When the Tigers traded two of their top four prospects in Jair Jurrjens and Gorkys Hernandez for Edgar Renteria this past offseason, they had to have set high expectations for the Colombian shortstop. After all, in each of the last three seasons he has increased his batting average, on-base percentage, slugging percentage, and OPS. Suffice it to say, close to the 100-games mark, he has not come close to meeting them.

In 82 games he has produced a .254/.301/.326 slash line, “good” for a .627 OPS. He has walked much less, doing so in 6.7% of his plate appearances compared to the 8.1-9.4% of the three years prior. In addition he is not only hitting less but when he does they are not normally of the extra-bases variety. He has just five doubles and five home runs. Add in his lone triple and he has 11 extra-base hits on the season. Of players with at least 300 plate appearances, that ranks as the second worst in baseball, ahead of nobody other than Gregor Blanco.

Now, just because he has performed this way to date does not mean he will continue to do so over the course of the season. Projection systems base their judgments on actual historical data, so they do not just come from thin air. Renteria’s Marcel projection for this year included a .295/.357/.425 slash line, a .782 OPS, 10 home runs, and 29 doubles. He is clearly off pace but how much so? How has his performance so far this year effected what should be expected of him?

Luckily, Sal Baxamusa of The Hardball Times created a spreadsheet that allows us to project performance in-season based on current statistics as well as those from the past three seasons. Using this, Renteria’s projection over the remainder of the season includes a .282/.342/.402 slash line, a .744 OPS, 5 home runs, and 13 doubles. His projected OPS in the second half comes relatively close to his pre-season projection, but what happens when we add back in his poor first half?

With the aforementioned second half, Renteria would finish this year at .267/.320/.360, a .680 OPS, 10 home runs, and 18 doubles. His OPS would be 100 points lower than his pre-season projection, and the only number he matched would be the 10 gopher balls. Quite simply, a .680 OPS from a shortstop expected to be a key ingredient on a team “that could score 1,000 runs this year” is terrible. Add in that he only had one year left on his contract—and a 2009 club option—entering this season and that the Tigers traded away two key prospects, and, while it is yet to be determined how the Braves will make out with Jurrjens and Hernandez, the Tigers end of this deal does not appear it will work out the way they hoped.

Of course, hindsight is always 20/20, and Renteria could be an outlier defying his projection, but he would have to recover from a hamstring injury to post some extra-gaudy numbers for this to happen.

In the third inning of the Padres-Braves game yesterday, while trailing 1-0 to his former employer, Greg Maddux tried to make something happen. With one out, he singled off of Charlie Morton, and proceeded to steal second base following the next retired batter. The inning would ultimately fail to produce a run for the Friars but the stolen base added yet another accomplishment to Greg’s long hall of fame resume. At 42 years and 89 days old, Maddux became the oldest pitcher to steal a base, a mark previously held by Jim Kaat.

According to Greg they weren’t holding him on and it wasn’t a big deal because, even if he was thrown out, the lineup had already been turned over. Plus, the Padres were struggling to score runs and, pitcher or no pitcher, he was a baserunner.

Greg has stolen eleven bases in his career while thrice being caught. He has not, however, failed in an attempt since the 2000 season, going a perfect 7-7 since. Stealing one base in each of the 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007, and 2008 seasons, Maddux actually stole two in the 2006 season; one while on the Cubs and one while in Dodger blue. Here are the pitcher/catcher batteries unsuccessful in preventing the speedy professor:

2002: Tomo Ohka/Michael Barrett
2004: Jason Marquis/Mike Matheny
2005: Jae Seo/Ramon Castro
2006: Matt Cain/Eliezer Alfonzo AND Chris Young/Mike Piazza
2007: Jeff Francis/Yorvit Torrealba
2008: Charlie Morton/Brian McCann

He has pitched fairly well this year—3.90 ERA/3.92 FIP—and his in-season Marcel projects him to get even better over his next 12-15 starts. Still, this may be his final season and I would not be surprised in the least if he finds himself in a new uniform prior to the trading deadline. A contending team likely would not need to part with a top-tier prospect for his services and teams could do far worse than plug him in as a #3 or #4 starter. The Padres have been a severe disappointment this year after coming within one game of the playoffs in 2007; it would do them well to work towards assembling an offense capable enough of preventing pitchers from feeling that if they do not steal bases, they will not be batted in.

