Blake Snell Has Better Command Than You Think

Two-time Cy Young Award winner Blake Snell is still a free agent toward the end of the third week of January, and there reportedly remains a large gap between his asking price and what his potential suitors are willing to pay him. Snell’s upside is undeniable, but there are some concerns about his long-term value. He has not been a model of durability or consistency throughout his eight-year career, and perhaps most concerning is that even at his best, he allows a lot walks.
Last year, despite his overall excellence, Snell led the majors with 99 walks, 16 more than the next two guys, Charlie Morton and Johan Oviedo. In terms of BB%, his 13.3% rate beats out Morton’s by 1.7 percentage points. Spending north of $200 million on a pitcher who gives up so many free passes, even one of Snell’s caliber, is a tough sell. However, Snell isn’t your typical wild thing who doesn’t know where the ball is going after he releases it. Rather, there appears to an intentionality to where he misses. His misses are frequently in locations where the worst outcome is a wasted pitch out of the zone, rather than over the middle of the plate where batters can do more damage. Such an approach can be incredibly unpleasing to watch, but it has proven to be effective for him, nonetheless.
That he has a propensity for giving up walks and preventing runs forces us to consider that walks alone might not be the best encapsulation of his command. His ability to live around the edges and leave his misses in low risk locations is a skill. To defend that notion, I’ll present some data outlining where Snell throws his pitches, and how that compares to his peers. Let’s start with fastball command. Below is a table of last year’s top 20 pitchers in fastball shadow zone percentage, out of the 119 pitchers who threw at least 1,000 heaters:
| Name | Total Fastballs | Shadow Zone% |
|---|---|---|
| Bailey Ober | 1062 | 51.2 |
| Ranger Suárez | 1254 | 49.9 |
| Joe Ryan | 1526 | 49.0 |
| Wade Miley | 1280 | 48.5 |
| Patrick Corbin | 1711 | 48.4 |
| Matt Strahm | 1018 | 48.3 |
| Kyle Freeland | 1127 | 48.0 |
| Luke Weaver | 1230 | 47.7 |
| Kyle Hendricks | 1167 | 47.6 |
| Sean Manaea | 1186 | 47.6 |
| Alex Cobb | 1001 | 47.6 |
| Aaron Nola | 1720 | 47.5 |
| George Kirby | 1723 | 47.4 |
| Reid Detmers | 1123 | 47.3 |
| Hunter Greene | 1135 | 47.3 |
| Blake Snell | 1541 | 47.2 |
| Pablo López | 1363 | 47.2 |
| Sonny Gray | 1578 | 47.0 |
| Trevor Williams | 1516 | 47.0 |
| Merrill Kelly | 1692 | 47.0 |
Snell’s positioning between command artists like George Kirby and Aaron Nola above him, and Pablo López and Sonny Gray below him is unexpected. (Hunter Greene and Reid Detmers are less regarded for their command, but even their walk rates were, respectively, 3.7 and 4 percentage points lower than Snell’s 13.3%.) When looking a little further, Snell had the third lowest frequency of heart percentage on his heater last year. It’s one of the reasons why he was able to avoid the long ball so well. His 0.75 HR/9 ranked fourth among qualified pitchers. This is not a new trend for him, either. His fastball Shadow Zone% was even better in 2022. His 26.6% Heart% was 2.6 percentage points higher than it was last year, but it still ranked 17th among the 117 pitchers who threw at least 1,000 fastballs, and consequently, he allowed just 0.77 HR/9.
