The Yankees have absolutely refused to stand pat this offseason. After adding Curtis Granderson in the first big trade of the winter, the Yankees have now agreed to terms with 1B/DH Nick Johnson. Johnson will receive roughly 5.5 million dollars for his services.

The champions have revamped their outfield and DH positions from last season, and it’s hard to deny that they’ve made a significant improvement. The signing of Johnson replaces the recently departed Hideki Matsui, and also makes Johnny Damon unnecessary. Johnson is a significant on-base threat, with a career OBP of .402. His power declined significantly last year, but despite below average power numbers – .114 ISO and .405 SLG – he still posted a .373 wOBA. It’s likely that Johnson regains some of his power this year, especially as a left handed batter in New Yankee Stadium, and will be worth well above his salary if he can only stay healthy – a task that should be made easier by the DH role.

The lineups that the Yankees can use with Johnson are absolutely ridiculous. Between Johnson, Derek Jeter, and Alex Rodriguez, the Yankees will have 3 players with a 2009 OBP over .400, and with Mark Teixeira and Nick Swisher, 5 players over .370.

Toss in Robinson Cano (.370 wOBA), Jorge Posada (.378 wOBA), and Curtis Granderson (.340 wOBA, .374 Fan Projected wOBA), and the Yankees can throw 8 players that are star level hitters in their everyday lineup. The last spot goes to either Brett Gardner or Melky Cabrera, both of whom are average to above-average players in left field depending on their defense, and there is still the chance that the Yankees add Jason Bay or Matt Holliday.

The Yankees have put themselves in a position to be even better than last year, and they’ve managed to do it while shedding payroll and making shrewd transactions. The Red Sox and Rays should be afraid. The American League should be afraid. Baseball should be afraid. The New York Yankees are back, and they’re here to stay.

Atlanta non-tenders Ryan Church

The Braves acquired Ryan Church last year by unloading Jeff Francoeur on the Mets. Church has seen a large power drain since 2006, as his ISO has steadily fallen from .250 down to a meager .111 in 2009. Church still showed average on base abilities, and his 4.0% HR/FB rate is unsustainable. His power will likely partially rebound in 2010, and thanks to his above average fielding in the corners, he could be an above average player in a starting role. Church has had an unfortunate injury history, but many of his injuries have been of the freak variety. He could be this offseason’s version of Ryan Langerhans.

Seattle non-tenders Ryan Langerhans

Well, that is, except for Ryan Langerhans. With Ken Griffey’s return and Michael Saunders and Bill Hall on the roster, there just wasn’t room for Seattle to carry another outfielder. His primary value comes from fantastic defense. In only 39 games, Langerhans posted a +5.5 UZR in LF – normally a sample that is too small to draw conclusions, but this is only slightly higher than his career mark of +17.6/150. He won’t hit for average – his .232 career batting average has kept him out of the major leagues, but he has decent power and walks enough that his 29% K rate doesn’t make him an offensive liability. Langerhans can play any OF position, and any team that needs an OF should have him on their radar.

Oakland non-tenders Jack Cust

Jack Cust is the model of the “Moneyball” type of player that makes certain traditional types froth over with rage. He’s slow, can’t play defense, and strikes out a ton. Yet somehow, he’s managed to put up wRC+ numbers over 100 each of the last three years, thanks to high BB and HR rates. However, defense does have value, and the Athletics would have actually had to pay Cust to play for them this season. Cust has declined steadily, as his HR/FB rate dipped to 17.7% in 2009, the lowest of his time with Oakland. A slight bounce back may be possible, but it is also possible that age may be catching up to him, as his skillset does not age well historically. It’s hard to imagine Cust not catching on somewhere, but he’s strictly a DH at this point, and is a below average player.

How do you think Church, Langerhans, and Cust will perform? Project them here!

The Brewers continue to receive a bargain bin price on Craig Counsell. Counsell, a native son of Milwaukee suburb Whitefish Bay, WI, will return to the Brewers on a 2.1 million dollar contract for 2010.

Counsell put up one of the best seasons of his 15 year career in 2009. An injury to Rickie Weeks and ineffectiveness by Bill Hall forced Counsell into nearly everyday action until the Brewers acquired Felipe Lopez in late July. In 459 PAs, Counsell posted a .336 wOBA and a 107 wRC+, his first above average season since 2001.

