The Changing Caught-Stealing Calculus

Leafing through an old Sports Illustrated, I recently happened upon this stellar article by Mr. Albert Chen entitled “Revenge Of The Base Stealers,” in which Chen analyzed the league’s continued shift towards base-pilfering over base-trotting.

With the whimper-death of the Steroid Era, league strategies have swung towards old-school baseball. Most winning teams now employ some combination of great defense, strong base-runningitudes, and notable pitching-miraculosities. As such, wise teams have found employs for otherwise marginalized speedsters.

The net result has been an uptick in the value of a stolen base, according to linear weights:

This chart shows how the cost of a caught stealing (the red line) is trending towards zero (meaning a caught stealing is costing less — in fact, much than its .400 runs high point in 2000) while the gains from a stolen base (0.161 runs in 2012) have remained strong.

Whither belongs the blame for this change? Simply: Home runs. And where do we wander from here? In short: Deep into the heart of Speedster Kingdom.

In 2000, during the apex of the stolen base depression, teams needed to maintain a 69.7% success rate on the base paths just to simply break even on the run value game (granted: game context — such as the pitchers, stadium, weather, and score — allows for varying levels of acceptable SB-rates). But by 2012, the break even point dipped to 66.6%.

Let us put that in real terms: A 2012 speedster can succeed with, out of 50 SB attempts, about 33 SB and 17 CS. Mr. 2000 speedster needed a balance of 35 SB and 15 CS. These differences seem small on the individual scale, but for a manager setting strategy across an entire roster this difference can have a considerable impact.

Before we expand that concept, we must understand why the run values for CS and SB have changed. In the height of the Steroid Era, home runs came in discount baskets. In the aforementioned 2000 seasons, the HR/PA rate nearly hit 3%. Compared to the 2.68% of 2012. That comes to a difference of almost a whole home run per five or six games.

The higher home run rate meant getting on base ended more often with a tater trot than in present seasons. Now, more teams are sliding across home plate as singles, doubles, and the odd triple must replace the extra weekly dinger.

The relationship between home run rate and the value of a stolen base are indeed quite related. Let’s examine at the break-even value for SB success, defined as the absolute run value of a CS divided by the absolute run value of a CS plus the value of a SB.

Unsurprisingly, the relationship between homers and the run values of steals are considerably and inversely related: The break-even rate for SB success shares a .806 .685 R-squared with HR rates, when looking at MLB seasons from 1950 through 2012.

Moreover, we find this:

A simple equation of:

Break Even Rate = 0.590 + 3.33 x (HR/PA)

This phat function allows us to predict the optimal break even point not just for a league, not just for a team, but for a lineup.

Take, for example, the San Francisco Giants. They do not hit homers. The led the league in not hitting homers. They are so superb at not hitting homers, they almost did not crack 100 dingers in 2012. They were the only team under 2.00% HR/PA. They posted a 1.72% HR/PA — excluding pitchers. With pitchers, they hit only 1.66% HR/PA — that’s a mere 3 to 3.5 total homers per week.

According to our handy Break Even Rate regression, we can predict the Giants break even SB rate in 2012 was 64.53% — well beneath the league average. Meanwhile, the homertastic Yankees (3.93% HR/PA) had a break even rate near 72.09%. So are teams being too aggressive or passive?