There is more to Snell than just his fastball, though. After all, he threw heaters less than half the time last year. To get a true sense of his command, we also need to evaluate his three other pitches: curveball, slider, changeup. Snell ranked second among all pitchers in breaking ball run value last year, so presumably he has a good handle on his curve and slider. For this table, I’ll use chase zone percentage:
| Player | Total Breakers | Chase Zone% |
|---|---|---|
| Corbin Burnes | 791 | 31.2 |
| Trevor Williams | 659 | 30.3 |
| Alex Lange | 670 | 29.9 |
| Patrick Corbin | 1024 | 29.5 |
| Framber Valdez | 718 | 29.2 |
| Brady Singer | 1112 | 28.9 |
| Kyle Gibson | 816 | 28.6 |
| Spencer Strider | 1048 | 28.5 |
| Zack Wheeler | 748 | 28.5 |
| Dane Dunning | 757 | 28.4 |
| Zac Gallen | 849 | 28.2 |
| Marcus Stroman | 620 | 28.2 |
| Braxton Garrett | 849 | 28.0 |
| Tylor Megill | 652 | 27.8 |
| Blake Snell | 1043 | 27.7 |
| Roansy Contreras | 638 | 27.6 |
| José Berríos | 870 | 27.4 |
| Julian Merryweather | 634 | 27.4 |
| Michael Grove | 627 | 27.4 |
| Bobby Miller | 704 | 27.3 |
The data presented here combines all the breaking balls a pitcher throws. In my best effort to keep the denominators similar (this one has 106 pitchers), the minimum number of breaking balls is set at 600. Once again, Snell has good positioning. Most of this top 20 list features pitchers who throw a high volume of curveballs and place them well, like Corbin Burnes, Framber Valdez, and Zac Gallen. With his nasty slider, Spencer Strider is a bit of an outlier in this group, but other guys with high velocity sliders begin to pop up in the 20s. Point being, Snell is one of the best pitchers in baseball when it comes to landing breaking balls in competitive spots to get whiffs, even if they are out of the zone. This part was expected, given his elite whiff rates on both his slider and curveball.
This doesn’t tell the entire story about how Snell uses his breaking balls, though. Yes, we know he gets plenty of chases and whiffs, but he does it differently than any other pitcher in baseball. He doesn’t give hitters many opportunities to hit mistakes because, more often than not, he refuses to throw his breaking pitches anywhere in or around the strike zone. Of the 149 pitchers in baseball who threw at least 500 breaking balls in 2023, Snell had the lowest combined rate of pitches in the heart and shadow zones by nine percentage points. Nine! He is the only pitcher on that list who throws his breaking balls in these two zones less than half the time.
It becomes even more clear that his avoiding the zone is by design rather than an indication that he has poor command when looking at what happens when he doesn’t locate his breaking balls as well as he would like. Last year, he threw 29.5% of his breaking pitches in the waste zone, the highest rate in the majors. That’s 9.4 percentage points higher than the next guy, Shane Bieber.
His unwillingness to give in leads to a lot of noncompetitive pitches, but that’s the point. Batters can’t crush pitches if they don’t swing, and even when they do, the pitches are breaking far enough outside the zone that hitters can’t do much with them, anyway. Considering that last year he also mostly ditched his slider against right-handed hitters in favor of his changeup, there is good reason to believe he has a much better understanding of how to execute and optimize his arsenal.
Speaking of the changeup, the plus command trend holds up there as well. Last year, he landed the pitch in the shadow zone 50% of the time, the fifth highest rate among the 107 pitchers who threw at least 300 offspeed pitches.
Specifically looking at the shadow zone is important for this pitch, because it’s not the kind of changeup or forkball that has wicked drop and falls out of the zone. Instead, it’s a pitch that tunnels with his heater and is roughly 9 mph slower without big time movement. Its success hinges on landing it in the shadow zone with consistency. Snell had never done that until last year. After fading the pitch for most of his San Diego tenure, he bumped the usage back up over 20%.
Usually this is the point in an analysis where I’d lay out some video highlighting how this data looks in practice, but that doesn’t feel necessary here. For one, I’ve already told you how visually unpleasing watching Snell walk the house can be. If you’ve watched him navigate a game, you know the feeling. If you haven’t, then here are some games where he walks guys for nitpicking around the edges.
Conventional wisdom would suggest that because of all the walks, Snell has poor command, and therefore is a risky investment for teams looking to sign him. Yes, it is true that he allows an uncomfortable amount of walks, and for a lesser pitcher, this would not be ideal. Except, Snell is not a lesser pitcher, and his approach is not conventional. Despite the walks, maybe even because of them, Snell is adept at run prevention. He has a good feel for keeping his pitches in places where he won’t get burned too badly. After all, bases on balls are better than long balls, right?
