A glance at Chan Ho Park’s 2009 statistics can mislead. None of his aggregate stats stand out. His 4.43 ERA ranked below league average, a 96 ERA+, and his 9.1 hits per nine and 3.6 walks per nine led to an inflated 1.40 WHIP. Combined with his poor reputation, this might lead someone to believe that Park stunk in 2009. As Dave explained during the World Series, that opinion does not reflect Park’s mid-season transition. His overall stats suffered from his poor performance as a starter early in the season. The real story lies in his move to the bullpen in May.

Park produced horrible results from the rotation. Over seven starts, from April 12 to May 17, he lasted just 33.1 innings, or just about 4.2 per start. In that time he allowed five home runs while walking 17 and striking out 21, for a FIP of 5.42 to go with his ERA of 7.29. Some of that, at least, appears to be bad luck. In April, for instance, Park allowed four of those five home runs, but on just 20 fly balls. But even in May, with a lower HR/FB rate, he still allowed 14 runs over 18 innings while starting, walking 12 to 11 strikeouts. At that point the Philies rightly decided that Park’s stint in the rotation was over.

From that point on Park allowed zero baseballs to leave the yard. That covers 49 innings, including 38 fly balls. In that span he struck out 52 batters while walking just 16, for a FIP of 2.06, which undercut his 2.57 ERA. He allowed runs in just eight of 37 appearances, and allowed multiple runs just four times, more than two runs just once. Over July and August, in 16 appearances and 25.1 IP, he allowed just three earned runs, walking just five to 29 strikeouts. Clearly, the move to the bullpen did him wonders. But can we expect that again in 2010?

Apparently the Yankees, who signed Park to a one-year, $1.2 million deal with an additional $300K in incentives, think there’s a chance. Even accounting for a league average HR/FB rate in 2009, Park’s xFIP was still 4.02. There’s a chance, though, that Park continues to keep fly balls in the park at a below league average rate. It won’t be zero, but if Park can continue what he did in 2009, he might keep that HR/FB low. That makes him slightly less valuable, but considering his strikeout and walk rates in the bullpen we still might expect a considerably above average performance in 2010.

The Yankees’ hope is that something changed for Park in 2009, because his 2008 stint in the bullpen didn’t go as well. Over 70.1 IP he struck out just 49 to 28 walks, posting a 4.85 FIP, a full run higher than his 3.84 ERA. The drastic increase in Park’s strikeout rate and reduction in walk rate from 2008 to 2009 does suggest that something changed, though we’d be hard pressed to prove it.

We could look to his PitchFx data, but from what I understand the pitch classification algorithm changed from 2008 to 2009. That might partly explain Park’s reduced use of his four-seamer and the increase in his two-seamer. The only other major change I can see is the reduced use of his slider and the increased us of his changeup. But, again, this counts both his starts and relief appearances, so it’s difficult to draw conclusions. Looking at his pitch type chart, he does appear to have increased his changeup usage later in the season.

It’s always a risk when a team signs an aging pitcher who showed signs of improvement in limited duty the previous season, but the Yankees are in a position to take the gamble. Adding Park to the bullpen gives the Yankees even more depth, allowing them to perhaps trade one of Sergio Mitre and Chad Gaudin, or otherwise send Joba Chamberlain or Phil Hughes to AAA in order to build up their innings, rather than sending one to the bullpen initially. If Park pitches near his 2009 level, they’ll benefit from a stronger bullpen. If he flops, the can afford to eat the remainder of Park’s $1.2 million salary, like they did with LaTroy Hawkins in 2008.

As we can expect in most cases, the headline overhyped the content. MLB.com’s Steve Gilbert, reporting on Diamondbacks GM Josh Byrnes’s Q&A at FanFest last weekend, quoted the GM on the issue of contract extensions for Mark Reynolds and Justin Upton. His answer was unsurprisingly ambiguous, though the copy editor played it up a bit in the headline. Seeing that headline, after finding through an equally tantalizing MLBTR headline, made me wonder what it would take to lock up Upton, through his arbitration years and perhaps a year into his free agency.

Using WAR dollars

Since we don’t know how Upton will fare this season, I’ll base my hypothetical on the Fans projection. Why Fans and not CHONE? Because the Fans projection is considerably more bullish, projecting Upton to produce a full win over his 2009 performance. I’m not sure if he’ll truly break out this season, but given all we’ve heard about him since the Diamondbacks drafted him with the No. 1 overall pick in 2005, I think it works for these informal purposes.

