This offseason has been particularly interesting, as seven, count them, seven, corner outfielders with similar skillsets hit the open market. Bobby Abreu, Garrett Anderson, Pat Burrell, Adam Dunn, Ken Griffey, Raul Ibanez and Manny Ramirez all became free agents, all looking to hit a big payday. To date, only Ibanez has signed, and that deal has been largely lampooned.

With a surplus at the position, the market price has seemingly been driven down. After all, why pay an exorbitant fee for Burrell if Abreu could be had for slightly less? Or, replace either of those two names with any of the aforementioned others and the rhetorical question still works. Anderson is a better fielder than hitter, but the remaining players can all be classified as good-hitting, bad-fielding players.

If we want to include Anderson in the mix, this classification can be adjusted to show that these seven players are all one-dimensional.

Going along with the idea of positional adjustments that Dave has written so much about this week, I thought it would be interesting to show the production levels and dollar valuations for everyone sans-Ibanez at both the corner outfield position and designated hitter spot.

Before examining the results, let it be known that the positional adjustments are -7.5 runs per 162 games for LF, and -17.5 runs per 162 games for DH. Short of 162 games, these are prorated. The value above replacement is +20 runs per 600 PA, prorated below that number. Here are the results if they signed on as a leftfielder:

Name        PA/GP    wRAA   UZR    Pos.   Adj.  WAR
Abreu      600/159   16.0  -14.0   20.0  -7.4   +1.46
Anderson   540/140   -6.0    5.0   18.0  -6.5   +1.05
Burrell    600/157   19.0  -12.0   20.0  -7.4   +1.97
Dunn       600/159   23.0  -12.0   20.0  -7.4   +2.36
Griffey    550/130    2.0  -13.0   18.0  -6.0   +0.10
Ramirez    580/150   35.0  -12.0   19.0  -6.9   +3.51

As a corner outfielder, Ramirez is still the cream of the crop, with Dunn coming in over one win less valuable. Griffey is essentially the definition of a replacement player, and the rest project as below average players. In Burrell’s case, he projects as an average player next year, but at his age, a sharper decline isn’t out of the question. How about if they were to serve as designated hitters instead of outfielders?

To convert to designated hitters, we prorate the -17.5 positional adjustment per 162 games and get rid of the UZR projections. This bumps up the value of Burrell, Abreu, Dunn, Manny, and Griffey. Anderson, who projects to be below average offensively, loses value.

Burrell shifts from +1.97 to +2.20. Abreu from +1.46 to +1.88. Dunn from +2.36 to +2.58. Manny from +3.51 to +3.70. And Griffey from +0.10 to +0.60. Anderson digresses from +1.05 to -0.30, becoming a below replacement level player if he signs as a designated hitter. Translated to dollars, here are the discrepancies between being a LF and DH:

Name       LF WAR   LF FMV    DH WAR    DH FMV
Abreu      +1.46    $7.30     +1.88     $9.40
Anderson   +1.05    $5.20     -0.30     $0.40
Burrell    +1.97    $9.85     +2.20    $11.00
Dunn       +2.36   $11.80     +2.58    $12.90
Griffey    +0.10    $0.50     +0.60     $3.00
Ramirez    +3.51   $17.55     +3.70    $18.50

These results suggest that everyone but Anderson would better serve their team as a designated hitter than leftfielder. For teams, perhaps the most financially interesting dilemma is how much to offer these players given how many of them are on the market. If teams can sign these players for their leftfield fair market value and play them at DH, they will get a steal of sorts. But, if the Ibanez signing is a sign of things to come, teams still do not understand the value of defense.

Still, the calendar year is almost over and these six players are yet to find new homes. A couple may get the paydays initially sought, but others may have to substantially lower their requests to garner a full year’s worth of playing time.

Though most of the offseason attention has been spent discussing where top-tier pitchers like CC Sabathia, A.J. Burnett, and Derek Lowe will sign, several hurlers capable of filling out the middle to back of the rotation were available. Daniel Cabrera became the most recent of these pitcher to sign, when he inked a one year deal with the Nationals. Tim Redding is currently seeking a two-year deal, and may very well receive one from the New York Mets. Another pitcher along these lines, likely better than Cabrera and Redding, is Braden Looper.

