Robinson Cano and Second Base Aging Curves
The Yankees have a long standing policy against negotiating contract extensions for players under contract, preferring instead to wait until the player reaches free agency to hash out a new deal. They even held that line with Derek Jeter and Mariano Rivera, two of the iconic players in franchise history, so it hasn’t just been selectively applied here and there. So, it was pretty interesting to hear that the Yankees are ignoring that policy with Robinson Cano, and have confirmed that they recently made Scott Boras a “significant offer” to get him from becoming a free agent after the season.
Brian Cashman’s answer for why they’ve changed course with Cano:
“Since we’re the team, we have a right to change our minds and adjust the policy whenever, especially ownership,” Cashman said. “It’s not like it’s a country club, and here’s the code of conduct that you can’t deviate from. We’ve had a history of doing things a certain way, but it doesn’t mean that it has to be that way every day.”
For the Yankees to shift policy and extend Cano an offer now suggests that they’re both a little scared of what his price might be if he gets to free agency, and that they’re comfortable with how well he’ll age that they don’t need to see his age-30 season before deciding to sign up for the rest of his decline phase. The fear about his price if the Dodgers get involved is certainly valid, but should the fact that Cano is a second baseman scare the Yankees away from making a long term commitment to him before they have gathered all the information possible by letting him play out the 2013 season?
Second baseman, if you haven’t heard, have a reputation for falling apart without much notice. Edgardo Alfonso, Carlos Baerga, Marcus Giles, Chuck Knoblauch, and even Roberto Alomar all went from being pretty terrific players to completely unproductive in a hurry. Most recently, Chase Utley has seen his production tumble, as injuries have begun to take their toll, and he’s been less productive at the plate than he was during his prime. The anecdotal evidence about the detrimental affects of playing the position — taking hard slides while turning the double play is the most often cited reason — are there, but anecdotal evidence can be selectively applied, and Cano is clearly a better player than most of the guys who fell apart earlier than expected. How concerned should the Yankees be about making a long term commitment to a second baseman headed for his age-30 season?
The evidence suggests that he’s not any more of a risk than a great player at any other position on the field. Over the last 50 years, there have been six second baseman (Cano included) who have put up a 130 wRC+ or better from ages 26 to 29. Here’s how the list of second baseman since 1963 who spent their prime years just bashing the baseball:
| Name | PA | BB% | K% | ISO | BABIP | AVG | OBP | SLG | wOBA | wRC+ | Fld | BsR | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chase Utley | 2,687 | 9% | 16% | 0.236 | 0.330 | 0.305 | 0.385 | 0.541 | 0.395 | 137 | 57.1 | 18.8 | 31.0 |
| Joe Morgan | 2,725 | 15% | 8% | 0.157 | 0.280 | 0.276 | 0.389 | 0.433 | 0.375 | 135 | 12.0 | 22.5 | 30.1 |
| Rod Carew | 2,555 | 10% | 8% | 0.100 | 0.372 | 0.348 | 0.410 | 0.449 | 0.386 | 143 | 2.0 | 8.1 | 25.5 |
| Robinson Cano | 2,748 | 7% | 12% | 0.220 | 0.323 | 0.314 | 0.365 | 0.534 | 0.384 | 138 | 3.2 | – | 24.3 |
| Dick McAuliffe | 2,160 | 14% | 16% | 0.187 | 0.274 | 0.254 | 0.361 | 0.441 | 0.361 | 134 | 15.0 | (3.6) | 21.8 |
| Craig Biggio | 2,612 | 12% | 13% | 0.155 | 0.323 | 0.294 | 0.390 | 0.449 | 0.374 | 134 | (20.0) | 6.7 | 19.7 |
As you can see, Cano has put himself in some pretty good company. Now, here’s how the other five players on that list performed starting with their age-31 season, which is the years that the Yankees would be buying out with a long term deal for Cano.
| Name | PA | BB% | K% | ISO | BABIP | AVG | OBP | SLG | wOBA | wRC+ | Fld | BsR | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Joe Morgan | 5,390 | 17% | 9% | 0.163 | 0.272 | 0.270 | 0.396 | 0.433 | 0.376 | 136 | (25.0) | 39.5 | 49.5 |
| Craig Biggio | 7,299 | 8% | 15% | 0.167 | 0.308 | 0.279 | 0.357 | 0.446 | 0.351 | 110 | (29.0) | 18.6 | 36.8 |
| Rod Carew | 4,915 | 11% | 9% | 0.096 | 0.355 | 0.327 | 0.403 | 0.424 | 0.370 | 130 | 12.0 | (5.8) | 31.4 |
| Chase Utley | 1,327 | 11% | 12% | 0.169 | 0.274 | 0.264 | 0.367 | 0.433 | 0.351 | 119 | 24.0 | 12.5 | 12.6 |
| Dick McAuliffe | 1,735 | 12% | 13% | 0.141 | 0.245 | 0.231 | 0.324 | 0.372 | 0.319 | 98 | (9.0) | (0.3) | 6.8 |
Finally, here are the same players, just with the changes in both their playing time and their production in that playing time during the two different timeframes.
