would only make them less bad.

This might be understandable if the Royals were committed to a thorough rebuild, but current management has never seemed to grasp that notion, and the signing of thirty-something mediocrities (Ankiel) and scrubs (Podsednik, Kendall) doesn’t signal a change. Moreover, while Butler is still young, Greinke, Hochevar, and Gordon are all already in their mid-twenties, and Meche and DeJesus are all in their thirties (Bannister is 29), so the aging curve doesn’t offer much hope for 2010 or 2011. Significant help won’t be arriving from the minors anytime soon.

The 2010 Royals will probably win 70+ games in 2010, and some will hail this as improvement. Don’t be fooled, it is less “improvement” than positive regression. “Even” 74 wins is never a sign of a good team, particularly in the weak AL Central. The very fact that 74 wins appears to be improvement says as much about the current state of the team than any number of player analyses.

Zack Greinke is the best pitcher in baseball. As a Royals fan, I’m biased, but I’m not alone. If you look at CHONE’s own runs saved above replacement, Greinke is the top pitcher projected for 2010. But I’m not interested in a “who is the best pitcher” debate at the moment. When all factors are taken into account, I can imagine good arguments for any one of a number of pitchers, including (but not limited to) Greinke, Tim Lincecum, Felix Hernandez, and Kei Igawa. My goal in this piece is not to argue Greinke’s case, but to argue that one “knock” on Greinke — his past struggles with depression and social anxiety disorder — should not be considered a significant factor.

Before I start, let me make three things clear: 1) I am not trying to minimize the seriousness of mental health issues; 2) I don’t have any special “inside” information; and 3) I am not a doctor, psychologist, or any other sort of expert or mental health professional; this is a lay opinion of a baseball blogger writing from the “outside.”

I’ve read comparisons of pitcher value going forward in which Greinke’s past mental health issues that caused him to leave baseball for a time in 2006 are given as a reason to grade him down. I disagree; if it’s a worry at all, it’s a relatively insignificant one. This isn’t meant as an “inspirational” piece about the power to overcome obstacles, either — there’s a place for that, but frankly, I’m not sure professional athletics is the arena to which we should look… that’s a rant for another time and place. This is more cold-blooded: it’s about how this should (not) factor into valuations of Greinke.

First of all, despite the way many of the bandwagon-jumping pieces that came out during Greinke’s 2009 Cy Young campaign made it sound, it’s not as if Greinke was out of baseball until right before his historically great 2009. Greinke’s problem actually came to a head four years ago, in 2006. His ‘comeback‘ to the major leagues full-time was three years ago, in 2007. He pitched well in 2007 and 2008 already — he’s been back for a while, and has been fine.

Second, the time off in 2006 as well as the lighter 2007 workload means that Greinke (who has never had a significant injury in his professional career, as far as I know) has fewer miles on his arm — another important factor for his value. So that at least partially (and in my mind, more than fully) offsets whatever risk Greinke’s condition involes.

Third, think for a moment about how many people you know that have struggled or have ongoing struggles with mental health that requires some sort of ongoing treatment (and again, I don’t know any specifics regarding Greinke’s treatment). It seems quite likely that a fair number of baseball players (including very good ones) are dealing with this sort of stuff, and we simply haven’t heard about it (some we have, as with Khalil Greene’s difficulties) because they’ve managed to keep it private. Do you really think professional baseball players are that much different from the rest of us?* If they can deal with it, so can Greinke, who has been dealing with for a few years now.

* And no, I’m not including the ‘shocking‘ increase in the number of players who needed AdderAll prescriptions after baseball banned greenies (which, unlike steroids, definitely didn’t help players’ performance in the past, even if they did do them, which they totally didn’t.).

