The Washington Nationals have been making headlines lately with big such as trading for Gio Gonzalez and getting a one-year deal with Edwin Jackson. They were even rumored to be in on the Prince Fielder sweepstakes. Some of the Nationals’ other moves understandably have garnered less attention, such as minor-league deals for veteran outfielders Mike Cameron and (more recently) Rick Ankiel. While these are low-risk deals that may turn out to be bench insurance, given some ambiguities about the Nationals’ outfield situation, Cameron and Ankiel could form a nice stopgap platoon in center field that would allow Washington to protect other, more significant investments.

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Despite the prestige of being 2011’s Most Average Player, Colorado Rockies outfielder Seth Smith has been the subject of trade rumors since the end of the season. Trading Smith might be a good idea for the Rockies if it enables them to fill a hole elsewhere, but Smith himself is better than one might think. He is not a great fielder, although it he is not horrible (the Rockies gave Brad Hawpe more than 6000 innings in the outfield, after all). What seems to bother many people is the large platoon split that the left-handed-hitting Smith has shown in his major-league career. However, Smith’s splits are at least as much of a potential opportunity as they are an impending crisis. It is, as a wise man might say, a crisitunity.

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It seems to happen every year — a good hitter gets especially hot in the playoffs and people start talking about how he should get the “Barry Bonds Treatment,” i.e., walking the batter almost every time he is up. It is generally a bad idea to give a free pass to any hitter that often, but if any current player deserves that treatment, it is Albert Pujols. A comparison of Pujols and Bonds as hitters is not quite as interesting as it sounds. Pujols’ highest single-season wRC+ is 185 in 2003; in 1993, Bonds’ wRC+ was 193 and that was only his sixth-best season. What more is interesting is the thought that teams should walk Pujols almost every time he is up. If you are reading FanGraphs, I hope that you know that walking even a Hall-of-Famer-if-he-retires-three-years-ago hitter like Pujols every time is bad strategy. However, Pujols is obviously good enough that opposing managers are justified in giving him a free pass in certain situations. How common are those situations?

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[NB: Working team names into titles is an oh-so-subtle way of showing readers how clever you are. Also: food metaphors~!]

I guess it is Brewers’ week here at FanGraphs, and why not? Surely I’m only one among many non-Milwaukee fans who is enjoying their all-in season. It’s been a hoot watching as they attempt to make the playoffs with a Stars and Scrubs approach. And, as we know, anything can happen in the playoffs (Roy Halladay versus Zack Greinke in the NLCS, anyone?). The Scrubs are as fascinating as the Stars… can a team really make it to the playoffs with Yuniesky Betancourt (anagram: “Batter Nine You Sucky,” thanks Graham) at shortstop? Shortstop has been a mess for a while now in Milwaukee, and there isn’t an immanent solution in sight. However, another position that was thought to be on the Brewers’ “scrub side” prior the season, center field, has turned into a real plus. It’s the too-rarely-used (and rarely-properly-implemented) Magic of Platooning, starring Carlos Gomez and Nyjer Morgan!

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I’m loathe to discuss the (alleged?) rift between Tony LaRussa and Colby Rasmus. My personal opinion is that the young center fielder should be playing every day, but I don’t have the desire, energy, or efficiency to cover every relevant issue. Joe Posnanski’s take is predictably enjoyable, in particular emphasizing reasons why many people are, well, sick of LaRussa. I imagine that’s a common sentiment, which is why it was good to see it acknowledged in Tim Marchman’s thoughtful “pro-LaRussa” post. One phrase in Marchman’s writeup particularly caught my eye:

Colby Rasmus is a really talented young player who can’t hasn’t hit lefties…

This raised the hackles of many people out there who quickly checked the numbers and pointed out that Rasmus has actually been pretty decent against lefties this season — 102 wRC+ (.323 wOBA) in 102 plate appearances, or a slightly above average hitter. However, he was absolutely dreadful versus southpaws in 2009, with a 28 wRC+ (.218 wOBA) over 115 PA. Despite a good overall line, a .256 career wOBA versus left-handed pitching is absolutely dreadful. But observed performance and true talent are two different things. Does Rasmus really have a problem hitting lefties?

As Marchman acknowledges in the comments to his post, 217 career plate appearances versus lefties doesn’t establish much (I assume that’s why Marchman has “can’t” crossed out in the quote above) — one should regress a left-handed hitter’s observed split against 1,000 plate appearances of league average to get an estimate of his actual platoon skill. After doing so, the estimate of Rasmus’ “true” platoon split still isn’t very encouraging. Using the ZiPS RoS .329 wOBA as a overall baseline, he projects as a .339 wOBA hitter versus RHP and a .297 wOBA hitter versus LHP. Even bumping that projection up to .340, he still only projects as a .307 wOBA hitter versus LHP. I’m not sure if platoon issues are one of the reasons LaRussa has sat Rasmus so often (and Rasmus has actually played seven of the last eight games, so this whole brouhaha may be about over), but if it is,
there’s reasonable evidence to suggest that in this case LaRussa might not be asleep at the wheel.