The Fans project Upton to post 5.6 WAR this season, based on an improvement of 10 batting runs above replacement. Converting WAR to dollars, that’s a $25.1 million performance. Again, given Upton’s upside, he could further improve on that through his arbitration years, though his positional adjustment doesn’t help. So let’s proceed figuring Upton hits most of his upside and produces ~6 WAR per season, which would put him around $27 million in WAR dollars.

Problem is, only one man makes that much money. Albert Pujols might become the second once he hits free agency, but in both cases we’re talking about generational talents. Like the Fans I’m bullish on Upton, but not quite ready to pronounce him A-Rod or Pujols. But, since the header says WAR dollars, let’s work backward from here anyway.

If we go by the rule of thumb, with a player’s first-year arbitration being 40 percent of his free-agent value, the second year being 60 percent, and the third year being 80 percent, we can make some pretty quick estimates of Upton’s arbitration salary. In 2011 he’d make $10.8 million, in 2012 $16.2, and in 2013 $21.6. Right away these numbers jump out as well higher than we’d expect, given recent arbitration hearing results. Then again, Ryan Howard did get $10 million in his first arbitration hearing, and Upton would be much younger. But, since teams sign long-term deals require a monetary sacrifice to the team in exchange for security, we can adjust this down, perhaps considerably.

Figuring a four-year contract, buying out all three arbitration years and a year of free agency, WAR dollars adjusted for arbitration would come out to four years, $75.6 million. If we adjust that down, say, 25 percent, it’s a four-year, $56.7 million contract. That still seems a bit rich. Even if Upton deserves it, I’m not sure the D’Backs would pay it.

Comparable players

When hashing out arbitration figures, teams and players make comparisons to similar players. Teams will obviously look t players at the lower end of that spectrum, while the players will try for the best. Since we’re looking for terms of a long-term deal, four to five years, maybe some comparable deals from team-controlled players could shed some further light.

In 2008 Hanley Ramirez signed an extension that started with his first arbitration eligible season, 2009, and runs through 2014. Those six years will cost the Marlins, or a potential acquiring team, $70 million. Hanley was two years older than Upton through his first two major league seasons, which could change the equation. On the other hand, Ramirez produced more value in his first two seasons, 4.5 and 5.7 WAR against Upton’s 0.7 and 4.6. If Upton produces to the level of Fan projection, perhaps he’d be in line for something similar.

More on Upton’s level positionally, Ryan Braun signed an eight-year, $45 million extension with the Brewers a month and a half into his first full season. The deal essentially pays him $4, $6, and $8.5 million for his arbitration years, so I don’t think this is a good comp at all. Since Upton already has more service time than Braun did when he signed, that should be relatively obvious. We can also turn aside Evan Longoria as a comp, for similar reasons. Ditto Grady Sizemore and Troy Tulowitzki.

How about David Wright? He signed an extension while finishing up his second full season in 2006. It bought out his first two arbitration years at $5 and $7.5 million, and buys out his final one for $10 million. It also buys out his first two years of arbitration for $14 and $15 million, plus a $16 million club option for 2013. Wright produced 5.8 WAR in 2005 and 4.6 WAR in 2006, close to what Upton did in 2009 and what we can loosely project for 2010. Of course, Upton might not want to sign away two to three free agent years, so maybe some of those dollars can go back into arbitration values.

Taking a stab at the issue, using the WAR dollars projection plus the Ramirez and Wright comps, a five-year, maybe a five-year, $58 million deal would get the job done. That provides Upton with security, and the Diamondbacks with a predictable salary plus two years of free agency. Upton would be 28 when the deal expires, so he could pursue a pretty hefty contract, perhaps in the range of Mark Teixeira’s eight-year, $180 million deal.

Clearly this was just the exploration of a curiosity, and by no means represents what the Diamondbacks should pay Upton should they want to lock him up. I’m interested to see others take a stab at estimating his value over the next four or five years.

Take a look around the league and you’ll see few, if any, bullpens that couldn’t use another arm. We’ve come to recognize relievers as the most volatile entities in baseball. Because they pitch so few innings it becomes difficult to gauge their true talent level, and so we see production fluctuate from one year to another, sometimes to a high degree. Even teams with solid bullpens could do worse than sign a high-potential reliever to a minor league contract. Yet, Kiko Calero remains unemployed.

