Last night was one of many emotions for me, all of which happened to coincide with the Phillies-Mets game. Johan Santana took on Phillies newcomer Joe Blanton in a contest that would eventually result in a sole owner of first place for the time being. While my night got off to an exciting bang thanks to a Jayson Werth RBI single in the first inning, it quickly turned sour when the Mets tied it up and pulled ahead thanks to a blown call from the umpire two run homer from the ever-so-torrid Carlos Delgado. The deflation quickly shifted to awe as Santana once again just cruised through the high-powered offense of the Phillies. Eventually that awe turned back into some form of sadness as Ramon Castro added to the Mets’ lead, before pulling a complete 180 to elation as the Phillies scored six runs in the ninth inning once Johan was taken out.

After the game, however, the baseball fan and analyst in me angered at the audacity of some mainstream writers to suggest, in so many words, Johan doesn’t have that “it” factor anymore, or that he isn’t nearly as good and seems to be on the decline. And the major reasons for these opinions stem from last year’s 15-13 W-L record and this year’s mere 8-7. From reading some of these articles or listening to some Baseball Tonight analysts you would think that Johan would struggle to cut it as the #3 option on most teams.

Frequent Fangraphs commenter Bill Baer wrote a great piece at Crashburn Alley that echoed my feelings last night during the game, that Johan has been incredibly unlucky this year, just like Phillies ace Cole Hamels. My feeling was that if Santana’s record was 11-3 or even 10-4 that most people would feel very differently about his performance this year. But then I looked at his numbers and calculated his projection over the remainder to see what his end of season statistics might look like… and my anger that he has lost something based on his W-L shifted to surprise.

See, even though his record doesn’t do his season justice, Santana does appear to have lost some semblance of effectiveness. Entering this season his projection called for around a 3.26 FIP, 1.10 WHIP, 2.24 BB/9, 9.23 K/9, and a 4.12 K/BB. Here are his 2008 numbers, his projection over the remainder, and what his overall numbers would be should this projection hold true:

2008 to date: 3.75 FIP, 1.21 WHIP, 2.47 BB/9, 7.79 K/9, 3.16 K/BB
Second Half: 3.45 FIP, 1.17 WHIP, 2.41 BB/9, 8.58 K/9, 3.57 K/BB
2008 Overall: 3.64 FIP, 1.20 WHIP, 2.44 BB/9, 8.08 K/9, 3.31 K/BB

If his season ends up like this, it would mark his worst K/9, BB/9, WHIP, K/BB, and BAA since becoming a full-time starter in 2004. Don’t confuse this with ineffectiveness, however, as he has been very productive this year, ranking in the NL’s top ten in several pertinent categories. As I mentioned above, if his record were 11-3 or something along those lines most of these conversations would cease to exist because most fans are usually quite content in believing a pitcher with a record that good is impervious to luck.

In his seven losses this year, Johan has pitched 45.2 innings and surrendered just 17 earned runs, good for a 3.35 ERA. That’s an extremely solid ERA for games in which he received a loss. In these same seven games, he has received only nine runs of support. Nine. That’s 1.77 RS/9 in these games. Of course he’s going to lose some of these if his team fails to score any runs. While I was shocked to see his strikeout numbers decline and baserunners increase, he is still among the elite in my eyes and the eyes of many others, I’m sure. If someone wishes to poke holes in his production this year it would make much more sense to note some of the aforementioned numbers, not to say his record is a disappointing 8-7, especially when considering how well he has pitched in some of these losses and how little support he has received.

He may not be the 2004 Johan and his true talent level may have changed a bit, but he is still a darned good pitcher.

One of the odder stories this season was the revelation that former MVP shortstop Miguel Tejada is actually two years older than the public had been to led to believe. Despite the questionable journalism techniques utilized in order to show that Miguel’s pants had in fact been on fire for sixteen or seventeen years, the fact remained that he was 33 years old, not 31 years old. A few months later, he is now 34, not 32 years old.

