While speaking to the Fort-Worth Star Telegram, Milton Bradley, now of the Chicago Cubs, made a couple noteworthy comments regarding not only his time as a member of the Texas Rangers but also his theory on statistics and playing time. Before adding any personal opinions or commentary, here are the quotes of interest:

“My agent was saying that Jon Daniels was telling him, ‘There are days when he doesn’t want to play because of his health.’ Well, you can get a healthy guy to go out there and play 162 games, but he won’t do what I did in 120.”

“When you’re on one-year deals constantly, you’ve got to put up as good numbers as you can. When you have days where you’re not feeling like you can contribute, you’re not going to go out there, because you’re not going to want your numbers to suck. So, if you’re in a situation like I am now, if they want me to go out there when I’m feeling a little banged up, I’ve got no problem doing that because they’ve made the commitment to me.”

Let’s go one at a time, starting with the top quote. Bradley seems to be bitter that the Texas Rangers showed little interest in retaining his services beyond the 2008 season, and lost his temper upon hearing the remarks of his general manager. The line about his 120 games outperforming 162 of others is incredibly cocky but it also reeks of truth.

If you take the 126 games Bradley played in 2008, which produced a win value of +4.5, and slotted in the -0.3 win value that comes from prorating Jeff Francoeur’s season to 36 games, the resulting +4.2 wins still exceeds the wins added totals of both Josh Hamilton (156 g) and Ryan Braun (151 g). I always find it humorous that people are criticized for pointing out something similar to Bradley’s self-assessment, especially if it is true.

Perhaps the cockiness overwhelmingly turns off those offering the critiques, but why is it if a player makes a comment like that it becomes blasphemous, yet if I point it out in an article it gets lauded as interesting? Of course a difference exists in the routes taken by both myself and Bradley in offering up the information, but because Bradley presented his case without humility he is very likely to get panned by the media and the casual fan.

Now, Bradley’s second quote does not evoke the same sort of defensive response, because it comes off as largely hypocritical. He is essentially claiming that he took days off when under 100% in order to preserve statistics. This preservation would, in theory, lead to lucrative contracts via free agency. I’m definitely a proponent of players taking days off when hurt because an injured player is more likely to hurt his team than help, but front offices might actually interpret his actions differently, choosing not to commit based on an attitude that puts statistical preservation above the team.

I’m not saying he is right or wrong, because these comments could easily sway to either side. Milton failed to mention that his proneness to injuries also turns teams off from committing, as do his perceived attitude problems. Sitting out of games intentionally for the sake of keeping your numbers high is equivalent to getting a triple-double in basketball by purposely missing your own shot to grab a rebound. If Bradley needed some time off to heal, then by all means he should because, with health, he is an incredibly talented player and it would benefit his employers to keep him on the field as often as possible.

The Cubs have made a commitment to Bradley, but statistical preservation issues aside, he just is not very likely to be on the field all too often given his track record and the fact that the senior circuit will require his presence in the field. Bradley is, in my eyes, the most talented player of the last ten years who truly deserves to sign one-year deals each season.

The Phillies and Rays, who met in the 2008 World Series, happened to be the two best fielding teams in baseball last season, tied with a UZR of +74.3 runs. Third on that list was the Oakland Athletics, who finished third in the AL West at 75-86. The Athletics have been known for defense for a while now, as GM Billy Beane has shown a knack for combining pitch-to-contact arms with solid defenders. The Oakland pitching staff also performed well, virtually deadlocked with the Rays, and ahead of the Phillies, in value wins. With a decent offense, the Athletics may have looked pretty darn good last season.

Of course, the offense was anything but decent save for Jack Cust, and its ineptitude canceled out the defensive contributions. Looking at the nine players who primarily comprised the Athletics offense, their slash line was an ugly .245/.323/.378. If you remove Cust, the line drops to .247/.315/.364, so it becomes evident just how much he added to the OBP and SLG.

In attempting to rectify the situation, Beane acquired Matt Holliday, brought back Jason Giambi, and emptied his pockets further for Orlando Cabrera and Nomar Garciaparra. Holliday is a tremendous offensive talent likely to take a slight step back due to the change in scenery from an NL hitter-friendly park to an AL pitcher-friendly park. He will still be very valuable, though, and a huge upgrade over the likes of Emil Brown or Rajai Davis.

Giambi is likely to spend most of his time as a designated hitter, though with Cust’s defensive struggles, the former MVP will probably get his fair share of innings at first base. For however many games he plays at first base, splitting time with Daric Barton, you can count on that position seeing a definitive rise in offensive production.