Yesterday, while teams wound down prior to the All-Star festivities, some of the top minor league prospects participated in the Futures Game. The World defeated the United States 3-0, and wow does that sound odd when repeated out loud. While I didn’t get to watch anything other than Carlos Carrasco’s inning—says the Phillies fan—I was more interested in seeing the Pitch F/X data for the minor league extravaganza. With that in mind, I decided to take a look at the wide array of pitchers who found their way into the game, in order to provide a sneak peak of sorts as far as what teams may be in store for.

Now, granted, all of these are small samples as each pitcher went for no more than one inning of work, but the velocity and movement readings below should be interesting for at least an “initial” look. For reference, the numbers will go: velocity in mph followed by movement in horizontal inches/vertical inches. An example would be, FA = 90.01, 3.32/4.56. First, the lefties:

• Brett Anderson, Athletics: FA = 92.37, 3.34/8.73, CB = 81.53, -5.05/-3.24
• Polin Trinidad, Astros: FA = 88.18, 6.05/9.65, CH = 81.18, 7.08/6.57

And that concludes our look at the lefthanded pitchers partaking in the Futures Game. Clayton Richard, a lefthanded White Sox prospect, did pitch but the system offered insufficient data to get any sense other than his fastball appeared to be around 89-90 miles per hour. Next up, the righties:

• Carlos Carrasco, Phillies: FA = 91.46, -7.53/10.05, CH = 83.58, -9.18/2.53
• Casey Weathers, Rockies: FA = 96.21, -9.95/8.70, SL = 85.49, 1.95/-0.03
• Eduardo Morlan, Rays: FA = 89.44, -9.64/9.62, SL = 80.63, -1.04/1.38, CH = 79.57, -8.78/3.61
• Fernando Salas, Cardinals: FA = 91.50, -8.51/9.92, CH = 84.13, -9.91/5.22
• Hector Rondon, Indians: FA = 93.28, -8.11/10.65, SL = 80.23, 1.11/-0.48
• Henry Rodriguez, Athletics: FA = 98.09, -10.07/9.85, SL/CUT = 91.95, -4.58/4.25
• Jake Arrieta, Orioles: FA = 91.85, -7.98/9.70
• Jess Todd, Cardinals: FA = 88.00, -5.29/4.76, SL = 83.93, -1.95/0.95
• Jesus Delgago, Marlins: FA = 93.30, -4.99/7.35
• Kevin Pucetas, Giants: FA = 90.72, -12.46/9.39, CB = 73.95, 0.67/-6.78, CH = 80.68, -12.30/8.21
• Ryan Mattheus, Rockies: FA = 93.76, -9.29/6.81
• Shairon Martis, Nationals: FA = 91.58, -8.79/9.88, CB = 73.43, 0.18/-0.87, SL = 80.05, -1.95/-0.78
• Trevor Cahill, Athletics: FA = 91.43, -13.31/4.49, SL = 82.43, -3.87/0.66

Julio Pimentel (Royals) and William Inman (Padres) also pitched, but there wasn’t enough data captured by the system to offer anything regarding their repertoire, velocity, or movement relative to this game. What stands out to me upon first glance of these numbers is Kevin Pucetas’s movement and velocity on both his fastball and changeup. He was able to get close to 12.5 inches of horizontal movement on both pitches—Brandon Webb is averaging close to 8 horizontal inches this year—and the movement on both pitches was essentially the same. Put together, he was throwing virtually the same pitch albeit ten miles per hour slower with his changeup.

The lively fastballs of Henry Rodriguez and Casey Weathers caught my eye as well since they really separated themselves from the rest of the group in that department. The game looked like a good one and a shutout in an all-star game is pretty rare. Thoughts from those who were able to watch more than my one inning?

