Fresh off of a World Series win, the Philadelphia Phillies headed into the offseason with a rather lengthy list of arbitration-eligible players. Eric Bruntlett and Clay Condrey quickly re-signed. Greg Dobbs soon followed suit. And Cole Hamels, as Matthew noted last night, signed a 3-yr deal to avoid arbitration that greatly benefits the team. Joining Hamels on the 3-yr extension express is reliever Ryan Madson, which is actually somewhat surprising.

See, Ryan is represented by Scott Boras, who claimed that the Madson-Lidge tandem was akin to the Rivera-Wetteland tandem of the old Yankees regime. Madson = Rivera? A stretch in every sense of the word, yes, but it gave us a glimpse of how the superagent values his client. Based on the way Boras presented Madson, it seemed almost guaranteed that the free agent market would be tested following the 2009 season.

Now, after reportedly turning down a 3-yr/$12 mil deal, Madson signed for a 3-yr/$12 mil + incentives deal. The terms of the incentives are not yet known but the Phillies managed to lock up their setup man for one more arbitration year as well as two free agent years.

Last season, Madson logged 82.2 innings with a 3.33 FIP and 3.05 ERA. The ERA actually matched his output in 2007, when he missed time down the stretch due to injuries. All told, he produced +13.1 value runs, good for +1.3 wins. At fair market value, Madson was worth $6 mil, despite earning $1.4 mil. Madson in 2008 was largely a tale of two pitchers, however.

From March 31-August 1, Madson pitched in 49 games and 56.1 innings of 3.51 ERA/3.88 FIP baseball. The numbers were not extravagant nor were they detrimental to the success of the team. He looked solid, but not fantastic. Something clicked after that, because from that day on, Madson pitched 26.1 innings with a 2.05 ERA, 2.09 FIP, and 8.33 K/BB ratio. His fastball velocity rose as well, which was extremely noticeable in the World Series. The guy went from a 92-93 mph fastball to routinely throwing 97 mph with the greatest of ease.

Next season, Madson projects to pitch around 78 IP with a 3.75 FIP, 3.85 ERA, and 2.80 K/BB. His average leverage index will also rise given the nature of setting up games. A win value in the 1.2-1.5 range seems pretty likely. If his actual value falls within that range, his fair market value would be between $4 and $6.75 mil. Let’s say that he will be worth 1.4 wins in 2009, and will lose 0.3 wins of effectiveness each year of this deal. Under those circumstances, with a bit of inflation factored in, though not 10%, Madson would produce 3.3 wins fot $15.6 mil. Based on these calculations, the Phillies seemingly signed him to a below-market contract.

It will be very interesting to see if Madson’s new workout/warmup regimen will allow him to sustain 95+ mph fastballs all year long, but he instilled plenty of confidence in Phillies fans down the stretch. I may have ragged on Ruben Amaro, Jr for some odd moves early in this off-season, but locking up Hamels and Madson are two key steps.

Everyone else was signing arbitration buyout contracts (hey, Felix!), so Hamels and the Phillies wanted in as well, coming to terms on a three-year, $20.5 million contract. What is interesting about this contract is that not only does it not buy out any of Hamels’ free agent years, it does not even cover his entire arbitration eligibility. Cole Hamels qualified as a Super Two this offseason. A Super Two is a player with less than three years service time, more than two and in the top 17 percent of said group of players. Because of that, Hamels garnered an extra early year of arbitration.

The Super Two status throws a wrench into our value calculations since our standard formula for arbitration awards, 40%/60%/80%, are based on a three-year model. The easy solution is to keep those in place and just assume that the fourth year of arbitration would be around 100% of market value. My gut feeling however is that since arbitration awards are more focused on the playing time of the player rather than his stats, that this is not the most realistic solution and that something more like 30%/50%/70%/90% is more likely for Super Two’s. I will present the math under both assumptions so that we can get a better range of values.

Projecting Hamels is thankfully pretty simple. From 2006 through 2008, Hamels posted the following FIPs: 3.98, 3.83 and 3.72. The three projection systems that FanGraphs hosts all place 2009 Hamels between his 2007 and 2008 performance and inning totals so averaging the win values for those two years is going to get us a reasonable estimate for his 2009 projection. Cole accrued 3.8 wins in 2007 and 4.6 last season, making his 2009 projection 4.2 wins. Assuming $4.5 million per win for this offseason, that’s a $19 million value.