Looper, 34, spent the last three seasons on the St. Louis Cardinals. In 2006, he appeared in 69 games out of the bullpen, putting together a solid season with a 3.46 FIP. Looper moved to the rotation the next season, where he logged 175 innings while posting a 4.82 FIP. He did not exactly take the league by storm but had value above replacement level and made just $4.5 mil.

This past season, Braden earned $5.5 mil while recording a 4.52 FIP in 199 innings. With a slight bonus for pitching about 200 innings, Looper was a +2 win pitcher in 2008.

In 2009, Marcel projects Looper to be a 4.53 FIP pitcher in 170 innings. I think it is more realistic he will log closer to 180 innings. Let’s call him a 180 inning pitcher with a 4.60 FIP, which would result in 92 runs allowed. A replacement level starter with a 5.50 FIP in 150 innings would allow 92 runs. The replacement reliever would amass the remaining 30 innings at a 4.50 FIP, allowing 15 runs in the process.

This places Looper at +15 runs above replacement, and we can add another two runs as a bonus for pitching 180 innings. With these numbers, Looper projects to be a +1.5 to +1.7 win pitcher next season. At the going rate of $5 mil/win, Looper’s fair market value would be set at $8.5 mil, $3 mil more than his salary last season.

It is somewhat surprising that Looper’s name has not surfaced in rumors or reports as often as the likes of Cabrera and Redding. Considering the fact that he has proven himself better and projects more optimistically than either of the aforementioned pitchers, that only one report features Braden’s potential new location—Milwaukee—seems odd. How does Redding have several reported suitors yet Looper only has one, and that has not even been confirmed?

Regardless, whichever team ends up inking him to a deal will be getting a pitcher who, last season, showed a big improvement in his O-Swing%, increasing from 20% to 25%. At the same time, his Z-Swing%, which measures pitches swung at in the strike zone, dropped by an almost equal amount. His percentage of first strikes rose from 55% to 62% and he sustained a 51% rate of pitches thrown in the strike zone. Put together, he was able to increase swings on bad pitches and decrease swings on good pitches, while avoiding throwing more pitches out of the zone and getting ahead more often.

Looper may be 34, and he might not have the power potential of a Cabrera, or the potential cheap fee like a Redding, but he can definitely strengthen the back end of a rotation.

One of the big stories down the stretch in 2008 involved the wide array of Dodgers outfielders and who would receive playing time. Having signed both Juan Pierre and Andruw Jones to very lucrative deals, Matt Kemp and Andre Ethier soon emerged as true talents. Add in the acquisition of Manny Ramirez and the team featured five outfielders, three of whom deserved playing time and two of which who realistically did not but were being paid as if they did.

Jones has already mentioned a desire to be traded to a team on which his playing time would increase, and it seems Pierre is singing the same tune. The Mets were initially reported as having some interest, but Omar Minaya shot that rumor down. For any team to take on Pierre, the Dodgers would need to pay a large chunk of his remaining salary.

From 2001-04, Pierre was a decent player. He proved to be extremely durable, playing over 150 games and stealing 45+ bases in each season. He recorded 200+ hits in three of the four seasons, producing OBPs above .360 in the corresponding campaigns. His wOBA in those seasons: .353, .312, .335, .343. These translated to the following wRAA totals: 14.8, -7.4, 4.6, 8.1.

His fielding in these seasons made him even more valuable. As a centerfielder, Pierre’s UZR data from 2002-2004 pegged him as +17 runs, +15 runs, and +5 runs.

In 2005, Pierre’s wOBA dropped to .309 and his offense was worth -10 runs below average. His defense declined to +3 as well. The following season, his offense remained in the same vicinity at -8 runs. Playing in Wrigley Field for the Cubs, his defense improved to +20 runs while captaining the outfield.

In 2007, Pierre inked a 5-yr deal with the Dodgers, which made little sense given the top-tiered prospects in the farm system. Though he played 162 games once again, and slapped his way to 196 hits, Pierre remained around -9 runs below average offensively, and saw his UZR drop to +7. While +7 in centerfield is still very solid, Pierre’s offense concerned many.

