The Orioles have plenty of problems, but right now missing Brian Roberts isn’t one of them. While his absence has created a void atop the order, his offensive production has been replaced, and then some. Ty Wigginton has done nothing but hit since taking over as the full-time second baseman. His defense doesn’t stack up to Roberts’, but his offense has more than bridged the gap. His .445 wOBA currently ranks sixth in the AL.

As Matt noted almost two weeks ago, Wigginton’s power surge is largely based on a high HR/FB ratio. When he wrote the post, on April 26, Wigginton’s rate was 35.3 percent. That hasn’t changed much in the ensuing 10 games, and it currently sits at 34.5 percent. That rate simply is not sustainable for a full season. Wigginton’s career HR/FB ratio is 13.3 percent, though he did reach 18.5 percent in 2008 with the Astros. At that rate, he’d currently have five home runs.

While the HR/FB ratio certainly stands out, two of Wigginton’s stats seem downright absurd when juxtaposed. I’m not quite sure how this happens, but:

GB%: 50%
ISO: .391

Grounders cannot leave the park, and so can only go for doubles and triples. Wigginton, unsurprisingly, has no triples this season. He has hit one double on a grounder, for an ISO of .027. On his eight line drives he has an ISO of just .125. When he hits the ball well into the air, then, he absolutely crushes it. His 10 homers and two doubles on fly balls adds up to a 1.143 ISO. That comes mostly when he pulls the ball. His HR/FB ratio on balls hit to left: 90.9 percent.

This isn’t the first time that Wigginton has gone on a tear for about 100 PA. In August 2008 he produced similar numbers. From the 2nd through the 31st he hit .390/.406/.830 in 106 PA, which is actually a bit better than his 102 PA sample from this season. For the rest of the season, in 323 PA, he hit .248/.333/.399. We very well could see Wigginton drop back to that level soon. That line, after all, isn’t too far off his career line of .271/.330/.459.

That, however, is not to downplay his torrid start to the 2010 season. If not for his production, where would the Orioles be? They’re 7-18 since Roberts’s last game. The difference between Wigginton and Roberts’s other most likely replacement, Julio Lugo, is more than 1 WAR right now. One win might not seem like a huge swing, but at this point the Orioles need everything they can get.

Baseball has no shortage of cliches. One of my favorites is when a manager or coach says that the starting pitcher gave his team a chance to win. Not that keeping your team in the game is a bad thing. Far from it. My amusement comes from how mutable the phrase has become. How good is good enough to give your team a chance? Does it depend on how many runs the offense scores? Or does the pitcher have to limit the other team to three runs? Or it is some other arbitrary number?

White Sox pitching coach Don Cooper has an interesting definition of a pitcher giving his team a chance to win. Speaking to the media after a 12-3 loss to the Yankees on Sunday, Cooper discussed his struggling starting staff. He didn’t put an exact number on it, but instead used a vague metaphor. “But it’s time to get people out and try to figure out a way to help us win games by fighting and clawing.” He then described John Danks’s effort the previous day, in which he allowed two runs through five innings, needing 118 pitches to accomplish the task.

Did Danks fight and claw through this start? It would appear so. His control wasn’t there, as he walked three batters in those five innings. He also threw just 55 percent of his pitches for strikes, so he found himself in a number of unfavorable counts. Yet he stranded six of nine base runners, escaping with just two runs to his name. He even left the game with a lead, thanks to yet another poor start by Javier Vazquez. That, to me, seems like fighting and clawing.

But did he pitch well enough to give his team a chance to win? I suppose you could say that, since he left with a 5-2 lead, that he did his job. Is five innings enough to earn that kind of praise, though? That leaves four innings to the bullpen, and we know how quickly bullpens can blow games. To that end, Scott Linebrink promptly blew Danks’s lead in the sixth, allowing three straight singles before Nick Swisher hit a three-run shot to right-center. That put the Yanks up 6-5.

