For those who fell asleep after the eighth inning, the Cardinals are not heading to Texas with a 2-0 series lead. The Rangers managed just three hits through seven innings before mounting a ninth-inning comeback in a rather unusual manner.

Ian Kinsler singled to open the frame and subsequently stole second base. The play was extremely close, but Kinsler’s hand appeared to touch the base a split second before the tag was applied. In real time, however, the quick tag after a tremendous throw looked to have gotten Kinsler. Kudos to the umpires for getting the call right in spite of the dramatic tag designed to obscure their perception of the play.

Elvis Andrus lined a single to center, sending Kinsler to third. Andrus advanced to second on a missed cutoff/missed catch error, putting runners at second and third with nobody out. The previously lifeless Rangers had a pulse, and with Josh Hamilton, Michael Young and Adrian Beltre due up, odds were slim that the Cardinals would escape the frame sans-damage.

Read the rest of this entry »

One of narratives leading up to Game 1 of the World Series emphasized the Cardinals’ and the Rangers’ heavy use of their bullpens in the Division and League Championship Series. We were told to expect pitching changes early and often, especially from Cardinals manager Tony LaRussa, who has a reputation for micromanaging his pitching staff to get just the right match-up.

In Game 1, LaRussa did not disappoint. Cardinals starter Chris Carpenter threw six innings, giving up five hits and two runs. After LaRussa pulled Carpenter for a pinch hitter in the bottom of the sixth, he used five relievers out of the bullpen to pitch the final three innings. The ‘pen acquitted itself well: three innings, one hit, no runs.

In the Division Series, the Cardinals’ starting pitchers threw 30 total innings to 14 for the bullpen. That’s 68% of the innings for the starters; 32% for the relievers. Over the five games played, LaRussa averaged 3.2 pitching changes per game.

In the NLCS, Cardinals starting pitchers were on the mound for only 24.1 innings to the bullpen’s 21.2 innings, a ratio of 53% to 47% over the six games played. LaRussa made an average of 4.67 pitching changes per game.

Despite LaRussa’s reputation, his bullpen management in the NLCS is the exception, not the rule, of his reign as the Cardinals skipper.

Let me explain.

Read the rest of this entry »

Rangers manager Ron Washington played the first chess matchup of Game One correctly, bringing in Alexi Ogando to face Allen Craig in the sixth inning, but Washington imploded the next time he had to make an important move, and Cardinals manager Tony La Russa and his charges started the World Series with a win.

Read the rest of this entry »

It seems to happen every year — a good hitter gets especially hot in the playoffs and people start talking about how he should get the “Barry Bonds Treatment,” i.e., walking the batter almost every time he is up. It is generally a bad idea to give a free pass to any hitter that often, but if any current player deserves that treatment, it is Albert Pujols. A comparison of Pujols and Bonds as hitters is not quite as interesting as it sounds. Pujols’ highest single-season wRC+ is 185 in 2003; in 1993, Bonds’ wRC+ was 193 and that was only his sixth-best season. What more is interesting is the thought that teams should walk Pujols almost every time he is up. If you are reading FanGraphs, I hope that you know that walking even a Hall-of-Famer-if-he-retires-three-years-ago hitter like Pujols every time is bad strategy. However, Pujols is obviously good enough that opposing managers are justified in giving him a free pass in certain situations. How common are those situations?

Read the rest of this entry »

David Freese has become a household name amongst the baseball community over the past two weeks.

It’s not difficult to see why. It’s an incredibly easy story to tell. Freese attended high school in Wildwood, MO — which is just 30 miles away from St. Louis — and spent his childhood dreaming of playing professional baseball for the Cardinals. You can almost picture him as a fifth or sixth grade boy out taking grounders at the neighborhood ballpark, pretending to be Ozzie Smith at shortstop and firing the baseball over to Gregg Jefferies at first base.