Under my proposed arbitration weighting, the Phillies are valuing Hamels at being worth $41 million on the open market for the next three years. That’s a little over nine wins total for that time period, a mark Hamels seems sure to better. Under the 40/60/80 line, the Phillies would be paying for 7.5 wins, something Hamels might exceed in just two years time. If the projection of 4.2 wins is at all correct, Hamels looks to be worth around $54 million in value over the next three seasons. Even if you think it’s a 20/40/60/80 line for Super Twos, that’s still a discount for the Phillies. There’s no ifs ands or buts about this one, the Phillies got themselves a killer deal here. Of course, Hamels made out well himself; he’ll go into his final arbitration year with a $9.5 million starting point, meaning he’s likely to command over $12 million on that final year and he still has all of free agency ahead of him.

Pitcher Win Values are now available in the leaderboards, team pages, and the MyTeam section.

Two fun facts:

After the park, league and replacement adjustments for 2008, it looks like Roy Halladay was ever so slightly more valuable than C.C. Sabathia by our calculations. Though for all practical purposes they were equally valuable. Neither of them the Cy Young award, though Sabathia did change leagues making it particularly difficult for him to win. (C.C Sabathia 7.68 wins vs. Roy Halladay 7.71 wins)

Remember when Eric Seidman wrote about how awful Brandon Backe was and how he couldn’t understand why he was still allowed to pitch in the majors? Well, of all the qualified starting pitchers in 2008, Backe finished dead last in wins, with -0.8 of them.

The Chicago Cubs organization will have two young players on the bubble when spring training rolls around in February. Pitcher Rich Hill, and infielder Ronny Cedeno are currently on the outside looking in when it comes to 25-man roster spots.

Unfortunately for the Cubs, both players are also out of minor league options, which means the club has three options: 1) Keep them on the 25-man roster; 2) Trade them for other talent; 3) Expose them to waivers in an attempt to send them down to the minors. If the club chooses the third option, each player would definitely end up in other organizations with zero compensation, which really leaves the club with two options: Play or trade.

Hill, 28, had a breakout 2007 season and allowed just 170 hits in 195 innings of work. He posted rates of 2.91 BB/9 and 8.45 K/9. The southpaw’s control was solid all season long, although he did walk seven batters in 11 innings over his final two starts of the season (When he also threw more pitches in back-to-back games – 219 – than he did all season).

In 2008, Hill made just five starts and did not walk fewer than three batters in any one game. In those games, he allowed just 13 hits in 19.2 innings and managed 15 strikeouts, but he walked 18 batters. The final straw came on May 2 against St. Louis when Hill went just two-thirds of an inning and allowed no hits but walked four batters.

Interestingly, his first three pitches of that game – to lead-off batter Brian Barton – were three solid strikes: fastball (looking), curveball (looking), fastball (swinging).

Next up (ironically, perhaps) was Rick Ankiel, who took four straight balls on a curveball and three fastballs. The next batter was Albert Pujols, who fouled off the first pitch and then looked at three straight balls (although Gameday shows pitch three was a pretty clear strike on a curve). Hill then received a strike call before walking Pujols on the six pitch of the at-bat.

The pitching coach visited Hill on the mound prior to Troy Glaus stepping up to the plate. When play resumed, Hill buried a curveball in the dirt. Glaus then eagerly popped up the next fastball, which would have been a borderline strike at the knees. Ditching the curveball, Hill then went after Ryan Ludwick with five straight fastballs, four of which missed the strike zone by a wide margin.

Yadier Molina then faced seven straight fastballs with the first three coming in as balls, although the first two were borderline strikes: over the plate and at the knees. The third missed way up. The next two pitches were called strikes, although they were worse than the first two that were called balls. Molina than fouled off a high fastball before Hill buried the final one in the dirt, signaling the end to his night – and season in the Majors.

The Cubs sent Hill to the minors after that game but the control did not improve. In three High-A ball games his walk rate was 8.03 BB/9 and in seven Triple-A games the rate was 9.69 BB/9. Hill continued pitching in the off-season in the Venezuelan Winter League and walked 23 batters in 21 innings.

Any trade of Hill at this point would definitely be selling low on the left-hander. But the sad truth is that this past season looked a lot like the tail end of Ankiel’s pitching career, and Hill does not have the option to pursue a second career as a hitter. More time in the minors probably won’t fix Hill’s problem, if it is indeed the dreaded Steve Blass disease. But he certainly is not going to be effective on a Major League mound while facing the best hitters on the planet with limited command and control of his pitches. It appears to be a no-win situation.

