One might be tempted to see the Royals’ signing of outfielder Scott Podsednik as a move to steal the headlines in the wake of cross-state rival St. Louis’ big Matt Holliday contract earlier this week. Or maybe they just wanted to sneak in the bad news on Friday. Close observers, however, know better. This is all part of The Contest.

I’m not exactly sure what the goal of The Contest is: to put together a team that might contend in 2005, get fired, or to shatter the blogosphere’s Universal Snark-O-Meter in one fell blow, but it’s been apparent for some time now that Royals General Manager Dayton Moore and his Mets counterpart Omar Minaya have been involved in some sort of bizarre rivalry for at least the last year. It’s been a real back-and-forth (forgive the shaky chronology):

* Dayton acquires Mike Jacobs, Kyle Farnsworth, Horacio Ramirez, and Willie Bloomquist as part of a misguided attempt to contend.

* Omar responds by giving Oliver Perez three years and $36 million (aka, “The Jose Guillen Special”).

* The same week that the Royals trade prospects for Yuniesky Betancourt, the Mets trade Ryan Church for Jeff Francoeur (the latter must really have burned Dayton up inside).

* Omar accuses a reporter critical of a fired Mets official of gunning for a job with the Mets.

* In the midst of a near 100-loss season, Dayton lectures Royals fans on their lust for instant gratification and admonishes them to “trust the process.”

* Dayton understandably allows two below-average catchers to walk (Miguel Olivo and John Buck), but then signs Zombie Jason Kendall for more than either Olivo or Buck get on the open market.

* Omar, bidding against himself, manages to overpay Jason Bay by at least $15-$20 million.

It was obviously Dayton’s time to shine. And shine he did.

The terms of the deal haven’t been made public yet (to my knowledge). But what kind of player is the 34-year-old Podsednik at this point?

CHONE has Podsednik projected for a context-neutral .271/.333/.367, 9 runs below average per 150 games. My own projection is .269/.324/.384, -8/150. Defensively, CHONE’s TotalZone projection is +4 in left field (Podsednik’s primary position the last few seasons) per 150 games. Jeff Zimmerman has him at -2. My projection includes basestealing (in short: he steals a lot, but gets caught too much to be worth it), but as far as his baserunning goes otherwise, he’s average at best at this point.

Per 150 games (which Podsednik hasn’t played since 2004): let’s call it +1 defense, -7 prorated positional adjustment for left field, -9 offense + 20 replacement level = 0.5 WAR player. Fans have so far projected Podsednik at 0.2 WAR for 2010.

I haven’t seen the terms of the deal yet. I’ve heard rumors or one year, one million dollars, and even at $3.5 million per marginal win, at 0.5 WAR, that’s sort of reasonable… sounding.

Except that it’s still a terrible decision. Let’s put it this way: the Royals aren’t exactly at a point at which they should be spending more for a marginal win — they are one of the worst teams in the American League. It’s a slight bargain at best, and assuming (perhaps foolishly) that Moore didn’t spring for more than one year, a player with this sort of projection needs to have some upside, and Podsednik is 34 years old.

Moreover, what does this mean in relation to opportunity cost? Podsednik is 34 years old and his primary position the last few years is left field. Of course, one of the few above-average position players the Royals have is their current left fielder David DeJesus, probably a 2.5-3.0 WAR player in 2010. DeJesus is good enough defensively that he could probably be at least adequate in center (certainly better than Podsednik), but his arm (despite 2009’s impressive statistical showing in left) won’t play in right. Podsednik doesn’t have the arm for right, either… which leaves center field, something Dayton Moore has repeatedly hinted at with his talk of “speedy center fielder” (roles!) all offseason.

Leaving aside the reality that Podsednik is at best barely above average defensively in left field, thus implying a disaster in center field (where he last played full-time in 2004), the Royals already have two center fielders on the roster. One is the recently signed replacement-level Brian Anderson (Moore is apparently adding former White Sox to his palette of former Braves and Mariners). Anderson, at least, is young-ish enough to have some upside, although why Moore felt he had to give Anderson a major-league deal worth $0.7M with performance incentives is beyond me. Even worse, the Royals have Mitch Maier. Maier is nothing special — he’s probably a good fourth outfielder at best — a 1.0-1.5 WAR player. But he’s 28, at the minimum, and the Royals aren’t contending (even for .500) in 2010: this is the year to play Maier and see what he’s got and save a bit of cash. But Dayton has other ideas.