But back up for a moment: when we say that we need to regress against 1,000 PA of league average performance by LHH against LHP, that means that at 1,000 PA of observed PA vs. LHP, a hitter’s platoon skill is estimated to be “exactly” between midpoint between league average and his observed performance. This sort of regression is the right way to do things, particularly for minimizing error when doing projections for numerous players, but it also means that from just 217 PA, we really know very little about Rasmus’ platoon skil — the estimate is based much more on league average than on observed performance. So let’s dig a bit deeper.

The Book-derived method I use to estimate splits is based on major-league data, so it isn’t clear how platoon skills displayed in the minor leagues translate to the majors. Nonetheless, given the paucity of Rasmus-specific major league plate appearances vs. LHP to go on, let’s take a look at his minor league numbers. A quick glance at Rasmus’ player pages at Minor League Splits (which doesn’t use wOBA) reveals that he actually hit lefties quite well in the minors: .275/.371/.455 versus .278/.364/.496 for righties. That’s a pretty small split. More specifically: in AAA in 2008, he only hit .255/.347/.353 versus lefties, but given that his OPS versus RHP was .250/.347/.417, that’s still a small split for a left-handed hitter. At AA Springfield in 2007, He had a larger split (.839 OPS vs. LHP and .958 vs. RHP), but again, that isn’t a terribly big split for a lefty, and he had almost the same OBP versus LHP (.379) as righties (.381).

As for the major leagues, one should be cautious when splitting up his miserable 2009 and better 2010 because it is already a very limited sample. Of course, as soon as bloggers bring up “small sample size” we almost always go on to talk about the sample anyway, and I’m no different. In 2009 Rasmus pretty much did everything horribly versus left-handed hitters, although his .187 BABIP does seem to be quite unlucky. I’m not ready to say (particularly given the minor league numbers) whether Rasmus “learned” something about lefties between 2009 and 2010 or whether it is just regression, but there is obvious improvement almost across the board. His line drive rate versus LHP and RHP is the same (19%). His walk rate versus lefties (8.8%) is above the overall league average (8.5%). The power versus righties has improved, and while Rasmus is being criticized for his high overall 2010 strikeout rate (33%), his K rate versus lefties (29.7%) is actually better than his K rate versus righties (34%).

On its own, this breakdown of a small sample some of Rasmus’ split peripherals by season doesn’t tell us much. However, given the platoon skill he displayed in the minors, it does suggest that 2010 might be more reflective of his abilities against lefties than 2009. I don’t know what issues Tony LaRussa has with Colby Rasmus, but a careful look at the numbers suggests that concerns about Rasmus’ ability to hit left-handed pitching are overblown.

As the “real” trade deadline approached last night, the New York Mets finally got rid of their 2010 team mascot, Jeff Francoeur, trading him to the Texas Rangers in exchange for Joaquin Arias. Dan Szymborski has already issued a brilliant analysis of the trade, but I want to focus on what Francoeur might bring to the Rangers over the last month of the season.

It depends on his role. Obviously, Josh Hamilton and Nelson Cruz are far superior to Francoeur, but as Rob Neyer notes, they’ve each struggled with injury issues this season, so Francoeur provides a bit of depth in case those come into play again. Still, Francoeur has been close to worthless for two seasons, so it’s not clear why the Rangers would need to trade for a replacement-level bench player at this point, especially one who can’t play center field (assuming the Rangers don’t want to play Julio Borbon and don’t want Hamilton in center). In any case, the Rangers already have David Murphy, who does play center occasionally, although he isn’t very good there.

Assuming Murphy and Francoeur are roughly equivalent in the field (and some quick number crunching has them in the same general area), the main skill Francoeur supposedly brings to the Rangers is as a platoon partner for Murphy. When Francoeur’s abilities have been (rightly) criticized this season, his alleged usefulness as a right-handed platoon bat is usually brought up as a way he might be made useful. Francoeur does have a fairly big observed split: .302 wOBA versus RHP and a .344 versus lefties. However, as most readers of FanGraphs know by now, there’s a difference between observed performance and true talent. We have to properly regress Francoeur’s split against league average to get an idea of what his real platoon skill, i.e., what it will likely be going forward.

