In one of my first posts here at Fangraphs I discussed some odd name similarities amongst players on the Phillies. One I did not mention was that, since 1909 there have only been two major leaguers with the last name of Durbin—JD and Chad—and both are currently on the Phillies; incidentally, they are not related either. JD is pitching in AAA this year but Chad signed a 1-yr/900k deal to pitch for the big club. Through the first two months this low-risk signing has definitely brought with it high reward.

In 23 games, Durbin has a 1.80 ERA, 3.46 FIP, and 1.20 WHIP. He has pitched in 35 innings, surrendering just 28 hits, only one of which was a home run. His walks and strikeouts are a tad suspect, 14 BB – 21 K, but opponents are hitting just .221 against him; additionally, despite a career BABIP ~.300, his current mark is .258. Not many runners have been getting on and 86.5% of those who do have been stranded.

What’s different now from a year ago? For starters, his rates of balls in play have changed. Compare his LD/GB/FB:

2007: 15.6% LD/44.0% GB/40.5% FB
2008: 21.4% LD/42.7% GB/35.9% FB

The grounders are very similar but he has traded in a reduced percentage of flyballs for an increase in line drives. A percentage of line drives like that, via the xBABIP tool of LD% + .120, should in theory produce a BABIP close to the .334 range; Durbin’s .258 is much lower. Though the xBABIP is not a good predictive tool for pitchers, mainly because the LD% is not stable, it can be effective when retrospectively analyzing a pitcher’s results. In Durbin’s case it appears he has either been lucky so far or, as The Professor at Rays Index recently hypothesized, the lower BABIP for certain pitchers could be a byproduct of enough movement to make the batters miss the sweet spot.

Durbin has increased slider usage by 12%, meaning 85% of his pitches are fastballs and sliders. As a reliever, conventional wisdom chimes in that he should be able to get away with a lesser repertoire. Whatever he’s doing is working, though, as his 10.15 BRAA ranks 7th amongst all relievers in the game, and 4th in the National League.

Scorching starts from unexpected players are great for the game of baseball as they remind us anything can happen. Who expected Edinson Volquez to jump out of the gate like this? Similarly, insane starts from usually great players often hog the media spotlight as well (See: Lance Berkman, Chipper Jones, Chase Utley). One thing in common for both of these groups is that they obstruct our knowledge or view of great players off to great—albeit not insane—starts.

That’s where Albert Pujols comes in. Arguably the best offensive player in the game today, Pujols has seemingly been lost in the shuffle this season. Perhaps I’ve been watching too many House MD reruns instead of ESPN but, if I recall correctly, the only times Pujols has really been seen in-depth on the channel are when he almost fought Brandon Backe and when he single-handedly took out the Padres battery.

If he was posting average or below average numbers this might make more sense, but, as of right now, Pujols currently has a .366/.486/.644 slash line, a 1.130 OPS, and 14 HR-39 RBI. Could the problem be that consistency is boring? We know Pujols will perform at a high level so it isn’t as meaningful as it would be if, say, Ryan Ludwick was off to a really hot start? As odd as it may be, the consistency=boring aspect of fandom is very true. Not to say fans don’t appreciate the performance but the unexpected players performing great seem to bring the spontaneity that sparks excitement.

So, in honor of the still-just-28 yrs old Pujols, here are his current ranks:

5th in WPA, 2.49
3rd in BA, .366
2nd in OBP, .486
4th in SLG, .644
3rd in OPS, 1.130
3rd in BRAA, 27.72
2nd in REW, 2.75
2nd in WPA/LI, 2.82
1st in BB, 47

Pujols ranks in the top five, in all of baseball, in these categories and, not surprisingly, those in front of him in many of them are: Chipper Jones, Lance Berkman, Chase Utley, and Josh Hamilton. It’s human nature to like the other stories better than Pujols’s hot start but do not mistake him not being featured in magazines and television shows as often with a decline in performance. He’s still Albert Pujols and, if his BB and K rates are any type of indicator, he’s still improving.

This offseason there was much speculation that the Yankees were going to lose Alex Rodriguez, Jorge Posada, and Mariano Rivera to free agency. All three returned with shiny new contracts. Rivera, widely considered the greatest closer of all time, may be getting up there in age but his current stats would surely disagree.