| Name | 26-29 PA/Year | 31+ PA/Year | 26-29 WAR/600 | 31+ WAR/600 | PA% Decline | WAR% Decline |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Joe Morgan | 681 | 539 | 6.6 | 5.5 | 21% | 17% |
| Craig Biggio | 653 | 664 | 4.5 | 3.0 | -2% | 33% |
| Rod Carew | 639 | 546 | 6.0 | 3.8 | 15% | 36% |
| Chase Utley | 672 | 442 | 6.9 | 5.7 | 34% | 18% |
| Dick McAuliffe | 540 | 434 | 6.1 | 2.4 | 20% | 61% |
| Average | 637 | 525 | 6.0 | 4.1 | 18% | 33% |
Overall, the group lost an average of about 100 plate appearances per year and went from playing like +6 win players to playing like +4 win players when they did take the field. McAuliffe had the biggest decline, as he was essentially done as a useful player by age 34, but one guy falling apart out of five isn’t the clear trend that the reputation of aging second baseman would suggest. Even including McAuliffe, these five players averaged 3.5 WAR per season after they turned 31. Hardly a group that just fell apart after their prime was over.
If we give Cano a projection of just below the group’s average performance for his age 31-40 seasons — Utley’s further decline will likely pull the +3.5 WAR per season average down slightly as he gets older — assuming he’ll have enough leverage to land a nine year deal, the Yankees would be paying for around +30 WAR over the life of the deal. If you assume something like 5% inflation annually over the next nine years, the average price of a win during Cano’s contract would be in the $7 million per win range, which would place a fair market deal in the range of $210 million. Projecting long term inflation isn’t easy, especially with the varying television deals being struck lately, so that might even be a bit of an undershot — we saw most of the premium free agents this year sign for more than the crowd expected when the winter began.
There’s no question that Scott Boras is going to be using the Prince Fielder, Albert Pujols, and Joey Votto contracts as his starting points in negotiations. Votto signed away his age 30-39 seasons for $225 million, and was two years away from free agency when he got that contract. Fielder signed his 28-36 seasons for $214 million, but isn’t as good as good of a player as Cano and had his market limited to AL teams because of his body type. Pujols signed his age 32-41 seasons for $240 million, and I wouldn’t be surprised if that was the contract Boras tried to beat if he gets Cano to free agency.
At some point in the near future, Robinson Cano is going to become a very, very rich man. The fact that he plays second base probably won’t hurt him in negotiations much, as the evidence that great second baseman age worse than other positions doesn’t really hold up very well. Cano won’t be a +6 win player in his 30s, but he doesn’t have to be to be worth $200+ million on his next deal. If the Yankees want to keep him from free agency, their “generous offer” is almost certainly going to have to start with a two.
Dave is the Managing Editor of FanGraphs.
Elite first basemen retain much more value age 31-38 than second basemen (or shortstops).
Not really.
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.php/how-will-prince-fielder-age/
Of the top 10 players by WAR through age 30 since 1973, first basemen have been worth 51% of their WAR age 31-38 compared to through age 30. For second basemen, the number is 48%. For shortstops, it is 41%. This is because they don’t crater. The worst two guys on the first base list are Keith Hernandez and Will Clark, who registered 16.3 and 16.4 WAR respectively age 31-38. On the other hand, you have Chuck Knoblauch (0.5 WAR age 31-38) and Edgardo Alfonzo (-1.3 WAR age 31-38). Four of the top 10 shortstops through age 30 failed to surpass 4 WAR age 31-38 (admittedly, this doesn’t include Jeter and Arod because they haven’t finished their age 38 seasons, but including them would knock Ozzie Smith out of the top 10 and he had the best age 31-38 (40.7 WAR) of anyone on any of the 3 lists.
