I’ll be honest, folks, I haven’t been able to get enough of MLB TV. I love the instructional demonstrations the analysts provide, and when nothing but Rock of Love Bus or whatever barely heard of National Lampoon’s movie on Comedy Central is playing, nothing beats some good ‘ole fashioned baseball television. Unfortunately, something has bothered me quite a bit recently: the cast and crew seemingly have it in their heads that the Kansas City Royals are vastly improved and have a shot at competing for the division next season.

The analysts have been praising Dayton Moore’s offseason moves, stating that Mike Jacobs and his 32 HR, Kyle Farnsworth and his blazing fastball, and Coco Crisp will all help turn the team around. Jacobs was replacement level last season after steadily declining in value since 2005. Farnsworth is not a bullpen savior and no explanation on my part should be needed to back that up. And Crisp, while he may be a nice player, is not going to turn any team around. This is before even discussing the additions of Horacio Ramirez and Willie Bloomquist.

The show ‘Hot Stove’ even had a discussion last night pertaining to whether or not the 2009 Royals can be the 2008 Rays. Seriously? Their reasoning dealt with both being small market teams with plenty of young talent. I can unequivocally say that the 2009 Royals will not be the 2008 Rays. The 2008 Rays were a well-oiled machine with incredible defense, great starting pitching, and a solid, interchangeable bullpen. The 2009 Royals have little in their bullpen outside of Joakim Soria, are going to be dependent on another solid season from Gil Meche and a breakout campaign from Zack Greinke to make even their 1-2 pitchers effective, and despite a solid defensive output last season, are well behind the Rays in that category.

The interviewer talking to Dayton Moore and Trey Hillman asked both if they watched the Rays, another small market team, and thought, “why not us?” Both said yes, but the major difference is that the Rays farm system was constructed in much better fashion. And, their GM, in a short amount of time, has shown a knack for acquiring the right veterans and role players. Dayton Moore has not.

Royals fans, I am not writing this to bash your team or drown your hopes. It just really bugs me when analysts who get paid a heck of a lot more than I do, who simultaneously receive a ton of national recognition, mistake acquiring new players with acquiring good players. Dayton Moore has been very active this offseason but he realistically has not done anything to seriously improve his team.

Colleague Matthew Carruth said it best: The 2009 Royals may actually be the Rays… the 1998-2007 Rays.

Only two players who may be headed to arbitration submitted salary figures at least $2 mil more than what their team’s offered: Ryan Howard ($4 mil) and Prince Fielder ($2 mil). Earlier today, we discussed Howard’s case and how he really does not follow the 40/60/80 fair market value modifier for arbitration deals. Howard set a record last season by winning his case and jumping from $900K to $10 mil, so does Prince have a shot to do something similar? Fielder had his deal renewed to $670K last season, which infuriated the portly first baseman.

Prince submitted an $8 mil figure while the Brewers felt a more appropriate salary would be $6 mil. Granted, with such a small discrepancy, relatively speaking, it should be much easier to settle with Fielder than Howard, but, alliteration aside what does Prince’s projected production portend?

The projection systems suggest Fielder’s wOBA will come between .380 and .400. At .390, he would be worth right around +32 runs with the bat. His fielding has never been a strong suit, ranging from -7 to -10 with the glove. Prince has been very durable, however, so 160 games and 680 PA are not a stretch. Based on these numbers, Fielder would be worth approximately +33.5 runs above replacement. We will round this off to +3.4 wins.

At fair market value, Prince commands $15.3 mil. Entering his first season, his value can be calculated by multiplying the fair market value by 40%. 0.40 * $15.3 mil = $6.1 mil. Essentially, the Brewers proposed salary is exactly 40% of Prince’s fair market value. Fielder’s figure would value around 52% of his fair market value, potentially setting up a 50/70/90 modifier as opposed to 40/60/80.

GM Doug Melvin has hinted that a settlement may well be reached prior to the court date, regardless of the fact that Scott Boras represents Prince. Whether Fielder gets $6 mil or $8 mil, the eventual contract makes sense given his production level and service time, especially considering he isn’t immediately jumping to 75-80% of his market value.