Of course, the Yankees bullpen pulled the same act the very next half inning and the White Sox ended up winning the game. Despite the result, though, Danks’s effort was not enough. He might have fought, and he might have clawed, but I wouldn’t say that he pitched well enough to give his team a chance — a good chance, at least — to win the game. He left 4/9 of the game to the bullpen, which features, for the most part, pitchers not as good as himself. If he had turned in this type of performance against, say, the Mariners, maybe it would have been good enough. But leaving almost half the game in the hands of the bullpen against the Yankees offense? That doesn’t say “good enough” to me at all.

The Chicago bullpen hasn’t been all that bad this year. While its 4.07 ERA is a bit below average, its 3.54 FIP looks a bit better. As a unit it walks a few too many batters, but it also strikes out a ton. By most measures, it has performed better than the starting staff. But any bullpen, no matter how solid, becomes vulnerable when it has to cover four innings. That effect only becomes worse with the better offenses. It came as no surprise that the Yankees took the lead soon after Danks’s exit.

This isn’t to say that Danks didn’t pitch well. He held a tough offense to just two runs. But when that covers only five innings, is that enough to give his team a good chance to win? Considering the inherent volatility of bullpens, I’d say no. Then again, a quality start denotes six innings and three runs, and is generally categorized as an effort that gives a team a chance to win. So is a run and an inning difference that much? I guess that depends on the opposing team.

Now Jake Peavy. He gave his team a good chance to win on Monday. Jon Danks in his previous start? Yep. Great chance to win. Danks on Saturday, though? Not so much. The results appear favorable, but five innings and two runs against at top-two offense just isn’t necessarily giving your team a good chance to win.

Though it certainly was a well-fought and well-clawed act.

Yesterday Jack wrote about the horrible Diamondbacks bullpen. While the crew got a boost last night by facing the Astros lineup for four innings, they still hold the worst ERA and FIP of any NL bullpen. With defense independent figures like that the Diamondbacks bullpen might actually be this bad. They could make changes, and perhaps some of their pitchers improve during the next five months, but the process and results correlation does not bode well.

What about the best bullpens in the NL? Are they built for success? Are the worst non-Arizona bullpens as bad as their ERAs indicate? The answers are probably not and no, but the questions led me to find some odd numbers throughout National League bullpens.

The Mets bullpen has thrown 97 innings, second most in the NL to the Pirates. That amounts to more than 3.2 innings per game, a rate that the unit probably cannot sustain. Even the 2009 Dodgers, the only NL playoff team with a bullpen that threw more than 500 innings, averaged under 3.2 innings per appearance. As expected, the bullpen FIP, 3.78, is a bit higher than the ERA, 2.60. Of all the NL teams with a bullpen ERA under 4, only Atlanta’s FIP outpaces its ERA. Of the other five, only one, San Diego, comes within even 1.00 of its bullpen ERA.

The Mets and the Pirates bullpens actually have a connection. They both boast high strikeout rates and low walk rates. The Mets relievers have struck out 22.2 percent of batters faced and have walked 13 percent, while the Pirates have struck out 21.2 percent of opposing hitters and have walked 11.3 percent. Pittsburgh actually has a better bullpen K/BB ratio. Difference, though, comes on the long ball. The Mets bullpen has allowed six home runs, while the Pirates unit has allowed double that. The Pirates bullpen has also allow far more hits and sport a .331 BABIP, almost .060 points higher than the Mets.

Thanks to Ubaldo Jimenez and Aaron Cook, the Rockies have let their bullpen rest for two games this season. In games they’ve actually pitched they’ve averaged just under 3.2 innings per appearances, but because of the complete games the unit averages a hair over 3.1 innings per game. The bullpen FIP, 3.53, is no great shakes. In fact, it ranks below Florida’s bullpen FIP, 3.38, though Florida’s bullpen ERA sits at 4.46, eighth in the NL. Combined with a .270 BABIP, Colorado’s bullpen success seems unsustainable. Having pitchers who go deep into games, though, will help mitigate a correction.