Last year he experienced what was determined to be his “worst” season as a closer. In 67 games he posted a 3.15 ERA. Oh god that’s terrible! His ERA was the highest it had ever been as a closer and that, combined with his 4 blown saves and age resulted in many wondering what he had left in the tank. Well, he is off to a tremendous start this year and, by all statistical accounts, last year wasn’t as bad as the media made it out to be.

His 2007 FIP came in at 2.65, suggesting his ERA leaned on the unlucky side. He struck out 74 batters in 71.1 IP, walking only 12, which greatly aided his 1.12 WHIP. Additionally, he wasn’t throwing any slower—93.6 mph compared to 93.8 the year before. Take ERA out of the equation and what exactly did Rivera do wrong last year?

Anyways, back to this year. In 23 games Rivera currently has a 0.36 ERA, 1.32 FIP, and 0.52 WHIP. The FIP and WHIP are just about one-half of his 2007 totals. In 25 innings he has given up 11 hits and two walks while striking out 24. His BB/9 of 0.72 is the lowest it has ever been and he has stranded 92.3% of the runners that reach base; his career LOB% is 79.3%.

Batters are hitting just .135 against him with a .191 BABIP. Pizza Cutter discussed Troy Percival’s knack for posting low opponent BABIPs and Dave Studeman commented that it isn’t that unlikely for elite relievers to follow suit. Rivera’s career BABIP is .278 and, since 1997 (when he became the full time closer) he has held it under .280 in seven different seasons.

Rivera’s career rates of balls in play are 16.4% LD/54.2% GB/29.4% FB. This year, he is posting the same 16.4% LD but has traded in seven percent of his grounders for flyballs; flyballs that stay in the park as evidenced by his no home runs allowed.

Interestingly enough, Rivera’s gmLI, which measures the leverage index at the time of his entrance is 1.88, the highest it’s been since 2002. The difficulty level clearly has not phased him yet as his 2.49 WPA dictates a contribution of 2.5 wins in just 23 games.

I can remember May 22, 2002 like it was six years ago yesterday as I did not even need to look up gamelogs to remember the very first major league start of Mark Prior. A high school sophomore at the time, I would often use my lunch period to watch day games on either Gameday or MLB TV; on that day I was lucky enough to watch Prior make his Mark. Get it?

Breezing through the Pirates hitters with the greatest of ease, this would begin a five-game stretch in which the Cubs rookie struck out 43 hitters in 28.2 innings. Calm, cool, and collected, his fluid windup provided such an intimidating presence on the mound. On the whole, his rookie season consisted of 147 strikeouts in 116.2 innings; just 38 walks; a 3.32 ERA, 3.16 FIP, and a 1.17 WHIP; and a .230 BAA. He finished seventh in Rookie of the Year voting but, in just 19 starts, had risen almost entirely to the top of the Cubs rotation.

If there were any doubts his 2003 not only erased them but helped make people forget said doubts ever crept into their minds. Finishing 3rd (to Eric Gagne and Jason Schmidt) in Cy Young Award voting, Prior went 18-6 with a 2.43 ERA. His WHIP went down to 1.10 and he struck out 245 hitters in 211.1 innings. His FIP of 2.47 suggests his ERA was right on the money and he allowed just 15 home runs.

Prior pitched game six of the NLCS where some guy in the crowd prevented a ball caught in foul territory that Moises Alou forgave six years later (Question: Why isn’t Alex Gonzalez criticized more? His play was worse!).

The next season, an injury-riddled one, looked a lot like a slightly poorer version of his rookie year. Check it out:

2002:19 GS, 116.2 IP, 98 H, 14 HR, 38 BB, 147 K, 3.32 ERA, 1.17 WHIP
2004:21 GS, 118.2 IP, 108 H, 14 HR, 48 BB, 139 K, 4.02 ERA, 1.35 WHIP

In 2005 he missed more time, albeit not as much as the year prior (get it?), and pitched pretty well; though not as well as someone determined to be the next 300-game winner would be expected to pitch. That year he struck out 188 batters in 166.2 innings, posting a 3.67 ERA, 3.85 FIP, and 1.21 WHIP.