On Tuesday, I will look at Cedeno. Outfielder Felix Pie was originally part of this series before his trade to Baltimore, which hit the press on Sunday.

Rays sign Lance Cormier (1/650k)

The recently discussed Dewon Day era ended abruptly in St. Pete thanks to Cormier. As documented elsewhere, 2008 was only the third time in his big league career that Cormier saw less than 50% of his innings come from starting, and the second time less than 5%. In both of those seasons Cormier has posted his career best FIPs; 4.39 in 2005 and 4.04 last season. Cormier has a faint strikeout rate, walks quite a few, and allowed too many homeruns as a starter. Regardless, CHONE has Cormier at a 4.49 FIP, if that happens, it’s possible Cormier fits in as a situational reliever — a.k.a. groundball inducer — in the Rays bullpen.

White Sox sign Bartolo Colon (1/1)

If Colon pitches enough innings he’ll have a shot at three million total. It’s a nice low-risk move for Kenny Williams. Colon was swell with Boston last season, earning 2.9 million, which is roughly as much as he can earn in 2009. Colon will continue to live and die off his fastball. Naturally Colon’s going to allow a number of homeruns, but his FIP should sit around 4.5 like CHONE and Marcels project. He’ll join a rotation that has to replace Javier Vazquez.

Orioles sign Gregg Zaun (1/1.5)

Zaun’s deal includes a team option for 2010 that could see him earn two million (or a 500k buyout). Pencil Zaun’s name into the catcher spot until Matt Wieters arrives, which may or may not be early in the season. Chad Moeller is the other catcher around, and Zaun is clearly better than that. Long billed as the “perfect back-up catcher”, Zaun’s win values have been on the decline since 2005, but CHONE is still a bit forgiving on Zaun’s offensive projection, suggesting we should expect a pretty average performance next year. It should be interesting to see how Wieters’ service time is handled, especially if Zaun is better than expected.

Indians sign Vinnie Chulk and Matt Herges (minor league deals)

Chulk’s strikeouts disappeared as his homerun totals shot up, prompting the Giants to move on after season’s end. Chulk also saw a loss in velocity, which is obviously bad, but even worse when you study his usage patterns and realize he relied more on his fastball last season than previously. Chulk has a history of being decent, if not fantastic, so there’s some hope here.

Herges 2008 is a good litmus test. Ask your friends how many runs worse he was in 2008 than 2007. If they say anything higher than 0.06 then odds are they’re relying on ERA too much. The only red flag is the increased line drive rate, pitchers simply can’t give up nearly 27% liners and live to tell about it. If Herges can regain his groundball inducing ability and avoid such solid contact, he’ll be a nice find for Cleveland. Odds are, one of these two is the last guy in the Indians pen.

Free Felix Pie! When the Cubs acquired Juan Pierre prior to the 2006 season, the 21-year old Pie went to work in Triple-A Iowa. Seemingly the plan was to use Pierre as a bridge from Corey Patterson to Pie. Instead, the Cubs handed the 2007 center field job to Alfonso Soriano, and later Jacque Jones. Kosuke Fukudome, Reed Johnson, and Jim Edmonds would be signed or claimed within the last season, leaving the Cubs yet again with a stacked outfield and leaving Pie on the outside looking in.

Only 260 at-bats into his pro Cubs career, the Cubs have traded Pie to the Baltimore Orioles for Garrett Olson and a prospect. Since 2007, Pie has hit well in the minors and has a knack for playing solid defense. It’s easy to forget that Pie will only be 24 this coming season, but the question is how he’ll fit in with the Orioles. Baltimore features a number of talent outfielders in Nick Markakis, Adam Jones, and to a lesser extent Luke Scott.

Olson is an unspectacular starter with average stuff and below-average stats. Olson’s minor league strikeouts have yet to carry over neither has his control in the minors. A 5.13 FIP isn’t overly encouraging, and neither is the homerun problem, but CHONE foresees a better season in 2009 for Olson, 153 innings and a 4.96 FIP. The Cubs might use Olson in relief, or in the back of the rotation, and that is the problem here.

Sure, Olson could later be dealt, but as of right now this trade is questionable for Chicago. Pie has lacked opportunity in Chicago and by dealing him for Olson the Cubs are not only selling low on a high potential player, but also potentially hurting their 2009 team. You can argue that the Cubs are in no position to rely on potential rather than known performance, but again, Olson is hardly a pillar of success.

