Playoff Hindsight and Short Rest

The playoffs often cultivate an ‘anything goes’ environment, where aces like Zack Greinke and Cliff Lee become legitimate bullpen options and starters get lifted before the fifth inning ends for a more favorable matchup. In a sense, playoff rules trump what fans grow accustomed to during the regular season as every single game is of tremendous importance. While many managers alter their mindsets to treat each playoff game as a must-win, the 2011 postseason has shown that the more holistic view of the series can lead to better decision-making processes.

Last week, Dave Cameron discussed Jim Leyland’s refusal to use Justin Verlander in Game Four of the Championship Series. Leyland’s quotes — mainly that using Rick Porcello over Verlander was a no-brainer, or that not using his ace was the best thing for the team — drew significant ire but ultimately made sense. Verlander pitching on short rest would reduce his effectiveness, and the Tigers still needed to win at least two games after that outing. Pitching him on short rest would have been an example of managing for the present as opposed to the future.

Though that type of approach is traditionally more optimal, especially in a five-game division series, it makes little sense in the latter playoff rounds.

Leyland wasn’t alone in that line of thinking, as both Ron Roenicke and Tony LaRussa made decisions based on playoff series, as a whole, instead of a collection of immensely important individual games.

Shaun Marcum pitched very well for the Brewers this season, and without his acquisition it’s unlikely that Zack Greinke waives his no-trade clause and joins the team. Despite that, Marcum will be viewed as a major reason the Brewers bounced out. In three starts, he produced a 16.20 ERA over 9 2/3 innings. His strikeouts and walks were identical at five apiece, and though he kept the ball on the ground more often than not, he wasn’t missing bats. Perhaps it was standard fatigue — he is still two years removed from major surgery — or random ineffectiveness, but the common narrative was that he looked cooked and eminently more hittable than at the regular season’s midway point.

Even though Marcum’s struggles to end the season carried over into the playoffs, manager Ron Roenicke unequivocally stated that the former Blue Jays starter was his Game Six starter. Yovani Gallardo was deemed unavailable, even in the bullpen, because managing completely for that sixth game would hinder the Brewers’ ability to win a potential deciding game. Gallardo didn’t figure to perform well on short rest in Roenicke’s eyes, and the perceived difference between him on short rest and this version of Marcum was minimal. Maybe they gained a smidgen of win probability by going with Gallardo on short rest, but they lose a good deal of win probability for the potential deciding game by not using Gallardo and having to use someone else on short rest.

Hindsight is 20/20, and it’s easy to buy into the idea that Marcum shouldn’t have pitched given his recent struggles. But that’s really just hindsight. There was never any question he would pitch, and he wasn’t clearly ailing to the point of predictably poor pitching. On the other side, hindsight proved Leyland correct, as Porcello pitched decently even though the Tigers lost that game, and they won behind Verlander in Game Five. The results were divergent, but the thought processes were identically built off of the proper foundation.

LaRussa took a slightly different approach to managing a series on the whole. He actually chose to start Chris Carpenter on short rest in the division series to ensure that the Cardinals ace would make two starts against the Phillies. Carpenter was never considered for the opening game, but LaRussa could have kept him out until Game Three, when he would have thrown on short rest. However, that would have prevented Carpenter from making more than one start in the series. LaRussa may not have believed the series would go all five games, but starting Carpenter in the second game, on short rest, was a risk management move in case the series did get to a deciding game. Lo and behold, Carpenter, on full rest, pitched a shutout against the Phillies in that deciding game.

LaRussa’s thought process was different here, despite accomplishing the same goal of managing for the entire series, as he made the most of the situation dealt instead of creating the situation. Three managers, all of whom adopted a holistic view of their playoff series, two of whom experienced success in that style. Though Marcum struggled, it didn’t invalidate Roenicke’s decision. While managing for a future that might not exist by hurting the present odds of succeeding is typically ill-advised, it can be correctly utilized in the playoffs when it comes to starters throwing on short rest. Kudos to Roenicke and Leyland, especially, for making the logical moves instead of those born out of panic.