Marlins sign Scott Proctor (1/750k)

Non-tendering Joe Nelson over ~800k and then signing Scott Proctor for 750k is just flat out bizarre. Nelson will not repeat his 2008, but he seems like a safer bet to be decent than the seemingly overworked Proctor. The victim of a poor BABIP (.350), Proctor compounded problems with 5.59 walks and 1.63 homeruns per nine. Proctor managed a career high in strikeouts per nine as well, but his FIP was a replacement level-esque 4.97. The Marlins have a good history of turning nothings into somethings, but this one is a bit puzzling.

Rangers sign Derrick Turnbow (minor league deal)

Another reliever who had a weird 2008. Turnbow lost complete control of his pitches, so much so that in one Triple-A performance he threw the ball into the backstop netting while warming up. That’s not to say Turnbow was ever precise with his control but if there’s a such thing as negative command, he had it. In limited Triple-A time (18 innings) Turnbow walked 41 and in 24.3 innings combined Turnbow walked 54 batters. In 2007, Turnbow walked 46 in 68 innings.

Yankees sign Angel Berroa and John Rodriguez (minor league deals)

Berroa is still finding jobs despite being a replacement level shortstop. Calling him the new Jose Macias is a little harsh, but he doesn’t field or hit even the slightest bit well, and most of his value is gained by simply playing shortstop. Between Cody Ransom (who should not play shortstop, but likely will) and Berroa the Yankees will use one in place of Wilson Betemit. Credit the Yankees for going the cheap replacement level route rather than the expensive replacement level route. It is better to pay the Andy Cannizaro’s of the world 400k for their efforts than give millions to Aaron Miles.

Rodriguez is organizational filler, and split 2008 with the Rays and Mets. He’s worth mentioning, since Rodriguez could probably be a decent bench outfielder on a non-contender.

Cardinals sign Royce Ring (minor league deal)

If one thing about Tony LaRussa is for certain, it is his love of situational lefties. Ring marks the third LOOGY acquired by the Cards this off-season, joining Trever Miller and Ian Ostlund. Like Ostlund, Ring was a member of what I called “F.A.T.: LOOGYS” or in English, Freely Available Talent useful as left-handed one out guys. Back to the Cardinals, they’re attempting to replace the duo of Randy Flores and Ron Villone from last season, and aren’t buying into the ideology that you have to buy a dependable LOOGY.

Ring is a nice addition, and should prove to be a worthwhile one thanks to heavy groundball inducing stuff, and that Ring’s fastball/curve combination plays better to lefties, as seen below. Last season’s numbers are proof of bad luck rather than bad talent, and that should show up in 2009.

The Philadelphia Phillies, fresh off their 2008 World Series Championship, will enter the 2009 season a bit short-handed. Their most valuable player, Chase Utley, underwent surgery after the playoffs and may miss up to two months. And J.C. Romero, their lefty specialist, will miss 50 games after his controversial suspension. Losing Utley and Romero for approximately the same amount of time is very significant; it isn’t as if we are talking about Eric Bruntlett and Clay Condrey.

Several names were tossed around as potential replacements should Utley not be ready for opening day. Eric Bruntlett and Jason Donald, internal replacements, were the most popular two. Mark DeRosa found his name in the mix back during those Jake Peavy trade talks as well. The Phillies decided to throw another name into the mix when they signed Marcus Giles to a minor league deal earlier this week. Signing Giles to this $600,000 deal signals that the team expects Utley to miss some time and that they are not fully confident in Bruntlett and Donald filling the void.

Giles last played in the majors in 2007 for the Padres. In 116 games that season, he hit an awful .229/.304/.317. With a .283 wOBA, Giles produced -19 runs offensively. His -2 run defense did not make him any more valuable either. After adjustments, Giles was worth -0.4 wins, a far cry from the very productive version of himself seen from 2003-05.