Even if Maier wasn’t around, Podsednik isn’t close to good enough to be an Iwamura-type “let’s at least have someone respectable out there” — in that case, there are still far superior players like FanGraphs-favorites Ryan Church and Gabe Gross available, and the market shows that superior players to Podsednik, such as Langerhans, are going for less than Brian Anderson money.

I could go on, but you get the picture: this deal makes no sense… unless you know about The Contest.

Your move, Omar.

[Update: As pointed out in the comments, I completely negleted to factor in Dayton’s brilliant ‘banning’ of Rany Jazayerli for criticizing the Royals’ medical staff. I apologize for the embarrassing oversight on my part. This really puts Omar behind… how many years and millions to Bengie Molina is it going to take for him to catch up?]

Today’s projection targets include a slick-fielding outfielder with a problematic bat, a legendary master of the strike zone, and a Cubs pitcher.

Austin Kearns was signed to a minor-league deal by Cleveland earlier this week. Although his bat has been less than stellar the last few seasons, his skills in the field are what keep teams interested. What will his role be in Cleveland, and how will he perform?

Perhaps tired haggling with Yorvit Torrealbea, the Rockies went out and signed hacktastic purveyor of passed balls Miguel Olivo to back up Chris Ianetta in Colorado. How much will Olivo play, and was the power he flashed in 2009 sustainable (particularly in his new run environment) given his plate “discipline?”

Last off-season, Ryan Dempster received a 4 year, $52 million dollar contract, and promptly went out in 2009 and proved to be worth it. Surprisingly, as I’m typing this, he hasn’t reached the projection threshold. Will his success in 2009 continue in 2010?

Click here to enter your 2010 projections for Kearns, Olivo, and Dempster.

There is something serendipitous about Austin Kearns being signed to a a minor-league deal by Cleveland GM Mark Shapiro. Both have long been admired for their potential, but both are widely perceived (at least in certain circles) as disappointments. Despite that perception (which is surely at least somewhat grounded in reality), both have had their moments — Cleveland’s 2007 ALCS run, Kearns’ 2002, 2006, and 2007 seasons. By signing Kearns and Shelley Duncan to virtually no-risk, minor-league contracts, is Shapiro showing he’s still capable of smart moves? Let’s see what Kearns and Duncan have to offer.

Austin Kearns is now 30 and and the apparent potential of the early 00s and the “rebound” of 2006-07 are a long way away. But the public emergence of superior defensive metrics shows that he was even more valuable in his good years than originally thought, and not totally worthless even in some of his bad years. Offensively, Kearns isn’t much. CHONE projects Kearns for a context-neutral .237/.338/.375, or 6 runs below average per 150 games. ZiPS is similar, projecting .237/.341/.377, which I translate to about -6/150. My own projection is right there: .247/.346/.376, -4/150.

That’s not good, but it’s also enough to justify a minor-league deal — even with CHONE’s average defensive projection for the corner outfield, that adds up to 0.7 WAR in only 452 PA. But UZR likes Kearns is much more than that, and Jeff Zimmerman projects Kearns’ RF UZR/150 for +10 in 2010. Putting it all together, per 150 games Kearns is probably around a 1.5 WAR player once we account for position. That’s excellent for a minor-league deal.

Shelley Duncan is an ex-Yankee International League superstar who is a pretty bad outfielder — CHONE’s TotalZone has him at -6 (there’s too little major league sample size to use UZR), and is probably more of a 1B/LF/DH type. One might dismiss his CHONE projection — .244/.329/.462, +12/150 — as overly optimistic given its reliance on MLEs, but ZiPS is also impressed with Duncan, projecting him for .252/.328/.460, about +8/150. Even if you don’t regard him as an above-average player as does CHONE, again, he’s a very valuable piece to have on a minor league deal.