Last year, the Dodgers decided not to play Pierre as often as he had previously played, and Juan partook in just 119 games. Overall, he produced a +0.7 UZR in limited centerfield action and a +0.3 in 84 leftfield games. His offense remained -8 runs below average. Essentially, Pierre had gone from a no-hit, good fielding player to a no-hit, average fielding player in 2008. While he may not have been a replacement player, persay, he tended to fit the definition with his lack of hitting ability and average defense.

Next season, we can project Pierre as a -10 run hitter and +5 run fielder. If he finds himself on another team, with plenty of playing time, an optimistic projection would peg him as worth +15 runs with adjustments for both position and value over replacement level. This is optimistic, though, and with limited playing time, his value could drop to anything from +5 to +10 runs. Even at 1.5 wins, his fair market value would not be worth more than $7.5 mil. Suffice it to say, his current contract will reward him with more than that fee.

If Manny Ramirez does not return to the lineup, Pierre will likely stay put, but if not, the Dodgers may end up paying a good portion of his salary to leave town. Without paying a high percentage of his salary, he simply is not an attractive option for other teams. At 31 years old, his already declining offense will continue to decline, meaning his defense will need to pick up the slack to keep him worthwhile.

He may still be a plus defender, but not the +20 fielder from a few years ago. Juan Pierre still has value, but not enough to merit his current salary or even earn him playing time on the team currently employing him.

Earlier today our focus centered around an Angels stalwart on his way out of town, making it only fitting that tonight’s topic involves an Angels outfielder returning to the team. Juan Rivera, the 30-yr old corner outfielder who has missed most of the last two seasons, will be an Angel for the next few years after signing a 3-yr/$12.75 mil deal today. The Angels bought out Garrett Anderson earlier this off-season and have been linked to Manny Ramirez as well, yet seemingly opted to go the safe route with Rivera.

Juan played in just 89 games last season, hitting .246/.282/.438, with 12 home runs. All told, his .306 wOBA in about half of a season made him worth -5.3 runs offensively. The year before, Rivera only appeared in 14 games, and hit .279/.295/.442. In both of these seasons, his O-Swing% looked very atypical of his previous performance. In 2006, Rivera had a career year, putting together a .310/.362/.525 line with 23 home runs, a .373 wOBA, and +17.5 offensive runs.

Defensively, he has not necessarily hurt teams, but he will not light the world on fire with his glove, either. Since corner outfield positions carry the same adjustment, a combination of his UZR totals in leftfield and rightfield peg Rivera as somewhere between a -3 and -5 run fielder. With aging, he looks like a -5 fielder moving forward. Offensively, Marcel projects Juan to hit .272/.323/.450, a .332 wOBA which happens to be the definition of league average. Should this come to fruition, Rivera would be worth 0 runs offensively and cost his team 5 runs defensively. Prorating the adjustments for 130 games and 430 PA docks him 6 runs for playing a corner outfield position and simultaneously adds 12 runs to account for his value above replacement level.

Under this scenario, Rivera would be +1 runs above replacement next year, or +0.1 WAR. At $5 mil/win, his fair market value would be $500,000. Unfortunately, his projections may be a bit skewed as they include two injury-plagued seasons. It is more than likely that the Angels see Rivera as capable of returning to his 2006 form in one way or another. If he can produce a .345 wOBA in 130 games and 500 PA, Rivera would be worth +6 runs on offense and -5 on defense prior to the adjustments. This results in +9 runs, or +0.9 WAR. At fair market value, that is a 1-yr deal worth $4.5 mil. Factoring in a 10% discount rate for signing a longer deal, a 3-yr deal would be valued at $12.15 mil.

Rivera actually signed for $12.75 mil, not too far off-base. Overall, a good deal for the Angels, as long as Rivera can stay healthy. An average annual value of $4.25 mil is well below the asking price of players like Bobby Abreu and Pat Burrell, whose defensive shortcomings almost completely counteract their offensive contributions. Rivera is not a defensive wizard, but if he can combine slightly above average offense with slightly below average defense, this will result in a fine deal for the Angels.

