It doesn’t take a sabermetrician to know that home runs helps teams win games. They lead to run scoring, and teams that score more runs generally win more games. The other side of the situation, of course, involves preventing runs. A team might score five runs a game, but if its pitching staff allows 5.5, the team will probably lose more games than it wins. Even an anti-stat crowd would have a hard time refuting this.

In my first article for FanGraphs, just about a month ago, I addressed the reasons why Jermaine Dye remains unemployed. The inspiration came from a Ken Rosenthal article in which he discusses the situation with Dye’s agent, Bob Bry. Frustrated that his client hasn’t received an acceptable offer, Bry decries the emphasis on the defensive metrics. He thinks it’s overblown, and then turns around to say that Dye hits home runs, and when teams hit home runs they win more games. Specifically, teams that hit zero home runs in a game had a .332 winning percentage, which rose to .517 with one home run and .659 with two.

This comes as no surprise. The home run is a subset of the larger runs category, and teams that score more runs win more games. Earlier this off-season, Walk Like A Sabermetrician posted a chart breaking down teams’ win percentages when scoring X number of runs. Teams that scored three runs had a .337 win percentage, four runs had .523, and five runs had .629. In other words, pretty close to Bry’s home run numbers. Of course, since his client’s strength lies in his power, Bry doesn’t mention the flip side of the equation.

While Dye adds runs to a team’s total with his home runs, he also detracts with his defense. He does not get to balls that other right fielders do, which leads to more base runners. Where other right fielders might have caught a fly ball and ended an inning, Dye’s inability to field it costs his team not only the base runner, but also extends the inning. All of this allows opponents opportunities to score more runs. So, while Dye’s home runs increase his own team’s chances of winning, his futile defense boosts his opponents’ run totals, thus increasing their chances of winning.

Dye’s maximum value comes from the DH spot, but as Cameron noted, his handedness complicates this issue. Further hurting his opportunities, all AL teams currently have their DH situation under control. Some have a permanent DH, while others are carrying four starting outfielders, with the intention of rotating then in the DH spot. This leaves Dye without any viable prospects. If he wants to play the 2010 season he’ll have to wait until a team has an opening. Since he’s certainly the best remaining free agent position player, that opportunity should come eventually.

It does appear, though, that underestimating the value of defense costed Dye this off-season. His power undoubtedly helps, but if he’s costing his team a similar number of runs in the field why would anyone sign him to a multimillion dollar deal?

For the past six seasons the Twins haven’t had to think about the ninth inning. If they had a lead in a close game, Joe Nathan was there to ensure victory. In only 25 of 272 instances did he fail to deliver. This year, though, the Twins will likely have to turn to someone else. News broke this morning that Nathan has torn his UCL and will probably undergo surgery before the season starts. He’s waiting two weeks to see whether rehab is an option, but at this point we can safely assume Tommy John surgery lies in his immediate future.

At RotoGraphs, Eno ran down Nathan’s possible replacements. The in-house options are pretty obvious: Jon Rauch, Pat Neshek, and Matt Guerrier. None of them stands a good chance to replace Nathan’s dependable production, but the effect on the closer role itself isn’t the Twins’ biggest problem. As Matt Klaassen has been saying all morning, they’ll lose perhaps two wins from that spot. There are larger implications, however, as Nathan’s absence cascades through the Twins’ bullpen.

For most positions, we define replacement level as the production of a AAA player called up to the bigs. This is not the case for closers. Replacement level for that position is the team’s next best reliever. When that next best reliever moves into the closer’s role, everyone else in the bullpen moves up, too. Relievers lower on the depth chart play a more prominent role. The biggest effect, then, comes at the back end of the bullpen, where the replacement level player shows up.

Teams, for the most part, can avoid using the seventh reliever on their staff in high leverage situations. But what of the former seventh reliever? He’s now the sixth reliever and will be pressed into more active duty. Such is the curse of bullpen chaining. About a year ago, Sky explained the process. His model agrees with Klaassen’s two-win estimate, but it also assumes a closer with a 3.00 ERA. The closest Nathan came to that was 2.70, and that happened five years ago. Clearly, unless one of the in-house replacements really takes to the role, as Nathan did when the Twins traded for him, the effect will be larger.

