The worst time to strike out is with a runner on third base and less than 2 outs. In fact, it’s runner on 3B and exactly 1 out. The pitcher knows it, the batter knows it, the fielder knows it, the runner knows it. The fans know it. Everyone is extremely aware that getting the second out changes the entire dynamic of the situation, since now only a positive event can score that runner on third base.

We can even quantify this situation rather precisely. With a runner on third and 1 out, we expect around 0.94 runs to score to the end of the inning. But with 2 outs, it’s all the way down to 0.37 runs. A strikeout in that situation is worth an astounding -0.57 runs.

On the other hand a sacrifice fly clears the bases, gets an extra out (run expectancy down to 0.09 runs), but adds a run to the scoreboard, so the total run value is 1.09 runs, or a net gain of +.15 runs. The sac fly is one of the very few times that trading a base for an out is a net positive.

We have a potential swing of 0.72 runs between a “bad” out and a “good” out. With everyone in the ballpark well aware of the situation, and with outs so common place, it’s clear the pitcher is going to do his best to pitch in a way to increase strikeouts at the cost of perhaps an increase in low impact walks with first base open. And the batter is going to do his best to counteract that, and not try to strike out at the cost of perhaps a tiny bit of power. Everyone is changing their strategy.

But remove the specific context, and an out is an out.

So, how do you want to account for this specific play?