Esteban is a contributing writer at FanGraphs. One of his main hobbies is taking dry hacks every time he sees a bat.
This is exactly how I pitch when playing MLB The Show
Absolutely!
How broken is FA and defeated is both gen pop and labor that this top amateur turned top prospect turned healthy 2x CY winner with 96 and some of the most productive secondaries in the sport is so easy to Actually Not That Good now that he can ask for money? Watching the public just hand our overlords all The Futures for imagined efficiency (esp payroll) is amazing
He’s had as many 4+ fWAR seasons as Zack Wheeler had when Wheeler was a free agent – and Wheeler was younger. If Snell was after that deal, plus a bit more, sure he’d be signed now.
Wheeler’s deal
is a half decade old and he also had a TJ. Do more to earn the leveragez to demand less is just another indication that we’re all lost while firmly under the thumb
Snell’s best seasons grade out better with bWAR (a 7 and a 6 win season – Wheelers best pre-Phillies was a pair of 3 win seasons) – but every other season is below 2 bWAR.
We could compare him to Carlos Rodon, who put up back to back 5 bWAR seasons before his deal with the Yankees but was a year younger when he signed. 6 years and 160 seems like the Wheeler deal plus a bit more (1 more year, 30 more million dollars).
Do teams view TJ surgery 3 years ago badly? In a way, did that make Wheeler more attractive, as he’s had the surgery, and recovered, and pitched better than pre-surgery?
I don’t think teams look at TJ surgery so badly, certainly not someone like Wheeler demonstrating a full recovery with premium velocity, but also believe their ultimate agenda tilts more towards financial domination, wage stagnation and deflation than something as archaic as being good at baseball. I maybe don’t think they (the org as a private entity, not the employee FO or player) care if a signing goes poorly or not tbh: contracts are insured and decrease in real Value for the players every year, the public’s paying for more or less everything anyway, and real wages are veeeeeeeeery slow to grow and lag way behind what they could be. If it were limited to athletics that would be different, still terrible, but the outcome of doing more to fake earn the fake leverage to demand less is the story of labor everywhere for the past 60+ years
I wouldn’t be surprised if Snell ended up with a deal more similar to Correa’s 3/108 or the Scherzer and Verlander deals from last year rather than a 5-6 year deal
“…a risky investment for teams looking to sign him.”
Not just risky. The riskiest potential contract I can remember. Signing Snell for $200+M would be suicide for a small market team. I think the Yankees offer of 6/$150M is more risk than I would be comfortable taking on even with their payroll. Snell looks like he has to work so hard just to get through six innings, I’m surprised his arm hasn’t fallen off yet and I can’t imagine him pitching at age 35.
A bit of an unfair snippet to quote. He’s actually making the opposite point if you continued
I’m not nearly smart enough to figure it out but common sense (if such a thing exists) would suggest that high BB%’s impact high K%’s guys like Snell alot less than the traditional “walks are bad” mindset thinks because the walks dont have as much of a chance to hurt with the overall lack of balls in play. How much it benefits him would be hard to sus out though.
The problem of course would be the lack of room for error. If he stops striking guys out at a high right for a game/week/year suddenly he is probably a not great pitcher. Kind of like Chris Davis, but a pitcher.
Many studies have shown that the more important number to look at is his K/BB ratio, not his BB/9.
As long as the pitcher can maintain a high K/BB ratio, even if his walk rate is high, if he striking out even more, then his ERA will be good.
Think of it this way. Basically a good ratio is 3.0 K/BB. If you walk an extra batter, but strike out three also, you just replaced roughly a hit (assuming BABIP of .300, for the extra three strikeouts) with a walk (reducing offense damage) and the three strikeouts also reduce offensive damage.
Using K% and BB%, for each percent of walks, if you are producing multiples of that in strikeouts, then the K%-BB% gets larger and larger, which is what is good for pitching well.
BB% is not BB/9
Actually the better metric to use would be K%-BB%, not K/BB ratio. Either way though, neither metric will capture the full effect of what Shirtless George Brett is describing for someone as extreme as Snell
Great analysis! Making me rethink my view of Snell for my fantasy strategy.