There’s no doubt that the Twins will miss Nathan’s dependable ninth inning performances. What they’ll miss more, though, is having guys like Guerrier, Neshek, and Rauch in setup roles. By moving them up in the pecking order, they’re allowing other, possibly lesser arms into the bullpen mix. That will hurt more than the mere ninth-inning downgrade.

With Brandon Webb possibly starting the season on the DL, the back of the Diamondbacks rotation will have to step up in the early goings. This affects no one more than Ian Kennedy, whom the Diamondbacks acquired from the Yankees this off-season. He came into camp expected to compete for a starting gig, and with Webb out his spot seems more of a certainty. The Diamondbacks sound eager to see what Kennedy can do now that he’s out of the AL East and in the weaker hitting National League. But can he succeed in the hitter friendly confines of Chase Field?

Kennedy is not short on potential. He put his talent on display during his first two seasons at USC, striking out 278 batters in 209.2 IP during his freshman and sophomore years. His performance dropped off during his junior year, as his ERA rose by over a full run and his strikeout rate dropped, though he still struck out a batter per inning. The knock on that year was that he lost a few miles per hour on his fastball. Despite the performance and speed loss, the Yankees picked him in the first round of the 2006 draft.

While, like many of his peers, he didn’t sign in time to pitch significant innings in his draft year, Kennedy came on strong in 2007. Starting in advanced-A ball he dominated the minors, climbing to AAA by August. His strikeout rate jumped back above a batter per inning, to about 10 per nine — though that dropped a bit at AAA. Impressed by his rapid rise through the system, the Yankees called him up in September to start in place of the struggling Mike Mussina, a pitcher to whom Kennedy has drawn comparisons. He pitched very well in his three starts, leading the Yankees to hand him a rotation spot the following year.

This is where Kennedy unraveled. In his first six starts he saw the fifth inning just three times. He had problems throwing strikes and ended up walking 20 batters in 24.2 innings. This seemed particularly odd, because walks were never a problem for Kennedy. He didn’t have the lowest walk rate, but it was at 3.0 per nine in the minors in 2007, a respectable rate. The walk issues begat baserunners, which begat runs and plenty of them. After allowing 23 in his six starts, the Yankees demoted him to AAA.

He returned to the majors twice, but faced similar issues. In his second stint he walked fewer batters, five in 14 IP, but allowed four home runs in that span. An injury shelved him for a month, and when he returned it was apparent that the Yankees did not want him back in the majors. His only performance afterward came on August 8, a horrible two-inning, five-run outing against the Angels coming after Joba Chamberlain hurt his shoulder. Even after Kennedy finished the season at AAA, the Yankees did not recall him in September.

Now, after missing almost all of 2009 recovering from surgery to remove an aneurysm under his right armpit, Kennedy will attempt to resurrect his career in the National League. While he might find it easier going than the AL East, his troubles could still follow him to Arizona. His minor league track record doesn’t bode well for his ability to keep runners of the base paths and, more importantly, his ability to keep the ball in the park.

Throughout his college and minor league career, Kennedy did a great job of limiting opponents’ home runs. He allowed just six home runs during his 2007 run through the minors, and then allowed just four in his 69 innings in 2008. This ability, however, had much to do with his unsustainably low 3.6 HR/FB% in the minors. This number figures to rise in the majors — it was at 7.6 percent in 2008 with the Yankees, and could get even higher at Chase Field, which has ranked as one of the most homer-friendly parks in the majors over the last three seasons. Even worse for Kennedy, he has always been a fly ball pitcher, allowing 41 percent fly balls in the minors and, in his limited major league experience, 48.7 percent.

