Arizona has some impressive depth, as well as a few high-ceiling players at the top of the system. The organization has added some solid up-the-middle talent to go with an enviable group of pitching.

#1 Tyler Skaggs (P)

Skaggs, 21, reached the majors in his fourth professional season. The southpaw has the potential to develop into a top-of-the-rotation starter. He has an above-average fastball for a lefty and a contact I spoke with said, “He gets a lot of extension out front and the fastball jumps on hitters.” Skaggs also has a curveball with plus potential and a changeup that could be average or better. The talent evaluator feels the changeup has plus potential, as well. “He throws it with good arm speed… He was just learning to believe in it [in 2012] and I think he does now.”

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The Arizona Diamondbacks had a disappointing 2012 season and the front office has identified key areas in which the team must improve. The outfield isn’t one of these areas, as the Diamondbacks now boast five players who could all stake a claim for a starting role, whether in Arizona or on another team.

They could conceivably make things work if everyone was retained, but that seems like a sub-optimal use of valuable resources. With platoons — both traditional and non-traditional — and injury risk, carrying four or five competent outfielders is often necessary. However, trading one or two of these players could solve issues elsewhere on the diamond. The team would still boast a solid outfield while improving in other key areas. But determining who to trade isn’t as straightforward, as non-performance factors must be taken into consideration.

The Diamondbacks currently have Justin Upton, Chris Young, Adam Eaton, Jason Kubel and Gerardo Parra under contract. Upton is the most talented of the group as well as the most expensive. Eaton is a top prospect under team control that played well in a small sample of September plate appearances. Kubel is a strong hitter who can’t run or field who is signed to a team-friendly contract. Parra is an average hitter under team control with excellent fielding marks. Young is a terrific defensive centerfielder capable of 20/20 production under team-friendly contractual terms.

The team is likely to retain Upton and play him in right field. The team also seems intent on playing Eaton in center field, which means that Young seems like the odd man out. He could shift to left field, but part of what makes him valuable would get eliminated in the process. Given his age, fielding skills, offensive pop and contract status, as well as the free agent market developing at the position, Young would instantly become a very attractive trade target if he were made available. Dealing him makes the most sense for the Diamondbacks, as he has become expendable with Eaton’s presence on the roster, and could extract the most value in return.

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I am a big proponent of the low risk signings with minimal commitment and non-roster invitations to Spring Training. The players involved are forced to audition their talent and do not get a free pass based on a glimmer or more of success in the past. For instance, the Mark Prior signings of the last two seasons make complete sense given that Prior cost very little and he was merely looking for a deal that would allow him another shot at major league dominance. Well, two more of these signings took place this weekend, both somewhat questionable, but one more bizarre than the other.

The Phillies released Adam Eaton (finally) after two abysmal seasons in red pinstripes. Unfortunately he still had another quite lucrative year on the deal making it impossible to unload the flailing righthander. Add in that teams knew the Phillies wanted to rid themselves of their poor investment and it becomes very easy to see why nobody wanted to send any type of package to the Phillies in exchange for Eaton’s services when he could be signed “free of charge” with a bit of due diligence and patience.

The Orioles jumped on Eaton quickly, signing him to a minor league deal worth $400,000. Due to his release, the Phillies are still responsible for around $8.7 mil of Eaton’s salary. Over the last three seasons, Eaton’s win values of 0.6, -0.3, and 0.4 help illustrate the depths to which his performance has fallen relative to expectations. He looked pretty solid in 2003 and 2005, both seasons in spacious San Diego, before going to the Rangers in a trade netting the Friars Chris Young and Adrian Gonzalez. After a pretty miserable season in Texas, Eaton then signed a ridiculous 3-yr deal with the Phillies worth near $25 mil.

Somehow, this former first round pick of the Phillies ended up in arguably the most lopsided trade of the decade right before signing the most undeserved contract of the decade. Still, if he impresses in Spring Training, the Orioles have themselves a #5 starter with the Phillies footing the bill.

The signing of Eaton at least makes some sense given the aforementioned details, but I am still racking my brain for a reason to justify the Bruce Chen signing by the Royals. Granted, Chen was given a minor league deal, but how… I mean… why… Bruce Chen!? Chen hasn’t pitched since April 2007 when the Rangers allowed him five relief appearances that didn’t work out too well: 7.20 ERA/7.54 FIP.

Before that, Chen had spent three years with the aforementioned Orioles, putting together win values of 0.6, 1.5, -0.7. Even at his absolute best in 2005, Chen greatly benefited from a .267 BABIP and 78% LOB. In other words, his 4.94 FIP that season was hardly impressive, especially for a career year of sorts. Outside of that 2005 season he looks like a marginal fifth starter, if that.

Perhaps Chen has added a new pitch to his repertoire, has gotten married, or worked out to be in the best shape of his life, but I doubt any of that matters in terms of his skill level. These low risk signings should really be utilized by inking players with talent, unless there are extenuating circumstances as there are in the Eaton case. The Chen signing is not a low risk, high reward situation, because the reward the Royals will get might not even be of the medium variety.