Mark Shapiro’s team had a disastrous 2009 after a disappointing 2008. The team has revenue problems, as well. On the field, two spots in the outfield are set, with CF Grady Sizemore likely to be one of the better players in the league again after a inujry-plagued down year in 2009, and Shin-Soo Choo is a likely 3.5-4 WAR impact hitter in right field. But there are other holes that need to be filled and not much money with which to do so. Matt LaPorta is a good young hitter, but he might be needed to fill the hole in 1B (unless Andy Marte works out there). Left field was slated for the likes of Michael Brantley and Trevor Crowe — bench fodder at best. Perhaps they’d work out, but for next to nothing, players like Kearns and Duncan provide likely improvement as well much-needed right-handed bats (Sizemore, Choo, and Travis Hafner are all left-handed hitters) while adding practically nothing to the payroll. Moreover, Duncan can fill in at DH or 1B “just in case” Hafner gets hurt.

This isn’t to say that adding 30-year-old minor league outfielders like Kearns and Duncan makes Cleveland a contender (although it doesn’t take much in a weak AL Central), especially given the pitching situation by the lake. But smart, no-risk moves like this show that Mark Shapiro is paying attention and that he has something left in the tank.

In a stunning turn of events, Jon Heyman managed to break a story about one of Scott Boras’s clients, reporting that Matt Holliday has resigned with the Cardinals for seven years and 120 million dollars with a full no-trade clause.

Make no mistake about it: Although he didn’t receive “Mark Teixeira money,” Holliday, who turns 30 next week, is a tremendous baseball player. Over the last 4 years, he’s accumulated about 24 Wins Above Replacement — an average of 6 wins a year. Of course, the Cardinals aren’t paying for what he’s already done, but what he will do in the future.

What are the Cardinals paying for? The market is still working itself out, but assuming an average market value of $4.4 million per marginal win, seven percent annual salary inflation, and 0.5 WAR a year decline, seven years, $120 million dollars indicates a 4.5 WAR player for 2010. With that number in mind, what is a reasonable projection for Holliday?

CHONE’s context-neutral projection for Holliday’s 2010 offense is .303/.379/.513, 29 runs above average per 150 games. (by the time you’re reading this, Sean may have moved Holliday to the Cardinal’s team page and adjusted for league and park). My own projection is very close to CHONE’s.

Holliday’s defensive reputation may have taken a hit in the minds of many during the 2009 playoffs, but most fielding metrics see Holliday as an above-average left fielder. Earlier this offseason (before most projections had come out), I used UZR and the Fans Scouting report and estimated Holliday’s defense at +4, and Jeff Zimmerman’s recent UZR projections get the same result. Taking into account the positional adjustment for left field (-7.5/162), let’s call Holliday a -3 fielder per 150 games.

Adding it all up: +29/150 offense, -3/150 fielding, +20/150 replacement level = 4.6 WAR player. For all practical purposes, given the assumptions we’re working with (and dealing only with the guaranteed years of the contract), St. Louis gave Holliday a contract almost exactly in line with his market value.

It has been said before, but it’s worth repeating: paying average market value for a win isn’t necessarily a “dumb” move, but it isn’t “smart” either. It’s “average” …on average. Moreover, straight market value isn’t the only factor to consider in this particular case. Leaving aside the possibility that the actual value of a win might actually be lower this offseason (dropping it down to $4.4 million, the market value of a 4.5 WAR player over 7 years drops to about $109 million), seven years is a long time for a corner outfielder in his thirties. Yes, the 0.5 win-a-season decline curve takes this into account to a certain extent, but when a team gives a player a contract this long, it not only guarantees their “control” over the player, but also gives him a higher degree of security through his likely decline years. For this reason, players usually give something of a “discount” for that security. The Cardinals did not get such a discount. Moreover, the no-trade clause inhibits the Cardinals’ flexibility down the road — and even if Holliday is willing to waive the clause, that is almost always just another negotiating ploy for more money. In other words, that is more value the Cardinals gave up on top of the money for the deal. [I’m leaving aside the vesting option for an eighth year based on MVP voting.]

