For a catcher, the “tools of ignorance” is an endearing term used to sum up the challenges of the position in a neat and tidy phrase. Over the past three seasons, scouting well over 100 games and a few hundred prospects has led me to develop my own “tools of magnificence” as a handful of players have displayed 80-grade tools which are now seared into my scouting conscious.
It is a simple question.
What is sabermetrics?
Not the history of it, but what is it, right now? What is, in our nerdiest of lingoes, its derivative? Where is it pointing? What does it do?
Last Tuesday I created no little stir when I listed the 2012 saber teams, delineating them according to their perceived embrace of modern sabermetrics.
Today, I recognize I needed to take a step back and first define sabermetrics, because it became obvious quickly I did not have the same definition at heart as some of the readers and protesters who gathered outside my apartment.
I believe, and this is my belief — as researcher and a linguist — that sabermetrics is not statistics. The term itself has come to — or needs to — describe more than just on-base percentage, weighted runs created plus, fielding independent pitching, and wins above replacement.
Sabermetrics is the advanced study of baseball, not the burying of one’s head in numbers.
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Silly monkey, BRAINS ARE FOR ZOMBIES.
Casey Kotchman is in many ways a man without a home — a player equal parts under-appreciated and over-valued, who irks both old and new schools at the same time. Old school analysts say his defense is amazing, but they cannot quantify it, and in 2011, they claimed his cleared vision meant he finally learned how to aim the ball “where they ain’t,” but he’s still a .268 hitter with little power. The new school says he’s worth about 7.6 runs per season defensively, but worth ~1.1 WAR per 600 PAs — not good — and his BABIP was high 2011, so he should not be able to repeat his success.
Despite his inability to build a consistent following of fans in the baseball outsiders communities, Kotchman seems to have some insider communities very much interested in him, as Tom Tango points out:
Kotchman’s last four teams: Redsox, Mariners, Rays, Indians. Can we say that a team that signs Kotchman is saber-leaning?
Indeed, after spending five and a half seasons on the Angels’ and Braves’ rosters, Kotchman has begun to shuffle around with the Nerdz, most recently signing with the Cleveland Indians. It makes sense too — Kotchman’s lack of power keeps him cheap, and his strong defense keeps him amorphous for the old school teams, while the new schools might have different valuations on Kotchman, they can at least quantify his contributions and better know how he fits.
Then, on Monday, the Houston Astros signed Justin Ruggiano, long-time Tampa Bay Rays outfielder who was never good enough to stick on the Rays’ roster, but who possesses strong defensive chops and above average patience. His lack of power and ~.290 batting average, however, must make him a mystery — or at least an undesirable asset — to the old school teams.
Upon Ruggiano signing with the Astros, a once highly old school team, my reaction was all: “Welp, that’s one more team to compete with” — and then it occurred to me! No only have the Astros entered the realm of, so to speak, saber-minded organizations, but so have the long-backward Chicago Cubs.
Suddenly the league looks very different.
This morning I was scrolling through some of Dan Szymborski’s projections over at Baseball Think Factory, and I noticed that he had run a projection for Matt Stairs. I had not heard any news about the guy we all know now as a pinch-hitter. As I scoured the internets (read: typed “Matt Stairs” into Google) I quickly realized that Stairs had retired, though since he will be a studio analyst for NESN this year, all is not lost. Still, it will be disappointing to not see him on the field any longer.
Few pinch hitters struck fear in my heart the way Matt Stairs did. When Stairs came to the plate against a team for which I was rooting, I always sure that something bad was about to happen. Even still, I couldn’t hate him. A portly slugger with a great sense of humor — I will always remember Will Carroll forwarding the Baseball Prospectus email group an email from Stairs with a picture of his flexed calf muscle and promptly doubling over in laughter — Stairs was exceedingly easy to root for, and in the latter, pinch-hitting days of his career he became somewhat of a nerdy folk hero.
GM Alex Anthopoulos and the Blue Jays have made their deal with former Reds, Brewers, and Rangers closer Francisco Cordero — to a one-year deal worth $4.5 million — official, reports Jon Heyman of CBS.
A successful high-leverage reliever at one point, who struck out more than 25% of batters faced every season between 2003 and 2008, Cordero’s velocity — and with it, his performance — has declined in recent seasons. Last season, with his fastball velocity having dropped to 93.0 mph per PITCHf/x — from 95.0 mph in 2009, for example — Cordero posted his worst strikeout rate (15.3%) since 2000 and second-worst xFIP- (108). His fastball usage from last season — at a career low 37.4%, per PITCHf/x — reflects Cordero’s changed approach.
However, the deal is notable less for the specifics regarding Cordero (about whom Jim Breen wrote last week) and more for what it represents in terms of the Blue Jays’ capacity for rebuilding a bullpen that was entirely gutted by the end of last season after a trade that saw Octavio Dotel, Jason Frasor, and Marc Rzepczynski go to St. Louis and Chicago variously for center fielder Colby Rasmus.
This offseason, Toronto has traded for Sergio Santos (due just $1 million), reacquired Frasor ($3.75 million), signed Darren Oliver ($4.5 million), and now Cordero. That’s almost an entire bullpen for just under $14 million — i.e. only slightly more than what Jonathan Papelbon will be making per annum for the next four years. As Alex Lewin demonstrated in a piece from late November, the risk associated with that sort of long-term reliever contract generally doesn’t merit the potential rewards. The Blue Jays are clearly proceeding with that notion in mind.