Ryan Howard of the Philadelpia Phillies is no stranger to the arbitration process. After a Rookie of the Year 2005 season, an MVP Award in 2006, and a 2007 campaign in which he smacked 47 HR with a wOBA of .396, Howard set an arbitration record by jumping from $900K to $10 mil. This past season, his numbers declined quite a bit, but the numbers that tend to overrate players, such as HR and RBI, tell a different story. Despite his impressive output of 48 HR and 146 RBI, Howard saw his wOBA fall to .366 and his OPS drop almost 100 points to .881.

He played in all 162 games, amassing exactly 700 PA in the process. Combine the adjustments accompanying those playing time indicators with average first base defense and solid-albeit-declining offense and Howard was worth +3.1 wins in 2008. Even in a down year relative to his standards, the burly slugger proved to be over a full win above average. At fair market value, he would have earned $14 mil… which is an interesting number given that the Phillies submitted the same figure as their bid for his 2009 contract.

Howard disagrees, as he and his representatives submitted for $18 mil. The $4 mil difference between player and team is the largest gap of any arbitration-eligible player, and the only gap above $2 mil. Does Howard have a case here? Before even delving into the calculations, it seems the answer is yes, given that his offense will likely regress closer to the 2007 levels and his playing time isn’t going to diminish.

The three projection systems offered on our site see Howard capable of a wOBA between .380 and .410. Let’s settle on .395, essentially a midpoint. At that mark, Howard would produce +37 runs above average with the bat. Add in +22 runs for his 680 or so PA and -12.5 runs for a full season at 1B, and prior to defense, Howard is worth +46.5 runs. His defense has been right around the average mark according to both UZR and Dewan, though he certainly does not look average. However, even with a pessimistic -5 run defensive projection, Howard still projects to be worth +4.2 wins.

At $4.5 mil/win, Howard’s +4.2 wins commands a fair market value of $18.9 mil. He requested $18 mil. The Phillies submitted a figure that seemingly suggests Howard’s offense will not regress, and all other evaluative aspects held constant, perhaps even worsen. The likelihood of that occurring is very low unless he has some injury the public does not know about.

He broke the bank last year around this time, and I wouldn’t be surprised to see him repeat the feat. He more than earned the $10 mil last season despite largely being overrated. We tend to forget that overrated does not necessarily mean “bad.” Howard had a down year compared to what he had shown himself capable of, but he was by no means a scrub. If his projections come to fruition and he produces +4.2 wins, even his submitted figure would not properly value his contributions.

Of course, we have been using a 40/60/80 modifier here for players eligible for arbitration, meaning Howard would make 80% of his FMV right now. 80% of $18.9 mil = $15.1 mil. Howard is only entering his second arbitration year, so he really should be closer to 60%, but I do not think he is currently on the 40/60/80 track, completely. Suffice it to say, 80% simply is more realistic.

It’s closer to the Phillies side of things but in between both figures. The ideal situation would see the two sides settle, but I cannot see that happening.

I’m not sure exactly how the arbitration judges think, but if you couple the idea that his offense will regress and improve to the tune of ~+4 wins, and that he finished second in MVP voting (hey, maybe that matters to them), this could easily tilt in Howard’s favor again.

Arizona GM Josh Byrnes has had, for lack of a better description, an interesting offseason. In 2008, the Diamondbacks ~$66.2 mil payroll rose above heights not seen since the 2005 season. The team led the division for most of the season before crumbling down the stretch, necessitating some personnel moves in order to ensure such an event does not repeat itself. With a mix of veterans signed to longer deals and young, productive players still under club control, few roster spots are actually available, however.

Compound that with the supposed lack of payroll flexibility and Byrnes finds himself in a tricky situation. How can he upgrade the team if a) certain players with plenty of value like Orlando Hudson, Adam Dunn and Randy Johnson cannot be retained, and b) he only has $4-$6 mil to spend? Sure, upgrades can be made in that ballpark of cost, but it is much tougher. In the current market, though, perhaps things would be a bit easier.