The first thought to cross my mind upon hearing this news was how it would effect his projection coming into this season. He was already a 32-yr old shortstop experiencing a noticeable decline in power. Now that we discovered him to be a 34-yr old shortstop, the sharp decline made a bit more sense. With the in-season Marcel projector readily available I plugged in Miguel’s current numbers but entered in both of his birthdays. Here are the results:

32 yr – 2nd Half: .293/.346/.455, 8 HR, .801 OPS
32 yr – Total: .284/.329/.435, 18 HR, .764 OPS

34 yr – 2nd Half: .291/.344/.452, 8 HR, .796 OPS
34 yr – Total: .283/.328/.434, 18 HR, .762 OPS

In 2004, he posted a .534 slugging percentage as a 30 year old (thought to be 28 year old). Since then, the same metric has decreased in each year and, if his true talent level holds up in the second half, the .434 would again show a decline from the year prior. His true talent level was barely affected by the change in age based on these in-season projections, but moving forward this level will have two lost years to take into account.

Yesterday we looked at Mike Hampton and his many injuries, and so it only made sense to today take a look at another member of the FIP—Fraternity for the Injury Prone—Carl Pavano. Prior to the 2005 season Yankees GM Brian Cashman inked Pavano to a four-year deal worth around 39.95 million dollars. The signing came on the heels of two very solid seasons from the righty once traded for Pedro Martinez. Aside from W-L and ERA, Pavano had decreased his BB/9, WHIP, HR/9, BAA, BABIP, and FIP each year from 2001-2004, leading to a rise in his K/BB and LOB%.

Unfortunately, his K/9 also took hits in each of these years. All told, the Yankees looked like they might have been getting a good #4 starter albeit at a steep price. Now, at the end of that contract, the deal looks like one of the worst ever handed out, not just because Pavano’s pinstripes performance lacked quality for the most part, but because those performances were so few and far between.

Since signing with the Yankees, Pavano has made 19 starts, pitched in 111.1 innings, with an FIP upwards of 4.70. He missed the 2006 season completely, made just two of those nineteen starts in 2007, and Cashman seems to believe that he won’t recover from his latest surgery in time to pitch this year, meaning the Yankees would have paid 40 million dollars for 17 starts of below average pitching in 2005, and two relatively meaningless starts in 2007.

Pavano’s contract bothered the players, as well, never the more evident than in the book Living On the Black in which Mike Mussina scoffed at a contract offer from the Yankees that there was no way he would accept less money than Carl Pavano.

He also took criticism for withholding injury information from the Yankees, after breaking his ribs in a car crash. He didn’t tell the team until he was scheduled to come off the disabled list for a different injury. I cannot imagine how that conversation went down.

Cashman: Well, Carl, we’re activating you and will schedule you in the rotation.
Pavano: Oh wait, I forgot to tell you…
Cashman: (sighs) What now?
Pavano: I actually have broken ribs.
Cashman: How long have you forgotten to tell us?
Pavano: A few weeks.
Cashman: Were you planning on telling us?
Pavano: Well… not really… but now that they hurt alot…

What the future holds for this once promising prospect is yet to be seen, but just like Mike Hampton will likely forever be remembered for his injuries, Carl Pavano will likely go down in baseball lore as one of the worst retrospective contract signings in the history of the game. Since Pavano signed, he has made 19 starts… in that same span, Roy Halladay has 23 complete games.

In a game like baseball, where a team like the 2006 Cardinals can sneak into the playoffs and win the world series, where the 2007 Phillies were able to come back from a seven game deficit in seventeen games to win the division, or where hits in play allowed by pitchers are largely contingent on factors out of their control, there are very few certainties anymore. Heck, we don’t even know if the Yankees will make the playoffs this year! One thing has been more than certain over the last few years, however, and it involves the name Mike Hampton and the word injury.

After pitching a full 2004 season he made just 12 starts in 2005 and has not pitched on a major league mound since. He has tried, however, making several attempts at coming back to justify the gaudy contract titling this post given to him in 2001, but to no alas. For all we know, that third of a season in 2005 may have been the last of Hampton’s career. Now, I’m not out to romanticize his career in any way, nor do I have any real sympathy for a guy making that much money for not really doing anything in recent years, but part of me does think it’s a shame that his body just does not seem fit for the game anymore, no matter what he does.