“He’s missing because he wants to miss” seems a bit like galaxy-brain thinking. I think it’s more likely that his stuff is just so hellacious that even when he’s missing his spots he still has margin for error.
Snell was very clear during the season that he was comfortable with the walks because he was purposefully not giving in, so I do think this reflects an intentional approach. This is supported by the lack of misses in the heart of the zone.
Shirtless George Brett’s question above about what happens if his Ks dip and he’s forced to come into the zone more often is a good one. Last year, Snell had the 5th lowest Zone contact % (min 80IP to eliminate RPs), which implies that he could still do well if forced to up his Zone% from a league-worst 42%.
It would be very interesting to see what would happen if a team just conciously decide to not swing against Snell. Literally just stand there and assume he will throw 4 balls before he throws 3 pitches in the zone. You might say “well he would just pound the zone once he realized what they are doing” but thats really what you want him to do if you are the hitter. Once he starts throwing more strikes, you start swinging.
Interesting related fact; last season 71% of PA’s took the first pitch against Snell. Collectively, they had a .325 OBP a .632 OPS. Not amazing but certainly better than the .214/.454 marks that the 29% of hitters who swung at the first pitch fared.
Just for comparison Spencer Striders splits were .281 OBP, .715 OPS on first pitch swings and .278 and .578 on first pitch takes.
The way to test this is at the game level, not the season. Season-level stats could just mean he is streaky. At the game level, you’d want to see games where he walked a lot but didn’t give up runs. I tried looking at the game log to see if this was true, but I came to the conclusion I would need a more sophisticated method than eyeballing it.
My question here is, what are Patrick Corbin and Trevor Williams doing on lists of pitchers who were mostly good in 2023? For them, is it that they don’t have the stuff to strike people out, so they wind up nibbling and eventually having to come over the heart?
Looked up Corbin because I was curious as well.
It would appear that hitters can spot the breaking stuff coming. He got a much smaller number of swings in that area than average, and thus had a whopping -20 run value there.
Also, the top six sections of the zone had single digit whiff rates, including an astonishing 0 for 60 on whiffs in the middle-in RHB zone.
Note also that they are the only two guys who, with Snell, appear on both lists.
If those “durability concerns” turn into lost velocity it could get ugly.
I think this doesn’t quite touch the reasons to be afraid of Snell. Yes, he succeeds in a way that other pitchers generally cannot succeed. He’s done that for quite a while. I do not think that teams are concerned that what he’s done cannot be replicated.
But what he’s done depends on locating in these locations mentioned here, and on pitches that generate tons and tons of whiffs and really bad contact. All the walks do not hurt him because base hits are so, so hard to get.
And the problem for giving Blake Snell a long term contract is age-related decline. Snell’s approach walks a razor’s edge – it’s dangerous and would be unacceptable for a pitcher with lesser stuff than he. As Blake Snell ages, he *will* become a pitcher with lesser stuff. Physical ability declines over time, constantly, and basically without exception. He will lose a tick of velocity. He will lose just a tiny bit of movement. It will not take much – at some point, those pitches won’t be quite nasty enough to generate the complete dearth of good contact they do right now. And then those walks will be a catastrophic problem.
Snell’s unique approach *amplifies* the risks related to his aging curve. This is what’s keeping teams away from him, especially over a long period. Because his method of success is so unprecedented and unique, how much he can physically lose before it becomes untenable is basically an unknown quality. It is hard to commit 5 or 6 years to that.
he has kind of a Patrick Corbin feel around 2018-2019. OF course, he has a longer record of success at it.
Another interesting discussion point I’ve heard on Snell, from 2018-2023, he has only 10 HBP in 774.1 IP. To put that in context, 101 pitchers have thrown at least 500 IP since 2018. Out of those 101, Snell is literally tied for second to last with 10 HBP. Snell is tied with Jose Quintana (659.2) and Ross Stripling (586.2). Only Ryu with 9 (580 IP) has less.