Unfortunately, he has been turned down a few times, most recently by both Randy Wolf and Jon Garland. The exact terms of the deals offered to these Type B free agent starters are not known, but according to Nick Piecoro of the Arizona Republic, Garland’s offer included two option years. In speaking to Nick, I also learned that the Diamondbacks generally do not give out incentive-laden contracts.

If the team did favor the incentive-laden deals, one could surmise that both pitchers were offered such contracts. In Wolf’s case, the deal may have featured a lower base salary with incentives for playing time given his recent injury history. His deal may also have included options that automatically vest if a certain games started threshold was met. In Garland’s case, the options may have automatically vested based on games started and innings pitched totals. This way, if he became ineffective, the team can easily cut ties with the righty.

Because they are not normally in favor of such deals, it appears more likely that both pitchers were offered salaries lower than they would liked. And, they were both likely offered option years in their contract as opposed to guaranteed years. Someone like Garland, who has routinely logged 190+ innings in 32+ starts, may have wanted guaranteed seasons to protect himself. That way, if he repeats his 2008 season, or worsens, at least he doesn’t have to worry if his option will vest.

If the salary aspect of these offers become available, we will know if the deals were rejected due to money or if the lack of guarantee dissuaded the hurlers. Based on fair market values, Garland projects to about +2.7 wins next season at $12.1 mil. Wolf looks like a league average, +2.0 win pitcher, with a FMV of $9 mil. The current market may depress their values, but if the Diamondbacks only have $6 mil to spend, they would really need to convince a player like Garland that the absolute best deal he will receive is half of his fair market value. A negotiating tactic like this should work more with an injury-prone pitcher like Wolf, but given his rejection, apparently not.

It will be very interesting to see how much these pitchers were offered as well as where (and for what) they end up signing. Neither is an elite talent, but both have value. Garland declined arbitration because he felt he could command a higher fee than the $12 mil earned last season. Wolf was not even offered arbitration because the Astros felt the $10 mil he would command carried with it too much risk. Regardless, both players consider themselves well above the reported amount of money the Diamondbacks have left to spend.

It seems weird when two pitchers turn down the same team in the same week, but under these circumstances, it at least makes some sense. Still, they may regret their decisions when the marketplace for such players continues to dwindle and the Mets, the only team reportedly interested in either, shore up their staff.

Fresh off of a World Series win, the Philadelphia Phillies headed into the offseason with a rather lengthy list of arbitration-eligible players. Eric Bruntlett and Clay Condrey quickly re-signed. Greg Dobbs soon followed suit. And Cole Hamels, as Matthew noted last night, signed a 3-yr deal to avoid arbitration that greatly benefits the team. Joining Hamels on the 3-yr extension express is reliever Ryan Madson, which is actually somewhat surprising.

See, Ryan is represented by Scott Boras, who claimed that the Madson-Lidge tandem was akin to the Rivera-Wetteland tandem of the old Yankees regime. Madson = Rivera? A stretch in every sense of the word, yes, but it gave us a glimpse of how the superagent values his client. Based on the way Boras presented Madson, it seemed almost guaranteed that the free agent market would be tested following the 2009 season.

Now, after reportedly turning down a 3-yr/$12 mil deal, Madson signed for a 3-yr/$12 mil + incentives deal. The terms of the incentives are not yet known but the Phillies managed to lock up their setup man for one more arbitration year as well as two free agent years.

Last season, Madson logged 82.2 innings with a 3.33 FIP and 3.05 ERA. The ERA actually matched his output in 2007, when he missed time down the stretch due to injuries. All told, he produced +13.1 value runs, good for +1.3 wins. At fair market value, Madson was worth $6 mil, despite earning $1.4 mil. Madson in 2008 was largely a tale of two pitchers, however.

From March 31-August 1, Madson pitched in 49 games and 56.1 innings of 3.51 ERA/3.88 FIP baseball. The numbers were not extravagant nor were they detrimental to the success of the team. He looked solid, but not fantastic. Something clicked after that, because from that day on, Madson pitched 26.1 innings with a 2.05 ERA, 2.09 FIP, and 8.33 K/BB ratio. His fastball velocity rose as well, which was extremely noticeable in the World Series. The guy went from a 92-93 mph fastball to routinely throwing 97 mph with the greatest of ease.