His other college and minor league strength, his strikeout rate, probably won’t translate to the majors. Throughout his minor league career he struck out 9.63 hitters per nine innings, or 28 percent of the batters he faced. During his 59.2 major league innings that number has been 6.49 per nine, or 15.5 percent. While that could certainly rise, especially in the NL, he likely won’t approach his minor league numbers. That, combined with his unspectacular walk rate, could hurt his chances for success.

None of this, of course, precludes Kennedy’s success. Perhaps his work with the Diamondbacks coaches will help him rediscover what made him a standout college pitcher and first round draft pick. Maybe the aneurysm surgery fixed a lingering issue in his arm. His performance to date, however, in both the majors and minors, does not portent success. He’ll need to make changes in order to keep the ball out of the air, and in the park, while pitching in Arizona. Even if he doesn’t he could make a nice No. 5 starter, but if he does he could become even more valuable to the Diamondbacks. With Brandon Webb out to start the season and possibly gone after the season, they could certainly use the help.

Not many catchers make it to their late 30s. The wear and tear that results from squatting behind the plate for an hour or more per game often chases catchers from the game before age 37. In fact, only nine players in baseball history have caught more than 100 games in their age-37 season. Among them, Jorge Posada stands out. He has the highest BA, OBP, and SLG for age-37 catchers, marks he attained last year. But does this bode well for his age-38 season?

At the Bloomberg Sports blog, Tommy Rancel runs down third-tier fantasy catchers. After the top tier, Joe Mauer, and the second, Brian McCann and Victor Martinez, Rancel lists Miguel Montero, Matt Wieters, and Chris Iannetta. Completely absent from the article is Posada. His advanced age and recent injury history certainly plays into that. Even so, among catchers with at least 430 PA in 2009 Jorge led the way in ISO, and ranked second, to Mauer, in wOBA. So why leave him off the list?

History provides us with the beginnings of an answer. While nine players caught more than 100 games at age 37, only five did so at age 38* — and only three have done it since 1940. Only one, Benito Santiago in 2003, slugged over .400. Fred Jacklitsch holds the highest OBP in the group, .376, but he did it in 1914. Among the post-1940 players, Santiago’s .329 OBP leads the way. The catchers that did make it to age 38, it appears, were known more for their defensive skills than offensive prowess.

* To be fair, two other age-37 catchers also played that season in 2009, Jason Varitek and Ivan Rodriguez.

On the age-37 list, the only other catcher to post an OPS of .800 or above was Carlton Fisk, who posted a .348 wOBA in 1985. In 1986 he played in 125 games, but started only 65 behind the plate. But even if he had caught 100 games in 1986, his numbers would rank him as the worst among his peers. His OPS sat at a lowly .600 that season, resulting in a -1.5 WAR. Age 38 does not appear to be a catcher-friendly one.

Even if Posada’s skills don’t decline as dramatically as his historical counterparts, his recent injuries do present a cause for concern. After avoiding the DL for the first 11 seasons of his career, Posada succumbed to shoulder issues in 2008, missing 109 days. While his shoulder did hold up in 2009, he did miss 24 days because of a hamstring injury. That’s 133 days over the past two seasons missed to injury. With another year taking its toll on his body, we shouldn’t be surprised at all if Jorge gets hurt in 2010.

How far will Posada decline? Because he ranked so far ahead of his peers at age 37, because of his recent injury history, and because he was one of the top offensive catchers in 2009, it’s difficult to say. Maybe he’ll be like Benito Santiago, who saw only a small drop-off in performance from age 37 to 38. Or maybe he’ll be like Fisk, who completely fell off — but who also came back and posted a few more excellent partial seasons before retiring. That will be part of the joy in watching Posada’s 2010 season. He’s in rare territory, not only in terms of his age as a catcher, but his performance at that age. Can he do it for one more season?

Two weeks ago we heard vague rumors regarding the Diamondbacks and Justin Upton working on an extension. As it turns out, those rumors had some legs. Yesterday we learned that the two sides have agreed to a six-year, $51.25 million contract that buys out all of Upton’s arbitration years, plus two years of free agency. This is a year longer and $10 million cheaper than the projection I offered, though that was based on an extension following the 2010 season. As with many deals of this nature, it represents a win for both sides.