This year, his arm was finally major-league ready following two elbow surgeries, but the rest of his body fell apart. He was all set to make his major league return in early April but hurt his left pectoral muscle, getting scratched from the start in the process. He later aggravated his chest, and in a recent minor league start in which his pitch count rose to 90, he strained his groin muscle.

Hampton’s not an all-star or even the #2 option on most teams going back to his 2004 and 2005 performances, but a healthy form of him would be a suitable #4 or #5 starter… albeit the most wealthy one. I’ve seen reports that he should sign for the major league minimum with the Braves next year so he can “give back” to the team, which made little sense since he would still be getting paid and, honestly, who’s going to give him a nice-sized contract given his history? If he hurt himself like Kevin Brown punching a wall, or something along those lines I could understand that standpoint, but the fact is that Hampton has consistently hurt himself while trying to get back to the major leagues. I don’t know if the guy is “cursed” or if he has some sort of illness like Rocco Baldelli that is preventing him from staying healthy, but he just seems unable to do so.

“I can honestly look myself in the mirror and know that I’ve done everything I possibly can to get back,” he said. “Whether that happens or doesn’t, it’s not going to define who I am. I know I’ve done what it takes to get here and be successful.”

Unfortunately for Mike, unless he can get back to the big leagues and put together 4-5 solid years, his career IS going to be defined by his numerous injuries and setbacks, as well as for performance and lack thereof relative to a very steep contract.

The Minnesota Twins have been one of the more surprising stories in baseball this year, given that relatively few people gave them any sort of significant shot at contending at all. Yet, as we approach the 100-game mark of the season, the Twinkies are 55-43 and sit just a half-game behind the White Sox for first place in the AL Central; additionally, they are only one game behind the Red Sox for the Wild Card. For a team performing well to be considered a surprising story, the implication exists that either the franchise floundered in the recent past, like the Rays, or that its components are largely unknown commodities to the more general public.

Since the Twins have made the playoffs quite a bit this decade the surprise factor stems from their players not receiving massive amounts of publicity. Ipso facto, while most people could recite the 25-man roster for numerous teams in the league I would be willing to wager one of the toughest would be the Gardenhire Gang. Think about it. Their top slugger won the home run derby and the commentators present couldn’t even pronounce his name… let alone remember he won an MVP not too long ago. Their starting centerfielder is more commonly known outside of Minnesota as “that Johan trade guy.” And the only members of their starting pitching staff most people know about are Livan Hernandez, who doesn’t deserve to be one of the only members recognized, and Boof Bonser, whose name is, well, Boof. Point blank, you don’t forget a guy named Boof.

This last notion is really a shame because their success in the starting rotation has largely been reliant upon the performance of the other three: Scott Baker, Nick Blackburn, and Kevin Slowey (Glen Perkins you get honorable mention). This trio does not possess lights out “stuff” nor do they fire the ball past hitters with plus-fastballs. Instead, they limit their baserunners and have been quite adept at stranding those that do happen to reach base. Baker has been better at this than his two colleagues, stranding 82.4% of runners, a number behind only John Lackey at the top of the AL leaderboard. A number like this certainly isn’t expected to be sustained, so his performance from here on out will likely hinge upon just how far that rate drops.

None of the three had extremely significant service time so the reliability of their pre-season projections was not as high as, say, Livan’s, but they have essentially either matched these projections or have outdone them in the first 59% of the season. Going forward, Baker is projected at an FIP of 3.90, with Blackburn at 3.93 and Slowey at 4.12, all very respectable numbers. Their strikeout to walk ratios are not expected to be as high as we have seen thus far but are not likely to plummet all the way down towards J.C. Romero-ville. Lastly, their BABIPs are all either on the average or right around the corner so they haven’t necessarily been of extreme benefit in that department.