The alternative option, placing Pie on the bench as the fourth outfielder in place of Reed Johnson or Joey Gathright does not give Pie an incredible opportunity. However, with Milton Bradley’s ever wavering health, there is a chance the Cubs would need a fill-in outfielder for some time. At the very least, the Cubs wouldn’t be seen as giving Pie away. Then again, the Cubs seem to lose interest in prospects quickly.

Even if Pie busts, you have to like the move for the Orioles, who have amassed a ton of young talent since Andy MacPhail took over control. In any other division the Orioles would be a future power.

or Part III of ‘Things Aren’t Always as They Appear”.

How is it that Derek Jeter can win three consecutive Gold Glove awards (2004-2006) for being the best defensive shortstop in the American League, but virtually every saber fielding metric rates him among the worst?

The image of a fielder standing over a muffed grounder as the batter crosses first is easily burned into our memory. It’s the avoidance of not only the errors but also infield hits that have impressed us as to who the Golden Glovers should be. Over past six seasons (2003-2008), the most recent period for which RetroSheet has complete batted ball information, Jeter is third at 91.7% among major league shortstops in “sure handedness”, the percentage on infield grounders where an out is recorded. The top spot is held by Omar Vizquel at 92.2%, and Vizquel has won two Gold Gloves during that period, and nine more earlier in his career. Second is Alex Rodriguez at 91.9%, with two Gold Gloves, and fourth is Cesar Izturis at 91.2%, with one award. Eight of the last twelve Gold Gloves at shortstop have gone to the four players with the highest rate of converting ground balls.

However, making outs on the balls you get to is not nearly the total measure of an infielder’s range. While it is easy to remember the booted grounder, it seems that we don’t mentally catalogue how many extra grounders make their way to the outfield for a hit. This is where Jeter falls down.

I counted the number ground ball hits to each outfield position, along with the fielder at each of the four infield spots and the handedness of the batter. I assigned which infielder was responsible for each hit based on the ratio of infield grounders to each position, based on bat hand. It’s an estimate, and it can be improved by adding vector data that is available from GameDay, but even the preliminary results match very well to who is expected to be in the top, middle and bottom.

The player with the highest rate of grounders kept in the infield is Adam Everett at 83.5%, while the worst is Ramon Vazquez at 76.5%. Jeter is next to last at 77.3%. No other shortstop today has such a wide divergence of the highly visible “hands” and the nearly invisible “range” as Jeter.

Let’s say we are designing a table top baseball game (that’s what we played before PCs were invented), and then let’s rate the shortstops on their range. 76.5% of groundballs to short are always outs, 16.5% are always hits. That leaves 7.0% to be contested. For those, we have to roll a 20-sided die. Vazquez is a 0, Everett is a 20, Jeter is a 2. If we roll a 1 or a 2, Jeter gets to the ball – anything from 3 to 20, it goes to the outfield. The difference from best to worst, over a full season, is about 40 hits.

There’s another problem. 6 of the top 11 in “hands” are also in the bottom 16 in “range”. If a player doesn’t get to that many balls, the ones he does get to are likely closer and thus easier to field. This is a bias in the “hands” rating, as those players with less range will have a higher expected value on the balls they do get to. Therefore, players with a high “hands” rating combined with low “range” (Jeter, A-Rod, Keppinger, Betancourt) likely don’t really rate as high, because their expected rate is likely closer to their observed. I will account for this when I process the GameDay vector data.

What really counts is when the ball is hit, does the fielder make an out? That’s the definition of Defense Efficiency Rating (DER) on a team level. Whether it’s by range, throwing arm or good hands, it’s the out that counts. With 1000 or more ground balls, the bottom five at shortstop are Angel Berroa 71.1%, Michael Young 71.0%, Jeter 70.9%, Felipe Lopez 70.2% and Carlos Guillen 69.8%. At the top are Adam Everett 75.7%, Omar Vizquel 74.9%, Troy Tulowitzki 74.3%, Julio Lugo 74.1% and Khalil Greene 74.1%.

Don’t let your eyes fool you.

Today was a very exciting day for us baseball analysts. Right about the time that we finally got used to what PITCH f/x could tell us about the game, we started jonesing for some form of HIT f/x to give us the other pieces of the puzzle. A full scale system of tracking batted balls off the bat and all the way to the fielder’s gloves will allow us to make massive strides forward in fielding metrics and even assist us in refining our offensive measurements as well.