On May 25th, the San Francisco Giants stood at 20-31, a full 10.5 games behind the first place Diamondbacks. Brandon Webb and his DBacks were cruising and the division was theirs for the taking. The Dodgers had been slumping but appeared to be the only real threat to the Snakes. Arizona was 30-20; LA sat just 3.5 games back at 26-23; and the Rockies, Giants, and Padres respectively had played to the melancholy tunes of 20-30, 20-31, and 19-33.

Since that fateful day the Boche Bunch has gone 19-23, “improving” to 39-54. While a stretch like that may appear to have put the Giants further out of the playoff race they have actually gained three and a half games on Arizona. Yes, since May 25, the best team in the NL West has been the 19-23 Giants. The others? Well, the Padres have been second best, going 18-23 for a .439 winning percentage. After them comes a two-way tie between the Dodgers and Rockies, who have both gone 19-25. The worst team in this stretch is the Diamondbacks, at a measly 16-27.

With the DBacks starting off ten games above .500 and then proceeding to go eleven games below they now lead the division with a 46-47 record. Something remarkable to note is that, even though the non-Dodgers teams have played at a better clip in this span, while the DBacks played significantly worse, Arizona maintained their lead in the division. The Dodgers are currently one game back; the Giants and Rockies are seven and seven and a half back; and even the Padres are within ten games reach.

Okay, the title is a bit facetious given how poorly each team has played recently, but despite all five currently posting below .500 records, rewind back to the 1994 strike-shortened season and take a look at the AL West standings. At the time of the strike, the Rangers held a slim one game lead despite just a 52-62 record. The Athletics were 51-63, Mariners at 49-63, and the Angels at 47-68. Yes, this division has been bad so far, but not on the same embarrassing level as the 1994 AL West. I doubt it will stay like this for the remainder of the season but right now this division really does seem to be up for grabs. I’ve seen analysts say and write that it would just take a nice 5-8 game winning streak from a team to put the division away or make it a legitimate race; the way these teams are currently playing, “just” being able to do anything that positive seems completely out of character.

When the Dodgers hired Joe Torre this offseason they envisioned a manager whose calm demeanor could offer stability to a rumored dissentious clubhouse. Regardless of whether or not this worked, the team was 14-13 through the first month and sat five games over .500 at 19-14 on May 6th. Unfortunately, that May 6th victory came without shortstop Rafael Furcal who had been, by all accounts, their best player to date. I discussed Furcal’s numbers both here and at Baseball Prospectus as he got off to an absolutely scorching start.

When he went down with injury, here is what the Dodgers lost:

154 PA, 49-134, 12 2B, 2 3B, 5 HR, 11.2 K%, .366/.448/.597, 1.045 OPS

The injury quickly worsened and, following a few more setbacks, it appears that Furcal will miss the rest of the season. Now, losing a player to injury is generally only as bad as the performance level(s) of those replacing him; think Lou Gehrig for Wally Pipp, or, in football, Brady for Bledsoe. Unfortunately for Dodgers fans the inverse has happened with Furcal.

Since he went down the others occupying his position have produced the following:

218 PA, 33-199, 6 2B, 2 3B, 1 HR, 19.1 K%, .166/.317/.231, .548 OPS

Looking at most of these numbers it seems that his replacements have combined to produce at around half his level. Filling in the majority of the time has been the triumvirate of Chin-Lung Hu, Luis Maza, and Angel Berroa. More recently it has been Nomar Garciaparra, a former all-star shortstop, though the jury is still out on whether he can come anywhere near Furcal’s early season production. Granted, Furcal wasn’t very likely to sustain those numbers all season—a .386 BABIP compared to his career rate a bit over .300 entering this year—but that isn’t to say his performance would regress to the poor numbers above.

With the trade deadline fast approaching it might be wise for the Colletti gang to look into a serious upgrade at shortstop—barring an offensive surge from Nomar—considering they are currently only one game behind the first place Diamondbacks despite a record two games under .500.