2012 Teams

Team	PA	HR	SB	CS	HR/PA	actual SB success%	break even SB success	net
Pirates	6014	170	73	52	2.83%	58.40%	68.41%	-10.01%
Orioles	6160	214	58	29	3.47%	66.67%	70.57%	-3.90%
Diamondbacks	6150	165	93	51	2.68%	64.58%	67.93%	-3.35%
Rangers	6216	200	91	44	3.22%	67.41%	69.71%	-2.31%
Mets	6091	139	79	38	2.28%	67.52%	66.60%	0.92%
Cubs	5967	137	94	45	2.30%	67.63%	66.65%	0.98%
White Sox	6111	211	109	43	3.45%	71.71%	70.50%	1.21%
Astros	6014	146	105	46	2.43%	69.54%	67.08%	2.45%
Rockies	6183	166	100	40	2.68%	71.43%	67.94%	3.49%
Cardinals	6326	159	91	37	2.51%	71.09%	67.37%	3.72%
Tigers	6119	163	59	23	2.66%	71.95%	67.87%	4.08%
Dodgers	6091	116	104	44	1.90%	70.27%	65.34%	4.93%
Indians	6195	136	110	44	2.20%	71.43%	66.31%	5.12%
Blue Jays	6094	198	123	41	3.25%	75.00%	69.82%	5.18%
Yankees	6231	245	93	27	3.93%	77.50%	72.09%	5.41%
Nationals	6221	194	105	35	3.12%	75.00%	69.38%	5.62%
Rays	6105	175	134	44	2.87%	75.28%	68.55%	6.74%
Mariners	6057	149	104	35	2.46%	74.82%	67.19%	7.63%
Red Sox	6166	165	97	31	2.68%	75.78%	67.91%	7.87%
Reds	6115	172	87	27	2.81%	76.32%	68.37%	7.95%
Braves	6126	149	101	32	2.43%	75.94%	67.10%	8.84%
Athletics	6183	195	122	32	3.15%	79.22%	69.50%	9.72%
Brewers	6224	202	158	39	3.25%	80.20%	69.81%	10.40%
Giants	6200	103	118	39	1.66%	75.16%	64.53%	10.63%
Angels	6121	187	134	33	3.06%	80.24%	69.17%	11.07%
Padres	6112	121	155	46	1.98%	77.11%	65.59%	11.52%
Royals	6149	131	132	38	2.13%	77.65%	66.09%	11.55%
Marlins	6057	137	149	41	2.26%	78.42%	66.53%	11.89%
Twins	6209	131	135	37	2.11%	78.49%	66.03%	12.46%
Phillies	6172	158	116	23	2.56%	83.45%	67.52%	15.93%

This data suggests the Pirates — blasphemous on the base paths by league standards — may not have been just as apocalyptically bad as they may have otherwise seemed. Their paucity of home runs allowed for a lower success rate. But their ineptitude still went too far.

Meanwhile, the homer-happy Orioles — perhaps more homer-happy in hindsight than in projection systems — proved likewise overly cavalier on the paths despite a solid 66.67% success rate. They clapped homers with the consistency of club that needs a 70% success rate.

The Phillies and Twins, both teams who appeared judicious on the paths, were in fact cowardly, gutless, un-American — North or South — base runners. They left far more productivity rotting on the table than the Pirates threw into the festering waste bin that was their 2012 season.

Of course, just because teams should be willing to have lower SB totals does not mean the Giants should start sending Pablo Sandoval (Note, however, the relatively efficient and base-stealing fanatical Rays did get 3 SB and just 1 CS out of Jose Molina in 2012). Every manager needs to play with the intention of successful steals, but in general, teams need to accelerate the running game.

The acceptable SB success rate of the last three years (about 66%) is on par with the late 1980s. But in the early 1980s, teams were attempting steals in about 3% of all PA — compared to the 2.5% of modernity. That’s around 1 steal per week, though probably more, that teams should be attempting, just to match the 1980s’ figures.

The Twins led the American League with 135 steals, but they also appeared to miss out on potentially more runs by not sending the likes of Ben Revere, Alexi Casilla, Darin Mastroianni, and even Denard Span more often.

Here is a look at the stealing tendencies across the league:

The horizontal axis shows the steals per opportunity. The vertical axis shows the team’s steal success rate minus their break-even rate. The bubble sizes indicate the team’s total steals on the season.

The Padres led the league in attempt rates in 2012 (which is roughly SB+CS divided by SB opportunities), but since they still hovered 12% above their break-even success rate, they could have easily afforded an even more aggressive base running style. Instead of running on 9% of opportunities, they could have gone for 10% or 12% — running until opposing teams throw more pickoff moves than strikes.

Obviously, this analysis of the running game is crude. But the ideas welling underneath it point to a concentric theme: Managers need to buckle their courage pants and start beaming the green light again. Home runs may never come back in quite the same fashion, so stealing deserves its renascence.

Chen’s SI article ends where the modern discussion of speed oft ends: Billy Hamilton. The 22-year-old shortstop has golden legs and may be approaching the major leagues at just the right time to challenge Ricky Henderson’s filthy, filthy records. Young players like Hamilton have a chance to begin a new era of baseball, to replace the wood-cracking echos of the 1990s with the sounds of fabric once again sliding on clay, to rebirth the small ball era and make running cool again.

But they will only do such things, of course, if the managers do like my charts’ color schemes, and go green.