Next season, Madson projects to pitch around 78 IP with a 3.75 FIP, 3.85 ERA, and 2.80 K/BB. His average leverage index will also rise given the nature of setting up games. A win value in the 1.2-1.5 range seems pretty likely. If his actual value falls within that range, his fair market value would be between $4 and $6.75 mil. Let’s say that he will be worth 1.4 wins in 2009, and will lose 0.3 wins of effectiveness each year of this deal. Under those circumstances, with a bit of inflation factored in, though not 10%, Madson would produce 3.3 wins fot $15.6 mil. Based on these calculations, the Phillies seemingly signed him to a below-market contract.

It will be very interesting to see if Madson’s new workout/warmup regimen will allow him to sustain 95+ mph fastballs all year long, but he instilled plenty of confidence in Phillies fans down the stretch. I may have ragged on Ruben Amaro, Jr for some odd moves early in this off-season, but locking up Hamels and Madson are two key steps.

The Florida Marlins are a very potent offensive club. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for their defense. Last season, their starting infield featured Mike Jacobs, Dan Uggla, Hanley Ramirez, and Jorge Cantu. Though these four players combined for approximately +90 runs with the bat, Uggla’s +0.3 UZR topped the bunch defensively. Despite defensive improvements from Ramirez and Uggla, their projections for next season still place them around a half-win below average with the glove.

One member of this quartet will not return in 2009, as GM Larry Beinfest sent Jacobs to the Royals this offseason. According to recent reports, however, a new infielder might be joining the team: Orlando Cabrera.

In a recent analysis of Cabrera’s future, I surmised that his value for next season is right around +3.1 wins. He isn’t a terrific hitter but is durable and plays solid defense at the toughest non-catcher position. The problem here is that Hanley Ramirez plays the same position. While it may seem obvious to place the better defender at the position, the more likely scenario involves Cabrera manning the keystone corner.

Except Dan Uggla plays that position. Again, even though Uggla had an average year defensively, Cabrera would likely play much better defense. With Cabrera at second base, where does Uggla go? He could play first base and replace Jacobs in this scenario, or he could head over to the hot corner. Assuming the signing of Cabrera results in Uggla moving to third base, Cantu gets displaced to first base.

Signing Cabrera would most likely see him playing out of position, Uggla moving to third base, and Cantu moving to first base. Unless Cabrera plays remarkably better defense at second base than at shortstop, his win value decreases to somewhere in the +2.7 to +2.9 range. Uggla’s suspect defense could be exploited less at third base, though, perhaps resulting in a higher UZR rating. Cantu, however, loses plenty of value with the shift to first base due to the positional adjustment.

How would their infield look under different circumstances? If Cabrera is not signed and league average play at first base occurs, the foursome is worth right around +13.5 wins. With Cabrera at second, Uggla at third, and Cantu at first, the infield is worth approximately +14.1 wins. If Uggla plays first, with Cabrera at 2nd, they are worth +13.3 wins. Therefore, the most productive alignment would be the proposed shift assuming Cabrera signs.

Of course, if he doesn’t sign, this has all been one monumental waste of time, but I always find it very interesting when values shift with different defensive alignments. As we saw here, merely moving players around the diamond could see an improvement of up to +0.8 wins.

After a solid enough 2007 season that saw the Padres come within one game (resist urge to make Holliday slide comment) of making the playoffs, the team took a large step back. In 2008, Bud Black’s bunch finished 63-99, four games worse than the Pirates. They managed to outperform the Nationals, but some minor league squads could have accomplished that feat. Offensively, the team not only struggled but lacked consistency and durability. Only Brian Giles, Adrian Gonzalez, and Kevin Kouzmanoff played 145+ games. The same can be said of their pitching, where nobody made over 27 starts.