Missing most of the next season his actual playing time in 2006 proved disastrous. In nine starts he posted a 7.21 ERA and a 1.69 WHIP. His FIP of 6.60, which suggests his ERA may have been a bit high, was still high in its own right. 2006 would also be the first season in which Prior struck out less batters than innings pitched and posted a BB/9 above 3.64. After stranding runners to the tune of 76.7%-79.4% he posted an LOB of just 62.0%.

He missed last season with more injuries and the Cubs decided to let him go. Signing a low-risk deal with the Padres this offseason, hope still existed that Prior could shake the injury-plagued status that accompanies him everywhere these days and be, at the very least, a league average pitcher. This weekend’s news changed everything.

News surfaced this weekend that Prior, still just 27 years of age, would have surgery and miss the entire 2008 season. Often the player associated most with regards to Dusty Baker’s poor handling of pitchers, Prior will again miss significant pitching time due to a faulty shoulder. As Sam Panayotovich points out, it’s a shame because Prior had the abilities to dominate the league at the age of 23; now he’ll be lucky to make 20+ starts in a future season.

When Prior returned from the DL in 2004, Cubs announcers remarked that fans now felt their season had begun with their ace making his return. As my friend Evan Brunell remarked yesterday, “Now you know the season has really begun when ‘Mark Prior out for the season’ hits the newswire.”

Oh, how the tides have turned, and oh how sad of a downfall it has been.

Riding the coattails of an absolutely scorching start from shortstop Rafael Furcal, the Dodgers found themselves with a 19-14 record on May 13th, their best record so far this season. Furcal got hurt, landed on the DL, and the Dodgers have gone a paltry 8-14 in his absence. Though impossible to say with 100% confidence that their success rests in the hands/bat/glove (depending on the metaphor) of their shortstop he clearly seems to be missed from that lineup.

More of their struggles can be attributed to the starting rotation. Take a look at these SP/RP splits:

Starters: 13-23, 4.43 ERA, 307 IP, 113 BB, 217 K, 1.48 WHIP
Relievers: 14-5, 3.08 ERA,178.1 IP, 67 BB, 161 K, 1.28 WHIP

Need some more? How about these:

Starters: -1.22 WPA, -5.95 BRAA, 1.92 K/BB
Relievers: 1.55 WPA, 24.12 BRAA, 2.40 K/BB

Derek Lowe and Brad Penny have underperformed thus far and the good starts from Chad Billingsley and rookie Hiroki Kuroda have not been able to cancel them out.

Interestingly enough, one of their top guns out of the bullpen this year has been Chan Ho Park. Yes, that Chan Ho Park, the one who elicits “he’s still around??” reactions. Other than Hong-Chih Kuo, Park has the highest BRAA of the entire pitching staff.

In 16 games, including one start, Park is 2-1 with a 2.41 ERA; however, his 5.14 FIP suggests he has been very lucky. In fact, just JC Romero of the Phillies has a bigger ERA-FIP differential in the league. He has surrendered 32 hits in 33.2 innings, both walking and striking out 16 batters. Despite just a .252 BAA and .262 BABIP, the walks have helped lead to a 1.43 WHIP. It does not seem to matter how many runners Park lets reach base, though, because he currently has an 89.9% LOB. Excluding his one start that numbers jumps up to 93.6%, placing him sixth in the National League amongst relievers with at least 20.0 IP.

Park is throwing harder as well. Comparing 2005-2006 to 2008—he only made one start in 2007—his fastball is up over two mph; his slider is up over two mph; his curveball has increased by one mph; and his changeup is up over two mph.

ERA is a fickle stat for relievers since a couple bad outings can provide a season-long taint on the number. It is not very likely Park will sustain such a high percentage of stranded runners, meaning his success has its best chance of continuing if less runners reach base. Since he is not getting hit around too much this decrease in baserunners needs to come primarily from his walks. If he manages a 1.43+ WHIP all season it is more likely the LOB% will drop, more runners will score, and his ERA-FIP discrepancy won’t be as high because both will be in the below average range.