A wide array of left-fielders hit the free agent market this off-season, and to date, just Raul Ibanez has signed a contract. The others garnering the majority of discussions are Adam Dunn, Bobby Abreu, Pat Burrell, and Manny Ramirez. These four, and Ibanez, are classic examples of all-hitting, no-fielding players, whose values diminish due to their time spent in the field. Ken Griffey, Jr has mentioned a desire to continue his career, and he also falls into the mix. One left-fielder available who does not fit this bill is Garrett Anderson.

In fact, if anything, Anderson is more of the opposite: a solid fielder whose hitting skills are declining. Due to this, rumors of Anderson potentially signing as a designated hitter seem to make little sense. Regardless, Anderson’s name does not appear too often in free agency discussions. Anderson now is different than the same player from a decade or so ago, but even back then certain numbers masked his true level of effectiveness.

From 1997-2003, Anderson ranged from 183-201 hits per season, 36-56 doubles, and 15-35 home runs. Looking solely at these numbers, which many do, Anderson appears to have had an extremely solid 7-year offensive peak. His wOBA tells a different story, however; outside of the .371 in 2003 and .363 in 2002, his wOBA ranged from .325-.342 throughout the peak. His wRAA numbers in the same 7-year span: -3.8, +1.8, +0.7, +1.0, +4.3, +20.6, +24.5. The latter two seasons correspond to the high wOBA seasons of 2002 and 2003, but prior to that, he was virtually a league average hitter.

Last year, he produced a wOBA of .326, resulting in -1.4 batting runs. UZR had him worth +6.2 defensive runs in left-field, though, and with the prorated adjustments for position and replacement level, Garret was worth +18.9 runs last year. This converts to roughly +1.9 wins, deeming him just slightly below average.

Marcel projects Anderson at a .319 wOBA in 2009 and -6.1 batting runs. Weighting his UZR, +4.5 defensive runs seems like a somewhat realistic expectation. Prorating the aforementioned adjustments places the 2009 Garret Anderson at +7.4 runs, or +0.74 wins. His fair market value, therefore, would be somewhere in the vicinity of $3.7 mil for a one-year deal. Something tells me Anderson will sign for much more than that, as he is coming off three straight years earning $10+ mil.

As a left-fielder, though, and not a DH, his projection is very similar to that of Abreu and Burrell’s. While he will command more than his fair market value, Anderson could likely be had for a lesser fee than these two former Phillies. So, if any team is looking for a legitimate left-fielder, perhaps their attentions should be turned to Anderson.

Tim Redding, a 5’11” righty starter for the Washington Nationals the last two seasons, was recently non-tendered. Though he will be 31 in February and is coming off of a 4.95 ERA/4.93 FIP season, several teams are inquiring about his services. Redding has been around since 2001, having played for the Astros, Padres and Yankees prior to the Nationals, as well as serving as a member of the White Sox AAA affiliate for the 2006 season.

His career got off to a rocky start, as in 2001 he posted an ERA of 5.50 and an FIP of 5.10. He managed to strike out over 8.5 batters per nine innings, but posted poor peripherals elsewhere. The following season, the ERA lowered to 5.40 and his FIP dropped over a half-run to 4.45. His K/9 also fell, but to 7.7, still quite good. He allowed way too many baserunners, though, and struggled to strand them. BABIPs of .333 and .321, respectively, can be worked around with solid control and a low walk rate, but Redding possessed neither of these.

In 32 starts during the 2003 season, he pitched 176 innings of 4.12 FIP baseball. His 3.68 ERA even outdid the solid FIP mark. His BB/9 decreased from 4.3 to 3.3; his BABIP stabilized at .300; and his LOB% rose to a slightly above league average rate of 73%. Unfortunately, his K/9 also fell, from 7.7 to 5.9. He did not strikeout as many hitters but he allowed a much lower number of them to reach base, and subsequently appeared more apt at keeping them on the basepaths.

2004 saw a 5.72 ERA/5.30 FIP, and in 2005 these numbers ballooned to 10.57/6.61. In fact, his WHIP in 2005 was a gaudy 1.99. Suffice it to say, he was below replacement level and did not deserve a roster spot on any team. He spent the 2006 season in the minor leagues for the White Sox, compiling decent but not earth-shattering numbers. The first half of the 2007 season was spent in the minors for the Nationals, where his 3.90 FIP earned him a callup.