I’d ask why this is the case, but the answer stares us in the eyes. Over the past three seasons Calero has missed time due to shoulder injuries. The most severe came in 2008, when he strained his rotator cuff and missed the first two months of the season. Upon his return he pitched reasonably well, allowing three runs (two earned) on just three hits and three walks through 4.2 innings. The only runs came in a single appearance against the Yankees, and it was actually Alan Embree who allowed the runners to score. One two-inning scoreless appearance later, the A’s designated Calero for assignment, releasing him 10 days later.

Why would the A’s release a reliever like Calero, who had pitched so well for them in the past? I’m not quite sure, but his performance in Triple-A later that season put that question to rest. He got roughed up in the hitter-friendly PCL, allowing four home runs and walking 12 in 21.1 innings. The sample was short, but the results were anything but encouraging. Calero had to settle for a minor league deal with the Marlins, though he broke camp with the team.

Despite again missing time with shoulder issues, this time inflammation, Calero managed 60 innings with the Marlins, posting a 2.56 FIP on the strength of 69 strikeouts and just a single home run. Not only was his FIP an excellent 2.56, but his tERA checked in at an even lower 2.29. As R.J. noted in September, Calero’s contact rate was among the lowest in the league. He finished 10th lowest among MLB pitchers with at least 50 IP.

Beyond injuries, one concern is that Calero’s ridiculously low home run is unsustainable. His 1.4 percent HR/FB ratio in 2009 was the lowest of his career, despite his fly ball rate being the highest. Any ERA predictor that normalizes for home run rate would have pegged Calero a bit higher than FIP and tERA, and we saw that in his 3.92 xFIP. Even so, that’s a decent number for a middle reliever.

He performs especially well against righties, a plus for any interested team. Over his career he’s faced 787 same-handed batters, striking out 223 of them, 28 percent, and walking just 62, or 8 percent, both better than his career averages. Perhaps most importantly, he’s allowed just 13 home runs, or one every 60.5 right-handed hitters faced. This is in spite of his fly ball rate, which sits at 52 percent against righties. Yet he pitches well enough against lefties that having him face a pinch-hitter, or a lefty between two righties, isn’t a huge concern.

It doesn’t appear a major league offer is in the cards for Calero. He was reportedly in negotiations with the Cubs last month, but nothing came of that. The Marlins have expressed their concerns with his shoulder, and that might have warded off other potential suitors. But in a league where a team’s best non-closer one year can rank among their worst the next, Calero presents an excellent option.

For two years, Chien-Ming Wang looked like a top of the rotation starter. He didn’t blow away hitters, but instead fed them sinker after sinker, forcing them to hit the ball on the ground. Keeping the ball out of the air meant keeping the ball in the park, leaving Wang with the best HR/9 rate in the AL for both 2006 and 2007. This, combined with a low walk rate, kept his FIP under 4.00, despite the poor strikeout rate.

Wang then opened the 2008 season in grand fashion, allowing just 19 runs, including one home run, and walking 19 in 59 innings. Making matters worse for opposing batters, he also started striking out more hitters, 38 in those 59 innings. It appeared he was taking another step forward. But then something changed.

On May 18 Wang gave up seven runs in seven innings to the Mets. He followed that by allowing five or more runs in his next three appearances. Those unconvinced that Wang’s true ability matched his early season performance might have called it a statistical correction, but there seemed to be more at play. In 2006 and 2007, and even earlier in 2008, Wang released his pitches from a three-quarters arm slot. Beginning with his May 18 start, that release point move upward, as shown in the following three graphs.

Those graphs, as you can see, also contain 2009 data, which we’ll get to in a moment. The higher arm angle didn’t seem to work for Wang, though we didn’t get a large enough sample to make any real determination. On June 15, during an interleague game in Houston, Wang fractured his lisfranc, ending his season.

Wang appeared ready to return in 2009, and looked fine in spring training. His first three starts, however, went as poorly as possible, as he allowed 23 runs over just 6 IP. The Yankees placed him on the disabled list with what they termed “hip weakness,” but the move was really to buy them time to figure out what was wrong. He returned on May 22, but continued to struggle. His season eventually ended on the Fourth of July, as he dueled with Roy Halladay in the Bronx. Later that month we learned he would need surgery to repair a torn ligament in his shoulder capsule.

Back to the above graphs, it’s clear that Wang released his sinker from an even further over the top arm slot in 2009. This caused many of his pitches to fall flat. So flat, in fact, that PitchFx categorized many of them as two-seam fastballs. Wang had thrown just under 5 percent two-seamers in 2008 — which could also have really been flat sinkers — and that number jumped to 22.9 percent in 2009. His fastball took a somewhat corresponding hit, as he threw it 73.6 percent of the time in 2008 and only 56.8 percent in 2009.