Adam Dunn of the Reds is not too complicated of a player to figure out: he walks a lot, strikes out a lot, and hits home runs. In his eighth big league season Dunn has a career walk rate of 17%, a career strikeout rate of 32.7%, and hits a home run about once every 14 at bats. In fact, from 2004 until yesterday, Dunn’s 189 home runs ranks first in the National League and third overall to Alex Rodriguez and David Ortiz. His 504 walks ranks first regardless of league as do his 816 strikeouts; in fact, second place in punchouts is Jason Bay with 639, about 180 behind. For anyone confused, Ryan Howard ranks third in this category primarily because he wasn’t a full-time regular in 2004-05.

This year has been essentially the same for Dunn as he finds himself atop the leaderboard in walks and in the top five in both strikeouts and home runs. Still, one major difference is his current .227 batting average. Though I am strongly against using batting average as any type of end-all evaluative barometer, his low percentage of hits in at bats has prevented his already high OBP and SLG from vastly increasing.

His BABIP, which over the course of his career comes out to .291, currently rests at just .248. The only other season in which he posted a sub-.250 BABIP was in 2003, when he still walked, struck out, and homered quite a bit but managed to produce a .215/.354/.465 slash line. While that season resulted in an .819 OPS his OBP and SLG have combined to provide a .902 OPS as of right now.

This got me thinking how many people have posted sub-.230 batting averages while simultaneously producing OPS counts of .900 or higher. Querying for all players satisfying these parameters while amassing 400 or more plate appearances, I found… nobody. I couldn’t find any player that has ever hit .230 or lower with an OPS .900 or higher. Though it isn’t likely Dunn will finish the season with a batting average that low, especially when considering his BABIP has been much higher in the near past, if he does he will end up literally in a league of his own.

Since .900 is a high OPS for years past I modified the search to give me anyone with a sub-.230 batting average and OPS+ of 130 or higher—based on Dunn’s current number—while totaling at least 400 plate appearances. This produced three results, yet all belonged to the same player: Gene Tenace. In 1974, Tenace had a .211 BA/130 OPS+; in 1978, a .224 BA/134 OPS+; and in 1980, a .222 BA/137 OPS+.

Again modifying the search to include those with sub-.230 BAs and an OBP of at least .380, four results and three names surfaced; Tenace in both 1978 and 1980, Wes Westrum’s 1951 season of .219 BA/.400 OBP, and Ray Cullenbine’s 1947 season of .224 BA/.401 OBP.

Just Tenace’s 1978 season and Cullenbine’s 1947 season achieved this “feat” with at least 500 PAs, and only Cullenbine did so with 600+ PAs. Essentially, assuming Dunn doesn’t get hurt, it is very unlikely this BA/OBP or BA/OPS+ combo will continue. Based on his past BABIP results compared to this year it is more likely the BA will increase, in turn meaning his OBP and SLG will look even gaudier. I’m not sure if teams are in serious, serious discussions regarding his services or not, but they should be… even if he isn’t really passionate about the game.

Just like he did this past offseason, Billy Beane recently traded one of his top pitchers for a bevy of prospects. Dave and Marc have done a great job profiling this Rich Harden deal and the pool of talent heading to Oakland. Earlier in the season, when discussing the Dan Haren move, I noted how Dana Eveland and Gregory Smith, just one third of the return from Arizona, were performing quite well. At that time, which was after the month of April had been completed, Eveland had a 1.86 K/BB and 1.34 WHIP while Smith had a 1.91 K/BB and 1.09 WHIP.

At that point in time both players were outdoing their FIP via ERA and, while their K/BB totals have taken somewhat substantial hits since my last look, they have continued to “beat” their controllable outcomes. For the season, here are their numbers:

Gregory Smith: 17 GS, 3.62 ERA, 4.24 FIP, 1.57 K/BB, 1.27 WHIP, 74.4% LOB
Dana Eveland: 18 GS, 3.50 ERA, 3.84 FIP, 1.35 K/BB, 1.38 WHIP, 75.3% LOB