By signing Upton now, the Diamondbacks ensure that their most promising young player stays with the team for the forseeable future. They also might have saved money. Even if Upton repeats his 2009 numbers this season, he’d be due a large raise in his first pass through the arbitration process. The Diamondbacks could approach him about an extension then, but at that point Upton would have more leverage. Perhaps at that point Upton wouldn’t agree to anything less than five years and $58 million.

In exchange for this presumed discount, Upton gains the security of a guaranteed contract. Even if he sustains a major injury next year the Diamondbacks will still pay him that $51.25 million. If he stays healthy he will likely make less than he would by going through the arbitration process and then hitting free agency after the 2013 season. But Upton’s age helps mitigate the underpayment. The contract runs through his age-27 season, meaning he could still be in line for a big payday. Depending on the economic conditions at the time, that could be a considerable deal, perhaps comparable to Mark Teixeira’s $180 million contract.

Even at a discount this deal pays Upton a healthy sum. Assuming $1.25 million for the 2010 season, and further assuming that Upton will make 40, 60, and 80 percent of his free agency value through his arbitration years, the deal will look like this:

2010: $1.25 MM
2011: $5.26 MM
2012: $7.9 MM
2013: $10.5 MM
2014: $13.17 MM
2015: $13.17 MM

For comparison, Ryan Braun will earn $4, $6, and $8.5 million for his arbitration years, followed by $10 and $12 million for his first two free agent years. Hanley Ramirez’s deal paid him $5.5 for his first arbitration year and will pay him $7 million for the second this year. In the third he’ll make $11 million, followed by $15, $15.5, and $16 million in free agent equivalent salaries.

The most comparable could be David Wright, who earned $1 million in his final reserve clause season, followed by arbitration salaries of $5, $7.5, and $10 million. The Mets then have his first two free agency years at $14 and $15 million, with a $16 million club option for a third. Upton and Wright signed their extensions with the same amount of service time, so it makes sense that they received comparable deals. Wright, however, put up better numbers during his first two seasons, and also plays a more valuable defensive position.

After posting a .388 wOBA and producing 4.6 WAR as a 21-year-old, Upton figures to improve over the next few years. The Diamondbacks wanted to make sure they had him under contract, as to avoid the threat of arbitration. Upton, like most players, wanted the security of a long-term contract. Both sides will get what they want, while Upton can still find his big payday in free agency at age 28. It’s hard to not like this deal from both sides.

At some point we will all experience what I have found to be the worst feeling for a baseball fan, a favorite prospect busting. It’s what prospects do best. Many of us, and I’m willing to wager most of us, have already experienced this. It’s like sustaining a concussion. The initial blow, seeing a player whom you spent so much time hyping fail at the major league level, hurts enough. The lingering effects can be even worse. You’ll continue to follow your team’s prospects, but after that first bust you view everyone with extra caution. No one wants to get bopped on the head a second time.

This added caution sometimes causes us to dismiss players before they’ve run their course. A prime example of this is Chris Young, the No. 23 prospect in baseball for the 2006 season. He has played three full seasons now, batting just .235 with a .307 OBP. In terms of results his 2009 was the worst among them, as he posted a .314 wOBA and 0.1 WAR. A ground injury sustained in June impeded him, perhaps making his season look a bit worse. Even so, after underwhelming performances prior to 2009 it’s tough to remain excited about Young’s potential.

Despite the likely disappointment we’ll feel by getting excited over Young, here are three reasons he just might turn things around in 2010.

1. His walk rate is rising

Through his 1,068 minor league plate appearances, Young walked about 12 percent of the time. During his first two years in the bigs that rate was much lower, at 6.9 percent in 2007 and 8.9 percent in 2008. He improved that again in 2009, walking 11.8 percent, or just a fraction under his minor league rate. He also saw more pitches per plate appearance than in his previous two seasons, 4.11. THis probably results from him swinging at fewer pitches outside the zone, just 18 percent, 13th lowest among MLB hitters last season. Perhaps his increased patience is the first step to better production.