Alas, the dream seemed far away as the expense required to track batted balls everywhere on the field is immense. Most of us tucked that dream away, waiting for the day but not conceiving that it could be anytime soon. Enter Matt Sisson who, while talking with Cory Schwartz of MLBAM, snagged some juicy scoops on what is to come in the world of f/x technology in 2009. I’ll let Sisson speak for himself:

Cory tells me that these improvements are to include an extensive “real time scouting” area in game day which utilizes Pitch-f/x data. The real time scouting would use the pitch data for the pitcher to show which pitch they are likely to throw depending on the count and situation and what zones are considered the pitchers and batters hot and cold zones. Pitch-f/x will also be expanded to provide more data and graphs for participating RSN’s to use in their broadcast as well as more data and graphs for clubs to use on their in-stadium scoreboards.

Cory also explained that we can expect the roll out of Hit-f/x, a system similar to Pitch-f/x that would use the technology already in place to track the initial batted ball data. Trajectory, angle, velocity, etc. measurements would all be recorded but the technology would be limited to just the initial batted ball data. The Hit-f/x system would not be able to track the entire trajectory of batted balls but from the recorded data, researchers would have the ability to correlate the recorded data with results data (hits, outs, errors, etc) and figure out answers to a range of questions including whether a hitter should try to hit more fly balls or if a hitter is having “bad luck” on their line drive rates. There is no firm time line for the roll out of this system yet but I was told that it is definitely on the radar for the ‘09 season. New software is being built and tested so its only a matter of time before we’re able to dive into another seemingly limitless goldmine of baseball data.

Well now. The improvements to PITCH f/x would be exciting enough, but the first inklings of HIT f/x data? This is fantastic news. We get to take a major step toward eliminating the problem of classifying batted balls based on someone arbitrary decision of ground ball versus line drive and line drive versus fly ball. This only helps augment what has been a rapid improvement in pitcher and hitter evaluation metrics and also gets us started on fielders.

If you want to follow along with the analysts attempts to figure out how to make use of this, I would suggest bookmarking the always informative Book Blog, namely this post in particular.

The New York Yankees organization has had quite a successful off-season with the signings of free agent hurlers A.J. Burnett, and C.C. Sabathia, as well as first baseman Mark Teixeira. The club also added six minor league pitchers to the 40-man roster but none of them fall among the Yankees’ best prospects.

In fact, it’s a bit of a low period for the organization in terms of impact pitching prospects now that the eligibility has expired for players such as Joba Chamberlain, Ian Kennedy, and Phil Hughes – all of whom have had varying degrees of success. That’s not to say the organization lacks pitching depth; there’s a lot of it but there are no sure-fire future stars (Not that the above three succeeded as scripted). It also doesn’t mean that the players added to the roster this off-season won’t have an impact. No one expected Dan Giese, Jose Veras, or Alfredo Aceves to have any kind of Major League success. The Yankees organization always seems to squeeze talent out of the most unlikely of sources.

Christian Garcia was drafted in the third round of the 2004 draft out of high school but injuries have taken a toll on his promising career. He missed all of 2007 after elbow surgery, but by all reports he still has his promising stuff, which includes a fastball that tops out around 95 mph, a wicked curveball and an improving change-up. Garcia spent most of the 2008 season in High-A ball and earned a one-game promotion to Double-A, where he walked six batters in 5.1 innings. In High-A, he allowed 45 hits in 49.2 innings with rates of 3.08 BB/9 and 10.87 K/9. The right-hander also allowed just two home runs.

Wilkins de la Rosa is a converted outfielder with power from the left side. After beginning the season in A-ball, and pitching mostly out of the bullpen, he ended the year with three solid starts in High-A ball. At the lower level, de la Rosa allowed just 60 hits in 90 innings and posted rates of 3.89 BB/9 and 10.96 K/9 with two home runs allowed. At this point, he is mostly a one-pitch thrower with a mid-90s fastball, but the southpaw is also working on both a curveball and a change-up. He’ll be 24 and in High-A ball when the season starts so time is against him to a degree.