In 15 starts that season, Redding pitched himself to a 3.64 ERA. His controllable skills told a different story, as a 5.0 K/9 combined with a 4.1 BB/9 and below average home run rate to produce a 5.17 FIP. The vast majority of pitchers are not able to have their ERA outdo FIP consistently for several seasons, and Redding was no exception. This past season, he made 33 starts and posted a 4.95 ERA/4.93 FIP. A good sign emerged, though: his K/9 rose to 5.9 while his BB/9 fell to 3.2, giving Redding his highest K/BB ratio since 2001.

Marcel projects him to pitch 159 innings next season with a 4.77 FIP. He would be responsible for 84 runs should this come to fruition. The replacement starter and reliever combination would surrender 97 runs, deeming Redding +13 runs above replacement. This converts to +1.3 wins, which has a fair market value of $6.5 mil. Tim made just $1 mil in 2008 with the Nationals.

The Rockies, Rangers, Mets, and Orioles have all been linked as aggressive suitors. If they can sign Redding to a deal lesser than or equal to the fair market value listed above, then he will serve as a decent fifth starter. Anything higher and we start to move into the Carlos Silva territory of overpaying fifth starter-types. Redding is not going to light the world on fire, but he could be a decent stopgap in a one-year deal, and could very likely be signed for less than his current $6.5 mil fair market value.

On Friday, the Florida Marlins non-tendered right-handed reliever Joe Nelson, officially allowing him to hit the open market. While the market for relief pitchers has not been as lucrative as the previous offseason, Nelson apparently has a wide array of suitors. In fact, according to one source, 19 teams are vying for the services of the newest reliever to become available. So, who is Joe Nelson, and why is he in such high demand?

Nelson turned 34 years old back in October and, prior to last season, had a whole 47.1 major league innings to his name. Two of those innings came in 2001, with the Braves. The next two and two-thirds did not occur until 2004, when he made three relatively ineffective outings with the Red Sox.

In 2006, however, the Royals gave him a legitimate shot out of their bullpen. While his overall numbers did not portend greatness by any stretch, a few signs pointing to potential success were evident. For starters, Nelson struck out 8.9 batters per nine innings, stranded runners at an above average rate of 72.7%, and held hitters to a .281 BABIP. His fastball averaged nothing more than 90 mph, though, and he appeared to complement that with a simply average changeup. All told, his 4.31 FIP deemed him a bit above replacement but by no means dominant.

Nelson did not pitch in 2007, but, after dominating for the Florida Marlins AAA affiliate in 2008, earned himself another call to the show. In the minors last season, Nelson fanned 12.6 batters per nine innings and limited his walks en route to a 6.0 K/BB. He posted an FIP of 1.72 and an ERA of 2.10, stranding 80% of his baserunners in the process.

On the big club, Nelson did not disappoint, as he pitched 54 very effective innings in 59 appearances. In those innings, Joe surrendered just 42 hits, issued no more than 22 walks, and struck out 60 batters. The rest of his numbers looked even better: a 1.19 WHIP, 10.0 K/9, 2.73 K/BB, 84.8% LOB. All told, Nelson posted a 3.45 FIP, which, while still very solid, ended up much higher than his 2.00 ERA.

He was not throwing harder in 2008 than 2006, and he did not implement any new pitches either. A major difference between the two seasons can be found in his rate of inducing swings on pitches out of the zone. Not only did he throw a lower percentage of pitches in the strike zone, but he increased his O-Swing% from 21% to 27%. On top of that, batters made contact just 50% of the time on these pitches, way down from the 59% rate against two years earlier.

Marcel projects Nelson for a 4.21 FIP in 52 innings of work next season. With so many suitors it is probably a good bet that his average leverage index of 1.16 last season will rise a bit. After all, 19 teams do not line up for a mop up man. Before factoring in the leverage index of his appearances, Nelson is about +3 runs above replacement. Multiply that by an LI in the vicinity of 1.20-1.45 and he could be worth anywhere from +3 to +6 runs above replacement. Assuming the going rate of $5 mil/win, Nelson, at fair market value, would sign for 1-yr/$2.5 mil, essentially the same contract recently inked by Chan Ho Park.