2. He’s swinging at more pitched inside the zone

Eno covered this back in December. In comparing Young to Mike Cameron, he noted that the latter swings at more pitches inside the zone. Young is working towards that, though. Not only did he swing at fewer pitches outside the zone, he also swung at more pitches inside the zone in 2009, up to 61.3 percent. The percent changes on both his swings out of the zone and swings in the zone are about the same. They’re not huge, around 2.5 percent each, but it’s something on which he can build. One aspect he’ll need to work on in this regard is making contact with those pitches in the zone. He did that just 82.1 percent of the time in 2009, below his numbers from the previous two years and 5.6 percent below major league average.

3. He’s not the only one

I love historical comparables, especially with struggling players like Young. Using B-R’s Play Index, I searched for players, starting in 1980, who posted an OBP below .310 and struck out more than 250 times in their age 22 through 25 seasons. As expected, there are some disappointing names on that list, including Corey Patterson, Alex Gonzalez (the one drafted by the Blue Jays, not the one who currently plays for them), Juan Samuel, and Jim Presley. Jeff Francoeur also showed up.

There is one name on this list gives Young hope: Dean Palmer. From age 22 through 25 Palmer hit .231/.307/.452, which almost mirror Young’s numbers. Over his next five seasons, from age 26 through 30, Palmer hit .273/.339/.507, posting one more strong year before declining and eventually retiring.

By reducing the strikeout requirement I found another interesting name: Sammy Sosa. From ages 22 through 25 he hit .260/.305/.456, a bit better than Young in terms of average but almost identical power numbers. The difference is that by age 25 Sosa was already starting to murder the ball, as he hit .300/.339/.545 that season, and went on to hit .278/.343/.567 over the next five seasons. Some good news for Young: Sosa led the league in strikeouts in three of those seasons.

Keep your helmet on

If you don’t want to suffer a case of prospect concussion I suggest you keep your helmet strapped on at all times, or else forget about Chris Young as a legitimate MLB player. If you want to hang on, and comprehend the consequences of doing so, there are a few glimmers of hope that he might put together a quality 2010 season. The odds are long. Disappointment looms. But isn’t that the case for all prospects?

When new Indians manager Manny Acta announced that Grady Sizemore would slide down to the No. 2 spot while Asdrubal Cabrera would assume leadoff duties, it didn’t seem out of the ordinary. Sizemore’s power makes him a better fit for the middle of the lineup, while Cabrera’s .360 OBP and 42 doubles in 2009 make him a quality leadoff candidate. It makes enough sense that there seemed little use arguing the point.

About an hour after reading this, I started to think about it again. Leading off with Cabrera and Sizemore sounds nice enough, but who will hit after them? The linked article mentions Shin-Soo Choo and Travis Hafner coming next, and surely Russell Branyan will also hit in the middle of the lineup. In fact, looking at the Indians’ lineup, the only other candidate for the 3-4-5 spots, barring a Matt LaPorta breakout, is Jhonny Peralta. Branyan is the stronger hitter, though, so I expect he’d fill the No. 5 spot.

This arrangement places lefties in four straight lineup spots, two through five. This makes me wonder if 1) these lefties have shown poor platoon splits over their careers and 2) if Acta will bat Peralta ahead of Branyan. While there is no current way to prove the latter — we won’t know until Acta starts filling out lineup cards — we can still examine the first. This is how the middle of the Indians order has performed against lefties, using their career numbers.

Sizemore: .235/.326/.393 in 1121 PA
Choo: .268/.353/.429 in 330 PA
Hafner: .261/.375/.462 in 1092 PA
Branyan: .210/.297/.459 in 513 PA

Clearly we run into sampling issues, as Choo and Branyan haven’t accumulated even a full season’s worth of PA against lefties. Branyan’s case is stranger still, as 36 percent of his career at bats against lefties came last season. He performed very well, hitting .222/.321/.481. He never got much of a shot against lefties earlier in his career, but then again he never got much of a shot as a starter until 2009.