Orlando Cabrera is a better fielder than Bobby Crosby and though he isn’t going to light the world on fire with his bat, he will still be a better hitter than Crosby as well. The swap may very well add +1.5 to +2 wins depending on how well Cabrera utilizes his glove. And Nomar will primarily face lefties, whom he has hurt over the last few seasons. With Eric Chavez hurt and Jack Hannahan, well, not being a good hitter, I would think Nomar and Hannahan would platoon in some form at the hot corner, with Garciaparra facing lefties.

The As have several positions that will require playing time decisions, but the increase in offensive productivity not necessarily at the expense of defensive prowess brings the As to around 83-85 wins right now, which could end up being good enough for the division. Last year, their starting lineup featured four players who added +1 win or less. This season, even if some of those players still receive playing time in a platoon situation, expect that number to shrink. Giambi might not have much left and Holliday certainly isn’t going to re-sign after the season, but do not sleep on the Oakland Athletics in 2009.

As I wrote back in October, it can be difficult for a player to shake a reputation. Fortunately, for the Red Sox, Jon Lester accomplished this very feat by showing everyone that he was a legitimate ace pitcher and not merely a cancer survivor with raw tools and potential. The 25-yr old lefty, who tossed a no-hitter in the 2008 season, put together a tremendous statline in 33 starts en route to +5.1 wins. Production like that translated to $23 mil at fair market value. Still well under club control, Lester of course earned nowhere near that salary.

His production did not go unrewarded for long, however, as he has just signed a 5-yr extension worth $30 mil, with a 6th year option valued at $13 mil. The extension buys out all of his arbitration-eligible seasons as well as his first two free agent years, and has the potential to keep the southpaw in Red Sox attire until he turns 31 years old.

Lester is tough to project thanks to just 144.1 innings logged in 2006-07 and the fact that the systems do not tend to recognize or reward breakout performances. The projection systems housed here suggest that Lester will take a decently sized step backwards, regressing to somewhere in the +3.5 to +4.1 win range. I’m a tad more optimistic and see him potentially as a +4.5 win pitcher if he can match the innings pitched total from last season.

Normally, with extensions, we break out the 40/60/80 calculator and determine the worth, but what intrigues me about this particular extension is that it has become hard to determine the true “winner” of deals this offseason. With the market as depressed as it has become, a deal that seemingly possesses a slam dunk pedigree such as this might be a bit more fair than meets the eye. Either way, the Red Sox have done a solid job of locking up two of their best players in Lester and Pedroia, players who will no-doubtedly outearn their salaries.

With the inconsistencies of Daisuke Matsuzaka, the potential that we have seen the best days of Josh Beckett, the question marks surrounding John Smoltz, Clay Buchholz, and Brad Penny, and increasing odds that Tim Wakefield will retire one of these years, the Red Sox have just locked up their best pitcher, ensuring themselves of an ace for the next several years. And if the aforementioned inconsistencies, question marks, and odds prove to be irrelevent with 2009 performance and beyond, Lester has the chance to headline one of the top rotations in the game for years to come.

For years now an automatic rubric of sorts has been in place to determine the Hall of Fame eligibility for hitters: launch 500+ home runs or amass 3,000+ hits. If either of these milestones are reached, the player has been more than likely to eventually find himself enshrined in Cooperstown. With the recent influx of power, however, several players with questionable credentials have either surpassed the 500 HR benchmark or have at least put themselves in solid position to do so in the next year or two. Players like Gary Sheffield and Carlos Delgado will finish their careers with more than 500 longballs and Jim Thome may very well reach 600, yet none of these three are considered Hall of Fame locks. And if Sheffield finishes at 518 HR, is he that much more worthy than Fred McGriff and his 493 gopherballs?

The 3,000 hit plateau has not been put under as much scrutiny because producing such a total is not necessarily considered as tainted. In a few years, however, a 20% chance exists that this milestone may no longer signal an automatic berth into baseball’s hallowed hall. Why 20%? Well, because Garret Anderson, he of the 2,368 hits, has a 20% chance of reaching 3000. Using Bill James’ Favorite Toy, Anderson is expected to play for another three seasons at an average of 148 hits/season, thus ending his career at 2,812. The 20% shot at 3,000 in no way locks him in but does acknowledge the definite possibility of such an event occurring.