Of course, players in their late 30s don’t typically have career seasons without some luck involved, and Counsell will turn 40 in August. Much of Counsell’s productivity came from a .321 BABIP, and so despite a six percent drop in walk rate, his on-base percentage still was over .350. His .124 ISO, the highest mark of his career, suggests an increase in power, which is possible given that Counsell changed some facets of his approach – most notably, his signature crazy batting stance is now much more normal.

Counsell will likely regress offensively, and any team with intent to sign him knew this. What is attractive about Counsell is his prowess with the glove. Counsell continued to defy age as he posted a 6.4 UZR between 2B, 3B, and SS, and was average or better at each. His UZR has never been below average in his career, and it would be remiss to expect a sudden drop in fielding at this point in his career, as he has shown no signs of decline whatsoever.

Counsell is not the 3 win player that last year suggests. However, as an extremely versatile defender who can step into any non-1B infield role and produce at a 1.5-2.5 win per 600 PA level, Counsell is well worth the 2.1 million dollar contract that he signed for.

After being connected to trade rumors involving J.J. Hardy earlier this winter, the Pirates have non tendered closer Matt Capps. Given that Pittsburgh assumes that other teams would value Capps, this strikes me as an interesting move. 2009 was rough for Capps, as his ERA rose to a staggering 5.80 after two years of 2.28 and 3.02. He also blew 5 saves in 32 chances. It’s clear that Capps has closer talent. What made him so ineffective in 2009?

The spike in ERA can be easily attributed a rise in home run rate. Capps managed to hold hitters to HR/9 rates of 0.57 and 0.84 in 2007 and 2008, despite fly ball rates in the 45%-50% range. The only way to survive as a flyballing relief pitcher is to post low HR/FB rates, and Capps had certainly succeeded with that prior to 2008. In 2009, however, Capps’s HR/FB ballooned to 13.5%, and even though Capps allowed fewer fly balls, that still resulted in a nearly twice as high HR/9. The end result is a 1.62 rise in FIP.

Capps did see a rise in walk rate, but at 2.82 BB/9, it’s nothing to be worried about. Since it was accompanied by a rise in K rate as well, it is even less concerning. Then, before any team adds Capps, the item of investigation is what caused the home run rate to increase.

Velocity was not an issue for Capps, as his fastball, slider, and changeup all had the fastest velocities of his career. In fact, it is the last pitch which jumps out when examining the data. His 87.1 average changeup is 2.5 MPH faster than that pitch ever has clocked in over his career.

What makes the changeup effective for most pitchers is the difference in speeds between it and the fastball. At 6.5 MPH in 2009, this difference was, unsurprisingly, the lowest of his career. It had a very noticeable effect on the pitch’s effectiveness, as measured by our pitch type values. From 2006-2008, the pitch had ranged in effectiveness from -3.21 to +3.12 runs per 100 pitches. In 2009, it plummeted to -5.35 runs per 100. It appears that Capps’s changeup lost much of its effectiveness after it no longer retained the 8.5 MPH difference that led to the +3.12 run value per 100 pitches in 2009.

There was more to Capps’s ineffectiveness in 2009 than a poor changeup. His .370 BABIP is unsustainable and will regress, and it’s likely that the same applies to his 13.5% HR/FB. Much of regaining his success, however, will lie on returning the changeup to an effective pitch.

Capps pitched far too well in 2007 and 2008 to not be picked up by a team in 2010. Whether or not he can regain his closer effectiveness again will remain to be seen.

Do you think Capps can rebound? Enter your projection for Matt Capps’s 2010 here.

In yet another victory for Kansas City GM Dayton Moore’s “Process,” the Royals released DH/1B Mike Jacobs on Thursday. Mike Jacobs is perhaps most indicative of what has been wrong with many of Dayton Moore’s moves. Jacobs had nearly every telltale sign of being a player to avoid. He was near or at his peak, at age 28 when acquired last year, and was about to receive a relatively large contract in arbitration due to his lofty power numbers. He couldn’t play defense. His fielding percentage was poor, and his UZR was downright atrocious. He couldn’t get on base. Jacobs did one thing well, and that was hit home runs.