While Florida’s bullpen ERA sits above its bullpen FIP by a considerable amount, 1.08, the oddest NL bullpen unit so far is easily Washington. The ERA isn’t so bad, just 4.05. In fact, that’s good for seventh best in the NL. When I first got a look at the bullpen peripherals, though, I thought the unit would have an astronomical FIP. In 91 innings the bullpen has allowed 12 home runs, as many as the Pirates. The Pirates have a better K/BB ratio, and so have a better FIP, 4.42, than the Nationals pen, 4.65. Yet the Pirates bullpen sports a far worse ERA, 5.83, probably due to the BABIP discrepancy. Washington’s bullpen has allowed a .275 average on balls in play.

We know that bullpens are the most volatile aspects of major league teams, so oddities like this can be expected when our sample is limited to a month of data. No bullpen has crossed the 100-inning mark, though Pittsburgh should tonight. During the next few months I expect that we’ll see fewer of these oddities. For now, though, we can get a better idea of why a bullpen has performed so well or so poorly, even if it is not a reflection of how they’ll perform from May through September.

Early season slumps are no fun for anyone. They’re the cause for mostly pointless questions. What’s wrong with the player? Is he hurt? Chances are, the answers to those two questions are nothing and no. A slump cares not for the calendar. It dispenses ill fortune at seemingly random intervals. We can more easily fall into the trap of overreacting to an early season slump, though, because it more definitively shows up in the numbers. There might be no better example of this right now than Hanley Ramirez.

After producing three straight MVP-quality seasons, Ramirez got off another quick start in 2010. He went 12 for his first 39 with three doubles and a homer, plus eight walks. Then came the slump. During his next 62 PA he managed just 12 hits, including only two extra base hits, and six walks. That brought his season triple slash down to .279/.386/.395. The OBP remained excellent, of course, but Ramirez struggled to make solid contact. Yet there was no reason to panic. The numbers might have looked bad, but that’s only because the slump reared its head in April.

We can look back to last season for a similar situation. From May 14 through May 29, Ramirez stepped to the plate 58 times and went 11 for 51 with five extra base hits, but just six walks. While he displayed a bit more power during last year’s slump, his average and OBP looked almost the same. The biggest difference between the two, though, is in the timing. On the day before he broke out of his slump last season his triple slash read .318/.399/.547, which is excellent by any standard. This year, because the slump happened before he could rack up numbers, his triple slash looked considerably worse.

An even better example of this effect comes from Johnny Damon. Last season he ended with a triple slash of .282/.365/.489, and was generally considered one of the most productive Yankees. Yet from September 3 through the end of the season, Damon hit just .215/.319/.278. That’s far worse than Hanley’s slump, yet it hardly made a dent in Damon’s final line. At close of play on September 2 Damon had a triple slash of .293/.373/.524. The former is clearly better, but because the slump came after Damon had accumulated excellent numbers through August it didn’t greatly affect his season totals.

The strangest part of Hanley’s numbers is how he altered them over the weekend. He went 6 for 9 with a double and three home runs. All the sudden, a .279/.386/.395 line turns into .316/.409/.526. That looks a lot more like Hanley. It took two stellar games after an early season slump to recover. One more and he’ll be right up where he was last year. The early season slump hurt, for sure, but it’s no more telling than a mid-July swoon. The only difference is how it shows up in the numbers.

Mark Teixeira has experienced a similar phenomenon in his first two Aprils as a Yankee. Last season he didn’t get off the interstate for good until May 13, the Yankees’ 33rd game of the season. Through that date he hit .202/.331/.430. The rest of the way he hit .313/.396/.596. This year he’s still on the interstate, though his luck might be changing. He ended April with a .136/.300/.259 line, and two games later is at .189/.336/.311. That’s not quite the boost Hanley got, but it’s a start. The Yankees have just played their 24th game, so if he goes 2 for 4 tonight, bringing his average over .200, and he never goes back, he’ll be a bit ahead of last season.

It’s natural to get concerned about a player’s production early in the season. We have been baseball-less for five to six months, and want to see our team’s best players help it win ball games. What’s sometimes tough to digest is that slumps can happen at any point in the season. If that comes early, it’s going to look much worse on paper. The good players will rebound, though. We’re already starting to see it from Ramirez and Teixeira.