As Dave noted early yesterday morning, the Joe Blanton-to-the-Phillies trade is one that fans of the Phightins—like me—are not going to be in favor of for years to come. It’s not that Blanton is a bad pitcher, or that a guy like Adrian Cardenas is a lock to become a superstar middle-infielder, but rather that the Phillies gave up two of their top prospects for a back-end of the rotation pitcher. From living in Philadelphia and watching the local broadcasts and such it seems to me that those in favor of this trade feel the way they do because Blanton is “new.” If these same fans watched Blanton intently over the last year and a half or so I have a funny feeling their dispositions would not be as sunny.

Add in the facts that Kentucky Joe dominated the Phillies lineup a couple of weeks ago, that he “won” 30 games in 2006-07, and that Adam Eaton stinks and it becomes very easy to see how fans could be manipulated into thinking this was the right trade to make.

One form of this manipulation really irked my family yesterday, however, in that some writers and reporters tried to justify the trade with the clause “if you remove Blanton’s X worst starts, his ERA is …” I’ve seen differing quotes, involving Blanton’s 3.87 ERA sans-three bad starts, or even his 3.58 ERA sans-four bad starts. Well, you just cannot do that. My brother, who covers the Phillies at MVN.com, offered this take, which is essentially the entire point of this post:

“Todd Zolecki wrote on Philly.com that Blanton actually has a 3.58 ERA if you take away his worst four starts. That’s great, but you don’t merely take away four starts to try to justify a trade. Heck, if you take away Adam Eaton’s worst four starts, his ERA would be 4.06! Has Eaton been a pitcher who deserves an ERA nearly in the 3’s this season? No. Has he been effective at all? No. So let’s not cherry-pick stats.”

You can’t simply remove numbers to justify anything. As has been discussed at length this season, the last three years or so should be quoted when discussing a player’s true talent level. If these same writers wish to justify the trade, perhaps it would serve them wise to note that Blanton’s current ERA is worse than his pre-season projection, and that he is expected to be in the 3.77 range over the remainder of the season… not that his numbers would be better if we take away the worst starts, or that he has performed well against NL East teams in a total of four or five starts in his career.

Overall, we don’t know if the Phillies are done dealing. Maybe they turn around and send the perhaps-overrated Carlos Carrasco and fellow top-tier prospect Antonio Bastardo for Erik Bedard, which would give them a rotation of: Cole Hamels, Erik Bedard, Jamie Moyer, Joe Blanton, and Kyle Kendrick, with Brett Myers also in the fold. From what I’ve come to learn, however, regarding Pat Gillick and his “approach” on his way out the door, it really does seem Blanton is supposed to be the prized acquisition to keep the Mets at bay.

But then again, maybe he IS what the Phillies need to keep the Mets at bay, because as many other Philadelphia columnists have noted, Blanton has pitched 15 scoreless innings against the Mets in his career… (sighs and hopes readers pick up on the sarcasm of small sample sizes and cherry-picked stats).

Primarily due to the MLB Extra Innings package and my sheer love of the sport I am a true baseball junkie. I don’t care if it’s the generic Red Sox/Tigers matchup on ESPN or the local feed of a Reds/Nationals game; watching various games helps me connect better with players who would otherwise be nothing more than names on a page. Something that comes with the territory of watching so much baseball is listening to different sets of broadcasters and their terminology or beliefs.

Though many differ in opinion over issues pertaining to clutch hitting, or Barry Bonds, one common weapon in their broadcasting arsenal involves some form of the following phrase: “Well, (insert pitcher) needs to just shut them down this inning to keep the momentum going.”

These assertions generally occur after their team has scored to either a) take the lead, b)tie the game, or c) make a significant effort to come back. Regardless of which takes place, the idea is that momentum has begun its shift into their dugout and, by shutting down the opponent in the following half-inning and preventing them from tacking on more runs, it can sustain its new position.

Hearing about these magical shutdown innings so much made me research which pitchers are truly the best at ensuring a change in momentum is not a fluke. Essentially, I’m defining these Shutdown Innings (SHIP) as any half-inning following one in which the team scores, to bring themselves within a maximum of four runs (ahead or below).

Trailing by nine runs and scoring two would not cause the following half-inning to qualify as a potential shutdown inning; trailing by nine runs and scoring five or six would. On a similar token, leading by one run and then scoring five would not lead to a SHIP; however, leading by one and then scoring two or three would.

Just looking at the National League, for now, I took every pitcher with 41+ innings (the top 25) and scanned their individual game logs to come up with the following top ten:

1) Todd Wellemeyer, 9-9, 1.000
2) Braden Looper, 10-11, .909
3) Scott Olsen, 7-8, .875
4) Ryan Dempster, 11-13, .846
5) Tim Lincecum, 10-12, .833
6) Jake Peavy, 9-11, .818
7) Mark Hendrickson, 13-16, .813
8) Jair Jurrjens, 12-15, .800
9) Dan Haren, 12-15, .800
10) Aaron Cook, 11-14, .786

Wellemeyer and Looper have provided 19 SHIP out of a possible 20. Of these 25 players, the worst three were:

23) Roy Oswalt, 6-11, .545
24) Adam Wainwright, 5-10, .500
25) Brett Myers, 8-16, .500

The next step of this, which I’ll get into later in the week, deals with just how much the failed SHIP attempts (trying really hard to resist a dock or anchor or sea metaphor) effected the teams; some players may be handed a four-run lead and give up just one run whereas others will be given a four-run lead and give up four runs. Shutdown Innings do not tell us which pitchers are better but rather who sustains the momentum discussed by broadcasters most often.