Indeed, a player with a .266 ISO can be an interesting player. Perhaps you give up nothing of value, hope you can teach him how to take a walk, and you might have a decent DH on your hands. Possibly. Still, a team in the financial situation of the Royals cannot afford a three million dollar or more reclamation project to sit on their roster, especially when players like Ryan Shealy and Kila Ka’aihue were blocked by this move.

The acquisition of Jacobs is certainly not a franchise crippling move in itself. Leo Nunez, the piece that went to Florida in exchange for Jacobs, is not a good pitcher, despite his upcoming promotion to the closer role upon the departure of Matt Lindstrom. Also, even with a good player in Jacobs’s spot in the lineup, the Royals were not going to reach the playoffs. So why do we make such a big deal out of moves like this one?

The problem is that moves like this, when repeated (Kyle Farnsworth signing for multimillion dollars and multiple years, Jose Guillen’s contract, etc.) are the type of things, that when piled on top of each other, can mire a franchise in mediocrity (or worse) for years. Recently, the Royals have seemed entirely dependent on The Process, as Moore calls it. He has banned bloggers, most prominently Rany Jazayerli, from Kauffman Stadium. Moore seemed to be entirely resistant to any sort of contradictory thoughts to his Process.

This is why the end of the Mike Jacobs era could be significant. By releasing Jacobs, it is an admittance of the mistake of acquiring him in the first place. Is Dayton Moore all of a sudden going to be reading the gospel of The Fielding Bible and quoting UZR and wOBA? Doubtful. But perhaps clearer heads can prevail. If the Royals are ready to admit that what they have done in the past hasn’t worked, it is the first step to finding the correct path in the future.

Today and for the rest of the weekend, we would like to take a look at some NL rookies who performed quite well and yet received little to no consideration for the rookie of the year: Seth Smith, Randy Wells, and Garrett Jones

Smith, from Colorado, was the best pinch-hitter in the league, with a PH OPS over 1.400, and put up monster numbers overall, as he was worth 2.7 wins in less than 400 PAs.

Wells, from Chicago, got a lot of play from Rob Neyer, who was the only BBWAA member to vote for him. Wells pitched extremely well, and was worth 3.0 wins in 165 IP, thanks to a 3.88 FIP

Jones, from Pittsburgh, much like Smith, showed good power in his first time up. He hit 21 HRs and was worth 2.6 wins in only 358 PAs.

Matt Lindstrom was traded to the Houston Astros on Wednesday as part of a three player deal. In the deal, the Marlins acquire two minor leaguers, RHP Robert Bono and SS Luis Bryan.

Lindstrom is an interresting player. He performed quite well in 2007 and 2008, putting up ERAs near 3.00 both year with similar FIPs. 2009 was a very down year, however, as Lindstrom’s ERA ballooned to 5.89 and he also suffered injuries which limited him to 47.1 IP, the lowest of his three year ML career. His FIP didn’t rise as much, coming in at 4.47, but this is still a below-replacement mark for a reliever.

What had made Lindstrom a productive pitcher through 2008 was his ability to suppress the home run. This can be summarized quite succinctly by his career graph.

Even though his HR/9 wasn’t terribly high last season, it was enough to make him unproductive. His K/9 fell quite a bit in 2008 and his BB/9 rose as well, both by over a point. Still, nearly any pitcher who can run a HR/9 of 0.16 can be productive. The other shoe dropped for Lindstrom in ’09, as his HR/FB skyrocketed to a roughly average rate of 9.3%. Thanks to his ground ball tendencies, he still gave up less than 1 HR/9, but with a low K rate and high BB rate, that’s not good enough in the major leagues.

Lindstrom is still an attractive asset despite his down year. His ground ball tendencies are great for a reliever, as it suppresses the home run ball. He has a live fastball, averaging over 96 MPH. The questions for Lindstrom are if he can find his control and lower his BB rate as well as if his crazy home run suppression will return.