You can’t assume that the distribution of talent is equal across positions, which would be a requirement for “top 10 at each position” to be an apples-to-apples comparison. Top 10 SS sets the line at Ozzie Smith (+27 WAR) for SS versus Will Clark (+38 WAR) for first baseman. Without actually matching up similarly valuable players, you’re simply showing that first base has more great players to begin with.
And, of course, arbitrarily setting the line at 10 players eliminates Don Mattingly from the 1B pool despite the fact that he was basically the equal of Clark and Palmeiro. Mattingly produced all of +8 WAR after he turned 31. And if you’re going to include Edgardo Alfonzo (+34.4 WAR), you should also include Kent Hrbek (+34.3 WAR), and Hrbek’s +7.6 WAR after he turned 31.
But I measured by the difference in value. Yes, first basemen produced much higher value through age 30, but they still produced a higher percentage of that value age 31-38. Elite first basemen have been better through age 30 than second basemen. Elite first basemen have been better age 31-38 than second basemen age 31-38. But the difference is greater age 31-38 than through age 30.
Your stats also don’t account for one of the main problems with second basemen – that they don’t make it to 38.
And while I do appreciate that 10 is an arbitrary number, it was not done with the intention of creating a false narrative. I could have included those guys you mentioned, and I could have also included the next guy, Mark McGwire, and his 39 WAR age 31-38.
Even measuring percentage of WAR retained is going to be problematic the way you did it, since you’re stating from different baselines. For instance, a guy who is a +3 win player in his prime might decline at the same rate as a +5 win player, but since the +5 win player can decline and still be good enough to be worth playing, his late career will be longer, giving him more chances to rack up value. As soon the +3 win player declines to the +1ish WAR level, he’s going to either have to retire or accept a bench job.
How well a +3 win player does in his 30s isn’t all that informative when it comes to someone like Cano. You have to match up players of equal value at different positions, then look at how they age. The way you’re doing it doesn’t support your conclusion.
Your “they don’t make it to 38” comment shows this bias. The second baseman who have been as good as Cano absolutely did make it to 38, with the exception of McAulfie anyway. Lesser players than Cano don’t make it to 38, which doesn’t tell us anything about players like Cano.
Chuck Knoblauch and Edgardo Alfonzo were absolutely as good as Cano through age 30 and neither made it to 38.
I will admit have a point about the 5 win v. 3 win player, Luis Castillo and Bill Doran had less room for error and thus were out of baseball and unable to add value to age 38 (though Castillo might have kept a job as a shitty player to age 38 if not for injuries, since he had a high batting average and was a “perfect two hole hitter”).
Alfonzo is a good example of why using career WAR through age 30 doesn’t work that well either. Alfonso destroyed Cano through age 26 (23.5 to 12.4), but then Cano clearly took a significant step forward in development at the same point that Alfonzo began regressing. From 27-29, Cano put up +20 WAR while Alfonzo put up +9 WAR.
Cano and Alfonzo did not head into their thirties on the same trajectory. Alfonzo was already playing himself out of baseball at this point.
That’s why I limited the age range to cover the same years that Cano produced in. For a fair comparison, you want to find guys who didn’t peak early and start collapsing. Cano is not an early peak guy, so we don’t really care too much how early peak guys did in their 30s.
You started by saying that “Elite first basemen retain much more value age 31-38 than second basemen.”
Then you said “first basemen have been worth 51% of their WAR age 31-38 compared to through age 30. For second basemen, the number is 48%.”
51% to 48% is much more?
Fair point. It would be more accurate to say “have more value,” as the average WAR for the top 10 1B the past 40 years age 31-38 crushes the elite second basemen.
And I said elite first basemen, not elite fat guys. I know there is overlap, but they are not the same thing.
dave cameron just got jammed
You got it backwards, Bilbo.
Carew was a 1B at age 30 and beyond. There’s probably other errors — and Mariners bias — in this piece.
Lemme give you some 2B aging curve info, from a blog post I’m working on. Robbie Alomar, last good year, age 33. Sandberg, first retirement in middle of age 34 year. Grich and Whitaker were part-time at 2B after 35. Hornsby, last good year, last full year, at 35. Frisch last good year at 33, last decent one at 36. Don’t cite Biggio as he didn’t start 2B until 26.
Because you can see the runner face-on, and don’t have to make a pivot, either, 2B has a bigger wear and tear than SS.
SS’s who played near 40 or beyond, and with nearly full to full seasons, include Ozzie, Wagner, Jetes, Larkin, Aparicio, and Vizquel.
Sorry, you and other M’s fans, but that’s going to be a “fun” contract for Cano at age 40.