The Cardinals get a player who should be very good-to great for a couple of years, and above average for maybe a few after that. Perhaps that is worth it to make a run while Albert Pujols is still under contract (and perhaps to convince him to re-sign if there’s enough left in the budget to do so while filling the other 23 spots on the roster). Still, paying market value long-term for a player in his thirties involves a great deal of risk for a franchise, and even without the no-trade clause, an expensive Holliday in his mid-to-late thirties would be very difficult to move if St. Louis needs to do so. The road to ruin for many a general manager and franchise is littered with long-term “average” contracts for players like Holliday — it doesn’t take much of a drop-off (injuries, anyone?) to turn a seemingly “reasonable” contract into an albatross. Flags may fly forever, but the only sure winners in this deal are Matt Holliday and Scott Boras.

The American League’s current superiority (as a whole) to the National League is well-established. Here is one brief illustration of the gap. In short: if someone asks why you think the AL is better than the NL, ask them why they think a 90-win team is better than a 70-win team.

The more interesting issue is source of the disparity. One can imagine various explanations with different degrees of credibility: money, the DH, luck, and so on. It’s likely a combination of a number of different factors. I won’t pretend to have all the answers, but I will suggest that the relative quality of front offices (represented here by general managers) plays a major role.

Rather than going through every team, I’ll avoid the illusion of being definitive and pick whom I see as the five best and five worst current general managers. I know that every choice is debatable, but I’ll try to be relatively uncontroversial. It is also worth looking back at the “Front Office” sections of Dave Cameron’s organizational rankings from last off-season, although the judgments presented here are my own. Keep in mind that this is merely a brief reflection. These are not rankings, but merely groupings the five best and the five worst GMs in baseball.

The best: Andrew Friedman (TBA) and Theo Epstein (BOS) work in very different situations, but would be on anyone’s short list for “Best GM” given the numerous ways in which their organizations excel. Billy Beane (OAK) is still one of the top GMs in the game, despite the current rebuild. It’s easy to forget just how good the As were from 1999-2006 on a shoestring budget. It’s only been one full season and less than two off-seasons, but Jack “Jack Z.” Zduriencik (SEA) has vaulted himself into this conversation. As for a fifth member in this group… well, that’s tough. I’d like to put Brian Cashman (NYY) here, given his metamorphosis the last few years from the Yankees’ Tom Hagen into their Michael Corleone, but I’m trying to avoid too much controversy and people always get hung up on the budget. Mark Shapiro (CLE) would also be a good choice, but given Cleveland’s recently struggles, I can understand why some would object. Josh Byrnes (ARI) would be another good candidate, but if Shapiro doesn’t make it, neither should Byrnes. For #5 I’ll go with Doug Melvin (MIL), who does a good job of blending traditional and contemporary methods, but any of the other guys could make it. In no particular order: Friedman, Epstein, Beane, Zduriencik, and Melvin.

Best GMs Tally: AL 4, NL 1

The Worst: Oh boy… This was surprisingly (and depressingly) easy. In no particular order, the Frightful Five are: Dayton Moore (KCA), Omar Minaya (NYM), Ed Wade (HOU), Ned Colletti (LAN), and Brian Sabean (SFN). Seeing those names together gives “Murderer’s Row” a new meaning. I’ll pursue the increasingly uncanny Moore/Minaya dynamic at length some other time. Suffice it to say, no one would blink an eye if tomorrow Minaya lectured Mets fans about “trusting the process” while Dayton Moore held a press conference at which he accused Joe Posnanski of gunning for a player development position with the Royals. Ed Wade’s Brandon Lyon contract aside, his organization is sort of like the Royals except older and without the glimmers of hope in the minor leagues. Some may feel it is unfair to put Colletti on this list given his team’s success, but look at the cash he has (or, more accurately, had) at his disposal relative to his divisional rivals. Then there’s Colletti’s mentor, Brian Sabean… That I’m so impressed that he’s restrained himself from resigning Bengie Molina sort of says it all.

Worst GMs Tally: AL 1, NL 4

The NL only has one of the best GMs (and again, there were other candidates in the AL that could have taken his place), and all but one of the worst. One or two changes would not alter the overall point: front office excellence seems slant heavily toward the American League, and the opposite of excellence toward the National League. Neither the selections nor the “method” employed are definitive, but I do think there is something here.