From 2003-05, Giles posted wOBA marks of .396, .364, and .363, resulting in wRAA totals of +36, +12, and +20. His defense also proved to be very solid as well, as Giles posted UZR marks of +11, +5, and +4. In terms of win values, we are talking about +6.8 in 2003, +3.4 in 2004, and +4.9 in 2005. The 2004 season looks much lower due to Giles playing just 102 games. Prorated over the course of a full season and the total comes much closer to +4.7.

In 2006, though, his stumble began, as he produced -5 runs on offense while experiencing a sharp dropoff defensively to the tune of -8 runs. He plummeted from +4.9 wins to +0.9 wins.

Marcel projects Giles to post a .309 wOBA in approximately 250 PA next season. This would place him right around -5 runs on offense. If we assume that the -8 defensive runs in 2006 was too low and the -2 in 2007 may be a bit optimistic, then -4 runs seems like a nice compromise. His positional adjustment as well as adjustment for playing time add up to +9 runs, which cancels out with the -9 runs from offense and defense.

Essentially, Giles is the definition of a replacement player next season. He costs just $600,000, is projected to provide replacement level production, and is only being called upon due to Utley’s injury. Of course, if he truly has overcome an injury that supposedly lingered from 2004, and can prove he still has some semblance of production, then the Phillies may have found themselves a significant upgrade over the likes of Bruntlett.

Filling the void left by Romero also presents both internal and external options. GM Amaro has stated that the team will not spend much money to replace him, and JA Happ could be a viable alternative already on the roster. Of course, Happ is likely the best option for the fifth spot in the rotation. If he finds himself in the bullpen, Scott Eyre will likely take over Romero’s role while Happ takes over Eyre’s longer duty role.

The other names being tossed around are Casey Fossum, Will Ohman, Eddie Guardado, and Joe Beimel. Fossum projects the worst of this bunch, literally at replacement level. Guardado looks like a +0.25 win pitcher, with Beimel coming in at +0.40 wins and Ohman at +0.55 wins. None of these pitchers should cost the team more than $2.8 mil or so for a one year deal, but with a plethora of players heading towards arbitration, Happ making chicken-scratch (relative to MLB) looks like the most fiscally responsible solution.

Either way, the Phillies have some decisions to make regarding who will fill what voids, as two significant voids currently need filling. Utley’s is by far more significant than Romero’s, but fans of the defending champs can only hope that the likes of Giles, and Happ/Guardado/Beimel/Ohman/Fossum/whomever can help lessen the productivity lost by these players missing time.

A cautionary tale to all of us never to under estimate the impact of injuries on a pitcher, John Patterson has retired from baseball after two surgeries and nearly three years were unable to rid him of the pain he was suffering in his throwing forearm.

Patterson was originally drafted by Montreal with the 5th overall pick back in 1996, but agent Scott Boras found a loophole that enabled him and a few others (also notable: Matt White), to declare free agency and sign with whoever they wished. For Patterson, that was the Diamondbacks at the even-impressive-today figure of $6.075 million.

Patterson came up through Arizona’s system and spent his first two Major League seasons with them, but just prior to the 2004 season he was traded back to his rightful owners Montreal for relief pitcher Randy Choate. Patterson would be slotted into the Expos’ rotation and begin showing signs of at least adequacy with a 5.06 FIP.

2005 was certainly the crowning achievement of Patterson’s career. He stayed healthy enough to log 31 starts and just under 200 innings over which he maintained his lofty strikeout rate and managed to cut his walk rate from over 10% of batters faced to under 8%. He turned 27 that season and it looked like Patterson was entering his peak.

He began 2006 looking for all the world as if he might even take that peak further. Four starts in Patterson had a ridiculous 32:5 strikeout to walk ratio in just 25.2 innings. But the injury bug hit and Patterson was on the shelf until June. He made four more starts upon his return, was near as effective and then was shut down for the remainder of the year.

2007 was another brief flirt at the big league level before more forearm pain sent him to the operating table. Thinking or hoping that he was finally clear of the troubles this season, Patterson signed a minor league contract with the Rangers after being cut loose by the Nationals who didn’t take to his poor Spring Training results. He wouldn’t last long with the Rangers either, just till May, when his forearm pain returned and he was forced to call it quits on 2008 and hope that rest would fix the problem.