We typically see managers try to break up a long string of lefties, but in this case I’m not sure that’s a good idea. These four, plus Cabrera, are the Indians best hitters, and should be receiving as many plate appearances as possible. Plus, it’s not like Jhonny Peralta has been great against lefties in his 956 career PA: .265/.337/.450. Why place him between two players who generally hit better?

Given the lineup composition, the Indians against left-handed pitchers could be a storyline to run through the season. Their career numbers indicate that they’ll fare just fine, and since skills are closer to average than they appear, we can expect decent performances from this lineup. Manny Acta has been billed as a progressive-thinking manager. Will he make the off-beat move and bat four straight lefties in his lineup?

The 2009 Mariners did not have the best pitching staff in the American League. They tied for eighth lowest FIP at 4.39, and tied for 10th in xFIP with 4.52. Despite ranking in the bottom half of the league in these fielding independent metrics, the Mariners boasted the best ERA in the AL by a fairly wide margin. Their defense apparently made up the difference, as they led the majors in UZR. A big part of their advantage came in the outfield, where Ichiro Suzuki and Franklin Gutierrez snagged everything that came near them. The result was the highest outfield UZR in the league.

The Twins felt the opposite effect. Their team UZR ranked second to last in the AL, while their outfield defense ranked last. Like the Mariners, they posted a team 4.39 FIP and 4.52 xFIP. But the team ERA was much higher, at 4.50, placing them 11th in the AL. Making matters worse, their pitchers gave up the highest percentage of fly balls in the league, 41.1 percent. They also allowed the third most balls in play, meaning their poor outfielders got plenty of chances.

Only two Twins outfielders accumulated positive UZRs in 2009: Carlos Gomez and Denard Span. That does not bode well for the 2010 team. The former is now a Brewer, and the latter posted his positive contributions from the corners, while running negative in center field. He’ll man the position full-time in 2010, flanked by a combination of Jason Kubel, Delmon Young, and Michael Cuddyer, all of whom posted a UZR/150 of -15 or worse. It looks like a sorry outfield situation in Minnesota.

While Carl Pavano, Nick Blackburn and, in his best days, Francisco Liriano, can keep the ball on the ground, two-fifths of the Twins projected rotation have trouble in that regard. Both Scott Baker and Kevin Slowey allow tons of fly balls, so it comes as no surprise that their FIPs were quite lower than their ERAs. Both, thankfully for the Twins, boast decent strikeout rates, but when they do allow contact the ball heads to the outfield more than to the infield. With outfielders like Cuddyer, Young, and Kubel, that can present a bit of trouble.

As with most takes on UZR, a few caveats apply here. First, Span hasn’t played enough innings in center field to get a good read on him. During his two major league seasons he’s accumulated only 704 innings, which totals less than a full-time season. We should get a better idea of his ability this year when he’s playing there every day. By most observer reports he does well enough, and I’m fairly confident that he’s not as bad as his -13.8 UZR/150 indicates.

We do, however, have decent samples on Cuddyer and Young. The results shouldn’t encourage Twins fans. In 3767.2 career outfield innings, Young has posted a -11.8 UZR/150. It gets even worse in his largest sample, left field, where in 2130.2 innings he has a -18.9 UZR/150. Cuddyer as played 4457.1 career innings in right field, posting a -10.1 UZR/150. Kubel has a much smaller sample, just 1802.2 career outfield innings, but the -18.7 UZR/150 isn’t encouraging. Nor are the anecdotal accounts of his defense. Thankfully, he’ll probably stay on the bench while the Twins play defense, filling mostly the DH role.