Players leave money on the table every year. It’s true! Pitchers, in particular, have been signing away free agency years at below-market prices for a while now.
Consider the most recent big signing, Yu Darvish. He most likely would have made more money had he stayed in Japan for three years and come over as a free agent. Through the arbitration process in Japan, he was due around $27 million over the next three years, and his deal with the Rangers only pays him $25 million over the same time frame. Had he continued his dominance, and come over in three years, it seems likely he would have made more than $30 million over three years. He would have had the leverage of the unrestricted free agent.
But Darvish’ plight resembled that of the arbitration-eligible pitcher here in the states. He could only talk to one team, which should sound familiar. And he probably valued some non-monetary benefits that a long-term contract offered: security and the ability to compete against the best in the world. How prevalent is this sort of give-and-take in the normal process here in the states? How many pitchers have given up free agent years at below the going rate?
Has it ever happened to you where one number — just one measly stat — throws your mind on a complete tangent, and results in you wasting a half hour of your life? This happens to me more often than I should admit. For instance, I was taking a stroll this morning through the FanGraphs leaderboards when one stat jumped out and lodged itself in my brain. Oh look, Brandon Morrow’s swinging strike rate (11.5%) was the second highest in the majors last season. That’s not even a surprising statistics; I know Morrow is a strikeout ace, and that his ability to get hitters to swing and miss is among the best in the game. But for some reason, the stat wouldn’t leave me alone.
Me: Didn’t Morrow just sign a new contract extension?
Other Me: Yes, that’s right — 3 years, $20 million.
Me: So the Blue Jays must think his ERA will eventually fall in line with his peripherals, right? You don’t make that sort of a commitment to a 4.50 ERA pitcher, and the Blue Jays are smarter than that. Morrow did post a 3.31 SIERA these past two seasons…
Other Me: They must. But Morrow’s problems have largely stemmed from an inability to strand runners on base (<70% LOB% over past two years). Could this possibly be a pitch selection problem? Or maybe Morrow isn’t able to go to his best whiff pitch when runners are on base, for whatever reason?
Me: For that matter, what is Morrow’s best swing-and-miss pitch?
Other Me: Uhhh…
Just like that, one simple statistic turned into a full-blown investigation.
Right-hander Francisco Cordero sat on the sideline as every other available closer on the free agent market found employment this winter. On Tuesday afternoon, however, it was reported that the 36-year-old native of the Dominican Republic agreed to a one-year, $4.5M deal with the Toronto Blue Jays.
He is expected to serve as the set-up man for the newly-acquired Sergio Santos, which will be the first year in a non-closer role for Cordero since he set-up for Ugueth Urbina for half of the 2003 season. Dave Cameron adroitly illustrated why Cordero was left on the outside of the closer’s market looking in — mostly due to a troubling decline in the ability to miss bats over the past few years — in this article.
It’s beneficial for the Blue Jays that Cordero will not be relied upon to be the team’s closer, because that declining strikeout rate was not the only red flag raised in 2011. The vast chasm between his 2.45 ERA and 4.02 FIP last season has been well-documented, but the other major concern stems from what appears to be a huge improvement from last year: his walk rate.
Fans can say what they will about the Jays efforts in attracting big ticket free agents but there aren’t many organizations in baseball that can match Toronto’s dedication to scouting and player development. Since taking over the general manager’s role, Alex Anthopoulos has rejuvenated the minor league system – through trades, the draft and international free agency – and the the efforts are about to bear fruit with numerous prospects nearing graduation.
1. Anthony Gose, OF
BORN: Aug. 10, 1990
EXPERIENCE: 4 seasons
ACQUIRED: 2008 2nd round, California HS (by Phillies)
2010-11 TOP 30 RANKING: 11th
Gose narrowly edges d’Arnaud for top spot on the Jays list because of his potential as a four-tool player (The hit tool is the only non-plus). The outfielder has an exciting mix of speed, power, arm strength and overall center-field defense that is hard to find. Previously more of a singles hitter, the Jays player development staff had Gose focus more on driving the ball at double-A in 2011 and his ISO rate rose form .122 with the Phillies organization in ’10 to .161. Gose struggles to make consistent contact and posted a strikeout rate of 26% in ’11. His willingness to take walks (10.6 BB%) helps to make up for the low batting average and allowed him to attempt 84 stolen bases (He was successful 69 times). I’ve been cautious with my rankings of Gose in the past but I’m becoming a believer as he continues to show improvements as he climbs the minor league ladder.
Brandon Morrow is set to sign a three-year, $20 million contract extension with the Toronto Blue Jays. The deal reportedly includes a $10 million option or a $1 million buyout in 2015. While we don’t have the particulars of the deal at this point — including how much Morrow could make in each of his three seasons — it’s sure to create some arguments among fans.
In Morrow’s two seasons with the Blue Jays, his 4.62 ERA has been below-average among American League starters. Yet Morrow’s FIP and xFIP during the same time indicate that he should be one of the league’s better ones. As a result, many stat analysts have predicted a major improvement from Morrow. But until his ERA matches up with his advanced stats, Morrow is going to remain a frustrating player.