Happy New Year’s Eve (Day)! Let’s crank out one more set of fan projections before the decade is over. Today’s players: Mark Ellis, Josh Willingham, and Luke Hochevar.

It seems like just yesterday that A’s second baseman Mark Ellis was the toast of the on-line baseball nerd community for his outstanding second base fielding. We threw a collective fit (or at least released a collective sigh) when he signed a far-below market deal with Oakland (right before the market collapsed). Our thoughts on Ellis today? As I’m typing this, he hasn’t even passed the threshold for fan projections. Sure, Ellis missed much of 2009 due to injury, but are our memories that short? C’mon.

About this same time last season, the Jim Bowden-run Nationals were seemingly intent on fielding Ryan Zimmerman, a pitcher, and seven outfielders. One of the many outfielders acquired in Bowden’s final bonanza before the end of his career as a baseball executive was Josh Willingham. While sometimes forgotten between Elijah Dukes, Nyjer Morgan‘s incredible year in the field, and Adam Dunn’s amazing (in very different ways) year at the plate and in the field, Willlingham had another season that was below average with the glove, but good with the bat. But what will he do going forward?

We certainly need more pitcher projections, and for this last one we have another forgotten man: 2006 #1 overall draft pick Luke Hochevar. While he has been generally disappointing in the majors so far, Hochevar did have several dominant starts last season, including a 13 strikeout game. Which Hochevar is the real one? How will he fare against (fading) expectations in 2010?

Click here to enter your projections for Ellis, Willingham, and Hochevar.

The Baltimore Orioles have a difficult task ahead of them the next few years with three juggernauts ahead of them in the American League East. However, since Andy MacPhail took over baseball operations in 2007, the Orioles have positioned themselves for a bright future. Part of this is manifested in their crowded, young, and skilled outfield.

The two best players in the outfield are right fielder Nick Markakis (26 in 2010) and center fielder Adam Jones (24). Combining ZiPS, CHONE, and my own projections for offense and Jeff Zimmerman’s UZR projections and CHONE’s TotalZone for defense, Markakis projects as a +21/150 hitter in 2010, and +2 defender in right field for about 3.6 WAR.Jones’ projections vary more widely, but he comes in at about +9/150 hitting, +1 fielding (both Jones and Markakis had surprising down years defensively in 2009) for about 3.2 WAR. Those are the obvious guys. For the remaining outfield spot, the Orioles have three candidates: Nolan Reimold, Felix Pie, and Luke Scott.

The 26 year-old Reimold will probably begin 2010 in left field, assuming he recovers well from ankle surgery. Reimold came on strong in 2009, projecting at about +12/150 offensively. His defense was less impressive, and he projects as a about a -6/150 defender in left field. Overall, that’s about about a league-average player. Still, there’s a lot of uncertainty in his defensive projection, and he is young.

While Reimold is the popular choice to start in left field, it’s not obviously the correct choice. While Felix Pie projects as the worst hitter in the group a -4/150, he’s also as good or better than Jones as a center fielder (+2), which would translate to about +12 in left field. So he projects as about a league average (2.0 WAR) player, and is the second-youngest player in the group (only to Jones). While he probably won’t ever be the superstar people though he would be become before the Cubs started jerking him around (as is their tradition), he’s young, good, and has little enough service time that it’s understandable why other teams are interested in obtaining him, and also why the Orioles have so far refused to sell him for a bag of magic beans.

Scott is the odd man out in this situation, but it’s hardly due to a lack of talent. As a hitter, he projects at +11/150. Despite being primarily a designated hitter in 2009, his past performance in the field suggests that is a waste of his talents, as he projects as +2 in left field — clearly better than Reimold. Overall, that makes Scott about a 2.5 WAR player.

The Orioles are in an enviable position of not only having excess talent in the outfield, but not necessarily having to trade any of them. Scott is an underrated player, but given his age (32), arbitration status, and the Orioles overall situation, he should be the first to go. But it’s not as if his arbitration award will be onerous relative to his value. If he’s willing to move to first base (despite his defensive ability), that would fill a hole for the Orioles. But he might have the most value in trade to a team that needs a left fielder, where his skills are best utilized as a 2-2.5 WAR outfielder rather than a 1-1.5 WAR DH.