We learned earlier today that the Nationals will announce that they’ve signed Wang at a press conference on Friday. While his recovery from shoulder surgery remains the foremost concern, the Nationals also have to work to get his release point back to where it was in 2006, 2007, and early 2008. It seems that’s a big part of his sinker’s success. Without that bread and butter pitch Wang has a much lesser chance of recovery to his previous form.

A big thanks to my buddy Jay Gargiulo and my friend and colleague Mike Axisa for putting together much of this data. The three of us are going to miss having Wang in the Yankees’ rotation.

Some players appear content to wait out the market. Johnny Damon remains unemployed as pitchers and catchers get ready to report, but he’s vacationing in Hawaii, not a care in the world. Other players appear a bit more impatient. Count Felipe Lopez among the latter crowd. He fired Scott Boras over the weekend, reportedly over frustration that he, like 10.6 percent of Americans, lacks a job. His new representatives at Beverly Hills Sports Council must now find a team needing an upgrade at second or third base.

Over the past year and a half Lopez has placed himself among the top MLB second basemen. In the 849 plate appearances he has accumulated since the Nationals released him in 2008, he has posted a .372 wOBA. Despite the poor first half of 2008 that led to his release, Lopez ranks ninth among second basemen in WAR over the past two years, .02 ahead of both Robinson Cano and Orlando Hudson and only .01 behind Mark DeRosa. His defense plays into that ranking, with a 2.5 UZR over the past two years, seventh among MLB second basemen.

Can Lopez sustain that production? His 4.6 WAR season in 2009 stands out, but CHONE projects him to produce only 2.2 wins above replacement in 2010. A large factor in this projection, it appears, is a regression of his .360 BABIP back to his career norm of .323. With a career high line drive rate of 22.3 percent, along with a career low fly ball rate of 25.9 percent, the regression makes sense. Chances are a number of those line drives will once again become fly balls. A 2.2 WAR would have moved Lopez from the fifth most valuable second baseman in 2009 to the 15th most valuable.

Even so, a number of clubs could still benefit from a stronger second baseman, even as we creep closer to spring training. The problem isn’t so much with the upgrade, however, as it is with money. Many teams have reached their spending limits, despite fielding less than adequate players at a number of positions, including second base. The Astros and Padres fall into this group, as they fielded, and will again field in 2010, two of the worst second basemen in the league. Only a few teams remain that need another infielder and have the money to sign one.

The Cardinals, for whom Lopez thrived in 2008, were reportedly interested in Lopez in December, before Matt Holliday signed, and still have some money to spend. Lopez might have to accept a reduced role there, however, as David Freese figures to get a long look at third base this spring. Over the past two seasons at AAA he has hit .304/.363/.542 in 664 at-bats. He’ll turn 27 just after the season starts, so the Cards might want Lopez as an insurance policy just in case Freese can’t come close to replicating his PCL numbers.

The Cubs could be another suitor. They ranked 27th in wOBA from their second basemen in 2009 and didn’t make many moves to upgrade for 2010. But, with their payroll over $135 million for 2010, they might be content with a platoon of
Mike Fontenot and Jeff Baker. CHONE projects them to combine for 717 plate appearances and 2.5 WAR, so unless they see something they don’t like in spring training it remains unlikely that they’ll spend the extra money on Lopez.

Like many of his fellow free agents, Lopez lost the waiting game. Had he signed in December, or even early January, he might have commanded a contract similar to Hudson’s one-year, $5 million deal. Now it appears that he’ll have to settle for much less, not only in money but perhaps also in playing time. Unless he forces his way into an everyday lineup with his bat, that’s going to cost him even more money next off-season. What kind of offers, I wonder, did Scott Boras turn down?

We would like to welcome Joe Pawlikowski to the FanGraphs team. We don’t hold his Yankee fandom against him, and neither should you.

When Jermaine Dye finally decides to call it a career, his post-baseball life will likely not include a job in sales. In a recent Ken Rosenthal article he stated his case for 2010 employment: “It’s only been [4 1/2] years since I was the World Series MVP. I’m a winner. Hopefully some teams out there can see that.” Teams, of course, care little about what Dye did in 2005 when he was a prime-aged, power-hitting right fielder. They’re more worried about his performance in 2009, as an age-35 right fielder.