Coming into play yesterday Braves third baseman Chipper Jones sported a .418/.495/.674 slash line, thanks in large part to his 77 hits in 184 at bats. In an 8-1 win over Milwaukee last night, Jones went 2-4 with two walks, raising his numbers to .420/.500/.670. Make no mistake: Chipper is playing out of his mind right now and doing much of the gruntwork in preventing the Braves from getting off to a terrible start. However, he is not the only player in recent history to get off to such a torrid start.

Trent McCotter, in a Retrolist message, passed along the following five instances of a player starting his season 77-184, or better:

Andres Galarraga, 1993: 80-184, .435/.462/.701, 1.163 OPS
Rod Carew, 1983: 79-184, .427/.473/.535, 1.008 OPS
Lenny Dykstra, 1990: 77-184, .418/.486/.546, 1.032 OPS
Paul O’Neill, 1994: 77-184, .418/.511/.703, 1.214 OPS
Todd Helton, 2000: 77-184, .418/.511/.815, 1.326 OPS

Pretty impressive stuff. Trent also acknowledged that this did not take into account years when a good amount of play by play files are missing so there may be others not mentioned here.

Curious about what happened from here I looked at the overall numbers of these players as well as what happened from their 185th at bat on. Here are their numbers starting with at bat #185 (their season totals in parentheses):

Andres Galarraga: 94-286, .329/.366/.538 (.370/.403/.602)
Rod Carew: 81-287, .282/.370/.331 (.339/.409/.411)
Lenny Dykstra: 115-406, .283/.386/.390 (.325/.418/.441)
Paul O’Neill: 54-188, .295/.408/.503 (.359/.460/.603)
Todd Helton: 139-396, .351/.440/.644 (.372/.463/.698)

While all five posted OPS counts over 1.000 during their 77-184 “streak” just Helton kept it up during his post-hot start plate appearances. On average, these five guys posted a .310 BA onwards from their scorching start. If Chipper were to hit .310 for the rest of the season, assuming his total number of at bats will be in the same range as the last few years, he would go 97 for his next 312, putting him at 174-496 to finish the season; that would be a .351 batting average.

Realistically, and with regards to this small group, Chipper has two options:

a) sustain a BA higher than .351 from last night to the end of the season, giving him the highest BA of the group (Helton hit .351 for the rest of his season after starting out .418, giving him a .372 for the season)
b) begin to regress, finishing the season with a tremendous slash line albeit not nearly as impressive as .418/.495/.674.

It is not very likely Chipper will finish the year with a BA over or around .400 based either on this evidence or our own intuition; however that does not, in any way, make what he is currently doing any less remarkable. We all tend to understand how difficult it is to sustain a .400+ batting average primarily because nobody has done so in recent years and Chipper is at the point of difficulty right now where a 2-5 night actually decreases the average.

Still, a large part of me is hoping he can somehow pull it off as it would be great for baseball.

While taking full advantage of my MLB Extra Innings package last night a scrolling bottom line informed me that Mets shortstop Jose Reyes hit his 7th home run. At that point it dawned on me that a) Reyes is on pace for a career high in home runs and b) I have not been bombarded with Reyes on the national media circuit as much as the last couple of years.

Reyes has steadily improved from the time of his initial call-ups until now but, while scanning his statistics, I found that we can actually trace his improvement by comparing two seasons: His 2004 campaign and numbers accrued through the first 49 games of this season.

2004: 53 G, 56-220, 16 2B, 2 3B, 2 HR, 33 R, 14 RBI, 5 BB, 31 K
2008: 49 G, 58-208, 12 2B, 5 3B, 7 HR, 31 R, 24 RBI, 20 BB, 31 K

2004: 2.2 BB%, 14.1 K%, .271 OBP/.373 SLG, .644 OPS
2008: 8.8 BB%, 14.9 K%, .338 OBP/.486 SLG, .823 OPS

Everything is very similar with the exceptions of added power and an increase in walks. His increase in extra base hits and walk frequency has turned a player with the makings to be another Nick Punto into a legitimately effective offensive threat.