By contrast, Charlie Morton, who was mentioned in this article for having the 2nd most BBs in 2023, has 79 (!) HBP since 2018. That’s pretty interesting, and it gives credence that Snell knows what he’s doing more than surface level BB% would suggest.
Blake Snell is the Javy Baez of pitchers. He does it unconventionally, and there’s always the worry that it will all completely crater if he has even a little age decline.
Its different because Baez’s unconventional wasn’t actually new or unique. We’ve seen guys like him before and since – super athletic, super aggressive, no pitch selection, make it work with extreme physical gifts for a while. Tim Anderson was just one of that player profile who just hit his crater point. There’s been a lot of them, relatively speaking.
We *know* those guys crater when the physical ability slips a little bit because they don’t have the skill set underneath to survive.
Snell lacks comparables, but he does something that’s almost always bad and gets away with it on physical ability. Someday, time will come for that ability, and then what?
I wouldnt even say Snell lacks comparables. Even among current plays, Robby Ray exists. Dylan Cease too. Going back farther a guy like Kerry Wood has a similar profile. The Mariners version of Randy Johnson would be another. Hell, you could argue that the most famous pitcher ever, Nolan Ryan, is a decent comp (obvious caveat being durability).
Snell is a outlier but he is by no means the first high K%, high BB% guy to find success.
He’s an outlier among those outliers. He finds more success than the guys you listed – he’s been arguably the best pitcher in his league in multiple seasons while doing it. You’re right that this is a niche that we’ve seen before, but Snell is taking an extreme niche to extremes, and that’s why there’s so much unknown about exactly how much he can decline and sustain it.
With Snell, I would be equally unsurprised by both of the following outcomes:
Snell is good for another 3 years; in 2027, the velocity has declined 1.5-2.5mph from 2023’s number and the movement is down a little. He’s very suddenly a below-average pitcher as the walks get driven in
and
All of that, except it just happens in 2024 when he loses 0.75mph from last year.
The uncertainty bands on Snell are enormous, wider than most pitchers and especially wider than most pitchers with his results (who tend to be the closest things to sure things you can find out there: dudes with multiple CYA are the ones teams usually actually trust). No wonder no one wants to give him 6/200. I don’t think I’d want to give him 4/120. I expect Snell will go off a cliff someday when his stuff can’t support his pitching style, and I honestly don’t know if that will happen in 2 months or 5 years. None of them would shock me.
I think that Baez might be even more of an outlier. Baez does literally everything wrong at the plate, but he was so good he got away with it for a while. But guys like Carlos Zambrano, Kerry Wood, and Rich Harden all kind of had this profile.
Baez is not that unprecedented either: Tim Anderson walked (walks?) even *less* and swung at even more garbage than Baez did, for instance.
That profile has existed for a long time and even has some history of being fairly good for 1-3 years before the athleticism declines just a little and the bat control isn’t good enough to get away with it anymore. They have existed for a long time, back to the times of guys like Brian Harper
What’s funny are the catchers with that profile – like Salvy Perez, or AJ Pierzynski.
Hard question to answer, but: would Snell be as or more effective on a per-inning basis, and maybe able to pitch more innings, if he attacked the strike zone? He has great stuff. Would he be even better if he pounded the zone and dared batters to hit him?
Perhaps we could learn something from how Snell pitches with the bases loaded, so that a walk would force in a run? I’m thinking back to Daisuke Matsuzaka. He was regarded at the time as having very good stuff, IIRC. But yet he was maddening to watch. He’d nibble away, walking lots of batters in the process. But once the bases were loaded, he’d attack the strike zone–and get excellent results doing so. Much better than his results in other situations. (That’s my recollection, anyway; too lazy to look up where I read this.) That left me wondering why Matsuzaka didn’t just attack the zone all the time.
So FG’s splits don’t split out base/out states exactly, but you can learn something from the categories that do exist. In *2023*, Snell allowed a substantially higher OPS with the bases empty than he did with men on base or men in scoring position.
However, *for his career*, there is no difference in his performance across those subsets. And Snell did not start pitching this way in 2023.