The Twins should feature very good, maybe even spectacular defense in the infield, especially if Nick Punto wins the third base job. But when the they face slugging teams that take a lot of pitches to the outfield, they could face problems. Maybe Span provides above average range once he settled into center field, and maybe the 30 pounds Young dropped this off-season will help him improve his defense a bit. Even with both of those factors, however, the Twins still won’t cover a ton of outfield ground. It could once again play a big role in how the pitching staff fares.

In about eight months we should find out how this year’s crop of good shapers fared. Dave listed 28 players who have claimed to be in the best shape of their lives, and a few commenters added to the list. While they’re busy being all shapely, I’m sitting at my work desk pining for baseball. This leads to odd ideas, like the one I had after reading Dave’s bit. What happened to players who last year who made the cliched proclamation?

Using a Google News search ranging from February through April, 2009, I was able to find only five players who declared their shapeliness during spring training. I’m sure plenty more said it, and I’m sure a more intense search would yield plenty of additional results. But for right now five sounds just about fine.

Julio Lugo

In the early days of last year’s camp, Julio Lugo not only said that he fully recovered from his quadriceps injury from the previous season, but also that he was in the best shape of his life. The first two years of his four-year, $36 million deal were his worst since 2002, and 2009 figured to be a big year for him. It didn’t help, then, that about a month after Lugo made his claim he hurt his knee and required surgery that would keep him out for the season’s first month.

Upon his return he did hit better, posting a .329 wOBA over 123 plate appearances. The Red Sox, however, had seen enough. On July 22 they traded him to the Cardinals for Chris Duncan, eating the remainder of Lugo’s contract. To rub it in, Lugo hit .277/.351/.432 over 170 PA in St. Louis. It added up to a 109 wRC+, his best mark since 2006.

Mike Gonzalez

The Braves acquired Mike Gonzalez from the Pirates in the winter before the 2007 season, but got only 17 innings out of him before he required Tommy John surgery. That kept him out from mid-May 2007 until June 2008. Heading into the 2009 season he’d pitched just 50.2 innings for the Braves. Wanting not only to impress the Braves, but to impress the league heading into his walk year, Gonzalez showed up to camp in the best shape of his life.

Used as both a setup man and a closer, Gonzalez got into 80 games and pitched a career-high 74.1 innings — over 20 innings more than his previous mark. His walk rate, while still high at 4 per nine, was still lower than his 2005 and 2006 seasons with Pittsburgh, and his strikeout rate, 10.90, was higher. It was clearly his best season since 2004, and it earned him a two-year, $12 million deal with the Orioles.

Howie Kendrick

Heading into 2009, Howie Kendrick knew something had to change. Over the previous two seasons he had hit well enough, but couldn’t stay on the field long enough to provide his full value. In total he missed 150 days, or about 30 days short of a full season. How can a ballplayer keep himself on the field? By getting into the best shape of his life over the off-season.

At the start it didn’t seem like the off-season workouts helped much. In April and May Kendrick hit .225/.263/.350 over 171 PA. While still healthy, he lost playing time to Maicer Izturis in June. In the second half of the season Kendrick hit much better, though, compiling a .351/.387/.532 line over his final 199 PA. That brought his season wOBA up to .341 which, combined with a slightly better than average defensive season, added up to a 2.0 WAR. Not terrible for a guy with just 400 PA.

Scott Proctor

Being in great shape can help a player in many ways, but it cannot heal an elbow ligament. Scott Proctor found that out last season. He showed up for camp in the best shape of his life, but got into only one spring training game, on Feb. 27. After spraining an elbow ligament he sat out all of March, but on April 1 said he felt no pain in his elbow. Like his proclamation of shapeliness, this meant nothing. Proctor underwent Tommy John surgery, though there are now reports that he’s ahead of schedule. I wonder if he’ll make the same claim again this year.

Chris Lubanski

I had no idea who Chris Lubanski was before researching this post, and I’m kind of surprised. He was the fifth overall pick in the 2003 draft, and fared pretty well early in his minor league career. He struggled once reaching AAA, though, and the Royals never added him to the 40-man roster, even when teams could have picked him in the Rule 5 draft. In 2009 he knew he had something to prove, and showed up for camp in the best shape of his life.