Pie is the wildcard, as he’s barely older than Jones, and perhaps the most defensively skilled player of the group. Baltimore has understandably committed to Jones in center given his superior bat (although Pie has better plate discipline). While Reimold is the popular choice to start in left, Pie’s far superior defensive skills make him more than just a fourth outfielder. For the future, the Orioles might be best off trading Pie and/or Scott for prospects and/or filling another area of need in the majors. On the other hand, especially in Pie’s case, he’s young, cheap, and skilled enough that they don’t have to trade him, and can certainly find something for him to do around the office. Not many teams find themselves in such a comfortable situation.

Click here to enter your projections for the Orioles various outfielders.

Or is it Christmas Eve Day? Why does being a blogger gotta be so hard?

Whatever holiday you choose to celebrate (or not) this December, won’t you spread a bit of cheer by clicking here to enter your projections for Fernando Rodney, Troy Glaus, and John Buck?

Rodney was signed by the Angels in order to shore up their bullpen in the wake of Brian Fuentes‘ less-than-faith-inspiring 2009. How will Rodney perform, and in what role?

After losing almost all of his 2009 season to injury, Troy Glaus was signed by Atlanta, where he will reportedly play first base instead of third. Will his skills translate to plus defense at first, or will he struggle? Will Glaus still be able to hit with power after dealing with shoulder problems?

Seemingly moments after being non-tendered by the Royals in favor of the undead Jason Kendall, John Buck was signed by the Blue Jays to a one-year, two million dollar contract. He seems to be in line for the majority of the starts at catcher. Was the power he showed in 2007 and 2009 for real? Is my liking for Buck based in some latent ability of his, or is it completely irrational?

In the snarky corners of the baseball blogosphere, regions of which I am occasionally (ahem) guilty of inhabiting, nothing says “gift that keeps on giving” like a terrible contract. That’s why the news that Gary Matthews, Jr. is available (the Angels are apparently emboldened by the Dodgers’ trade of fellow 2006-07 crazy-contract recipient Juan Pierre) brought such a smile to my face. I can hear the boardroom conversations now:

Really? The Angels are willing to listen to suitors for “Little Sarge?” The Gary Matthews, Jr.? Hey, before we call, we should call the Blue Jays about Vernon Wells! I wonder if Dayton will finally talk about Jose Guillen? With those three guys, we’ll totally make the 2006 playoffs! Seriously, Gary Freaking Matthews? Hold my calls, Marty, I gotta ring up Reagins ASAP before Jack Z. gets to him!

Snark aside, it’s easy to criticize a bad contract after the fact, but it’s worth looking back into the situation in which it was originally signed. Hence my award-winning Contract Retrospectives (that no one read), an occasional series that I hope to revive. By trying to reconstruct whether or not the team doing the signing had a good “process” at the time or not, perhaps we can also learn what sort of mistakes they did (or didn’t) make.

Matthews signed with the Angels during the 2006-2007 offseason for five years and $50 million to much derision, with many attributing the contract to a memorable catch by then-Ranger Matthews. In terms of Wins Above Replacement, what were the Angels paying for? Back then, a win above replacement was going for about four million dollars on the open market, with about ten percent inflation each season. Assuming a generic half-win-a-year decline curve, a five-year, $50 million contract implies that Matthews would be 3-3.5 WAR in his first season, let’s call it 3.3 WAR. Was that totally unreasonable of the Angels? For this kind of retropective projection (or “retrojection”) I try to stick with the simplest sort of projection possible, using weighting, regression, and slight adjustments of basic stats.

Offensively, from 2003-06, Matthews had wOBAs of .298, .347, .329, and .367 respectively. That “retrojects” to .338 for 2007, about 3.6 runs above average per 700 plate appearances (assuming 2006’s run environment). Defensively, Matthews was good, with +6.6, +21.3, +18.7, and +1 UZR/150s in the outfield. Regressing and adjusting, he retrojects as a +5 position-neutral defender. (+3.6 offense + 5 fielding + 25 AL replacement level) times 85% playing time = about a 2.8 WAR player.