GM Kevin Towers cut ties with Khalil Greene this offseason, opening up a spot at shortstop. According to reports, that void may be filled as soon as this weekend, as the team has been talking to Omar Vizquel. Omar is not going to sign a 5-yr deal to become the new face of the team, or anything along those lines, but as a one season stopgap, the deal potentially makes sense.

Vizquel turns 42 years old on April 24 and is coming off of a disappointing, injury-plagued season. We all know his value primarily comes from the defensive side of the spectrum, as outside of the 1996 and 1999 seasons, his wOBA has been average at best. Even last season, when he partook in just 92 games, Vizquel managed a +5 UZR rating. Granted, he hit .222/.283/.267 with a .235 wOBA, but he was anything other than a liability defensively.

In 2007, with a full season under his belt, Vizquel saved just about +20 runs defensively. From 2004-07, he provided solid defense in 145+ games, and save for a couple of seasons, has been very durable. In fact, the value he gains above replacement simply for the number of plate appearances amassed generally counteracts his lack of offensive prowess.

Take a look at that 2007 season as an example. His offensive worth fell to -22.7 runs, but he produced a win total above average. How? Outside of the +20 defensive runs, he earned +6.7 runs for a positional adjustment and +19 runs for his number of plate appearances. All told, Vizquel played +2.3 win baseball that season, a number that fell below his marks from 2004-06. Over the last five seasons, his win values are +2.6, +3.4, +3.6, +2.3, and -0.3.

If Vizquel played more last season and lacked the health issues, he would have earned more runs for both of the adjustments. It is also likely that his UZR would have risen. Suffice it to say, the -0.3 wins is not, on its own, an accurate representation of what the Padres would receive. Most likely, they would be getting 140+ games and 600+ PA of +9 fielding and -17 hitting. With adjustments similar to those received in his durable years, Vizquel’s projection pegs him as a +1.8 win player next season.

Even at 42, Omar will be right around the league average given his ability to play stellar defense at the toughest non-catcher position. His fair market value would be in the $8 mil range. If Towers can ink Vizquel to a 1-yr deal for $8 mil or less, go for it. Anything requiring more funds or commitment would not be very wise, though. And if injuries are a big concern, an incentive-laden deal in terms of plate appearances would protect their investment.

The move does not have anything near the flash value of the major signings this offseason, but has the potential to improve the Padres while simultaneously providing them nothing more than a stopgap veteran. One has to wonder, though, if the team does not project to perform that well next season, why not give some younger players ample playing time? With Brian Giles also on the club, adding Vizquel makes the team even older, seemingly counterintuitive to a team trying to rebuild. Perhaps, then, the rebuilding will not impact the major league club until the trading deadline, or even 2010. Bottom line, though, in a vacuum, signing Vizquel would provide an overall upgrade over the departed Greene while not requiring much commitment.

Believe it or not, pitchers and catchers report in about one month. It still seems like yesterday, metaphorically speaking, that Eric Hinske flailed at a Brad Lidge slider, officially ending the 2008 season. And yet here we are, three months later, with the offseason in full bloom. Though a fair share of players have inked deals with new teams or garnered new uniforms via a trade, three players who would normally report to camp in the middle of February are still available.

And all three are old!

Jason Varitek and Paul Lo Duca are each 37 years old, and Ivan Rodriguez is one year their senior. All three are at different stages in their respective careers, but given the importance of the position, could at least be expected to serve backup duty, right? Varitek and Pudge could probably still hold down fort as starters while Lo Duca would need to play for a team like the Nationals to earn starting time.

Tek, the Red Sox captain, is coming off of a terribly disappointing 2008 season. With a wOBA just south of .300, Varitek saw his win value drop from +3.0 to +1.3. Prior to that, his win values were up and down as well. Over the last four years: +4.3, +1.2, +3.0, +1.3. Granted, quantifying the defensive prowess of catchers is an extremely difficult task, and these measures are excluding that facet of the game. If Varitek’s leadership, defense, and ability to handle the pitching staff is worth +5 runs in each of these seasons, he still comes strikingly close to a league average player in 2008.