If he reaches 3,000 hits, which I hope happens, the benchmark will lose its credibility because Garret Anderson is not a Hall of Fame player. Granted, my view of the HOF as an historical document of sorts designed to showcase the can’t-miss players of a certain era may differ from that of others, but regardless of our views I am extremely confident that everyone would agree Anderson is not of the HOF-ilk. Why do I hope he gets to the aforementioned milestone? Because if the credibility of the milestone is weakened with regards to the Hall of Fame, perhaps situations wherein aging players hurt their team’s production in order to reach the milestone will be lessened, if not eradicated.

Did Craig Biggio really need 3,000 hits to earn his way into the Hall of Fame? Not in my eyes. Did he hurt the Astros in the process of reaching the milestone? Yes, because he prevented more productive players from accruing playing time at the expense of a milestone relatively meaningless to his HOF chances. This is what bugs me about the milestones: if you need a specific number for everyone to believe you belong, chances are you do not belong.

The Hall of Fame is certainly about numbers but it is also about impact. Sandy Koufax came nowhere near 300 wins, and was only effective in 6 of his 12 seasons, yet he was a no-doubter. Garret Anderson is 36 yrs old, somewhere between a +0.7 and +1.0 win player this season, and will be pretty lucky to find work next season barring an abnormally strong 2009 campaign. Still, I’m holding out hope that he lasts for another few seasons, gets his 3,000th hit, effectively destroying the credibility of the milestone in the process. 3,000 hits is a tremendous feat for any hitter to accomplish, but it should in no way signal an automatic berth into the Hall of Fame without the impact of the player taken into context as well.

Last night began our journey into the land of trade valuations, looking at how the Eaton-Otsuka for Gonzalez-Young-Sledge deal compared to the Colon for Sizemore-Lee-Phillips deal. If you recall, it was not even a contest, as the Colon deal vastly favored the Indians. I didn’t expect the post to take off the way that it did but a personal thanks to all of the commenters is in order for not only bringing about different trades to look at but also discussing the process itself. Tonight we will talk a bit more about the valuation process itself, based on a few comments in the thread.

The process used to determine lopsidedness involved looking at the win values for the players, on their new teams only, avoiding the usage of career win values as well as wins added to teams other than those who acquired the players in question. So, when the Expos acquired Bartolo Colon in the aforementioned deal, they received +2.3 wins only, since he left for the White Sox the following season. Likewise, the Indians do not get credit for Brandon Phillips‘ play on the Reds, just his -1.1 wins with the Indians. Put together, the value of this trade is the contributions of Lee and Sizemore compared to the +2.3 wins from Colon.

But how do we take into account the ideas of club control and and free agency. A comment was brought up with which I wholeheartedly agree in that the Doyle Alexander for John Smoltz deal cannot be evaluated, straight up, as twenty years of Smoltz vs. a couple seasons of Alexander. The underlying reason being that Smoltz re-upped himself with the Braves a few times, choosing to re-sign with the team as opposed to traveling to greener pastures, pun completely intended. Similarly, the Jeff Bagwell for Larry Andersen trade is not properly valued by stacking up Bagwell’s entire potentially Hall of Fame career with the one season Andersen spent with the Red Sox.

The solution to this problem would be to include only club controlled years in the valuations. Reverting to the Bagwell example, the deal would be limited to Andersen’s lone season with the Red Sox vs. Bagwell’s club controlled tenure with the Astros. Things get a bit trickier, though, when it is remembered that teams tend to lock up talent early, occasionally buying out a year or two of free agency. Grady Sizemore is a prime example of this, as his current contract lasts through his first year of free agency eligibility. Do we count the entire duration of this contract? Or do we steadfastly stick to the club controlled solution, discounting his final season with the Indians while valuing the Colon deal?

The former makes a bit more sense and I’m very comfortable using that as the criteria from here on out. This way, certain trades don’t look as ridiculous and are more accurately measured. After all, as a free agent, signing with the team that most recently employed you should not be treated any differently than joining another squadron. And when players joined new teams, like Colon with the White Sox, we stopped adding their production into the mix.

I’m extremely interested in finetuning this system even further, so please do not hold back any and all ideas. Hopefully, we can continue our intellectual discourse.

Last week, in discussing the minor league signings of both Adam Eaton and Bruce Chen, I mentioned that the trade sending Eaton to the Rangers in exchange for Adrian Gonzalez and Chris Young was arguably the most lopsided of the decade. Perhaps I was a bit too hasty in my assessment, or too eager to remind fans of the trade, because several commenters pointed out that the extremely lopsided Bartolo Colon deal in 2002 would wipe the floor with the Eaton trade. Evaluating trades is tough because it is human nature to utilize hindsight as opposed to foresight, when the rationale at the time of the trade is of equal importance. Still, when I made my comment, I was clearly evaluating the trade retrospectively. Let’s look at both of these deals.