Fourth, again without minimizing the seriousness of mental health issues, keep in mind that in February 2006, Greinke was just 22. Undoubtedly, social anxiety was the primary factor in Greinke’s difficulties at the time, but it’s also an age at which many people are at a crossroads. In The New Bill James Historical Abstract, James recounts the 1978 tale of the 22-year old Robin Yount, who, like Greinke, had been brought up at a very young age and was going through something of a career crisis, as the Brewers were considering moving him off of shortstop. Like Greinke, Yount thought about leaving baseball entirely (in Yount’s case, to take up professional golf). Some saw this as immaturity, but, as James writes after he returned to baseball

…Yount became a better player than he had been before; his career got traction from the moment he returned. What I didn’t see at the time was that Yount was in the process of making a commitment to baseball… What looked like indecision or sulking was really the process of making a decision… In the biographies of men and nations, success often arrives in the mask of failure (p. 594)

Greinke’s case (aside from the obvious) is obviously different than Yount’s, but there are similarities. Greinke, too, wanted to leave baseball behind for good. But that’s clearly not the case now. Contrary the “Zack’s just so goofy!” stereotype sometimes projected onto him (due to some memorable quotes), the main picture one gets is of a guy who is super-competitive (in everything — Brian Bannister has called Greinke “the most competitive peson I’ve ever met in my life.”) and driven.

Moreover, given baseball’s relative unconcern with its drinking problem, why would teams be concerned about a guy who got help for a treatable problem four years ago when they don’t seem to care all that much about players hitting the town every night while on the road? I’m not moralizing, I’m just “wondering” which is more detrimental to high-level athletic performance. Who knows?.*

* It’s hard to imagine, but maybe Greinke also hits the town with a world-historically awesome entourage of Kyle Farnsworth (Drama), Brian Bannister (“E”), and Billy Butler (Turtle). Um, not that I watch that stupid show.

But I digress. There are many reasons why someone might (wrongly, in my opinion) prefer one pitcher or another to Zack Greinke. Relative to all the various factors, Greinke’s issues with social anxiety shouldn’t be one of them.

Who is Alexei Ramirez? Well, he’s the starting shortstop for the Chicago White Sox who hails from Cuba. But who is he really as a baseball player? No, this isn’t a predictable comment about the birth certificates of Cuban players. Rather, it’s about the striking contrast between his only two seasons of playing baseball full-time in the MLB. (He did not play in the minor leagues.)

Many players have widely varying performances from season to season. Ramirez’s jump in Wins Above Replacement from 1.0 WAR in 2008 to 2.2 WAR in 2009 isn’t all that shocking; it happens all the time. Breaking it down into offense and defense doesn’t surprise either, on the surface. Dropping from a .336 to a .319 wOBA isn’t unusual, and I think we all know enough about the year-to-year variation and the error bars surrounding defensive metrics that a -10.6 to +2.3 in fielding isn’t all that unbelievable, either. It isn’t necessary to postulate a shift in true talent — there have been far more bizarre cases of observed performance jumping around from season to season. In Ramirez’s case, it’s the closer look that makes things surprising.

Let’s begin with fielding. As mentioned above, year-to-year correlation of fielding performance is fairly weak compared to overall offensive statistics, so while -10.6 to +2.3 is big, it’s not as if it is unprecedented. What makes it more surprising is the circumstance in which is occurred. In 2008, the bulk of Ramirez’ time in the field was spent at second base, where his “rate” stat was -10.6 runs below average UZR/150 (which coincidentally matches his overall fielding “counting” version of UZR for 2008). In 2009, Ramirez moved to shortstop. Shortstop is more difficult to field than second, so even after regressing the 2008 performance, you’d have a hard time expecting him to be good at shortstop in 2009. Well, Ramirez put up a +2.4 UZR/150 at short in 2009.

The Fans Scouting Report is a good resource for helping sort these things out. But if we look at Ramirez’s 2009 rating among second basemen, hardcore fans saw him as a second baseman on par with defensive standouts like Placido Polanco and Dustin Pedroia. Maybe that meant he was ready to make the shift to the more challenging position for 2009, despite UZR. Sounds promising, except in the (currently unweighted) 2009 Fan ratings for shortstops, Alexei is ranked among the likes of Ronny Cedeno, Julio Lugo, and Nick Green, none of whom are going to be mistaken for Adam Everett. What is going on here?