In the past few days I’ve discussed two components of the Yankees-Tigers-Diamondbacks trade over the winter. Both Austin Jackson and Edwin Jackson present interesting cases. The former has gotten off to a hot start despite some concerning peripherals, and the other has gotten hit around a bit in two of his five starts. Arizona has actually seen better from another pitcher their received, 25-year-old right-hander Ian Kennedy.

In March I wondered about Kennedy’s potential in the NL. He flopped during his limited exposure with the Yankees, but a move out of the AL East might have been the boost Kennedy needed to get going. He is, after all, a former first-round draft pick who so consummately dominated the minors during his first professional season that he essentially forced the Yankees to call him up (well, that and Mike Mussina’s breakdown). An impressive September earned him a rotation spot in 2008, but that ended in disaster.

In Arizona it appears things are starting to come together. Throughout the minors Kennedy displayed excellent strikeout skills, 9.9 per nine innings, or 28 percent of the batters he faced, while walking just 2.8 per nine. During his Yankees tenure he struggled in both areas, but with the Diamondbacks he has excelled. In 30.1 innings he has struck out 27, 8.01 per nine, or 21.6 percent of all batters faced. He has also kept his walk rate low, just 2.37 per nine. This success hasn’t exactly shown up in the results yet — he owns a 4.45 ERA — but there are some signs that could change.

Kennedy’s biggest problem this year has been the home run. He has allowed 2.08 per nine, or one every 15.6 batters faced. The home runs have been concentrated, with the Dodgers hitting three and the Phillies two, each in a single game. That type of home run rate stems from his ridiculously high HR/FB percentage. Kennedy will not see 17.9 percent of his fly balls leave the park this year, so his home run rate should drop as the season progresses. This shows up in his xFIP, 4.07.

In terms of batted balls, a pitcher like Kennedy, who doesn’t blow away hitters, could do more to induce ground balls. In the minors he induced about 39.7 percent grounders, which is just a tick above where he currently sits, 37.9 percent. He has mixed in a two-seamer more frequently this year, so perhaps as he throws that more he’ll generate more grounders. That will not only help produce more ground ball outs, but will also help his efforts to keep the ball in the park.

While he has always been a four-pitch pitcher, Kennedy showed reluctance to use his curveball in 2008. Instead he used his fastball 63.3 percent of the time. Some pitchers can get by with that usage level, but when the pitch averages 89.1 mph, secondary stuff becomes necessary. Kennedy went mostly to his changeup, but that apparently was not fooling AL hitters. This season he has thrown 56.5 percent fastballs, though that includes many more two-seamers. He has relied heavily on his changeup, throwing it 20.6 percent of the time, but has also mixed in his curveball much more frequently. It accounts for 16.9 percent of his pitches. This comes at the cost of his slider, a pitch that AL hitters destroyed in 2008.

There are still some negative signs with Kennedy, starting with his .225 BABIP. That will come up, but his declining home run rate could off-set that. Combined with a high strikeout rate — and only 2 of 27 have been of the pitcher — and a low walk rate, and he could certainly turn in a good season. It’s too early to definitively conclude that Kennedy’s luck will change for the better, but there are some indications that it will.

Last night Edwin Jackson experienced the worst start of his career. It isn’t particularly close, either. The 10 runs he surrendered in just 2.1 innings trumps his next worst start, his final one of the 2009 season, in which he allowed eight runs in five innings. While it’s almost certainly an aberration, his start did continue a trend that we’ve seen so far this year from Jackson. He has started employing his curveball and changeup more often.

Just last year, as Dave Allen noted, Jackson used his slider more often than he had in years past. After throwing the pitch 22.5 percent of the time in 2007 and 20.6 percent in 2008, Jackson threw 25.5 percent sliders in 2009, the year in which he pitched more than he had previously in his career. Since Jackson is primarily a fastball-slider guy, he ended up going to the fastball more often, but also lessened his reliance on his third pitch, a changeup that hasn’t served him well in the past three years.