Before getting into the details, the criteria for these evaluations needs to be crystal clear. I am only going to use Win Values for players on the teams they were traded to. So, if Eaton was traded to the Rangers and then joined the Phillies, the actual transaction analysis will see Eaton’s shorter tenure with the Rangers stacked up against Gonzalez and Young with the Padres… not the aggregate win value for each player regardless of team.

Eaton spent the 2006 season with the Rangers and the disabled list, pitching in just 65 IP with a +0.6 WAR. From 2006-2008, Chris Young sandwiched a very solid season with two slightly below average ones, amassing a total of +5.4 WAR over the three-year span. In the same window, Gonzalez proved to be very durable and productive, producing win values of +3.8, +3.2, and +3.5, for a total of +10.5 and an average of +3.5 wins/season. Put together, the valuation of this trade looks like +15.9 wins for the Padres and +0.6 for the Rangers, a difference of +15.3 wins in total and +5.1 wins/season. Does the Colon deal surpass this mark?

Update: I realize I neglected to include both Akinori Otsuka and Termel Sledge as part of the trade. With Otsuka’s +3 wins for the Rangers and Sledge’s -0.7 wins for the Padres factored in, the results shrink to +15.2 wins for the Padres and +3.6 for the Rangers, a difference of +11.6 wins.

The Colon deal in question took place halfway through the 2002 season, when the Indians sent their ace right-hander to the Expos in exchange for prospects Cliff Lee, Grady Sizemore, and Brandon Phillips. At the time of the trade, Colon was still at his peak, pitching a boatload of innings and producing effectively in them. In that 2002 season, he was worth a total of +4.7 wins, +2.3 of which were earned in Montreal. He pitched to the same tune of +4.7 wins in 2003, although that season was spent with the White Sox, not the Expos. The Expos portion of this deal is the +2.3 wins provided by Colon following the trade.

How about the others? Well, Brandon Phillips has a solid reputation now, but he didn’t really fit into the Indians grand scheme and actually cost them -1.1 wins in his four years with the team. Cliff Lee had a tremendous 2008 season but was by no means an all-star up to that point, yet he has still managed to give the Indians +16.4 wins over his seven-year career following the trade. And Grady Sizemore… well, he’s just an amazing talent, worth +26.1 wins since his 2004 debut. Put together, Phillips, Lee, and Sizemore added +41.4 wins to the Indians. Colon added +2.3 to the Expos, resulting in a difference of +39.1 wins favoring the Indians, over two and a half times the difference in the Eaton trade.

This isn’t a perfect method by any means but it gets the job done for our own intents and purposes. So, yes, the Colon deal was vastly more lopsided. Anyone else have any trades of potentially large lopsided magnitudes to evaluate?

I am a big proponent of the low risk signings with minimal commitment and non-roster invitations to Spring Training. The players involved are forced to audition their talent and do not get a free pass based on a glimmer or more of success in the past. For instance, the Mark Prior signings of the last two seasons make complete sense given that Prior cost very little and he was merely looking for a deal that would allow him another shot at major league dominance. Well, two more of these signings took place this weekend, both somewhat questionable, but one more bizarre than the other.

The Phillies released Adam Eaton (finally) after two abysmal seasons in red pinstripes. Unfortunately he still had another quite lucrative year on the deal making it impossible to unload the flailing righthander. Add in that teams knew the Phillies wanted to rid themselves of their poor investment and it becomes very easy to see why nobody wanted to send any type of package to the Phillies in exchange for Eaton’s services when he could be signed “free of charge” with a bit of due diligence and patience.

The Orioles jumped on Eaton quickly, signing him to a minor league deal worth $400,000. Due to his release, the Phillies are still responsible for around $8.7 mil of Eaton’s salary. Over the last three seasons, Eaton’s win values of 0.6, -0.3, and 0.4 help illustrate the depths to which his performance has fallen relative to expectations. He looked pretty solid in 2003 and 2005, both seasons in spacious San Diego, before going to the Rangers in a trade netting the Friars Chris Young and Adrian Gonzalez. After a pretty miserable season in Texas, Eaton then signed a ridiculous 3-yr deal with the Phillies worth near $25 mil.