At first, it looked like Lubanski’s off-season workouts paid off. Royals manager Trey Hillman called him the MVP of camp, though that didn’t earn him a spot on the big league roster, or even the 40-man. Then, a month into the season he tore his left hamstring, which kept him out until August. He hit poorly upon his return, getting into 12 games and getting just two hits. The Royals shut him down, ending his season. He caught on with the Blue Jays this off-season.

Despite what you might have heard earlier this off-season, the Tigers are not broke. That notion was refuted back in December, as was the idea that the the team would hold a fire sale. Yes, they traded both Curtis Granderson and Edwin Jackson, but those two wouldn’t have had an enormous effect on the 2010 payroll. The much larger contracts of Miguel Cabrera, Magglio Ordonez, and Carlos Guillen still remain. In fact, not only did the Tigers keep those significant salaries, but they actually increased payroll during the off-season.

In 2009, the Tigers opened the season with a $115 million payroll. From that group they shed about $12.5 million when Placido Polanco, Brandon Lyon, Fernando Rodney, and Adam Everett became free agents, and another $1.2 million because Ordonez’s vested option comes in below his 2009 salary. Players due raises, however, more than made up for the $13.7 million in savings. Cabrera, Guillen, Granderson, Dontrelle Willis, Brandon Inge, and Nate Robertson will earn a combined $15.3 million more in 2010 than in 2009. Then there are arbitration cases, many of them in Years 2 and 3, meaning a few players were set to become even more expensive.

Seeing the potential issues ahead, the Tigers made some moves in December. They traded Granderson and the remaining $25.75 million on his contract to the Yankees, while at the same time trading Jackson and his arbitration raises to the Diamondbacks. In return they got players making the league minimum (though it appears Max Scherzer will make $1.5 million from his draft contract). That helped them fill holes, but the team was still incomplete — and payroll was still around the 2009 level. Since then the Tigers have signed free agents Jose Valverde, Adam Everett, and Johnny Damon, and signed Justin Verlander to a five-year, $80 million contract that will pay him $6.85 million in 2010.

All told, according to Cot’s, the Tigers will open the year with a payroll around $130 million, or about $15 million higher than in 2009. How, then, can the team justify trading two productive players in Jackson and Granderson? Why not just keep Granderson, who will earn $5.5 million in 2010, and not sign Damon, who will earn $8 million? The answer is that the Tigers are paying today in order to save on payroll in 2011 and beyond.

Of the 16 Tigers who will earn more than $1 million in 2010, eight or nine will hit free agency in 2011. These include Willis, Robertson, Damon, Inge, Everett, Gerald Laird, Bobby Seay, and Jeremy Bonderman, for a total savings of about $54 million. Signing Damon means having four players — in addition to Ordonez, Guillen, and Ryan Raburn — for two corner outfield and one DH spot. That should allow the Tigers to keep Ordonez’s plate appearances under 540. They could then decline his option and shed another $18 million, bringing the total to $72 million.

Had they kept Jackson and Granderson, the Tigers would have been on the hook for an additional $16.5 million in 2011, assuming the $8.35 million Jackson will earn with the Diamondbacks. They also might not have signed Damon, which would have made it harder to hold Magglio’s plate appearances under 540, perhaps costing them another $18 million. Assuming the worst, that would bring the Tigers 2011 commitments from $55 million to $89.5 million, while their 2010 payroll would still, even without Damon, be around $130 million.

While the Tigers’ financial situation isn’t as harsh as some assumed earlier in the winter, it’s still probably a looming concern. Instead of selling off their expensive players for 50 cents or less on the dollar, they made a few moves to help save on future payroll. This will allow them to remain competitive in 2010 and more flexible come 2011. With a much stronger free agent class on the horizon, the Tigers will be glad they made the moves they did this winter. They might have set the foundation for a strong future.