Yes, the Angels overpaid, but it may be surprising to some that they “only” overpaid by half-a-win per season. Given that my deliberately crude projections don’t take parks into account offensively, 2.8 may be a bit high given the Rangers’ bandbox. Still, given Matthews’ WAR performances from 2007 through 2009 (0.5, -0.8, -0.8), this may seem wildly optimistic, but that’s exactly the kind of unfair 20/20 hindsight I’m trying to avoid. Look at Matthews’ WAR totals from 2004-2006: 2.1 (in limited playing time), 3.2, and 4.2. It was a poor contract, but not as crazy as it now appears. Given his performances from 2004-2006, one certainly would not have predicted (at least from statistics alone) that Matthews would become a replacement-level scrub almost immediately.

The longer a contract is, the more a half-win mistake can burn a team, by making a bad contract that much more unmovable, especially a longer contract (hence the “discount” teams should try and get on longer contracts in particular). It can burn a team so badly that they’ll make even a stud like Gary Matthews Jr. available to the highest bidder. Brian, Ned, Omar, Dayton, Jim, Ed… anyone?

The Orioles have reportedly signed Garrett Atkins (non-tendered earlier by the Colorado Rockies) to a one-year contract with a base salary of four million dollars with incentives. The deal includes an option for 2011 with a $500,000 buyout. Atkins is thus guaranteed about $4.5 million dollars for 2010. Is Atkins worth what Baltimore will be paying?

The now-30 year-old Atkins put up genuinely impressive offensive numbers in 2006 (.410 wOBA, 142 wRC+) and 2007 (.368 wOBA, 116 wRC+) for Colorado. His wOBA dipped to .337 (98 wRC+) in 2008, which isn’t too bad until one takes into account his home park. 2009 was even more disappointing for Atkins, as he only managed a .291 wOBA (67 wRC+) and saw his playing time cut. It is difficult to project players moving out of extreme run environments like Atkins, but CHONE posts context neutral linear weights and already has Atkins projected for Baltimore: .257/.326/.410, 3 runs below average per 150 games.

While that isn’t a thrilling offensive line, three runs below average isn’t actually all that bad for a third baseman. Unfortunately, Atkins’ fielding also seems to have fallen off of a cliff. In 2006, his UZR/150 at third was a reasonable -2.1, but Atkins followed that with a horrendous -14.6 in 2007. This was bad enough that he began to see more time at first base (where he also was hardly a defensive standout), but still was below average at third, with -8.6 and -0.7 UZR/150s in 2008 and 2009 respectively. The Fans Scouting Report rates Atkins well below average as a third baseman. Jeff Zimmerman projects Atkins at -7/150 at third base for 2010. He might play some first base for Baltimore, depending on whom else they sign, but neither the positional adjustment as well as his past play there suggests that would increase his overall value. TotalZone is much more generous, projecting Atkins as a +3/150 defender, but given UZR’s rating of him as well as the fans, it’s hard to project Atkins at anything better than -5.

Including positional adjustment, over 150 games Atkins projects as about a 1.3 WAR player for 2010. Assuming $4.4 million per marginal win as average market value, his $4.5 guarantee plus incentives seems to be in the right neighborhood.

It is worth reiterating that consistently paying “fair market value” isn’t really a “smart” thing to do. Teams on budgets need to get more for their money to win consistently, especially going up against New York and Boston in the American League East. On the other hand, it isn’t particularly “dumb,” either. It’s “average…” on average. It makes sense in this particular case. They certainly didn’t want to bring back Melvin Mora, who has entered the undead phase of his career. Baltimore’s prospects at third and first aren’t ready for the major leagues yet. Atkins isn’t a star, and will be lucky to be league average again. While Baltimore surely isn’t trying to contend, as has been noted elsewhere, sometimes a team simply needs to put a competent player on the field for fans. That’s okay as long the team doesn’t pay out the nose. Baltimore isn’t paying excessively for Atkins, and he won’t be blocking any prospects who might be ready for 2011. Way to bridge a gap, Mr. MacPhail.

How do you think Garrett Atkins will play for Baltimore in 2010? Enter your fan projection by clicking here.