Here are their numbers this year, followed by what can be expected from here on out:

Scott Baker (now): 3.99 FIP, 1.16 WHIP, 4.86 K/BB, 1.52 BB/9
Scott Baker (2nd): 3.90 FIP, 1.26 WHIP, 3.08 K/BB, 2.13 BB/9

Nick Blackburn (now): 3.86 FIP, 1.27 WHIP, 3.56 K/BB, 1.37 BB/9
Nick Blackburn (2nd): 3.93 FIP, 1.29 WHIP, 2.58 K/BB, 2.16 BB/9

Kevin Slowey (now): 3.98 FIP, 1.13 WHIP, 4.69 K/BB, 1.42 BB/9
Kevin Slowey (2nd): 4.12 FIP, 1.19 WHIP, 3.00 K/BB, 2.13 BB/9

Their projections from here on out are calling for higher walk rates which in turn raises the WHIP and lowers the K/BB. This means more baserunners will reach and their barometric success (such as ERA) will be determined by an ability to strand them. There are plenty of “if’s” that must be met for the Twins to sustain their success and have a legitimate shot at winning the division, but I don’t consider it to be out of reach. Baker, Blackburn, and Slowey might not be the most well-known, or most exciting pitchers in all of baseball, but they have definitely been solid performers expected to continue producing at a quality level, most likely under the radar.

As Dave noted early yesterday morning, the Joe Blanton-to-the-Phillies trade is one that fans of the Phightins—like me—are not going to be in favor of for years to come. It’s not that Blanton is a bad pitcher, or that a guy like Adrian Cardenas is a lock to become a superstar middle-infielder, but rather that the Phillies gave up two of their top prospects for a back-end of the rotation pitcher. From living in Philadelphia and watching the local broadcasts and such it seems to me that those in favor of this trade feel the way they do because Blanton is “new.” If these same fans watched Blanton intently over the last year and a half or so I have a funny feeling their dispositions would not be as sunny.

Add in the facts that Kentucky Joe dominated the Phillies lineup a couple of weeks ago, that he “won” 30 games in 2006-07, and that Adam Eaton stinks and it becomes very easy to see how fans could be manipulated into thinking this was the right trade to make.

One form of this manipulation really irked my family yesterday, however, in that some writers and reporters tried to justify the trade with the clause “if you remove Blanton’s X worst starts, his ERA is …” I’ve seen differing quotes, involving Blanton’s 3.87 ERA sans-three bad starts, or even his 3.58 ERA sans-four bad starts. Well, you just cannot do that. My brother, who covers the Phillies at MVN.com, offered this take, which is essentially the entire point of this post:

“Todd Zolecki wrote on Philly.com that Blanton actually has a 3.58 ERA if you take away his worst four starts. That’s great, but you don’t merely take away four starts to try to justify a trade. Heck, if you take away Adam Eaton’s worst four starts, his ERA would be 4.06! Has Eaton been a pitcher who deserves an ERA nearly in the 3’s this season? No. Has he been effective at all? No. So let’s not cherry-pick stats.”

You can’t simply remove numbers to justify anything. As has been discussed at length this season, the last three years or so should be quoted when discussing a player’s true talent level. If these same writers wish to justify the trade, perhaps it would serve them wise to note that Blanton’s current ERA is worse than his pre-season projection, and that he is expected to be in the 3.77 range over the remainder of the season… not that his numbers would be better if we take away the worst starts, or that he has performed well against NL East teams in a total of four or five starts in his career.

Overall, we don’t know if the Phillies are done dealing. Maybe they turn around and send the perhaps-overrated Carlos Carrasco and fellow top-tier prospect Antonio Bastardo for Erik Bedard, which would give them a rotation of: Cole Hamels, Erik Bedard, Jamie Moyer, Joe Blanton, and Kyle Kendrick, with Brett Myers also in the fold. From what I’ve come to learn, however, regarding Pat Gillick and his “approach” on his way out the door, it really does seem Blanton is supposed to be the prized acquisition to keep the Mets at bay.

But then again, maybe he IS what the Phillies need to keep the Mets at bay, because as many other Philadelphia columnists have noted, Blanton has pitched 15 scoreless innings against the Mets in his career… (sighs and hopes readers pick up on the sarcasm of small sample sizes and cherry-picked stats).

In 1995, I was a 10-year old sprout who loved the game but failed to truly grasp the rammifications of baseball’s labor strike. It constituted the major news story leading into the season, but not the only one. The other big news that year involved a Japanese pitcher named Hideo Nomo, who was in the process of becoming the first such player to permanently relocate to the major leagues. He would not be the first Japanese-born player in the major leagues, but rather the first to permanently leave Japan for streets paved in gold.