Next year, he projects to -6 runs offensively. With a slight decline in his defense and intangibles to +3 runs, and similar adjustment values for position and replacement level, Varitek looks like a +2.3 win player. At $4.5 mil/win, 2.3 wins commands a fair market value of $10.4 mil. If he declines to +1.8 wins in 2010, assuming he plays that long, then a 2-yr deal properly valuing his contributions would pay him $19.3 mil. Bump that up to $20 mil and it is still in the realm of the understandable.

Pudge Rodriguez saw a slight improvement in his numbers from 2007, as his .317 wOBA helped produce a +1.6 win season. Over the last four seasons, all of which were spent with the Tigers: +2.1, +2.6, +1.3, +1.6. Prior to joining the Tigers, Pudge put up two consecutive +5 win seasons. Suffice it to say, he simply is not that type of player anymore. He still has value, though, but it would not surprise me in the least if he is forced to take a minor league deal. Despite a projection of +1.75 wins (FMV of $7.9 mil), Rodriguez could also fall into the Kenny Lofton category of players with value seemingly forced to retire.

Paul Lo Duca is a different story altogether. Even though he produced +2.3 wins in 2005 and +3.4 wins in 2006, his best days are very far behind him. In fact, his average or slightly below average days are a pretty decent hike behind him. In 67 games last season, Paul posted a .287 wOBA for the Marlins and Nationals. All told, he was the definition of replacement level, literally worth 0 wins above replacement. If he signs with a team and receives similar playing time to last season, Lo Duca projects to be worth +0.1 wins, still virtually replacement level.

The Astros are reportedly interested in signing Lo Duca to a minor league contract. Anything above $600K would greatly overpay him, but signing him to a deal like that would carry with it little risk. Still, kind of odd that Lo Duca is the only one of these three catchers being tossed around the rumor mill.

Omar Minaya and the Mets made a 3-yr/$36 mil offer to Derek Lowe a week or two ago. Lowe, and agent Scott Boras, felt the contract would not compensate the pitcher relative to his contributions. Those of us who have covered Lowe’s projected performance here have felt the same way, as Lowe still projects to be an above average pitcher in the 2011 season. I have said, time and time again, that he will end up signing a 3-yr/$45 mil deal or something in that vicinity. And it looks like the Braves might agree.

Frank Wren reportedly has an offer on the table for Lowe that would pay the grounder-inducing righty $15 mil/yr for at least three seasons. In fact, the deal might include an option for a fourth year, if not an outright fourth year guaranteed. Who would the Braves be getting?

Well, Lowe is 35 years old, but has been one of the most consistent, durable, and effective major league starters over the last four seasons. His minimum innings pitched total in that span is 199. He has made 32+ starts each season while averaging approximately a 3.55 ERA and 3.75 FIP. This past season actually wound up being Lowe’s best as a starter. He posted a 3.26 FIP and 3.27 K/BB ratio, both lows in his career work as a starter.

He projects to about +3.6 wins next season, which translates to a fair market value of $16.5 mil. If he declines by 0.6 wins per season, we get the following:

2009: +3.6 at $16.5 mil
2010: +3.0 at $14.9 mil
2011: +2.4 at $13.0 mil

That deal would net +9.0 wins and cost $44.4 mil over three seasons. A four-year deal would come in the $55 mil range. Given that the Braves are reportedly valuing Lowe at $0.6 mil more than his 3-yr projection and $5 mil more than his 4-yr projection, the deal looks pretty sound. The Mets have made it clear that pitching is their top concern, but Tim Redding is nowhere near enough. If they are not serious about pursuing Lowe, are they going to re-sign Oliver Perez?

Well, according to other reports that have recently surfaced, an offer to Ollie may already be on the table. The contract could be close to 3-yrs/$30 mil. Now, perhaps the Mets knew Lowe would reject the $36 mil and negotiations would begin, but it seems odd to consider Perez that close to Lowe’s production level from a monetary standpoint.

Perez may be just 27 years old, but he has not put it together yet, so to speak. Can he? Maybe. At times, he has looked dominant, but prefacing the dominance with “at times” should speak for itself. While a member of the Mets, he has experienced a big disconnect between ERA and FIP. Last season, Perez posted a 4.68 FIP but a much lower 4.22 ERA.