Now, over the last thirty days they have both posted great ERAs, but are way out in front of what their FIP would suggest, which is higher primarily due to their ultra-low strikeout to walk ratios. Neither are punchout machines, but they have the 2nd and 4th lowest ratio in the last thirty days. For the season, Eveland has the third lowest in the AL while Smith joins him in the top ten at spot number eight. Here are their numbers in these parameters:

Gregory Smith: 3.34 ERA, 5.15 FIP, 4.85 K/9, 5.76 BB/9, 0.84 K/BB, 81.5% LOB
Dana Eveland: 2.89 ERA, 4.01 FIP, 4.58 K/9, 4.34 BB/9, 1.06 K/BB, 80.9% LOB

Combining for 1.22 WPA wins in this span, Smith and Eveland have found ways to produce arguably better results recently despite the triumvirate of less strikeouts, more walks, and more runners on base. The Athletics rotation currently has a 3.47 ERA and .238 BAA, both tops in the AL. They have struck out the sixth most amount of batters while simultaneously walking the fifth most; this places them 10th out of 14 teams in terms of K/BB ratio. With three pitchers in the top twelve (Smith, Eveland, Joe Blanton) this does not really come as a surprise.

It will be very interesting to see what happens to this rotation sans Rich Harden and Chad Gaudin but, for the sake of having much confidence moving forward, Smith and Eveland should be working towards improving their controllable outcomes; that way their success could be defined by skills and not potentially luck.

The Florida Marlins, thought of as very unlikely to compete at any point this season, currently sit in a second-place tie in the so-far-disappointing National League East. They are a team built almost entirely on offense and, because of this, are even less likely to replicate their relative success over the season’s remainder. Because nobody talks about their pitching, and rightly so because those talks might not be so nice, Ricky Nolasco has pitched quite well and deserves some kudos.

In 19 games, two of which were relief appearances, he has posted the following numbers:

3.74 ERA, 4.19 FIP, 110.2 IP, 104 H, 29 BB, 82 K
2.83 K/BB, 1.20 WHIP, .279 BABIP, 74.4% LOB

The statistics above have helped result in a 0.45 WPA, tops amongst starters on the team. Scott Olsen is close behind him at 0.35, but while these two have some similarities in their overall results, there are also some noticeable differences, mainly in their controllable skills:

Ricky Nolasco: 3.74 ERA, 4.19 FIP, 110.2 IP, 2.83 K/BB, 1.20 WHIP
Scott Olsen: 3.96 ERA, 5.01 FIP, 111.1 IP, 1.49 K/BB, 1.30 WHIP

Over the last thirty days, Nolasco has made six starts, giving up just 31 hits and 4 walks in 44.2 innings, striking out 42 in the process. His 0.78 WHIP ranks second and, while the average HR/FB is around 10-11%, Nolasco has sliced his in half to the tune of 5.8%. Though his K/9 of 8.46 in this span ranks 21st, his ridiculously low 0.81 BB/9 helps result in a first place 10.50 K/BB.

Something struck me as particularly interesting with regards to his pitch data: from last year to now he is throwing harder across the board. His fastball has increased from 89 mph to 91.2 mph; his slider from 79.8 mph to 83.6 mph; his curveball has risen from 72.5 mph to 75.6 mph, and his changeup, though used just 2.4% of the time compared to last year’s 9.1%, has increased velocity from 78.5 mph to 82.3 mph.

Ricky has been pitching very much under the radar primarily due to the Marlins’ pitching woes serving as a generalization for the entire team and their propensity for offense. Nolasco is not a Cy Young Award contender—though now that I think about it his W-L record could convince voters he may be—but he has been a nice little diamond in the rough to date.

Back at the end of April, Dave posted his First Month Heroes, a position by position look at the highest WPA/LIs through one month of play. In the comments section I had joked that it would be even more interesting to see the inverse, or the worst context-neutral performers in the same span. My wish became Dave’s command and the following players surfaced: Josh Bard, Adam LaRoche, Robinson Cano, Ryan Zimmerman, Troy Tulowitzki, Garret Anderson, Andruw Jones, Jose Guillen.