Given the likelihood of a plethora of teams vying for his services, a bidding war of sorts may ensue, which could theoretically bump his fee up into the $5 mil range. Pretty interesting given that he is 34, has struggled to stay around the big leagues, and realistically only put together one decent season. Nelson may be a valuable part of a bullpen next season, but do not mistake him for a young flamethrowing specialist or anything along those lines. He has shown himself capable of missing bats at a solid rate, but he will need to exhibit better control to be as effective as he can be. He would definitely be worth the same contract Park signed, but if a bidding war breaks out, he isn’t likely to be worth the money.

Jack Wilson of the Pittsburgh Pirates has been linked to numerous teams this offseason. It seemed for a bit as though a deal shipping him to the Tigers had been completed. Reports then surfaced disproving this notion and merely adding the Tigers to a list of several interested teams, including the likes of the Dodgers, As, Royals, and Blue Jays. Jack is currently owed $7.25 mil in 2009 with an $8.4 mil club option for the 2010 season.

As of right now, however, Wilson is still a member of the Pittsburgh Pirates.

Jack turns 31 years old in a couple of weeks and a few of his performance indicators seem to be moving in the wrong direction. He has never been an offensive force, with the +6.2 batting runs produced in 2004 the best of his career, but his patience appears to be deteriorating. His O-Swing%, which measures the frequency of swings on pitches outside the strike zone, has risen from 18.5% in 2005 to 26.9% last year.

His rate of contact on these pitches out of the zone has increased as well, from 68% to 80%. Contact on pitches out of the zone does not necessarily refer to balls put in play, so a chance exists that Jack merely may have been fouling off plenty of these pitches. Regardless, the increased swing frequency helped reduce his walk rate from 7% to just 4% in 2008.

Defensively, Wilson looked stellar last season, saving +7.4 runs with the glove in just slightly over half of a season. Injuries prevented him from playing the entire year, and over the last three seasons, he has topped out at 142 games played. The UZR defensive mark in 2008 showed great improvement over the numbers posted in 2006 and 2007.

Back in 2005, Wilson saved +13.3 runs, before declining almost two full wins defensively the next season to -7.5 runs. In 2007, he improved slightly to -2.7 runs, making him a bit below average. Optimistically averaging out his defensive performance, we can call him a +4 run defender in 2009. Since he is not very likely to play an entire season based on the past three years, his positional adjustment at shortstop is +6.0, not +7.5.

The positional adjustment is per 162 games, and Wilson is currently projected to play 130 or so games. Likewise, the +20 runs adjustment given to show value above replacement, not average, would be prorated to +12 runs, since he is not projected to come close to 700 plate appearances. Put together, Wilson is -7.5 runs offensively, +4 runs on defense, +6 runs with an adjustment for position, and +12 over replacement.

This adds up to +14.5 runs, or +1.45 wins. If Wilson were a free agent right now, with a going rate of $5 mil/win, his fair market value would be $7.25 mil. As I mentioned at the start of this post, his current contract will pay him exactly $7.25 mil next season.

Wilson is not a superstar and he certainly is not the missing piece of the puzzle for a team extremely close to contending, but he appears to be an above average defender at the toughest non-catching position to field, and is not atrocious with the bat.

He might not be the definitive answer to a team, but with 130 games and 418 PA, would be productive enough to truly merit his 2009 salary. If he ends up playing 150 games and amassing 600 PA, his value rises to +2.05 WAR, worth over $10 mil in a 1-yr deal. Given that the option for 2010 belongs to the club, and isn’t triggered mutually or by the player, and that the farm systems of potential suitors need not be mortgaged for his services, a team looking for a stopgap would be well-served to acquire Wilson. Unfortunately for Jack and the Pirates, Rafael Furcal and Orlando Cabrera still need “homes” and are higher on wishlists, making it all the more tougher to trade the pesky shortstop.