The Marlins return comes in the form of two minor leaguers who, according to a tweet from Baseball America’s Ben Badler,

“Neither Robert Bono nor Luis Bryan, the two guys the Marlins got from Houston for Lindstrom, would have made the Astros top 30 ,”

In addition, the Astros farm system is, simply put, not good. Bono had decent numbers (3.62 FIP) in A ball at age 20 and has a very high ground ball rate, but doesn’t seem to be highly acclaimed by scouts. Bryan didn’t walk a single time in 105 ABs in rookie ball, and that lack of plate discipline will not play in the majors.

The Marlins didn’t get much for Lindstrom, and although he was unproductive and is aging, at 30 years old, he doesn’t seem like the kind of guy to just give up on. Lindstrom is arbitration eligible this year, however, and given the Marlins financial situation, he probably would’ve been non-tendered. The conclusion that I come to given the poor return is that leaguewide interest in Lindstrom just wasn’t there. It that’s the case, this is a better outcome for Florida than a simple non-tender. However, Lindstrom probably won’t cost Houston too much, and as such an intriguing player at such a low cost, this move makes a lot of sense for Houston.

The Rangers managed to get themselves out of Kevin Millwood’s 12 million dollar contract on Wednesday, trading the starting pitcher along with 3 million dollars to the Baltimore Orioles for reliever Chris Ray and a PTBNL.

2009 was a banner year for Millwood, as his 3.67 ERA was his best mark since his last year of his original contract with Atlanta in 2002. However, as we often see, Millwood’s ERA didn’t showcase his true talent level. Millwood only struck out 5.5 batters per 9 innings, and he walked over 3. He simply wasn’t the type of dominant pitcher who should end the season with a sub-4.00 ERA. Only his .279 BABIP (vs. a career mark of .306) kept his ERA at such a low level. His sub-par peripherals resulted in a 4.80 FIP.

In 200 innings, the value of a 4.80 FIP comes out to 2.4 wins. So Millwood was a productive pitcher last year and he certainly can be a productive pitcher in the future. There aren’t very many 2.4 win players out there, and Millwood may be due for a better year, as his 2007 and 2008 years were better than his 2009. On the other hand, Millwood is aging, and it’s possible that he’s entered his decline phase and his innings may slip and his peripherals may fall farther.

Essentially, there are clearly better ways to spend 7-8 million dollars (roughly the difference between Ray’s salary and the 12 million cleared by Millwood’s departure). The Rangers signed Rich Harden to a 7.5 million dollar deal, and he has produced 3.9 wins or better 3 times. This is a great example of what a team can do with cleared salary, and so this trade is already paying dividends for Texas.

The return of Chris Ray is negligible. He is arbitration eligible, but due to his 7.27 ERA, he will likely see a similar contract to the 0.85M he received, if not lower, if he is even tendered a contract. He missed all of 2008, and has only thrown more than 45 innings in a season once. Ray has never shown the ability to either limit walks or home runs enough to become a truly productive pitcher. He will be a reclamation project for Mike Maddux at best, and probably will not be a factor.

For the Orioles, they receive a roughly average starting pitcher. As a one year commitment, 9 million dollars isn’t egregious. It will be probably be near his market value. With the Orioles not in a position to compete, taking on that kind of salary doesn’t really make sense. This kind of money could be much better spent on international signings, draft picks, or other developmental type of projects. He will give them decent production, but is the marginal value of his 2-3 wins above replacement really worth 9 million dollars to them? I’m not sure.

Edgar Martinez presents one of the most interesting debates about the hall of fame to date. Certainly, he was a hall of fame caliber hitter, regardless of the metrics you use. For his career, he hit .319 with 309 HRs, 514 2B, and 1261 RBI. His career OPS .933 is fantastic. His career wOBA was .405 – over 8600 plate appearances over 18 seasons, he produced at the level of Alex Rodriguez in 2009. This is phenomenal, especially when considering that this includes both his pre-peak and post-attrition numbers. His 544 wRAA translate to nearly 54 wins added with his bat alone, before considering credit for playing time and defense – he did play third base for roughly four full seasons and, according to Sean Smith’s TotalZone (seen here), he was a plus fielder.

Of course, Martinez is not known for his defense, and any argument against his hall of fame candidacy rests upon the fact that Martinez spent a large majority of his career – 1412 of his 2055 games – at the DH position. In the end, the decision of whether or not to vote for Martinez really comes down to a philosophical view of what the designated hitter position really means to baseball.