Nomo utilized a contractual loophole after his 1994 season in Japan that stipulated players who retired were free to play wherever. This loophole paved the way for Nomo playing in America, which is largely considered to have further paved the way for future Japanese-born major league players.

That 1995 season would be an incredible one for Nomo, as he baffled hitters en route to a Rookie of the Year win. Adding to the circus surrounding each of his starts was his funky windup. Not only had many fans never seen a foreign player of this magnitude, his pitching motion looked borderline insane when stacked up next to the vanilla “hands over head” delivery thought of as the industry standard. Nomo finished 4th in WPA/LI that year, behind just Greg Maddux, Randy Johnson, and Mike Mussina, and kept hitters at bay to the tune of a 2.54 ERA/2.88 FIP and 1.06 WHIP.

In 1996 and 1997 he still posted quality numbers, including a no-hitter in ’96 at Coors Field, but as hitters began to figure him out, his windup became less puzzling and he lost some effectiveness. His ERA and FIP had increased in each of those first three seasons; his WHIP shot up from 1.06 to 1.37; he gave up more home runs on average each year; and his ability to strand baserunners lessened in each subsequent season.

It then came as little surprise that 1998 turned out to be his worst season to date, stranding just 69.5% of baserunners and getting off to such a poor start that the Dodgers shipped him to the Mets for the not necessarily exciting package of Greg McMichael and Dave Mlicki. Following below average production from June 4 until season’s end, the Mets released Nomo in spring training of the 1999 season. The Cubs picked him up, but following a few minor league starts they had a clash of opinion: Hideo wanted to pitch in the majors and the Cubs felt he wasn’t ready. After refusing to make another minor league start the Cubs released him towards the end of April. The Brewers signed him for the remainder of the season, which incidentally involved his lowest K/9 and highest HR/9. His WHIP stayed stagnant at 1.42, but luckily he was able to strand 73.1% of runners, a significant increase from the year prior.

He and the Brewers clashed in contract negotiations following the season and the Phillies soon claimed him off waivers. The Nomo in Philadelphia experiment lasted 24 hours, when they could do no better in negotiations than the Brewers. All told, Nomo eventually signed with the Tigers for the 2000 season. His 4.74 ERA, 4.79 FIP, 4.22 BB/9, and career highs 1.47 WHIP and 1.47 HR/9 did very little to make the move look worthwhile and, at season’s close, Nomo again found himself without a job. He had played in the major leagues for six seasons now and had been a member of six different franchises.

He tossed another no-hitter as a member of the Red Sox in 2001 and posted his best numbers in the last couple of seasons—including a 10.0 K/9—but nowhere near his 1995-1996 seasons. Following his tenure in Beantown he returned “home” to Los Angeles, where his 2002 and 2003 seasons seemed very reminiscent of those initial years. In 67 starts over those two seasons, Nomo posted a 3.24 ERA, 4.17 FIP, 1.29 WHIP, and 79% strand rate. His ability to strike hitters out had diminished (7.59 K/9) but he proved to be effective enough to limit any threats pointed in his direction. In 2004, however, Nomo was officially done, regardless of whether or not he realized it.

His strand rate dropped from 79% to 59%, which looks even worse given that he accrued a 1.75 WHIP. Allowing over two home runs per nine innings with a K/BB ratio below 1.30, Nomo had lost all semblances of effectiveness at the major league level. The Rays, Yankees, White Sox, and Royals all took flyers on the former Rookie of the Year from 2005-2008, but an inability to get hitters out is not one that should be on the resume of any pitcher.

Nomo’s story is exactly the kind that will leave a sour taste in the mouths of some fans due to his poor performance in recent years. However, in my eyes, his is a success story, even if from a relative standpoint. No matter how old I get, when looking back upon a childhood built largely on baseball, I will always remember attempting to emulate his funky windup on the playground and the excitement that hinged upon every pitch thrown in those first few seasons.

How many times have you been watching a game or engaged in conversations with fellow fans in which the topic of velocity differential between pitches and its effects comes up? The idea in that tremendous offspeed pitches can enhance a fastball has somewhat grown into the conventional wisdom. It may seem odd at first, but throwing a devastating changeup can make an 89 mph fastball feel like a 93 mph fastball, perhaps even higher.