Eric Hacker falls in the realm of ‘great results but lacks great stuff.’ Like Garcia, Hacker’s career has also been sidetracked by both elbow and shoulder surgeries, after originally being drafted out of high school in 2002. Those surgeries have taken a toll on his stuff and the right-hander now relies on command/control and the ground ball (58 GB% in High-A). Beginning the 2008 season in High-A ball, Hacker allowed 38 hits in 53 innings. He also posted rates of 1.53 BB/9 and 5.26 K/9, with just one home run allowed. Upon his promotion to Double-A, Hacker allowed 83 hits in 91 innings of work. He continued to show good control by posting a rate of 2.76 BB/9, along with 8.28 K/9.

The remaining three hurlers added to the 40-man roster include Michael Dunn, Anthony Claggett, and Steven Jackson. Dunn was a 33rd-round draft pick and, like de la Rosa, began his career as a hitter. He spent most of 2008 in High-A ball and allowed 124 hits in 124.2 innings. Claggett was acquired from Detroit in the Gary Sheffield trade during the 2006-07 off-season. The 24-year-old reliever posted rate of 4.60 BB/9 and 8.44 K/9 in Double-A in 2008. Jackson was acquired in the Randy Johnson trade with Arizona in the winter of 2006-07. Last season, Jackson, 26, split the season between Double-A and Triple-A, where he allowed 44 hits in 48.1 innings and posted a strikeout rate of 10.06 K/9.

We took a day off from the pitcher win value explanations yesterday so I could help a friend move (when you need to move on a weekday, call the baseball writing friend with the flexible schedule – he’s always available), but we’ll tackle park factors this afternoon and wrap up the series on Monday and Tuesday of next week.

As mentioned earlier, the win values are based on a park adjusted FIP. However, we never covered how we handled the park factor. There are lots of different park factors floating around out there, so I figured it would be useful for us to spend a bit of time talking about them. For those that aren’t aware, a park factor is basically the run environment of a particular ballpark expressed as a decimal, where 1.00 is average. A ballpark with a park factor of 0.90 would depress run scoring by 10%, so that if the league average runs per game is 5.00, then the runs per game in that park would be 4.5. On the flip side, a ballpark with a park factor of 1.10 would have an average of 5.5 runs per game.

Park factors are determined by the relative offensive level between each park and the league average. One of the common misperceptions about park factors is that they will be overly influenced by the home team. However, because the home team plays equal amounts of games per season in their home park and on the road, and the visiting team’s also play 81 games per year in that park, we get a decent sized sample with which to understand how parks affect run scoring.

‘That doesn’t mean that there isn’t noise in a single year’s park factor, however. Let’s take Turner Field in Atlanta as an example, for instance. Here are the single year park factors for that park since 2002:

2002: .88
2003: 1.04
2004: .94
2005: 1.01
2006: 1.02
2007: .95
2008: 1.01

That’s a six year average of .98, which makes it just barely below average in term of runs per game, but it obviously hasn’t been very consistent from year to year. The 2002 to 2003 change, especially, would suggest that the park went from being something like Petco Park to being more like Fenway Park. Most parks don’t have swings that large, but single year park factors can still be a bit unreliable. So, to calculate the win values, we’ve used a five year regressed park factor. For 2008, here are the park factors we used for all thirty teams:

Season	FullName	         PF
2008	Arizona Diamondbacks	 1.05 
2008	Atlanta Braves	         1.00 
2008	Baltimore Orioles	 1.01 
2008	Boston Red Sox	         1.03 
2008	Chicago Cubs	         1.04 
2008	Chicago White Sox	 1.04 
2008	Cincinnati Reds	         1.02 
2008	Cleveland Indians	 0.99 
2008	Colorado Rockies	 1.09 
2008	Detroit Tigers           1.00 
2008	Florida Marlins	         0.97 
2008	Houston Astros	         0.99 
2008	Kansas City Royals	 1.00 
2008	Los Angeles Angels       0.99 
2008	Los Angeles Dodgers	 0.98 
2008	Milwaukee Brewers	 1.00 
2008	Minnesota Twins	         0.98 
2008	New York Mets	         0.97 
2008	New York Yankees	 1.00 
2008	Oakland Athletics	 0.98 
2008	Philadelphia Phillies	 1.02 
2008	Pittsburgh Pirates	 0.98 
2008	San Diego Padres	 0.92 
2008	San Francisco Giants	 1.01 
2008	Seattle Mariners	 0.96 
2008	St. Louis Cardinals	 0.98 
2008	Tampa Bay Rays	         0.98 
2008	Texas Rangers	         1.04 
2008	Toronto Blue Jays	 1.01 
2008	Washington Nationals	 1.01