As is covered in the linked post, there is less variance among right-handed hitters with regard to platoon skill, so while Francoeur’s observed split is bigger than average, his 961 career PA versus LHP is regressed against 2200 of league average RHH versus LHP. In other words, his estimated hitter platoon skill is still far closer to league average than to his past observed performance. ZiPS overall rest-of-season projection for Francoeur is a .311 wOBA, which is pretty useless for a corner outfielder who isn’t exceptional defensively. Applying the split estimate to that figure gives us an projected wOBA of .304 versus RHP, and .330 versus LHP — terrible versus RHP and a bit above average versus LHP. Murphy’s ZiPS RoS wOBA is .344, and his estimated splits are .319 wOBA vs. LHP, .353 vs. RHP. *

* I realize that the ZiPS RoS projections currently assume Francoeur playing in the Mets’ pitcher-friendly park and Murphy playing in the Rangers’ hitters’ paradise. There isn’t a simple way of working around that, so I’ll simply note a) the park differences aren’t as big as one might think, especially over the few games left in the season (in terms of run values), and b) they are somewhat offset by the AL’s superior pitching.

Over a full season of 700 PAs, the difference between Francoeur’s .330 vs. LHP and Murphy’s .319 is about six runs. Of course, there isn’t a full season left, but about a fifth of a season — so it’s one or two runs over 140-150 PA. But even that is too much, since Francoeur would be the lesser part of a platoon. Assuming one third of the PAs go to the right-handed batter, the expected offensive difference between Murphy alone and a Francoeur/Murphy platoon would be less than a run over the remainder of the season. Yes, they’ll have Francoeur in the playoffs, but that’s (at most) 19 games. The expected difference is miniscule.

From the standpoint of creating a productive platoon, Francoeur’s expected platoon skill isn’t enough to overcome his overall lousiness at the plate, and can’t reasonably be expected to make much of a difference over the remainder of the season over just playing Murphy. If an injury does occur to one of the starters, forcing a backup into a full-time role, then Francoeur will have to face right-handed pitching. In that case the Rangers would be better off playing Julio Borbon (superior defense) and keeping the recently-designated Brandon Boggs around as depth.

It might not be a total wash. Francoeur might get a big hit in the playoffs and that, combined with his apparent ability to charm the press corps, will lead to some indignant newpaper columns when he gets non-tendered in the off-season. Fun for everyone!

As you’ve probably heard by now, the Mariners waived Ryan Garko, having been thoroughly unimpressed with his glove and bat this spring, particularly his glove, which is so bad they don’t want to platoon him with Casey Kotchman at first base. Plenty of reaction and analysis is already out there in the blogosphere, here I offer a loose series of (dis)connected thoughts.

1. Given that Garko’s glove is apparently un-platoon-able, and assuming that the Mariners had been willing to use him as their full-time DH, how would that compare to the current plan? CHONE (less optimistic on Garko than ZiPS) projects Garko for a .336 wOBA. ZiPS is more optimistic for both Mike Sweeney and Ken Griffey Jr. If they platoon at DH (with a 70/30 RHP/LHP distribution), and adjusting for estimated platoon skill, a Griffey/Sweeney platoon projects for a .327 wOBA. Over 150 games (about 630 PA), that’s about a 5 run (about half a win) difference.

2. Using the same inputs as in #1, against RHP, right-handed hitting Garko projects to have a .329 wOBA; against RHP, left-handed hitting Griffey projects for .325.

3. A league-average hitter is a replacement level DH. For the past three seasons, the league-average wOBAs have been .331, .328, and .329, respectively.

4. Sweeney and Griffey are apparently important to the Mariners for their positive effect on chemistry. Last season, Tom Tango used the example of Cliff Floyd to show that the open market values the “intangibles” at $350,000 per season. What does this situation tell us about the 2010 market for intangibles?

According to Cot’s, Garko is guaranteed $550,000 this season, Sweeney $650,000 in the majors, and Griffey $2.35 million (we’ll leave out the various playing time and award incentives for the sake of simplicity). First, let’s eliminate the “replacement salary” of about $400,000 for each player, so we’re left with $150,000 for Garko, $250,000 for Sweeney, and $1.95 million for The Zombie Kid. From #1 and #3 we can infer (generously) that a Sweeney/Griffey DH platoon would be around replacement level. So their “surplus salary” would tell us how much the Mariners are willing to pay for chemistry — $2.2 million. But we need to take account of Garko. Let’s assume he adds nothing to chemistry (or is it alchemy?). Still, we’ve established him as (conservatively) half a win (runs) better than the Sweeney/Griffey DH platoon (and we should really be only eliminating one of Griffey/Sweeney’s replacement salaries, since Garko only takes one roster spot, but this was supposed to be a simple post…). A win on the open market this offseason was going for around $3.5 million, so half a win is $1.75 million. That means that the Mariners are valuing Griffey and Sweeney’s “clubhouse presence” at almost four million dollars this season. The Mariners thus must think that the chemical advantage added by Sweeney and Griffey will add at a bit more than a win for them this season.