One of the most interesting aspects of the baseball offseason is tracking which players change teams. Another aspect our eyes focus on involves how much money these players sign for. My colleagues and I have posted dollar valuations of players for the last month or two, and on many of the comment threads, a valid point continues to surface: shouldn’t we be evaluating the contracts based on how the players will perform throughout as opposed to multiplying the fair market value by the number of years?

Normally, the answer to a question like this would be a resounding yes. However, in baseball, for whatever reason, the majority of contracts signed seem to do the latter. Ideally, a team would pay the player based on his value moving forward over the duration of the contract, factoring in inflation as well. Sometimes contracts may reflect this mindset. Sometimes they will reflect the fair market value mindset. And other times, neither of these can effectively describe the logic behind the contract (cough, Ibanez, cough).

To put both of these primary valuations to work, I decided to take the recent contracts signed by both A.J. Burnett and CC Sabathia. Both were signed by the Yankees, which will enable us to see if Cashman used a singular logic, or if it changed from deal to deal.

Burnett signed a 5-yr/$82.5 mil deal which will keep him employed through the 2013 season. Based on his runs saved relative to the replacement level, as well as a slight bonus for logging a good amount of innings himself, Burnett’s projection is +3.3 WAR for 2009. His fair market value for a one year deal calls for $16.5 mil. Now, players will generally give a discount of around 10% in exchange for contract length and security. With this discount factored in, a 5-yr deal for Burnett would be worth $74.3 mil.

He received over $8 mil more. So how did Cashman arrive at this number? While I cannot, with 100% confidence, speak for the Yankees GM, what I can do is show that a 5-yr deal at Burnett’s fair market value, without the discount for length and security, would be worth exactly $82.5 mil. Whether Cashman realized it or not, he signed Burnett to his fair market value in 2009, for five seasons.

What would happen if Burnett signed to a deal that properly balanced the inflationary rate of dollars per win with his projected performance? Assuming a 10% inflationary rate, and that Burnett would decline by 0.40 wins per season, he would be worth +12.5 wins over the life of the deal. With the dollars per win rate increasing, his deal would begin with $16.5 mil in 2009, and steadily decrease to $12.5 mil in 2013. All told, the deal would be approximately $74 mil, which is nearly identical to the 5-yr fair market value contract with the discount for security factored in.

What about Sabathia? CC signed a 7-yr/161 mil deal, with an opt-out clause after three years. His projection calls for +5.5 WAR next season, putting his fair market value at $27.5 mil. A 7-yr deal with a discount factored in would be valued at around $174 mil. Without the discount, $192.5 mil. His actual contract was worth significantly less than both of these, meaning that Cashman did something different with Sabathia than with Burnett. Was Sabathia signed to a deal appropriately paying him for his projected decline over the life of the deal?

If CC loses a half-win of effectiveness each year, by year seven he will be a +2.5 win pitcher. With the rate of dollars per win rising by 10% each year, this would give CC +28 WAR and $180.8 mil. That deal is almost $20 mil more than he signed for. With that in mind, perhaps Cashman sees Sabathia declining more quickly. If CC loses 0.6 wins each year, he will go from +5.5 WAR to +1.9 WAR, making him a league average pitcher by 2015.

This contract would be worth $164.7 mil, right around the deal he actually signed. Though this is still about $3 mil more than his contract, it is safe to say that Cashman and the Yankees are anticipating a steeper decline for Sabathia than for Burnett. After all, A.J. was signed to five years worth of his current fair market value and CC is being valued at a +5.5 WAR pitcher right now who will lose over 0.6 wins of effectiveness each year. This just goes to show that even though we think baseball teams tend to use a standard approach to valuing contracts, it really does depend on the who and the where.

For the last five seasons, certain truisms have come to fruition with eery consistency. Mark Prior is going to get injured and miss most of the season. Alex Rodriguez will post gaudy numbers and still become the subject of intense scrutiny. Curt Schilling will make controversial claims in interviews or on his blog. These are just a few examples. Another example, despite occurring on a somewhat smaller stage in terms of popularity or importance, is that Daniel Cabrera of the Baltimore Orioles will fail to live up to his potential.