Earlier in December, Patterson began again on a throwing program, but with a return of forearm troubles, Patterson has called it good. Part of the inaugural season for the Nationals that saw them surprise many by finishing 81-81 and leading the NL East for a period of time as late as July 24th, Patterson’s 2005 will always stand though as a far too short glimpse of what might have been.

Boston is rolling the dice twice more this off-season, and no, not Daisuke Matsuzaka. As if adding oft-injured Brad Penny wasn’t risky enough, the Red Sox appear close to signing both outfielder/DH Rocco Baldelli and pitcher John Smoltz to one-year deals with heavy incentives, including 5.5 million for Smoltz, pushing the potential worth of his deal to 10 million. Baldelli’s terms have yet to be announced.

Baldelli’s story is well known. Only a few weeks ago news was release a development in his ongoing health battle, leading to a sense of newfound optimism concerning playing time. Last year, Baldelli returned to the Rays in September and finished a game in which he started in the outfield only once, that coming in the playoffs. The Rays recent signing of Pat Burrell and prior acquisition of Matt Joyce left them without a roster spot to offer Baldelli, and thus he became a free agent. In-game television reports quoted Baldelli as saying his legs would begin to shake and feel as if they were burning during his stints in the field.

That makes the new diagnosis the wild card in this deal, if Baldelli can sustain health, he should be a worthwhile forth outfielder, however if this is more of the same, there’s no way of telling whether an injury to J.D. Drew will also lead to an injury to Baldelli, and a promotion to Jonathan Van Every. Obviously the latter is the worst case scenario, but something Boston will have to have in mind.

With the playing time concerns in mind, it’s hard to get a grasp on Baldelli’s value. In 90 plate appearances, Baldelli was worth nearly half of a win. Of course, the last moderately healthy season Baldelli had he was worth 3.3 wins, and 1.4 in the couple prior to that. If he can stay healthy and simply play at a near league average rate, the Sox are likely going to get more value in return than they’ll pay him.

Smoltz will soon be 42 and is recovering from shoulder surgery that limited his 2008 appearances. Smoltz should be ready by the summer, but there is talk of a return-by-date bonus, which seems a bit reckless. Yes, the Sox want as much of Smoltz as possible, but pushing him to return by a certain date in order to earn some more cash is a recipe for disaster, especially if he is not ready. As for his actual role, it is unknown whether Smoltz would pitch in relief or as a starter, and how the Sox will handle their rotation if Smoltz, Penny, and Tim Wakefield remain healthy and effective at once – although that’s a problem they wouldn’t mind.

Whenever he ends up pitching, Smoltz will likely be worth the money. Even with all the incentives earned, the Sox are paying for two wins. It’s possible the surgery costs Smoltz some effectiveness, and even if we tack on a few runs to his 3.50 FIP that Marcels projects and 19 runs above replacement that CHONE projects, Smoltz still projects to be worth the base amount of 5.5 million. Even if Smoltz doesn’t work out, you have to appreciate Boston’s aggressiveness and awareness when dealing with injury-prone starters. Yes, they bring headaches, but if they’re good like Smoltz 50 innings given to him instead of another pitcher can be worth the hassle.

It’s an off-season of risks for Boston, which makes the 2009 AL East even more exciting.

I have to say, we’ve really loved watching how the Win Value stats we introduced a few weeks ago have taken off around the blogosphere. It was definitely a project we were excited about, and I’m personally quite pleased that you guys have responded to them as well as you have.

I did want to mention a couple of things, though. Yes, win values for pitchers are coming. We’re actively working on making sure we have the most accurate formula we can for calculating them, and because of things unique to pitchers, they simply aren’t as straight forward as hitter win values. There’s the starter/reliever issue, how leverage should be handled, the DH issue between leagues, and the various issues of what is within a pitcher’s ability to control and what could be considered outside influence. When we introduce the pitcher Win Values, though, we’ll definitely walk through them step by step, as we did with the hitters, and try to make them as transparent as possible.