Two full months later I thought it again to be prudent to check on these low-level offensive performers. So, as of July 8, the worst WPA/LIs by position are:

C: Kurt Suzuki, OAK, -0.84
1B: Daric Barton, OAK, -1.33
2B: Freddy Sanchez, PIT, -2.56
3B: Melvin Mora, BAL, -1.15
SS: Jason Bartlett, TB, -1.71
LF: Emil Brown, OAK -1.20
CF: Michael Bourn, HOU, -1.67
RF: Jeff Francoeur, ATL, -1.31
SP: Bronson Arroyo, CIN, -1.94
RP: Brad Hennessey, SF, -1.26

Yes, Frenchy was demoted to the minors, and yes, it took me three attempts at spelling his name correctly, but he has been the least productive rightfielder on offense. After him it gets a little hazy since certain guys who may be classified as rightfielders played different positions (SEE: Gary Matthews, Jr, and Mark Teahen).

One interesting part of this group is that their WPAs, which could benefit from some game state bias, are not all the lowest at their position. In fact, the only players listed above with both the lowest WPA/LI and WPA are Suzuki, Barton, and Frenchy. Sanchez, Bartlett, and Brown have the 4th worst WPA at their respective positions; Bourn has the second worst; and Mora actually ranks at the halfway point in WPA terms.

The other aspect of this group that piqued my interest is that three Oakland Athletics position players are, as of this moment, the worst win-contributors at their respective positions. In terms of WPA, not WPA/LI, the most productive offensive total is the 0.80 of Eric Chavez. Overall, though, their offense has cost them six wins; thankfully their starting rotation and bullpen have combined to the tune of ten added wins. Perhaps this is why some As fans were calling for offense in return for Harden. Regardless, I’ll be very curious to revisit this closer to the end of the season not only to see how these players improve or digress, but whether or not any of them remain.

With the advent of the calendar year data here on the site I have gotten a few questions regarding what constitutes “good” win probability statistics in the various time parameters. One question in particular piqued my interest: How do the context-neutral wins look across the position spectrum? The reader essentially wanted to know how, say, Brian McCann’s WPA/LI over the last two calendar years stacked up not just to all other offensive players but all other catchers. Not only would something like this help show which players’ context-neutral contributions were above- or below-average but it would allow a look at how the averages change from position to position.

Looking at the last two calendar years, with anyone amassing 450+ plate appearances (to use a qualifier but allow for mid-season callups), here are the positional averages with the top player(s) at each:

C: -0.86 WPA/LI, Russell Martin, 3.62 WPA/LI
1B: 2.17 WPA/LI, Albert Pujols, 10.77 WPA/LI and Lance Berkman, 10.65 WPA/LI
2B: -0.10 WPA/LI, Chase Utley, 8.77 WPA/LI
3B: 1.03 WPA/LI, Chipper Jones, 10.26 WPA/LI and Alex Rodriguez, 9.33 WPA/LI
SS: -0.65 WPA/LI, Hanley Ramirez, 6.75 WPA/LI
OF: 0.95 WPA/LI, Matt Holliday, 9.21 WPA/LI
SP: 1.10 WPA/LI, Roy Halladay, 6.90 WPA/LI and C.C. Sabathia, 6.06 WPA/LI

The outfielders on the leaderboards here are lumped together rather than separated by left, center, or right, so their results may shift a bit when properly divided. I also did not use relievers since there are all different types of them—closers, setup men, long relievers, etc—and I don’t much like comparing one set to another out of their element.

These overall results will change as the season goes on as well since calendar years implies a duration spanning yesterday to the same day two years ago; since we are currently in the middle of the season this is not a concrete look at the WPA/LI from concluded years, which I’ll get to sometime later this week. The scary aspect of these numbers is that, of those meeting my previously established cutoff point, any Catcher, Second Baseman, or Shortstop that has a 0.00 WPA/LI over the last two calendar years—meaning their efforts ended up cancelling each other out to the point of zero contribution—is above average. Essentially, someone at these positions contributing, on average, no context-neutral wins, is above average. For now, though, you can see that the averages supply, at the very least, the general ranges for where the benchmarks should be set.