Over the last three seasons, his win values have been -0.3, +2.1, +1.2. Suffice it to say, nowhere near Lowe. His projections call for around +1.7 wins next season, which places him closer to the $8.5 mil/yr range than $10+ mil/yr. Maybe the Mets are hoping to re-sign him in the hopes that he finally harnesses his raw talent and breaks out.

If they see him as a +2.5 win pitcher next season capable of sustaining that performance with just a slight decline in 2011, his fair market values look like:

2009: +2.5 at $11.5 mil
2010: +2.5 at $12.5 mil
2011: +2.3 at $12.4 mil

Put together, Perez would be a +7.3 win pitcher earning $36.4 mil. Based on the supposed 3-yr/$30 mil contract, the Mets, whether they realize it or not, are valuing him as being capable of producing somewhere in this vicinity. If he continues his inconsistency, however, his value could realistically be cut in half. As of right now, though, the monetary tradeoff isn’t the same.

If the Braves are offering $15 mil/yr for three seasons, the Mets would at least have to go to $16 mil/yr for three seasons. They might even have to guarantee a fourth year or raise the salary even more. Potentially, we could be talking about 4-yrs/$66 mil for Lowe or 3-yrs/$30 mil for Perez. For Mets fans who have seen their team fall apart the last couple of seasons, the consistency of Lowe may be worth the extra money.

Of course, if he signs with the Braves in the next day or two, they won’t have a choice, but any Mets fans out there who come here: would you rather take a chance on Perez, hoping the young lefty will return to performance closer to that one season with the Pirates? Or would you rather pay extra money for Lowe, given that he has been eerily consistent in the recent years?

The Tampa Bay Rays continued their extremely solid offseason today by signing Gabe Kapler to a 1-yr deal worth $1 mil. Andrew Friedman and company previously traded Edwin Jackson to the Tigers for outfielder Matt Joyce, signed reliever Joe Nelson to a nice deal, and inked Pat Burrell to a 2-yr/$16 mil contract. These moves might not carry the same flash value as Sabathia/Burnett/Teixeira, but improve the club at positions meriting an uprade.

Kapler is coming off of pretty much the best season of his career. Oddly enough, the career year came on the heels of nothing, as he was, for all intents and purposes, retired from major league baseball. Kapler’s last season came in 2006, when he produced a .311 wOBA in just 147 PA. Last year, as a member of the Brewers, Kapler starred in centerfield while Mike Cameron served his suspension and began the season as one of baseball’s best.

And, he was the subject of Dave Cameron’s first post here at Fangraphs. One other interesting Rays-related note: my first post here involved Pat Burrell, Kapler’s new teammate. Coincidence? I think not! Okay, yeah, definitely a coincidence.

Kapler played 96 games last year, amassing 245 PA and posting a .362 wOBA. Adjusting for park effects, Kapler was worth +8 runs offensively last year. He played +5 run defense in centerfield though fell below the average mark in the corner outfield spots. All told, he produced a 1.7 win season in 2008, enough to command a fair market value of $7.7 mil.

His projection calls for a wOBA around .333, good for +1 run offensively. On the defensive side, it seems safe to expect around +1 or +2 runs again. In terms of playing time, it is not likely that Kapler will log more than 300 PA in 100 games. These plate appearances could come as a result of B.J. Upton not being ready for opening day. Kapler could also platoon in RF with Joyce or Gabe Gross. Or, he could just end up as the fourth outfielder.

Taking his projected playing time into account, Kapler appears to be a +0.75 to +0.80 win player next season. At $4.5-$4.8 mil/win, his fair market value would fall somewhere between $3.3 and $3.8 mil. The Rays signed him for approximately 1/3 of that value.

A low risk move in every sense of the phrase, the Rays are able to cover themselves should Kapler get hurt or prove to be ineffective. Either way, this move works out for them. If he produces like Michael Bourn or 2008-Andruw Jones, the team can cut him loose without wasting much money. Or, should he prove to be every bit as valuable as last season, they have him as a steal.