I know that a lot of you are already calculating these win values on your own as well, using various inputs, especially in terms of projecting how teams will fare in 2009. That’s great, and definitely one of the fun things you can do with a Win Value system. This isn’t intended to dampen your enthusiasm for these metrics at all. However (and I know you could feel that word coming), I think there are a few things we should mention in regards to adding up Win Values for a roster.

First off, wins aren’t entirely linear. A player who is projected as a +2 win player won’t have the exact same impact on a 60 win roster that he would on a 95 win roster. There’s diminishing returns that start kicking in, and there are only so many at-bats and high leverage innings to go around.

And, of course, the specifics of the player’s skillset interact with his environment, so a change in environment could change his value. For instance, taking a flyball pitcher and sticking them in front of the worst outfield defense in the world is going to have an impact on the value of a +2 win pitcher. By just adding up individual player win values, we lose these contexts, and they matter.

Also, as many of you have noticed, the position adjustments don’t add up to zero. For each individual player, this isn’t a problem. However, the fact that the AL has a DH and the NL doesn’t makes it an issue when trying to compare teams across leagues. It’s not that hard to adjust for, but it shouldn’t be left out of the discussion if you start doing Win Value evaluations or projections for all 30 major league clubs.

Just a few things to keep in mind as we all bask in the awesomeness of the availability of these metrics.

Over the last few days we have taken a look at the remaining free agents on the market, be they Type A or Type B players. When a team signs a Type B free agent, they do not surrender a pick even though the team losing the player earns a supplemental pick. With Type A players, however, the signing team surrenders a pick, either in the first or second round, depending on their draft position. After covering Type A relievers and starting pitchers the natural step involves evaluating the available hitters with this classification. Unfortunately, this would result in a post discussing Bobby Abreu, Adam Dunn, Manny Ramirez, etc, players who have been covered like crazy here.

Fortunately, however, there are a few other Type A free agent hitters available. Jason Varitek is one of them, but the two of interest right now both play infield positions up the middle and share the same first name. In case the title or this lead-in did not give them away, the players in question are Orlando Hudson and Orlando Cabrera. Both are valuable players yet have seen their names mentioned rarely in the transaction rumors department.

Hudson, a second baseman, is currently 31 years old and coming off of an injury-plagued season that saw him partake in just 107 games. He hit .305/.367/.450 in a senior circuit that saw keystone cornermen average a .271/.338/.408 line. Since coming to the Diamondbacks prior to the 2006 season, he has also shown offensive consistency, posting OPS marks of .809, .817, and .817.

In 2006, with a .346 wOBA, Hudson was worth +8 batting runs. The next season, his wOBA shot up to .361, almost doubling his run production to +15. He posted an almost identical .358 wOBA this past season, but the limited playing time suppressed his batting runs to +11. Prorated over the full season that is right in line with the +15 produced in 2007.

Defensively, Arizona has not been as kind, as Hudson has seen somewhat substantial dropoffs in his glovework since leaving Toronto. From 2003-05, as a Blue Jay, the O-Dawg posted UZR numbers of +3, +16, and +6. In Arizona from 2006-08, -4, -2, and -6. His offense has improved but seemingly at the expense of his defense. All told, over the last four seasons, our win values have him as +2.1, +2.5, +3.4, and +2.1. He looks like a half-win above average per season in this timespan.

In 2009, he projects to be worth +10 runs offensively and -4 runs defensively while earning +22 runs in adjustments. This would place Hudson at +2.8 wins, worth approximately $13.5 mil at fair market value. Over the life of a three year deal, if declines by a half-win each season, he would be worth +2.8 wins at $13.5 mil in 2009; +2.3 wins at $12 mil in 2010; and +1.8 wins at $10.5 mil in 2011. Put together, that is a grand total of right around +7 wins on a 3-yr/$36 mil deal.