Now, at 28-years-old, he is the National League Championship Series MVP and a hometown hero, after hitting .425/.465/.850 with five doubles and four home runs through the first two series of the postseason for the very team about which he grew up dreaming.

That is not what makes David Freese an interesting baseball story, though. That is simply the story that generates page views and sells newspapers, especially amongst the St. Louis Cardinals’ fanbase.

Read the rest of this entry »

It’s World Series time, so that must mean it’s time to discuss (read — argue about, mock, decry, belittle, etc.) the differences between the American and National Leagues. Sometimes, the fact that an extra hitter has to hit for a National League team or that one less gets to hit for the American League team can lead to some interesting decisions, like Vladimir Guerrero playing right field, David Ortiz playing first base or Ryan Spilborghs serving as a designated hitter. This season however, the moves should be pretty cut and dry.

Read the rest of this entry »

Sometimes announcers state that a player is not able to catch up to a fastball. Common sense states that the faster the pitch the harder it is to hit. I decided to look at the results of every fastball swung at to see how the results changed as the speed increased or decreased.

Fastballs generally have a 20 MPH difference in speeds (80 MPH to 100 MPH) at the major league level, so a baseline of what happens at every swing needed to be created. I took the results of every fastball over the last 4 years. I divided them up by in 1 MPH intervals (except for those >100 MPH which were grouped together). Then, I divided up the results further into those pitches missed, fouled off, hit into an out or hit for a hit. Taking all the data, I got the following results:

Read the rest of this entry »

With the Rangers and Cardinals each capturing their respective league championships over the weekend, one central theme of the 2011 postseason has become obvious – how important a dominating bullpen can be in October. Both the Rangers and the Cardinals were let down by sub-par starting pitching, but were rescued by shut-down work from their relief corps, and the depth of both bullpens allowed each manager to have a quick hook with struggling starting pitchers.

Throughout both series, but especially the NLCS, this was treated as something of a surprising development. We were constantly being told that the failure of the Cardinals starters to get beyond the fifth inning was a significant problem, and that if Tony LaRussa didn’t start to get more innings from his rotation, the Cardinals were doomed. Of course, the Cardinals never did get much from their starters in the NLCS (they combined to pitch 24 1/3 innings in six games) but won the series pretty easily anyway, outscoring Milwaukee 43-26 in the process.

The reason for the Cardinals success – besides an offense that put up seven runs per game, which never hurts – was the quality and quantity of work that LaRussa was able to extract from his bullpen; Jason Motte, Fernando Salas, Mark Rzepczynski, Octavio Dotel and Lance Lynn allowed three runs in 24 2/3 innings. The Cardinals essentially shifted innings from their starters to their relievers, and given what we know about the relative performance of starters and relievers, this was absolutely the right call.

Read the rest of this entry »

The playoffs often cultivate an ‘anything goes’ environment, where aces like Zack Greinke and Cliff Lee become legitimate bullpen options and starters get lifted before the fifth inning ends for a more favorable matchup. In a sense, playoff rules trump what fans grow accustomed to during the regular season as every single game is of tremendous importance. While many managers alter their mindsets to treat each playoff game as a must-win, the 2011 postseason has shown that the more holistic view of the series can lead to better decision-making processes.

Last week, Dave Cameron discussed Jim Leyland’s refusal to use Justin Verlander in Game Four of the Championship Series. Leyland’s quotes — mainly that using Rick Porcello over Verlander was a no-brainer, or that not using his ace was the best thing for the team — drew significant ire but ultimately made sense. Verlander pitching on short rest would reduce his effectiveness, and the Tigers still needed to win at least two games after that outing. Pitching him on short rest would have been an example of managing for the present as opposed to the future.

Though that type of approach is traditionally more optimal, especially in a five-game division series, it makes little sense in the latter playoff rounds.

Leyland wasn’t alone in that line of thinking, as both Ron Roenicke and Tony LaRussa made decisions based on playoff series, as a whole, instead of a collection of immensely important individual games.

Read the rest of this entry »