Dye’s defense has been nothing short of atrocious over the past four years. Bob Bry, Dye’s agent, believes that the recent focus on defense “has reached the level of absurdity.” Of course, when one of his clients ranks among the most defensively deficient outfielders over the past half decade, his job is to say things like that. But since Bry wants to place the emphasis on offensive skills, let’s look at four reasons why Dye’s 2009 numbers at the plate warrant a red flag or two.

1. He dropped off significantly in the second half

Players streak and players slump. It’s part of any baseball season, so it’s usually best to take a bad month as just that. As players age, though, a prolonged slump starts to raise questions. Since Dye’s slump came in the second half of the season, his raises even more. He hit .179/.293/.297 after the All-Star Break, after hitting .302/.375/.567 prior. Did he wear down as the season got into the later stages?

We can’t answer that with any degree of certainty. Maybe he battled through an injury. Maybe something was just off and it had nothing to do with his age. His second half numbers present an awfully small sample, just 246 plate appearances, so maybe we shouldn’t take his drop-off so seriously. But, just because I think it’s interesting, in his 83 September plate appearances he posted his highest fly ball rate of the year and his lowest HR/FB. Again, probably meaningless in the long run, but when we see this from an aging player it causes concern.

2. He was horrible going the opposite way

Looking back to 2002, as far back as FanGraphs splits go, Dye has posted two standout years, 2005 and 2006, with wOBAs of .361 and .417. Part of his success that year came on balls hit to right field. He was particularly excellent on those pitches in his 2006 career year. In 2009, however, he was horrendous — and I’m not sure that word adequately describes his opposite field prowess.

His rate stats are poor enough, but Dye’s problem went deeper. He it .184 on balls to right, with a .223 SLG, for a puny .039 ISO. Making matters worse, of the 370 balls Dye put into play, 104 of them were to right field, or 28 percent overall. When a dead pull hitter fares this poorly hitting to the opposite field it’s usually not a huge deal, because he’s not hitting many balls that way in the first place. But with numbers that bad on 28 percent of balls in play, it becomes a much larger issue.

Furthermore, of the 105 balls he hit to right field, two-thirds were put in the air. For Dye, whose game centers on power, that might seem like a good thing, but as we saw above his power was almost nonexistent. Part of that is that many of those fly balls never left the infield. His infield fly ball rate to right was 20 percent. He hit 70 fly balls to right, so the second or first baseman shagged 14 of them.

3. He posted the lowest line drive rate of his career

Leaving out his shortened 2003 season, Dye’s 16.9 percent line drive rate marked the lowest of his career, by over two percent. Even in his sub-par 2007 season he hit a line drive 19 percent of the time. This included a 17.9 percent line drive rate to left field, his lowest mark since 2005, and a 15.7 rate to center, the lowest of his career since 2002.

By itself, this might not mean much. Maybe Dye was just having trouble seeing the ball and he got over or under pitches he normally would have hit on the nose. But, again, Dye is not a player in the prime of his career. If this were the only factor, maybe we could chalk it up to a bad year, maybe even a bad few months. But when combined with other factors, it appears to be a larger issue.

4. His defense

Grammarians claim that the most important aspect of a sentence should appear at the end. Consistent with this, the most important point about Dye rounds out this list. His defense isn’t just bad. Bad is Bobby Abreu. Bad is Michael Cuddyer. Jermaine Dye stands with rare company over the past four years, posting a UZR/150 of worse than -20 each year. If Johnny Damon is having trouble finding work because of one poor defensive season in the outfield, it’s tough to imagine Dye getting any serious offers, especially from an NL team.

Looking at the past three years of UZR data, only Brad Hawpe ranks worse than Dye in terms of UZR and UZR/150 among right fielders with more than 2,800 innings at the position. The next worse, Cuddyer, is far out ahead at -13 UZR/150, to Dye’s -22.4. Dye says he’s willing to play left field, but that should only further deter clubs from signing him. Given that Dye’s futility covers four years — he was at -21.5 UZR/150 in 2006 — there is no reason why any team should sign him with the thought of giving him even one inning in the outfield.

Dye does understand that the market isn’t as robust as it was when he signed a two-year, $22 million extension late in the 2007 season. Yet he doesn’t think it devalues him too much. “But there are still guys getting money that I feel I’m better than,” he said. The market, however, does not care how Jermaine Dye feels. With about three weeks left until position players officially report to spring training, there’s little to no chance Dye receives an offer anywhere near what he’s seeking. His best chance, in fact, might be to see how things develop in March and catch on with a team short a player or two due to injury. As it stands now, there doesn’t appear to be much room for another DH on many rosters.