Cabrera, 34, is a shortstop with the opposite skillset. He has been a very solid fielder over the last few seasons though not nearly as potent with the bat. In 2008, Cabrera hit .281/.334/.371 with the White Sox, a .705 OPS. The .705 was down from the .738 and .742 produced during the previous two seasons. In terms of wOBA, we are talking about a .329, .331, and .316 player since 2006, which translates to -1, 0, and -7 batting runs respectively.

With the glove, however, Cabrera has put up UZR numbers of +21, -1, +9, and +14 since 2005. When combined with his adjustments and offense, this Orlando has been worth +3.8, +2.9, +3.6, and +3.5 wins over the last four seasons. In 2009, he projects to be worth -10 runs on offense and +10 runs on defense. Therefore, his true value lies in the adjustments he receives for playing shortstop as well as an entire season with 700+ PA. Getting the full +7.5 runs per 162 games and +23.5 runs for his total number of plate appearances, Cabrera looks like a +3.1 win player next season.

+3.1 wins at $4.8 mil/win comes out to a 1-yr/$15 mil deal. If he signs for a 3-yr deal, with a slight discount for contract security, the deal would be closer to 3-yr/$42 mil at fair market value. If he declines by the same half-win each season then he is +3.1 at $15 mil in 2009; +2.6 at $13.8 mil in 2010; and +2.1 at $12.2 mil in 2011. Added up, that is almost +8 wins over a 3-yr/$41 mil deal, right around the aforementioned contract with a slight discount for security.

Neither of these players is likely to sign as lucrative of a deal, however, not just due to the market heavily favoring the buyers but also due to their Type A classification. Teams are clearly being more risk-averse this offseason in terms of signing players to lengthy and expensive contracts. On top of that, being Type A free agents will cost the signing teams either a first or second round draft pick. The Nationals have been linked to Hudson while the Royals and Athletics have been linked to Cabrera.

Outside of those three teams, just about nobody else has reportedly expressed interest in these two up the middle position players. The market for second basemen may be a bit more dried up than that of shortstops, but both of these players could end up as steals next season given that their contracts are very likely to fall vastly below their estimated fair market values. Now is the time to buy.

The Florida Marlins organization made some fishy choices when adding pitchers to the 40-man roster recently.

Right-hander Dallas Trahern, who was acquired in the Miguel Cabrera trade with Detroit last year, had a dismal 2008 season at the Triple-A level. He posted a 5.72 FIP with 141 hits allowed in 111 innings of work. Trahern was hit hard and allowed 20 home runs (1.62 HR/9). On the plus side, he did not walk a ton of batters (3.65 BB/9) but that positive feeling is negated by his low strikeout rate (5.76 K/9). Trahern’s repertoire includes an 88-92 mph fastball, curveball and change-up.

Canadian Chris Leroux is your typical talented but raw Northerner, who needs to improve his command by pitching as many innings as possible. The right-hander was originally a starter, but could not stay healthy so he was shifted to the bullpen in 2007, which was a wise move. Since that time, Leroux has appeared in 103 games out of the bullpen and improved last season despite advancing from A-ball to High-A. In 2008, Leroux allowed just 60 hits in 74 innings and posted rates of 3.16 BB/9 and 9.49 K/9. His WHIP dropped from 1.41 to 1.16. He’ll be a little old for Double-A in 2009 at 24, but Leroux has less experience on the mound than most his age. He can touch 94 mph with his fastball and also has a solid slider.

Tim Wood was definitely a head-scratcher when he was added to the 40-man roster – if you look at his numbers. The 26-year-old was originally selected in the 44th round of the 2002 draft. The right-handed middle reliever had a nice season in High-A ball by allowing 25 hits in 40 innings (His BABIP was a fluky .209) but posted mediocre rates of 3.38 BB/9 and 4.95 K/9. His ERA was 1.80 but the FIP was a less-impressive 3.85. Promoted to Triple-A, Wood allowed 20 hits in 20.1 innings and posted rates of 2.66 BB/9 and 6.64 K/9. His FIP was 4.18. Wood’s fastball hits 95 mph and he has a power slider, but the numbers just don’t add up.