Last night Jackson threw 55 pitches. While he used his fastball a bit more often than he had in previous starts, he also used his changeup and curveball more often — and used both more often than his slider, which he threw just four times. Neither the curveball nor the changeup helped him much, as the results make clear. In fact, all three secondary pitches failed Jackson in the first inning. On an 0-1 count to Troy Tulowitzki Jackson threw a curveball low and in, and Tulowitzki lined it for a double. The next batter, Carlos Gonzalez, saw a 1-1 curveball below the zone, but he ripped it down the line for a two-RBI double. Jackson then went to his bread and butter, the slider, on the first pitch to Miguel Olivo, but left it up in the zone. That resulted in a ground rule double.

This increased use of his curveball and changeup was not a one-start occurrence. Maybe he used them more often because he wasn’t feeling the slider — he threw it four times and the results were double, foul, double, swing and miss. But the trend has spanned his five starts this season. His changeup use has increased from 6.6 percent in 2009 to 9.4 percent so far this season. His curveball rate has increased even more, going from 2.3 percent to 7.4 percent. While Jackson might benefit in the long run by adding two serviceable pitches to his repertoire, he still has some work to do with them.

The biggest problem with his increased changeup and curveball usage is that it has taken away from his best pitch, the slider. According to pitch type values the slider was by far his best pitch in 2008 and 2009. His curveball also proved a weapon in 2009, so perhaps working it in more frequently would be to his benefit. His changeup, though, has never been a good pitch, ranking in the negatives every year since 2007. It has been a particular disaster this year, yet he uses it more than his curveball, a pitch that appears to be better.

The one major complication I can think of in this case is employing dual breaking pitches. While his slider and curveball might be superior to his changeup, I imagine the stress on his arm is far greater when he throws the former two pitches. The change, then, might be a necessary evil, a different look that can help preserve his arm. Given how poorly he throws it, though, maybe he should go to it less frequently.

After acquiring Austin Jackson from the Yankees last winter, the Tigers wasted no time in testing their new center fielder. Even with Johnny Damon, a career leadoff hitter, on the roster, Jim Leyland still wrote Jackson’s name in the lineup’s top spot. So far he has flourished in the role, posting a .372 wOBA, which is identical to his OBP. That is largely based on his .316 batting average, though his 8.1 percent walk rate is far from horrible. Even with his hot start, though, Jackson clearly has to make adjustments if he’s to sustain his success.

Steve Goldman and Rob Neyer discussed Jackson recently, noting the obvious: no one can sustain a .520 BABIP and a 31.9 percent line drive rate. As the latter falls back into a normal range so will the former. This hurts a player like Jackson even more, because he strikes out at a tremendous rate. In his 86 plate appearances to date he has struck out 32 times, or in 38.6 percent of his PA. We can expect that number to decline, too. But will it be to an extent that it can keep up with his declining BABIP?

At his current strikeout rate, Jackson would break Mark Reynolds’s single-season strikeout record, 223, in just 600 PA. Yet, because he bats leadoff, Jackson would have far more plate appearances during a full season. If he played 150 games at his current rate of 4.77 PA/game, he’d come to the plate 717 times. That would amount to 272 strikeouts, 49 more than the record Reynolds set last year. Of course, if Jackson continues to strike out at his current clip, chances are he won’t be long for the leadoff spot. Even at 650 PA, though, Jackson would still walk back to the dugout 247 times.

In AAA last year Jackson struck out in 24.4 percent of his plate appearances. Even if Jackson reduces his strikeout rate to that level he’d still swing and miss at strike three 175 times in 717 PA. That would represent the 29th most strikeouts in a season ever, a tie with Jay Buhner, Jose Canseco, Rob Deer, Dave Nicholson, and Gorman Thomas. As you might recognize, at least from the first three names, those guys hit for power. Jackson does not.

Jackson’s power peaked at advanced-A ball in 2007 where he posted a .221 ISO during his breakout second half. The next season, when he moved to AAA, his ISO declined to .135. During his 2009 season in AAA it barely cracked .100, sitting at .105. This year he has started the year hitting for a bit more power, a .145 ISO fueled by five doubles, two triples, and a home run. Even at that rate, though, Jackson still doesn’t hit for considerable power. Historically, this does not bode well for his future performance.