The 6’9″, 270-pound righty has been a full-time starting pitcher since 2004. Known primarily for bringing the heat, Cabrera has always struggled with control problems. Still, everyone in the Baltimore organization held out hope that he could somehow harness his raw ability into something exceeding potential. Suffice it to say, this has not happened, outside of mere glimpses.

His FIP marks from 2004-2008: 5.10, 4.02, 4.20, 5.01, 5.61. In 2005 and 2006, Cabrera appeared to be on the verge of making himself a quality pitcher. Appeared is the key word, however, as his FIPs were a bit deceiving. In 2005, he struck out 8.76 batters per nine while posting a BB/9 of 4.85. Granted the walk rate was down from the 5.42 in 2004, and the strikeout rate had practically doubled from the 4.63 in the same season, but walking five batters per nine innings is not efficient at all.

The next season, his strikeout rate again rose, this time to a gaudy 9.55. Unfortunately, his walk rate rose to a career-worst 6.32. Somehow, Cabrera managed to post a 4.20 FIP and 4.74 ERA despite walking over six batters per nine innings. On top of his FIPs being a bit deceiving in that regard, the best ERA of his career came in 2005, at 4.52. Even when he looked good, he was not really anything special.

In 2007, his FIP rose to 5.01; his ERA jumped to 5.55; his K/9 lowered to 7.31; and, luckily, his BB/9 decreased to a still poor 4.76. He was not walking as many hitters in comparison to the previous three years, but the mark did not portend greatness by any stretch of the imagination, and his ability to miss bats seemed to be on its way down. Last year, Cabrera reduced his BB/9 to a career-best 4.50. Unfortunately, his strikeout rate fell to 4.75, which primarily led to a 5.61 FIP, below replacment level.

Daniel’s 97 mph fastball in 2004 has steadily decreased to its 92.6 mph average right now. The frequency at which batters swing at his pitches out of the zone has dropped from 23% to 19% in this stretch. Unfortunately, the rate of contact on these outside pitches has almost exponentially increased, rising from 35% to 48% to 55% to 70% over the last four seasons.

He is throwing much slower, striking batters out at a below average rate, and walking hitters at a below average rate. His strand rate has always hovered around the league average, but when you allow that many baserunners, the LOB would need to be well above average to serve as a counteracting force.

Marcel pegs Cabrera for 170 IP in 2009 at a 4.95 FIP. How does that stack up? Well, a Replacement SP would pitch about 150 IP at a 5.50 FIP. The remaining 20 innings would go to a Replacement RP at a 4.50 FIP. Cabrera’s projection calls for 94 runs allowed; the Replacement SP would be responsible for 92; and the Replacement RP for 10. Put together, we have the 94 runs of Cabrera vs. the 102 runs given up by the replacement level.

This puts Cabrera at +8 runs above replacement, and +0.8 WAR. Assuming a dollar valuation of $4.8-$5 mil/win, a reasonable contract for Cabrera would be for one year, ranging from $3.6-$3.9 mil. And, again, this is assuming that his strikeout rate can rebound to slightly above average at worst, and that his walk rate can remain close to the career low posted last season. Forgive me, but I am rather skeptical of either of those occurring.

Daniel was non-tendered last week, meaning that the Orioles could still theoretically bring him back, or that other teams could inquire about his services. Sometimes teams will non-tender players they want to bring back, but at a lesser fee.

Last year, Cabrera made around $2.9 mil after avoiding an arbitration case in which he wanted $3.3 mil and the team offered $2.6 mil. Even if he was offered arbitration, it isn’t likely that, given his poor 2008 campaign, he would jump up to something in the $6-7 mil range. This practically confirms that the Orioles just want to cut ties with the 28-yr old righthander.

Even though all the signs are pointing towards him lacking the skills and stuff to be a successful pitcher, it seems very likely that someone will take a flyer on him and hope to resurrect his career. Paying him anything over, say, $3.8 mil for his services would be a mistake, however. If a team can snag him for something in the vicinity of Mike Hampton’s recent contract, or even the 1-yr/$2.5 mil w/incentives deal given to Chan Ho Park, little risk would be involved, but anything more would be a mistake.