Right now, as we see a slow moving free agent market causing players to adjust and take deals they wouldn’t have otherwise considered, I begin to wonder who will be left standing without a chair when the music stops. Are we going to see another situation as we did last year, where Kenny Lofton couldn’t find anyone to give him a job despite being a quality player? Probably.

But the train of thought led me to wonder – what on earth happened in regards to Lofton last year?

In ’07, Lofton hit .296/.367/.414, stole 23 bases in 30 attempts, and played above average defense in center field. He racked up 559 plate appearances and was worth 3.1 wins in his age 40 season. He showed no signs of decline, drawing more walks than strikeouts and posting a .118 ISO that was right in line with his career average. He didn’t get any slower, as evidenced by his eight bunt singles and quality baserunning.

His career wOBA was .359. In his final three seasons, it was .368, .345, and .349. From 2005 to 2007, he was worth a total of 8.2 wins, for a dollar value of about $30 million. He made less than half of that.

And then, last winter, he couldn’t find anyone to give him a job. Even if you had decided that he was going to suffer significant decline at age 41 (despite there being no evidence of erosion in his skills), at worst, you could have projected him as a +2 win player for 2008. The absolute worst case scenario would have led a team to expect him to be league average. And no one wanted to employ him?

Put this another way – Torii Hunter got $90 million last winter to be a slightly above average center fielder. His 2005 to 2007 three year win value was 8.5 wins, barely more than Lofton’s total. Yes, he’s younger, so you’d expect him to age better, but that just means that you think Hunter would be half a win or so better than Lofton in 2009. Hunter was paid $16.5 million last season while Lofton sat at home unemployed. In what world does that make any sense?

How Kenny Lofton was forcibly retired by MLB will remain one of the stranger stories of the last year. It will be interesting to see if baseball tosses any other quality players out of the talent pool this winter.

This is my first post at FanGraphs, and I would like to thank David Appelman for inviting me onboard. I have previously written for Seamheads.com and StatSpeak.net, and frequent “The Book” blog. If you’d like to know some more about my background, check out this article I wrote a few months ago.

Today I am going to start off by climbing up on my soapbox to address one of my pet peeves, the use of Line Drive rates as a predictor for Batting Average on Balls in Play (BABIP). The standard practice is to estimate BABIP by LD/Balls in Play + .12. It is claimed that LD rateas are more stable than BABIP from year to year, and that when the actual observed BABIP varies from the predicted by a large margin, this indicates a future regression to the mean.

I’m in the process of updating my park factors for 2008, along with adding in 1999, 1955 and 1953 that the folks at RetroSheet have included in their most recent release. I’ve added a couple more categories, foul flies and line drives. Now, I’ve never heard anyone mention park factors when using LD rates, but in fact they are quite large. I might guess that there could different opinions of what is a line drive from one ballpak to another, or maybe it’s the air or the hitting background. I limited my LD factors to 2003-2008, when the RetroSheet data has complete information on whether a ball is a line drive, ground ball, fly ball or popup on every batted ball, including hits. In Arlington, a batter is 18% more likely to have a batted ball coded as a LD, which may have helped Milton Bradley to have the 2nd highest LD rate in 2008 – while in Minneapolis, it’s 20% less likely. Four of the lowest six LD rates belong to Michael Bourn, Geoff Blum, Ty Wigginton and Hunter Pence, and Minute Maid Park has the second lowest LD park factor at 0.82. This is not saying that Houston batters hit fewer line drives – it’s that Houston and it opponents both have 18% fewer balls scored as liners in Houston than they do on the road.