The dilemma of differentiating between positions is a difficult one in the first place. It’s obvious that a shortstop is more valuable than a first baseman given equal hitting lines due to the relative difficulty of SS and ease of 1B. Similarly, CF is more valuable than LF/RF, and a SP is more valuable than a middle reliever. One solution is the idea of the positional adjustment, which we employ in our WAR valuation here. It’s one way to quantify the value from playing a position given the scarcity of players that can adequately play it.

When it comes down to the designated hitter, there is no longer an issue of scarcity. Anybody in the major leagues can be slotted into the designated hitter position with no defensive detriment to their team. With players like Martinez and David Ortiz who have little to no defensive value, the question of how to properly value them is interesting. Firstly, they can only play in the American League. Secondly, roster flexibility is lost. Clearly, a designated hitter that can play no other position has a lower value to his team than other players.

Still, that doesn’t allow us to take away from the fact that the rules of the American League allow for Edgar Martinez, David Ortiz, Frank Thomas et al. to devastate pitchers and continually produce runs and wins for their teams. As mentioned above, Martinez produced about 54 wins with the bat alone. With Sean Smith’s position adjustment, Martinez produced 67 wins above replacement (vs. roughly 81 wins without any position adjustment). Most players within 5 wins of that mark are either in the hall of fame or will be once they become eligible.

This is where the baseball philosophy comes in. Unlike players like Tim Raines, whose wins were produced via methods unrecognized by traditional metrics, Edgar Martinez’s hitting accomplishments are hall-of-fame caliber by any metric. I believe that Edgar is a hall of famer because he was such a fantastic hitter that any detriment caused by his position is cancelled out. The question is whether or not the BBWAA will agree.

It’s not exactly surprising that of all the pitchers that the fans have projected so far, Mariano Rivera is the leader in saves, ERA, WHIP, and K/BB. After all, Mo has been hands down the greatest reliever of his era, if not all time, and has shown no indication of slowing down. Here’s what his fan projection line looks like (as of 2:40 AM ET on Friday)

77 IP, 4-4, 2.38 ERA, 41 SV, 9.23 K/9, 1.52 BB/9, 6.08 K/BB, 0.70 HR/9, 2.61 FIP

Pretty fantastic numbers. It’s hard to imagine a reliever with a better line, except for maybe Mariano himself. Of course, this brings up one of the more interesting questions regarding value in baseball, and that’s the value of the closer. Right now, this line by Rivera is projected to be worth 2.4 WAR. This is easily the best of the three relief pitchers so far projected, besting David Aardsma‘s 1.3 WAR and Takashi Saito’s 0.5 WAR. If the crowd is truly wise, it will remain the highest. So then is 2.4 WAR truly as good as a reliever can be?

Probably not. That’s mostly because this measurement doesn’t account for leverage index. This certainly can be done, and it is done in some places. Sean Smith’s WAR database at www.baseballprojection.com uses the mean of 1.0 and the pitcher’s actual leverage index. As Smith explains in his stat definitions, this is because of the effects of chaining. That is, the actual replacement for the closer’s innings isn’t a replacement level pitcher. The replacement is actually the setup man, who, on most teams, is nowhere near replacement level. As such, giving the closer full credit for the leverage of his innings isn’t a true representation of his value.

Even if we did, though, we still wouldn’t see any closer come near the value of the top-flight starters. Tim Lincecum right now is projected for an 8.0 win season by the fans (which is slightly ridiculous, but that’s another matter), and Mariano Rivera would be projected for a 4.8 win season with a LI of 2.0, slightly high for a closer. Similarly, Rivera comes nowhere near our top position players, Chase Utley (8.2 WAR) and Albert Pujols (8.0 WAR). The key here is that Rivera simply will not take part in enough events over the course of the season to impact a game nearly as much as the Utleys and the Greinkes, or the Pujolses and the Lincecums. His events may be better and they may be more important, but sometimes quantity does trump quality.

Mariano Rivera’s true value probably falls somewhere between the 2.4 WAR the base numbers give and the 4.8 WAR his fully leveraged numbers give. Remember that this isn’t only the best reliever out there, but a guy that is by a wide margin the best reliever. This is why many analysts, such as myself, are constantly wary of big money signings or marquee trades involving closers.