Somehow, this former first round pick of the Phillies ended up in arguably the most lopsided trade of the decade right before signing the most undeserved contract of the decade. Still, if he impresses in Spring Training, the Orioles have themselves a #5 starter with the Phillies footing the bill.

The signing of Eaton at least makes some sense given the aforementioned details, but I am still racking my brain for a reason to justify the Bruce Chen signing by the Royals. Granted, Chen was given a minor league deal, but how… I mean… why… Bruce Chen!? Chen hasn’t pitched since April 2007 when the Rangers allowed him five relief appearances that didn’t work out too well: 7.20 ERA/7.54 FIP.

Before that, Chen had spent three years with the aforementioned Orioles, putting together win values of 0.6, 1.5, -0.7. Even at his absolute best in 2005, Chen greatly benefited from a .267 BABIP and 78% LOB. In other words, his 4.94 FIP that season was hardly impressive, especially for a career year of sorts. Outside of that 2005 season he looks like a marginal fifth starter, if that.

Perhaps Chen has added a new pitch to his repertoire, has gotten married, or worked out to be in the best shape of his life, but I doubt any of that matters in terms of his skill level. These low risk signings should really be utilized by inking players with talent, unless there are extenuating circumstances as there are in the Eaton case. The Chen signing is not a low risk, high reward situation, because the reward the Royals will get might not even be of the medium variety.

As many of you know, this offseason proved monumental for the site as we added a wide array of evaluative metrics, becoming one of the primary sources for player valuations. One of these additions, UZR, the fielding metric designed by Mitchel Lichtman, enabled analysts and readers alike to incorporate the fielding aspect of baseball into discussions. Several aspects of fielding combine to provide the final UZR figure, and two, range runs and error runs, are of particular interest given their reputations in the world of conventional wisdom.

The conventional wisdom goes that the better a player’s range, the more likely it is that he will commit errors. The underlying reasoning is that the player will be able to get his glove on more balls, thereby not only giving himself a chance to make more plays, but also the chance to mess up on more plays. I like to refer to this as ‘The Abreu Complex’ as Bobby Abreu used to be considered a solid fielder by many fans because he rarely made errors. The issue of course is that his limited range prevented him from covering more ground: he didn’t bobble many balls but he couldn’t get to balls that others would catch and that he might then bobble.

With the different components of UZR freely available on the site, I decided to see if the conventional wisdom held true – does more range really translate to increased errors? I pooled every player with at least 100 innings at a position over the last three years, removed catchers, and wound up with 722 player position seasons. Correlations were then run for infielders and outfielders with regards to both range run and error runs. A correlation is basically a statistical test that measures the lack of independence of two random variables; in this case, do range and errors relate strongly to one another in the sense that as one goes so too does the other?

For two variables to be considered to have at least a moderately strong relationship, a correlation coefficient of at least 0.40 would be needed. Among infielders, range runs and error runs produced a 0.10 correlation, while outfielders featured only a slightly stronger relationship at 0.15. Neither group of fielders exhibited anything close to a moderately strong relationship between range and errors, leading the conventional wisdom astray: more range does not necessarily result in more errors, no matter how much sense the statement might make from an intuitive standpoint.

Even when I restricted the data to at least 800 innings at a position, the correlations remained virtually the same–0.16 for OF, 0.11 for IF. Based on this data it seems that there are certainly cases where range and errors relate to one another, but it is in no way a foregone conclusion that more range results in more errors.

“Batting average, unfortunately for a lot people, and it’s only been really noted in the last five or 10 years, that it is somewhat of an overrated stat. There are so many other numbers that are more important to a team winning a ballgame – that’s all that matters.” – Eric Wedge, Manager, Cleveland Indians

Thank you, Eric Wedge, for this response to the question of whether or not Grady Sizemore’s declining batting average over the last few seasons set off alarm bells. Sizemore hit .289-.290 in 2005-06, his first two full seasons, before dropping to .277 in 2007 and .268 last season. His wOBAs in that span: .359, .386, .376, .384. Grady’s proportion of hits to at-bats may have dropped a bit, but his overall offensive productivity is extremely high. His batting average may have been .268, but Sizemore hit 33 HR, 39 2B, stole 38 bases, and earned 98 free passes.