The years in between the two shown above saw Reyes make great strides towards improvement. Take a look at how his frequency of walks has increased through the years:

From 2005-2007 he went from walking 3.7% of the time all the way to 10.2%; inversely, his K% dipped to the 11.2%-12.5% range. This year, however, Reyes has been walking less and regressing to his strikeout rates of four years ago.

Oddly enough, he currently has a WPA of 0.00; he has a +4.44 +WPA and a -4.44 -WPA. Also odd, is Reyes’s BABIP of exactly .300. It has been suggested elsewhere, on numerous occasions, that speedy players are much more likely to post consistently higher batting averages of balls in play due to their ability to leg out infield singles or bunt hits. This has not been the case for Reyes (career .308 BABIP), who, by many accounts, is one of the fastest players in the entire game.

To check the reasons behind his decrease in walks and increase in strikeouts I turned to the swing data here to compare this year to last. Reyes is swinging at the same amount of pitches outside the zone yet making 7% less contact on those swings. He has also swung at 5% less pitches in the zone and is making close to 1% less contact. Pitchers have offered 6% more pitches in the zone than last year as well.

The increase in pitches seen in the zone could go a long way towards explaining the decrease in walks and his significant drop in out of zone contact definitely contributes to the explanation behind his strikeout increase. I’m sure Reyes will be fine and his Mets won’t play this poorly all year long, but I find it very interesting that we can seemingly track his improvement by comparing two half-seasons, five years removed.

As of right now, the Tampa Bay Rays (I didn’t say Devil!) are tied with the Cubs for the best record in baseball. They are playing with confidence and really seem to feel they belong at the top. Some of this confidence stems from the knowledge that, every fifth day, Scott Kazmir will toe the rubber. The actually productive component of arguably the worst trade of all time broke out last season, leading everyone without the luxury of an 163rd game in strikeouts.

Oddly enough, Kazmir missed the entire month of April and the Rays still managed to go 15-12. Since his return he has not missed a beat and the team is currently 31-21.

In five starts he has gone for 30 innings, giving up 19 hits and 10 walks, striking out 32 in the process. Omitting his first start, Kazmir has gone 26 innings, giving up just 13 hits and 7 walks, with 27 strikeouts to boot; additionally, his last four starts have an average game score of 71.

Kazmir is yet to surrender a home run and has kept runners off base as evidenced by his 0.97 WHIP. Those who do manage to get on have been stranded 79.3% of the time. He has been in the 1.27-1.48 WHIP range the last three seasons primarily due to his walks. Since he does not surrender many hits—a .247 BAA from ’05-’07—he should experience even more success with some added control.

Now, 79.3% is quite high for LOB but if/when he regresses and more runners score, it does not mean he will not be effective; rather, he just won’t be Sandy Koufax anymore.

Last year he posted his highest BABIP against at .341; spreading his balls in play with 15.6% LD, 43.1% GB, and 41.3% FB, Kazmir may have been a bit unlucky. This year, surrendering 7% more line drives (22.7%), he currently has just a .265 BABIP. His career numbers also suggest this frequency of line drives should decrease to the 18% range.

When put together, all of this suggests Kazmir’s production may not sustain its current pace, but a slightly regressing Scott Kazmir is still better than the vast majority of major league pitchers.

Last week, Dave Cameron wrote about the Free Talent All-Stars; players who did not require much return either in personnel or salary to acquire, and how they were performing. Most of these players garnered the moniker “low risk/high reward” because teams are giving up very little for them; perhaps these players will experience a career renaissance and produce at a very high level. I also conducted a study of low risk pitchers in the last issue of SABR’s statistical newsletter, By the Numbers.

This offseason, two particular low risk pitchers seemed to stand out from the pack: Bartolo Colon and Freddy Garcia. Both had lousy 2007 seasons which, when coupled with their expensive contracts, made their performances look even worse. Both, however, had caveats to their struggles. Colon’s numbers were a bit deceiving and Garcia was pitching with a significant injury.

Colon signed a minor league deal with the Red Sox while Garcia is still awaiting his shot at auditioning for several interested teams.

Back in February, Josh Kalk pointed out how Colon’s 2007 statistics were more on the deceiving side, noting that his FIP was over 1.5 points lower than his ERA; he also had a ridiculously low LOB% compared to the rest of his career.