BBRef does have base/out splits. For his career, Matsuzaka had 9 BB and 27 K in 101 PA with the bases loaded–significantly better than his career BB rate of 11.2% and his career K rate of 20.9%. And his tOPS+ with the bases loaded was 65, which is to say batters did much worse against him with the bases loaded than usually.
Snell also does much better with the bases loaded with a 60 tOPS+, but this is driven by a .184 BABIP more than by coming into the zone. In 79 PA he has 11 BB and 28 K, which is a 13.9% BB rate and 35.4% K rate, which are both higher than his career rates (10.9%/29.7%).
Mostly, though, these sample sizes are probably too small to draw any conclusions.
This reminds me of an article I read a long time ago, around 2005, by ESPN Rob Neyer, about Kirk Rueter and Nate Corn-something.
It was noted that Rueter would adjusting his batter approach depending on the men in base situation. He would strike out more, challenging hitters, and giving up more homers, with no men on base, but then would nibble and reduce homers when there were men on base. Basically trying to limit the damage done by homers, limiting the crooked number innings.
But FIP basically penalizes pitchers who adjust their strategy like that, because the formula assumes average standard run production values for walks and homers, whereas these pitchers increased walks but limited homers.
Right. While fip is a very good tool overall, and does a great job for the masses it isn’t going to be perfect for everyone overall. Same way that babip outliers exist. Tim Andersons collapse didn’t indicate everyone was right on him, it’s just that once the slightest slip happens a profile like that becomes much harder to make work.
I mean I was exactly right about Tim Anderson when I said that his production wasn’t sustainable because he was exactly the kind of player who would collapse when his athleticism declined just a little and it may be the most downvoted thing I’ve ever opined in the FanGraphs comment section, to be totally honest with you.
Even though it was abundantly obvious, people love them some outlier players.
I really had people right here on this very website insist that no, Tim Anderson was actually the generational outlier so talented that he would be able to sustainably be above-league average with a 2.5% BB rate, and he would not be a flash in the pan that was only good for a couple years like every other guy who succeeds with that skillset.
You mean you were being a wet blanket about a player who was still pretty good at the time and people called you out for it?
This story doesn’t make you look as good as you think it does.
I dunno about you, but when I look at the performance of a player in MLB, my first question, and typically the most important question is “How do I expect them to perform going forward?”
With Anderson, that answer was pretty obviously negative and people were talking about how he should get extended in 9 figure ranges, and that was *absolutely nuts*.
People should enjoy the players on their teams, that doesn’t obligate the rest of us to laud them or expect continued goodness or greatness from them when that is improbable.
Understanding when player performances are unlikely to be sustainable is pretty important; in fact, it’s pretty close to *the entire point of the sabermetric endeavor*, which I would describe broadly as “understand the game better to have a better grasp of what’s going to happen next year/for the rest of this year”. How good someone has been or what he has done is only really relevant to the subset that are fans of that team and got to experience it – for everyone else, a player’s relevance is entirely future-forward (should I want my team to acquire him? is he going to be a threat when we play them next year?).
Sometimes that’s bad news. Sometimes it’s good news. It is what it is.
With that said, I appreciate that some people disagree. Modern sabermetric analysis has become extremely focused on the future, and this has been it’s breaking point with Bill James, who disagrees with many of the conclusions it makes, because James has always been fundamentally interested in looking backwards: He wants to compare great deeds and players across seasons and put them into context.
But most people involved in modern baseball, from teams to fans, are interested in *what will this guy do next* not *what did he do last year*. For teams, and for some fans, that’s about winning or not winning. For others, its about winning (at fantasy).
There’s a subset of Fangraphs user, one that is even more populous if you head over into some of the other FG-related communities like Effectively Wild, that is just obsessed with novelty. From guys like Anderson to guys like Willians Astudillo, doing *not what everyone’s doing* gets that subset of people going and fires their imaginations. Then they end with a wet splat of irrelevance, but those people have already moved onto the *new* novelty performance.
Interesting that Tylor Megill ranks just ahead of Snell on the breaking ball chart. Does that suggest that, if Megill gets his good fastball back, he could take the step forward that it seemed like he was in early 2022? When he was throwing 96-97 instead of 93-94, he was terrific.