Only one player in baseball history has struck out 175 times in a season while producing an ISO of .150 or less. Jose Hernandez accomplished the feat in 2003 with just 571 PA. Jackson should not look at Hernandez as a role model of any type. In addition to his puny ISO, Hernandez posted a minuscule .287 OBP that season. For Jackson, a guy who hits leadoff, that’s unthinkable. Even if we make an adjustment and look for players who have struck out in 24 percent or more of their PA (minimum 500) with an ISO of under .150, we get only 16 names. Of those, only three — Ben Grieve in 2001, Rick Monday in 1968, and Rich Becker in 1997 — posted an OBP of .350 or better.

If the voting took place today, Jackson would be the obvious choice for AL Rookie of the Year. If he continues adapting to the majors, he could end the year in the same spot. The way he’s currently going, though, will not suffice. He has hit far more line drives than any player can sustain during a full season, and currently boasts the best BABIP in baseball by nearly .070. Even at his ridiculous .384 BABIP from last year, Jackson would show greatly different numbers. His batting average, for instance, would fall to .241. Who knows what type of effect it would have on his power numbers?

The Tigers have to be happy with the production they’ve received so far from Jackson’s hot bat, but the way he’s currently going it would be foolish to expect his run to continue. This isn’t to say he can’t adjust. He certainly can, as he showed during his minor league career. Part of that is striking out less often as fewer of the balls he puts in play drop for hits. It’s not an easy adjustment, but it’s one Jackson will need to make as we get deeper into 2010.

The AL East had a pretty tidy storyline heading into the season. The Yanks, Sox, and Rays are perhaps the three best teams in the AL, and they were set to do battle and eliminate at least one from playoff qualification. The other two teams, the Orioles and Blue Jays, didn’t factor much into anyone’s accounting of the division, and for good reason. Even outside the AL East neither figured to field a contending team.

While the Blue Jays went into full-blown rebuilding mode this winter when they traded Roy Halladay, the Orioles have been busy acquiring young players for almost three years now. While there was little chance they’d pull an 08 Rays and surprise everyone, they still presented a compelling story. Savvy franchise builder Andy MacPhail took the reigns from over-involved owner Peter Angelos and gave O’s fans hope. It’s only a matter of time before the AL East features four powerhouses.

Even though no one expected the Orioles to finish even third in the division, it was a pretty reasonable projection for them to place fourth, ahead of the Blue Jays. Yet in the early goings the Orioles have been, by far, the worst team in the majors. They picked up just their third win of the season yesterday, and even that took them 10 innings, and a nearly blown lead, to accomplish. On Monday morning the team found itself at 3-16, 4.5 games behind the next worst teams in the league, the Royals and the Pirates, both at 7-11.

When examining what Baltimore has done so far, a few things stand out as aberrant. First, the production they’ve gotten from first base. When MLB Trade Rumors asked front office executives about the worst off-season signings, many answered Garrett Atkins. He’s proven them right, posting a .239 wOBA in 61 PA. He should start to see reduced playing time now that John Rhyne Hughes has joined the team. While he might not rank among the league’s best first baseman, he’ll present a significant upgrade over Atkins’s production. It’s difficult not to.

The middle infield has also caused Baltimore offensive issues this season. Brian Roberts remains on the DL, which hurts right off the bat. His first replacement, Julio Lugo, has been worse than Atkins, though in fewer than half the number of plate appearances. Still, his .137 wOBA will keep him on the bench while manager Dave Trembley runs with Ty Wigginton’s hot bat. It’s an offense for defense sacrifice, but the sacrifice works the other way for shortstop. Cesar Izturis is there for his glovework, but his bat has been below even the low standard he’s set for himself.

In the outfield and at DH the Orioles also have a few underperformers. Adam Jones tops the list. He’s clearly better than his current .263 wOBA indicates, and many of his woes stem from a .242 BABIP, perhaps further due to his drawing only one walk in 87 PA. He’s been swinging and missing at many pitches out of the zone while laying off pitches inside it, so it sounds like something that should even out in the next few weeks. He’s shown that he’s an excellent hitter, but even good hitters can find themselves in nasty slumps.