PARK_ID PARK_NAME            First   Last    PAw     LDf	   
PHI12   Veterans Stadium     2003    2003    4768   1.23	   
ARL02   Ballpark Arlington   2003    2008   26850   1.18	   
TOK01   Tokyo Dome           2004    2008     283   1.13	   
CIN09   Great American       2003    2008   28827   1.11	   
DEN02   Coors Field          2003    2008   29158   1.10	   
STL10   Busch Stadium III    2006    2008   13967   1.09	   
KAN06   Kauffman Stadium     2003    2008   27530   1.09	   
WAS11   Nationals Park       2008    2008    4790   1.09	   
TOR02   Rogers Centre        2003    2008   27513   1.08	   
SFO03   Phone Co Park        2003    2008   29439   1.07	   
MON02   Stade Olympique      2003    2004    7684   1.07	   
STL09   Busch Stadium II     2003    2005   14280   1.06	   
STP01   Tropicana Field      2003    2008   27830   1.06	   
DET05   Comerica Park        2003    2008   28008   1.06	   
PHI13   Citizens Bank Park   2004    2008   24640   1.06	   
MIL06   Miller Park          2003    2008   29354   1.06	   
WAS10   RFK Stadium          2005    2007   14885   1.05	   
OAK01   Oakland Coliseum     2003    2008   26719   1.03	   
SEA03   Safeco Field         2003    2008   26683   1.01	   
CHI12   Comiskey Park II     2003    2008   28644   1.00	   
NYC16   Yankee Stadium       2003    2008   28722   1.00	   
MIA01   Dolphin Stadium      2003    2008   29849   1.00	   
CLE08   Jacobs Field         2003    2008   28136   0.99	   
BAL12   Camden Yards         2003    2008   29103   0.99	   
PIT08   P.N.C. Park          2003    2008   27652   0.98	   
PHO01   Bank One Ballpark    2003    2008   28810   0.98	   
SJU01   Hiram Bithorn        2003    2004    2598   0.98	   
SAN01   Jack Murphy          2003    2003    4943   0.98	   
LOS03   Dodger Stadium       2003    2008   29555   0.98	   
CHI11   Wrigley Field        2003    2008   28663   0.96	   
SAN02   PetCo Park           2004    2008   24432   0.95	   
NYC17   Shea Stadium         2003    2008   29299   0.92	   
BOS07   Fenway Park          2003    2008   28311   0.86	   
ATL02   Turner Field         2003    2008   29016   0.86	   
ANA01   Anaheim Stadium      2003    2008   26490   0.86	   
HOU03   Minute Maid Park     2003    2008   28271   0.82	   
MIN03   Metrodome            2003    2008   28048   0.80

Point Two – are line drives really more predictive? It’s said that if a player’s BABIP is not close to his LD+.12, that it’s becuse of luck, and this should be expected to correct itself next season. Expect the overachiever to come back to Earth.

For all the batters from 2003-2008, in non-bunt plate appearances, I added up the base hits, line drives, ground ball, fly balls and popups. I compared the predicted BABIP to the observed one in each season, which showed a root mean square (RMS) error of .045. Then I compared each years predicted value to the next years observed, and the RMS was .048 – slightly larger. For pitchers, the RMS was .039 in the same season, .039 in the next. I don’t see the evidence of future regression.

Complete line drive data is only available since 2003, and for a few seasns in the 1990s. In the seasons when it was not available, a “true talent level” of BABIP can be estimated by using a rolling weighted mean of past data, commonly referred to as Marcel. I used a seasonal weight of 0.7 – the most recent season is weighted at 1.00, the one before that at 0.70, two seasons back at 0.49, etc, each previous year 0.7 times the next. In this test, I did not use any regression to the league mean. The RMS of LD+.12 compared to the Marcel for the same season was .048 for batters, .046 for pitchers. The Marcel compared to the observed BABIP in the NEXT season was .041 for batters, .039 for pitchers. Historical BABIP data is better than the current season’s LD rate.

If LD data is available, so are GB, FB & PU. I tried a more complex model using .15*FB+.24*GB+.73*LD to estimate BABIP. This worked much abtter at reducing the mean errors, even surpassing historical BABIP. For batters, the yearly RMS came down from .048 to .036, for pitchers from .041 to .031.