Oh, and Grady plays a mean centerfield, as well. His UZR marks since 2005: +3.7, +14.3, +2.6, +6.1. Averaged together, Sizemore has been a +6.7 runs/season fielder. He is also the model of durability, amassing 157+ games in each of his full big league seasons. As evidenced by his four consecutive 20/20+ seasons, Grady also runs the baseball very well. Our wOBA includes stolen bases, but if you subtract the EQSBR from the EQBRR at Baseball Prospectus, Grady looks worthy of an additional two or three runs per season on the basepaths.

Add everything together and we have win values of +5.3, +7.7, +6.0, +7.0 (his posted win values plus a couple additional baserunning runs). That is a grand sum of +26 wins in four big league seasons, and Sizemore is still just 26 yrs old, suggesting that continued improvement is not out of the question. Grady has made $4.2 mil in his young major league career while producing at levels valued around $102 mil, a mind-boggling number. Has anyone who previously did, stopped caring that he posted a .268 batting average last season?

I’m not here to bash the batting average statistic. I think it has uses, and it works well in a slash line, but it is not the barometer many make it out to be. In the case of Grady Sizemore, who adds to a team from so many different areas, batting average falls even further down the list of metrics of interest. I’m very glad that his manager understands this fact and realizes he has a very special player on his squad, not one who needs to fix his mechanics to hit for a higher batting average.

Thinking back over the last decade or so, it is tough to consider any player with elite talent yet a proneness to injuries more frustrating or disappointing than Mark Prior. One player that could give Prior a run for his money, though, is Nomar Garciaparra, who staked claim as one of the top shortstops in baseball for several seasons before falling off the map due to health issues. Following several injury-plagued seasons, Garciaparra is legitimately considering retirement against joining either the Athletics or Phillies.

Nomar burst onto the scene in 1997 by hitting 30 home runs, 44 doubles, and posting a .375 wOBA as a rookie. Not shockingly at all he went onto win the Rookie of the Year award and actually finished 8th in MVP voting. He successfully avoided the sophomore slump by launching 35 longballs in 1998, finishing 2nd in MVP voting on the heels of a .401 wOBA.

His production improved further in the subsequent two seasons, to the tune of .436 and .432 wOBA marks, respectively. As you might have imagined, he finished in the top ten in MVP voting in each of these years. Then, in 2001, Nomar missed most of the season with an injury, a sign of what was to come even though most chose to ignore its rammifications.

Nomar bounced back in 2002 and 2003 with wOBAs of .373 and .371, still very solid production albeit nowhere near the 1999-2000 seasons. Fortunately, our Win Values begin here, giving us a glimpse of what Nomar may have been worth in his first four seasons. In 2002 and 2003, Garciaparra played well enough to be worth +5.5 and +5.7 wins, while losing some range thanks to injury issues and suffering an offensive decline from his 1997-2000 campaigns.

With this in mind, it isn’t hard to believe that, with better fielding and the previously discussed gaudy offensive numbers, Nomar could have been worth around +6 wins as a rookie, +6.5 as a sophomore, and over +7 wins as a junior and senior. Unfortunately, a quick look at his Win Values now shows a +5.5 win player who suffered a drastic dropoff in performance and struggled to stay on the field. Ultimately, with almost equal time as a tremendous player and one not in the lineup more often than he was, Nomar’s legacy has become quite comparable to my favorite NBA player of all time: Grant Hill.

Both are players who, when at the top of their respective games, were all-stars, MVP contenders, faces of the league, and considered heir apparents to the greats of the game. As we know, both fell by the wayside due to injuries, yet have hung on in vastly reduced roles over the last few seasons. I would like to avoid having a Hall of Fame discussion, however, so I will instead focus on what Nomar could bring to the table in 2009.

He is no longer a starter, but his ability to play 1B, 3B, and occasionally fill in at SS—a -5 UZR/150 at SS in 2008 is not that bad—make him a very versatile bench player. On top of that, he can still hit lefties, with a .339/.424/.643 line against southpaws last season. As long as the Phillies and Athletics avoid paying him starter-type money or relying on him in their overall seasonal scheme, he will be a very solid addition.

The Phillies apparently don’t want to get involved in a bidding war with Billy Beane for Garciaparra’s serviced, and the Athletics are offering more of a chance to play, making it likely that Oakland would be his destination should he choose to prolong his career. Then again, the Phillies just won the World Series and he may decide to end his career with a contending team in the hopes that they repeat.

Either way, I feel that Nomar deserves to have the first half of his career remembered just as much as the more recent years, a call that will go unanswered by many current fans, I fear. He was one of the best players in the game for a four-year stretch, but it has become increasingly hard to believe that we ever engaged in those classic A-Rod/Jeter/Nomar debates.