That’s fielding, with all its usual caveats. What about offense? A .336 to .319 wOBA (+1.2 to -7.1 Batting Runs against Average) is, again, not shocking. But the peripherals tell a strange story. One typical explanation — changed luck on balls in play — doesn’t stand out, as Ramirez’s BABIP and batted ball profile were roughly the same in both seasons. While assessments Ramirez’s modest success in 2008 tended to be qualified by concerns about his plate discipline, he actually improved his peripheral performance in that area. In 2008, he had a measly 3.5% walk rate, which reflects his near 60% of pitches swung at (league average is usually around 45%), including swinging at an incredible 43.7% of pitches outside the strike zone (O-Swing%). In 2009, his walk rate increased dramatically to a near-league average 8.1%, while his Swing% was a more reasonable 50.7% and his O-Swing%, while not great, was much improved from to 32.1%.

Make no mistake, Ramirez’s actual offensive contribution was far superior in 2008 — mostly due to hitting for a slightly better average (.290 vs. .277) and much better power (.185 vs. .113 ISO), the latter probably due to a superior HR/FB rate (13.8% vs. 8.2%). Still, he was even better at stealing bases in 2009 (14 out of 19 safe) than in 2008 (13 out of 21). It appears as if Ramirez became much “smarter” both at the plate and on the bases in 2009, and it got him… much less.

I’m not drawing any conclusions. I was simply struck by the various changes with opposite results from what one would expect. This is not to say that this makes Ramirez “hard to project.” For all the variations between projection systems, the core of all good systems is still regressing components, adjusting for age and context, and weighting them properly. Ramirez’s true talent is probably somewhere between his 2008 and 2009 performances. But that doesn’t make his 2010 performance any less intriguing to watch.

Why, yes, I am starting a consulting firm specializing in hack-tastic headlines, why do you ask?

The Yankees designated reliever Edwar Ramirez for assignment on Sunday to make room for Chan Ho Park on the roster. Although the Yankees say outwardly that they want to hold on to him, Ramirez’s strikeout rate leads some observers (like Rob Neyer) to the understandable conclusion that he’ll be claimed off of waivers.

It’s hard to imagine Ramirez making it through waivers. Sure, there are probably still some teams that look at a reliever with a 5.19 ERA and a sub-90 mph heater and blow him off, but this isn’t 1999. Many, probably most teams look deeper. Ramirez’s strikeout rate in the major leagues from 2007-2009 is 10.62 per nine innings. That is higher than Francisco Rodriguez, Rafael Soriano, Joe Nathan, and Jose Valverde, among others.

Of course, during the same period, Ramirez also walked 5.13 batters per nine innings, leaving him with a decidely below-average 2.07 K/BB ratio. To make matters worse, 2009 was by far Ramirez’s worst major league performance in both areas, with his K/9 dropping from 13.29 in 2007 to 10.25 in 2008 to 9.00 in 2009, at the same time his walk rate ballooned to its highest yet, at 7.36 in 2009. All of this is reflected in his FIP, which was only good in 2008 (3.96) but horrible in 2007 and 2009. WAR, as one would expect, followed suit, with Ramirez posting a -0.3 in 2007, 0.5 in 2008, and -0.4 in 2009. While it is true that single-season reliever performances have to be taken with a shaker of salt due to sample size, it is also true that pitcher true talent tends to vary more season-to-season than that of hitters, and Ramirez’s overall trend it not good.

FIP doesn’t necessarily tell the whole story. While Ramirez is a fly ball pitcher, he did suffer some dreadful luck with home run/fly ball rates in 2007 (19.4%) and 2009 (18.2%), whereas in his one decent season of 2008, it was closer to league average (10.9% — average is usually around 11%). Still, the advanced stats that adjust for batted ball types don’t completely absolve Ramirez — xFIP agrees that he was fairly unlucky in 2007 (4.73) but the decreased Ks and increased walks in 2009 gives him a 5.60. tERA says something similar — a 6.40 in 2009 is downright ugly.