From a pure logic standpoint it makes sense. Consider this scenario: You are standing on the middle of the road and five cars are driving towards you, one at a time, at say 15 mph, from a great distance. But then the sixth car moves at around 30 mph. You aren’t very likely to know exactly how fast that sixth car is but it is going to seem much faster than its actual speed due to what had previously been experienced.

It was mentioned in the comments section of Dave’s article about Jamie Moyer that perhaps he has been able to strike hitters out or simply continue to get hitters out at his age, with a lack of tangible skills, due to his relative velocity; that is, the difference between the velocity of his fastball and his changeup confuses hitters and deems him a bit more effective than we might give him credit for.

Here are the top ten fastball-changeup dropoffs this year, using the BIS data, and their velocity dropoffs:

Mike Mussina, NYY: 15.8 mph
Vicente Padilla, Tex: 12.3 mph
Zack Greinke, KC: 11.9 mph
Johan Santana, NYM: 11.5 mph
Tim Lincecum, SF: 11.3 mph
Edinson Volquez, Cin: 11.0 mph
Oliver Perez, NYM: 11.0 mph
Javier Vazquez, CHW: 10.9 mph
Barry Zito, SF: 10.6 mph
Tim Hudson, Atl: 10.6 mph

And the bottom five:

Brian Bannister, KC: 4.3 mph
Derek Lowe, LAD: 5.1 mph
Greg Maddux, SD: 5.4 mph
Shaun Marcum, Tor: 5.7 mph
Josh Beckett, Bos: 5.8 mph

Of those in the top ten, the only two that throw below 90 mph, on average, are Mussina and Zito, who clock in around the 84-86 mark. Mussina has been in a relative velocity league of his own this year, throwing an 85.9 mph fastball and a 70.1 mph changeup. Now, pitchers don’t follow a uniform routine of changeup usage: some will throw it much more often than others. Mussina only throws his 6.9% of the time whereas Johan Santana has done so with 26.8% of his pitches.

Looking at pitchers who throw their changeup at least 10% of the time, Johan finds himself atop the relative dropoff leaderboard and new names like Cole Hamels and Brandon Webb join him. The sample of players is likely too small from just one year to find any type of significance or trend within the data, and even then, a regression amongst others would need to be run as a starting point to find what type of effects this dropoff has, which I could perhaps get into in the near-future, but if this relative velocity really matters as much as our logic and commentators suspect, then it should be fairly easy to find a meaningful correlation between dropoff and some form of success.

I had something else planned for tonight, but in light of learning about Brad Lidge having to warmup on six different occasions over a two-hour span last night, my anger at this ridiculous game had to be expressed. First, a question: WHY does this game count? Why does this exhibition game, in which the rosters are not always indicative of the best players in each league, in which each team is required one representative meaning that other deserving players are excluded, in which players rarely last more than three or four innings, determine which league gets home field advantage in the World Series? Honestly? Can someone please answer this for me?

“Well, Cubs, you had a tremendous year, winning more than any other team in the whole sport, scoring more runs than everyone else as well, but you won’t have home field advantage in the World Series because your league failed to win the All-Star game.”

Say that a couple of times and let it sink in. I’m very confused why this game was made to be the determining factor of home field advantage in the World Series and doubly so why more stipulations were not made clear with regards to how managers must utilize players or how roster spots should be filled. The first basic point that needs to be fixed if this game is going to remain as “important” is that people who can actually play need to be selected. I don’t care how good Brandon Webb or Scott Kazmir have been this year: if they cannot pitch or just pitched a couple of days prior, they serve no purpose to the team. They are taking up a roster spot, risking injury and should not be participating.

Those actually capable of pitching should be selected, and for the sake of honoring those deserving, regardless of whether or not they can participate, why not just come out with some type of list, citing the best players of the first half, not necessarily intertwined with the game? That way a guy like Kazmir could be recognized for his first-half performance but not be subjected to what happened last night. Imagine if Corey Hart didn’t throw like a nine-year old girl, as Dave Cameron noted, and the game continued. Kazmir was on a strict pitch count and Francona would have no choice but to forfeit the game.