After off-season surgery to repair his Achilles’ tendon, Nolan Reimold has spent plenty of time at DH to start the season. But with Felix Pie out for at least a couple of months Reimold has a chance to step up and be the every day left fielder. He’s started slowly, just a .287 wOBA to this point, but he’s another guy who has shown that he can hit better than that. Maybe his recent move to the leadoff spot will help. That means Luke Scott continues taking the majority of his at-bats at DH. He continues the theme of slow offensive starts, just a .293 wOBA at this point.

While Wigginton will certainly fall a bit from his lofty numbers, the Orioles can expect rebounds from a number of their offensive contributors. In addition to increased production all-around from Jones, Scott, and Reimold, the Orioles could further benefit when Matt Wieters finds his power stroke. While he’s hit well so far it has been mostly singles. His ISO sits at .074, a number he’s probably capable of doubling this season. Add to that the return of Brian Roberts, and the Orioles offense could be in decent shape at this point next month.

On the pitching side they’ve posted a few crooked numbers, and once they start to even out things should be just fine. Brad Bergesen will try to find his rhythm in AAA, and in the meantime his replacement will almost certainly allow fewer than 14 earned runs (20 in total) in his first 10.1 innings. Mike Gonzalez is through blowing saves for the time being, leaving a hole in the bullpen. Matt Albers has been pretty bad in his 8.2 innings so far, and got absolutely trashed over the weekend against Boston. The bullpen just isn’t going to be a strength on this team.

Will the Orioles make a huge turnaround and flirt with a .500 season? At this point it’s out of the question. It’s still early, but even a very good team will find it difficult to emerge from a 3-16 hole. Their Pythag record bodes a bit better, but even then that’s 6-13, about 51 wins in a full season. I still don’t think that their true talent is this bad. Once their better offensive players star to hit to their potentials they’ll close that run differential. Maybe they’ll even go on a run after they fire Trembley. For now, though, it’s just another rebuilding season in Baltimore.

The Rays have just ensured that their 3-4 combination of Ben Zobrist and Evan Longoria will spend many more years together. We learned this morning that the Rays would announce an extension for their multi-position star, a three-year guaranteed deal. The deal will also include two team options for Zobrist’s first two years of free agency. While the exact financial details aren’t known as I write this, R.J. Anderson has the right idea: “Long-term deals in pre-arb are like 99% guaranteed to look good for the team.”

This one looks good right from the start. The Rays have hedged their own risk by turning Zobrist’s first two years of free agency into team options. If Zobrist continues to perform near the level he did in 2009 — or even his 2008 level — the Rays can get up to two more years of that production at a discounted rate. If he doesn’t live up to those standards, the Rays can let him go at little cost to the organization. The only way the Rays lose is if Zobrist’s production declines significantly over the next three years. That, however, does not appear likely.

Zobrist might have earned a poor reputation, at least among frequent spectators, in 2006 and 2007, when he looked like a light-hitting utility player. He didn’t walk much, he didn’t hit for power, and even his batting average looked horrible. Still, in the minors he did a fine job. In 2006, he spent most of his year destroying Texas League pitching, posting a .410 wOBA for Houston’s AA squad. After the Astros sent him to Tampa Bay in the Aubrey Huff deal, Zobrist struggled at bit at AAA before earning a call-up in August.

Again, in 2007, Zobrist performed well in the minors, posting a .391 wOBA in the AAA International League, mostly on the strength of his .403 OBP. Still, the results in the majors were discouraging, especially his walk rate. Major league pitchers, it seemed, just didn’t want to walk a guy with an ISO of .052. In 2008, however, we saw some improvement from Zobrist. After utterly demolishing AAA, a .464 wOBA to start the season, Zobrist came up in late June and, other than a low BA, hit pretty well, a .364 wOBA in 227 PA. Most encouragingly, his walk rate rose from 5.1 and 2.9 percent during his 2006 and 2007 stints, to 11 percent in 2008.