Feel free to check my math.

5. If Griffey and Zombie Sweeney are platooning at “chemistry,” does this mean their lockers are on either side of Milton Bradley’s?

6. I wonder what Kenny thinks of all this?

7. Yes, it’s only one decision, so “small sample size” caveats apply, even to front offices. Still, how fitting is it that this decision is announced so close to the Mariners’ organizational ranking being posted?

In line with our Fabulous Split Week here at FanGraphs, this post will utilize the framework for estimating hitter platoon skill outlined on Monday. If you crave more details, read that post, or, even better, take a look at the sections from The Book on which it is based. Today, I’ll apply this analysis to four of the remaining DH-ish players left on the free agent market. This will allow us to set aside issues of defense and get a simple overview at how platoon skill effects the value of some hitters. Recalling Monday’s post, platoon skills are regressed to the mean (here based on league-wide splits 2007-2009), moreso for righties (regressed against 2200 PA) than for lefties (1000 PA).* For the projected overall wOBA, I use CHONE’s projections as listed on the FanGraphs player pages.

* David Appelman informs me that the “career splits” pages only include stats starting in 2002. That’s helpful in this case because we’re getting the more recent data for older players, although platoon skills usually don’t change much over most players’ careers. But keep in mind that the “career” numbers listed below are post-2002.

Let’s begin with some lefties:

Russell Branyan
Career Split: 15.2% (437 PA v LHP)
Regressed: 10.6%
CHONE projected wOBA: .359
Estimated wOBA vs. RHP: .367
Estimated wOBA vs. LHP: .329

Like most saber-nerds, I love talking about Russell Branyan. Although he has a platoon-guy rep, in 2009, when he got more PAs against LHP than ever before in his major-league career, he hit well against them (.345 wOBA). It’s still a small sample, but it does show that sometimes regression to the mean happens right before our eyes. Branyan actually projects as about league average vs. LHP. His back is problematic and he probably went into the off-season with unrealistic expectations about what he could get in free agency, but it’s hard to believe he won’t find a starting job before Opening Day.

Carlos Delgado
Career Split: 18.2% (1400 PA v LHP)
Regressed: 14.2%
CHONE projected wOBA: .337
Estimated wOBA vs. RHP: .352
Estimated wOBA vs. LHP: .304

In an earlier post on free agent 1B/DHes, I hinted that the once-great Delgado might want to consider hanging it up. But this is a case where a larger split makes a guy more valuable with a decent platoon partner.

Hank Blalock
Career Split: 21.8% (1060 PA v LHP)
Regressed: 15.4%
CHONE projected wOBA: .328
Estimated wOBA vs. RHP: .342
Estimated wOBA vs. LHP: .291

It may seem like Hank Blalock was good just a couple years ago, but it’s really been six. He has even a bigger splits than Delgado, but he’s also not as good of a hitter in general. A .342 wOBA part-time DH can be useful, but not often.

And now some righties…

Jermaine Dye
Career Split: 9.1% (1196 PA v LHP)
Regressed: 7.1%
CHONE projected wOBA: .345
Estimated wOBA vs. RHP: .338
Estimated wOBA vs. LHP: .363

Dye seems to have realized he can’t play the field anymore, which is good. Given how long he’s been in the league relative to Ryan Garko (discussed in Monday’s post), that their estimated split is almost exactly the same points to how much observed RHH platoon splits need to be taken with a grain of salt.

Johny Gomes
Career Split: 15.4% (600 PA v LHP)
Regressed: 8.1%
CHONE projected wOBA: .336
Estimated wOBA vs. RHP: .327
Estimated wOBA vs. LHP: .354

Now this is a righty with a big split, although not as big as people think. Despite Gomes’ reputation, his estimated platoon split isn’t any bigger than the average lefty split. Of course, he’s only about average against RHP.

This small selection reflects what we’d generally expect — lefties have larger splits that vary more widely. This implies that when setting up a platoon, given similar defensive skills (or lack thereof), the key is finding a lefty with a big split, and to find a RHH who is a decent overall hitter. And, of course, there’s the issue of whether bringing in a platoon partner is worth the roster spot. For example, given that the expected performance of Gomes and Dye (the lesser half of the platon) vs. LHP isn’t that much better than Branyan’s overall projection. On the other hand, on the right team, Gomes or Dye + Delgado might make sense.