Or if Lidge could only go two innings last night, apparently David Wright was going to be his replacement. That would have been spectacular. The AL could have garnered home field advantage by hitting a home run off of a third baseman. And if Wright gets hurt pitching, I would have to imagine it would be mighty tough to justify his usage on the mound due to the game “counting,” to the thousands of Mets fans excited at the possibility of overtaking the Phillies in the NL East.

Either the game counts and the rosters should be populated by those capable of pitching, regardless of whether or not they are Jeff Suppan, Jamie Moyer, et al, or the game reverts to exhibition/fun nature and after a certain period of time, say 11-13 innings, it is called regardless of score. Pitchers should be required to go for at least one inning, with no platoon or LOOGY moves and, if the game “must be decided” as the commissioner’s office informed Francona, why take so many closers? Honestly, did the AL need anybody other than Mariano Rivera, Jonathan Papelbon, or even Francisco Rodriguez? It could have been Zack Greinke, not Joakim Soria, and then Greinke could have gone a few innings.

It just really irks me that the sport I love could be so stupid and naive with a tradition such as this. If you want to have a competition between the leagues to determine home field advantage in the world series, why not make a balanced interleague schedule and whichever league wins gets the advantage. That way it’s more than just one meaningless game acting as the determining factor.

Overall, IF the game supposedly counts:

a) No more fan voting
b) No more requirements about representatives from each team
c) Pitchers who can actually pitch are selected
d) More starters than closers
e) Pitchers have to go at least one full inning

If it doesn’t count, do whatever you want. It’s a fun game, there should be no real rules other than to have fun. Or, what I would ultimately suggest, is that all of the aforementioned suggestions be disregarded and just let Tim Wakefield make the team every year, with the clause that he can pitch for both teams.

Dave showed us the other day a group of pitchers due to regress over the remainder of the season based on some quite unsustainable numbers. Here we are going to look at what should be expected of some hitters, projected to have good to great years, that struggled prior to the all star game festivities. As you saw last night I called upon the in-season Marcel to evaluate what Edgar Renteria’s second half and updated seasonal line would look like, and that same projection spreadsheet will be called upon right now.

The reason is that the pre-season projections are based on actual data representing the true talent level of a player. So, if someone expected to OPS .900 only posted a .700 in the first half, it does not mean he will continue to be in the .700 range all season. Based on what we know about the player we would expect him to have a better second half; however, his projection for this season would be updated to an OPS lower than the .900 thought to be accurate before the season.

I looked at the projections entering this season and found ten guys thought to be capable of posting an OPS higher than .820, who posted counts at least 70 points worse in the first half. The numbers below will follow the format: projected OPS, actual OPS to date, difference. There may be more than the following players fitting the aforementioned criteria but, for now, I decided to profile these ten:

Miguel Cabrera: .966, .837, -.129
Ryan Howard: .965, .832, -.133
Paul Konerko: .862, .687, -.175
Robinson Cano: .844, .643, -.201
Ryan Zimmerman: .826, .718, -.108
Ryan Garko: .826, .668, -.158
Todd Helton: .889, .783, -.106
Derek Jeter: .830, .740, -.090
Alexis Rios: .823, .737, -.086
Nick Swisher: .826, .754, -.072

By virtue of having high expectations and falling well short, these ten players are all expected to have better to much better second halves of the season. Here is their projected second-half OPS, followed by their updated seasonal count:

Miguel Cabrera: .936, .879
Ryan Howard: .932, .873
Paul Konerko: .825, .757
Robinson Cano: .797, .708
Ryan Zimmerman: .810, .771
Ryan Garko: .776, .716
Todd Helton: .854, .816
Derek Jeter: .804, .766
Alexis Rios: .798, .764
Nick Swisher: .808, .777

Of these ten players, the only one whose updated seasonal OPS would come within 50 points of his pre-season projection is Nick Swisher; his OPS was projected to be .826 and is updated to .777. Cano, Garko, and Konerko (is Konerko what you get if you combine the names Cano and Garko?) are all updated to have an OPS over 100 points lower than they were prior to the season. Cabrera, Howard, and Helton should all have very good second halves and they are the only three on this list whose updated seasonal OPS would clock in at over .800. All ten of these players should perform better than they did in the first half but they are also very likely to finish the season worse than we thought they would.