In just two starts for the Red Sox this season, Colon has gone 12 innings, surrendering 11 hits and three walks, while striking out 8 batters. He has won both games and has an FIP of 2.68. Though much too early to proclaim Colon has “found it” he has definitely looked much more in tune than the last couple of years. So what happened in 2006 and 2007?

Well, from 1998-2005 his LOB% was 70.8 or higher; in 2006 it was 66.1% and in 2007 it fell to 63.5%. In that same eight year span his BABIP topped out at .313; in 2006 it was .319 and in 2007 it rose to .364. In 2006 he also gave up 14.9% HR/FB, the highest percentage of his career.

Last year he actually reduced his BB/9 from 2.63 to 1.76 and still managed to post a 1.62 WHIP, meaning he got hit around. As evidenced by his decrease in line drives and vast increase in BABIP it seems Colon was very unlucky last year. Perhaps not unlucky to the point that, in a perfect world, he would have gone 13-3 with a 3.00 ERA but unlucky because his 6.34 ERA did not nearly tell enough of the story.

Colon may not be the dominant force he was at the beginning of his career but he doesn’t need to be to produce at the level at which this Red Sox team expects him to.

One of the perks of working for Redlasso is that I am constantly patrolling baseball blogs for all teams. This no-doubtedly keeps me apprised not just of the statistics but also some of the inner workings of teams I would otherwise not be familiar with. One of the articles I came across this morning, over at Mets Fever, initially confused me. The post discussed Adam Rubin’s assertion that the Mets were seriously thinking about sending Aaron Heilman to AAA in favor of Carlos Muniz.

Now, Heilman has not gotten off to the greatest start in reliever’s history, but here are four reasons why the Mets should not send him down.

1) HR/FB
David Appelman wrote about home runs per flyball a few hours ago, explaining that pitchers will generally be in the 10% range. In 2006, Heilman gave up 5.4% HR/FB; last year, 9.1%. This year it is currently 17.9%. It is not very likely he will sustain this pace. He might not regress to the 5-9% range but even something around 12% will cause some of his barometers to drop.

2) Rates of Balls in Play
From 2005-2007 Heilman had an average LD/GB/FB breakdown of 21%/45%/34%. Right now he is at 15.8%/47.4%/36.8%. He has given up ~5% less line drives yet his BABIP of .327 is much higher than the .290, .283, and .263 of the last three years. More of his flyballs are leaving the yard and more of his grounders are finding holes. Additionally, his BA against has been between .222 and .229 the last three years, nowhere near the .274 clip at which opponents are currently hitting him.

3) Mets Starters Are Not Helping
The starting rotation is averaging around 5.81 IP/start, just slightly over 5 2/3 innings. Last year the rotation came in at around 5.95. The bullpen is needed more because the starters are not going very deep into games, giving the Mets three relievers with 23+ games: Pedro Feliciano (26), Heilman (24), and Joe Smith (23). Unlike Feliciano and Smith, Heilman is not a specialist reliever and therefore has accrued more innings.

4) ERA Can Be Misleading for Relievers
Heilman has a 5.81 ERA and a 5.38 FIP, meaning his controllable skills have not been much better than the earned runs results; however, his ERA and FIP numbers are likely to regress when his HR/FB goes down. Additionally, of his 24 games, 17 have been good, or at least not terrible, meaning his high numbers are a direct result of just 29% of his outings.

Now, in defense of those considering the option, Heilman is walking 4.44 batters per nine innings, way up from the 2.09 last year. Still, though, he is striking out 9.23 per nine innings, way up from 6.59 last year. Due to the double increase he still has a respectable K/BB ratio. Another area of concern is his velocity. No, he isn’t throwing slower but rather has increased speed on all of his pitches. His slider has jumped from 83-84 mph to 87.1 mph. With a fastball at 92 mph the difference in speeds might not be large enough to make the slider effective.

Heilman may not repeat the successes of the last few seasons but he is not very likely to finish this season the way he has started it. If the Mets want to make a move to shake up the bullpen, perhaps they should bring up a starter that can go deeper into games rather than send down he who has been a consistent key cog over the last few seasons.