According to our pitch types, about half of Ramirez’s pitches are fastballs, a bit under 10% are sliders, and about 40% are the change-up that reputedly got him discovered in the independents by the Yankees. His fastball has not fared well, being below average all three seasons according to pitch type linear weights. The slider has been slightly below average, but what got Ramirez in 2009 was that, unlike the previous two seasons, his formerly excellent changeup stopped fooling hitters. In genearl, prior to 2009, major league hitters offered at Ramirez’s outside-the-zone pitches fairly often, but in 2009, his O-Swing% was below average.

I’m not a scout or a coach, so I’m not going to say exactly what Ramirez might be doing wrong or whether it’s fixable. The numbers seem to indicate that Ramirez has to rely on fooling hitters with his changeup, and that simply didn’t happen in 2009. It will be interesting to see which team takes the (low-risk) chance to find out whether it can in the future.

Zombies.

Yup, Zombies in baseball. It happens. Guys who are clearly shells of their former selves hanging on for no reason. Well, I guess there is the money, but most of these guys already made tons of money. A zombie, you see, isn’t just any bad player who just keeps getting jobs for no reason. To be Undead, one must once have had life — one must once have been good. Paul Bako, for example, has somehow managed to be in and around the majors for more than 10 seasons (left-handed hitting catcher!) while always being around replacement level, but since his FanGraphs-WAR Era (2002-present) “peak” was 0.3 wins in his glorious 2003 season, we can be pretty sure he’s just being Bako (although he’s assuredly still a money-grubbing traitor). No, a zombie can be identified by having once been very good, but now putting on performance that let us know the Life Force has long since departed.*

* We’re talking about zombies here, not arch-liches. In other words, I won’t be discussing Jamie Moyer.

Ivan Rodriguez, is a good example of a zombie. Most of his best years actually predate the FanGraphs Era, but he did have some ~five win seasons in 2003 and 2004 with the Marlins and Tigers. While Zombie Pudge clearly can still play baseball a bit, his offense, always reliant on lots of contact, has pretty much completely eroded, and his defensive skills, once widely admired, are now decidedly average-ish. He’s not useless, but from one a Hall-of-Famer to a part-timer? Zombie Pudge.

Jason Kendall has been fodder for thousands of internet jokes of a couple of years now. While it’s understandable, give his inflated defensive reputation and offensive worthlessness (grit!), Kendall was a pretty great player back in the late-90s/early00s. Heck, he was still pretty good only a few years ago. At this point, though, while his defense might be a bit above average (he had a great year defensively in 2008, although 2007 and 2009 were both poor), his offense… well. Zombie Kendall.

We know that some teams will go gaga for Zombie catchers for what “they’ll bring to the team” (perhaps Washington and Kansas City are the bsaeball equivalents the Underworld). Who are some non-catchers?

Andruw Jones springs to mind, not only for his past excellence and current zombie status, but for the rapidity with which he joined the ranks of the undead. Jones is one of the greatest defensive center fielders ever, and even in 2007, when his bat began to slip, UZR has him at about 22 runs above average. In 2008 he joined the Dodgers, and had clearly fallen under the power of a necromancer. Sure, he was better in 2009 with Texas, but when a guy who used to regularly put up 6 wins seasons has a 0.8 win “comeback,” when he says he’s coming to 2010 Spring Training ready to compete for a starting job in center field for the White Sox and we find it laughable… dude’s a zombie.

Perhaps the most obvious current zombie is Ken Griffey, Jr. Junior was awesome back in the 1990s, and is a surefire Hall of Famer if there was one (I think Jones should be in, too, but I digress). But man, he’s only been over 1.5 WAR once in the FanGraphs Era, and that was back in 2006. Kid Zombie is clearly sucking up a roster slot for feelgood reasons* in Seattle (“he’ll mentor Milton Bradley!”), but isn’t Seattle supposed to be contending in the 2010’s likely tightest division? Maybe Griffey has powers of hypnosis; perhaps he’s a vampire rather than a zombie, I dunno.

* No, I don’t have it in me to discuss Zombie Mike Sweeney.

That’s just a start to get you going. What other zombies slated to play in 2010?