Still, you can’t assume that every batter has the same rate of hits on their ground balls. Some batters hit more balls to the left side than the right, some run fast and some run slow. Instead of trying to profile each batter on each type of batted ball, I will continue to use Marcel to weight each batter’s historical BABIP in my projections.

On the other hand, DIPS theory states that a pitcher has little control over the outcome once a ball has been put into play. There is clearly an ability to be a flyball or groundball pitcher. Line drives are considered mistakes, and that may be evidenced ny looking at the six-year totals which show the lowest LD rates nelonging to Mariano Rivera, Fausto Carmona and Derek Lowe, while the highest belong to guys like John Van Benschoten, Edwin Jackson and Tony Armas Jr. Using the FB-FB-LD estimator on the six-year totals drops the pitchers RMS all the way down to .016.

Even so, some pitchers consistently defy the estimates. Roger Clemens, Brian Bannister, Chien-Ming Wang, Carlos Zambrano, Dan Haren, Brandon Webb, Chris Young and Greg Maddux all do at least .020 better than estimated. On the other end, Zach Duke, Sidney Ponson and Glendon Rusch all under perform by at least .020. Is it the ballpark? Is it their defense? The batters they faced? Or is it their own skill or lack of it?

Here’s my plan (I won’t have the answers next week) I want to compile park factors for each type of batted ball in each ballpark – what is the normalized rate of hits for flyballs to left in Dodger Stadium? Then do a WOWY analysis of fielders, showing the rate that each fielder allows more or fewer hits than expected on each groundball, flyball, linedrive and popup. Finally, each batter’s rates. Then go back and look at how many times each pitcher faced each batter, and with which fielders, and in which ballparks. Once those are controled, see how many hits, plus or minus, are left over for each pitcher.

Indians sign Carl Pavano (1/1.5)

About a month ago, I covered Pavano and his prospects moving forward. The story remains the same, if healthy, Pavano can be a decent pitcher, but health has been an outlier for Pavano in the past few seasons. This is a relatively low risk move since the Indians are paying for 0.2 wins, something that Pavano should easily surpass unless he misses the entire season. If it works out, the move can help to cement the Indians “rebound” status in 2009, and helps to continue their off-season makeover.

Mariners sign Tyler Walker (1/?)

Seattle added Eric Hull to the bullpen fray last week, and now Walker. Walker missed most of 2006 and 2007 thanks to injuries, but worked through more than 50 innings last season as a Giant. Using a 92 MPH fastball and 83 MPH slider heavily, Walker racked up the strikeouts last season in one of his better seasons. Homerun tendencies are a bit alarming given his groundball/flyball rates, which are seemingly close during any given season.

Since 2005 Walker has worked primarily in higher-leverage situations, with a two-year stint as closer thrown in. Jack Zduriencik’s crew will have to figure out if Aaron Heilman or Brandon Morrow is their closer, but it’s safe to assume Walker will be one of the primary set-up men in Seattle’s bullpen next season. Assuming the money is reasonable, it’s hard to find fault here.

Rays sign Randy Choate and Julio DePaula (minor league deals)

Last off-season Choate signed a major league deal with the Milwaukee Brewers and promptly got comfortable with his Nashville apartment. This season things could be a bit different – the apartment might be in Durham, woo! In all seriousness though, with the Rays signing of Pat Burrell and apparent desire to move some bullpen payroll, Choate has the opportunity to make the roster as a low-cost LOOGY. Choate possesses an unconventional delivery and has groundball inducing stuff and will likely wind up with the major league club eventually in 2009.

DePaula, not to be confused with Jorge, saw his first majors action last season with Minnesota. As mentioned, the Rays are looking to move some payroll and groundball extraordinaire Chad Bradford could be the one to go. DePaula induces grounders and could profile as a low-leverage reliever. The more likely route involves hanging out in Choate’s Durham apartment while Choate relieves in St. Petersburg.