Everything came together in 2009. Zobrist’s .408 wOBA ranked third among AL hitters, trailing just Joe Mauer and Kevin Youkilis. Even better, he did it while playing excellent defense at not only second base, but also in the outfield. It’s no wonder, then, that he led the AL in WAR at 8.3. Only Franklin Gutierrez posted a better fielding component. His flexibility adds another bonus, in that manager Joe Maddon can play the hot hand wherever he fits, moving Zobrist to any spot on the diamond. Except catcher, of course. If Zobrist could catch, well, he might solve one of the Rays’ few issues.

This year Zobrist is off to a slow start, but it sounds like just that. Once his walk rate comes back up and his strikeout rate falls back to normal levels, the rest of his game should fall into line. That could be a scary prospect for the American League. The Rays already lead the league in runs per game, 5.81, and a hot Zobrist will only make them better. Much to the joy of the Rays faithful, they’ll get to watch him for what will probably be the next five years. At some point during that span it’s possible that he and Longoria represent the best 3-4 combination in the game, while costing less than one component of the Yankees’ 3-4. That’s how a good small market club must operate. The Rays have struck again.

Despite a late-season collapse that, for the second straight year, removed them from the playoffs, the Mets had reason to be excited after the 2008 season. Their 2005 first-round draft pick, Mike Pelfrey, had just completed 200.2 innings of quality work, the first time he had done so in the majors. He left room for improvement, too. His 4.93 K/9 ranked near the bottom of the NL among qualified starters, something he could certainly build on in his sophomore year.

While Pelfrey did increase his strikeout rate, it was’t by much, just to 5.22 per nine. In fact, this shows why strikeouts per nine might not be the best analytical tool. In 2008 Pelfrey struck out 12.93 percent of the batters he faced. In 2009 he struck out 13 percent. An improvement it was not. As expected his minuscule 0.54 HR/9 rate from 2008 rose, though only to 0.88, while his walk rate also increased, though not by much. These small changes, along with a nearly 20-point jump in BABIP, led to a poor season for Pelfrey, a 5.03 ERA. Both FIP, 4.39, and xFIP, 4.52, rated him better, so there was reason for some optimism.

In 2010 Pelfrey has jumped out to a tremendous start. In 21 innings of work he has allowed just two runs, none of which have come via the home run. He has even earned a save. Encouragingly, he has struck out hitters at a greater rate than last year, 19.75 percent. While Pelfrey has a few more starts before this number becomes reliable — K/PA stabilizes at about 150 batters faced — it’s a good start. Then again, his swinging strike percentage ranks right around where it did in 2007 and 2008, so perhaps his K rate will drop with it.

One of the biggest differences Pelfrey has shown in these 21 innings is the frequency with which he achieves a first-pitch strike. Of the 81 batters he has faced, 48 have seen an 0-1 count while five have put the ball in play, only one of which has fallen for a hit. The batters facing an 0-1 count have not fared well, going just 9 for 45 with a double. Ten of them have struck out. The 48 0-1 counts might not be the sole key to Pelfrey’s success, but they surely play a role.

Another quirk from Pelfrey’s early performance: he has gone to the fastball less often. According to his PitchFX page, Pelfrey has thrown 45.2 percent four-seamers, down from 70.9 percent. That might be an algorithmic issue, though, as his two-seam percentage is up to 24.4 percent from 6.2 percent. Still, the combined total, 69.6 percent, falls below his fastball totals from last year, 77.1 percent, and in 2008, 81.5 percent. He has compensated by going to his changeup far more often 11.5 percent, which is more than double the rate he has used it over the past two years.

Next time one of us writes about Pelfrey, his numbers certainly will not look this pretty. He will surrender home runs, and hitters will produce better than a .231 BABIP against him. His strand rate, 90.5 percent right now, will also dip. There are indicators, though, that he might have made the necessary adjustments this season. He’s going to his secondary pitches more often, and is putting himself in favorable counts. He still has to do it for 30 more starts, but if Pelfrey continues his current trends he just might fulfill the hopes the Mets had for him in 2005.