For 850k, it’s hard to argue with. David Eckstein figures to be the full-time second baseman, a position he showed more promise at than shortstop last year with the Diamondbacks. The Padres have to figure this signing will work out better than the Tadahito Iguchi signing last off-season.

2008 was hardly a banner year for Eckstein, but it wasn’t all based on skill decline. Eckstein’s BABIP was a bit lower than you’d expect for him or for a player with his line drive rate. Along with increased walk and strikeout rates, Eckstein also produced his highest ISO since 2005. CHONE has Eckstein at -4.8 wRAA next season and Marcels at -6.1. We’ll call it -5 and assume his defense is a bit below average.

~15 runs for replacement
~5 runs positional
~ ~5 runs defense
~ -5 runs offense

10 runs, or a win. If that happens, Eckstein is making the Padres a few million in profit, which isn’t a bad return. Throw in the potential for a mid-season trade – even if it is a Chad Beck type – and this is a low risk low reward move. Of course, this also makes the Pads projected middle infield stand just over 11 feet combined, which is going to create some interesting photo ops, especially with the taller players in the division.

The Padres also claimed Jae Kuk Ryu (pronounced like “You”) off of waivers from the Tampa Bay Rays. Ryu missed most of last season thanks to elbow surgery, but he’s got the potential to be a decent grab for San Diego. Ryu has an average repertoire freaturing a high-80’s fastball and change/curve. Ryu was bumped off the Rays 40-man by Gabe Kapler.

The Florida Marlins are a very potent offensive club. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for their defense. Last season, their starting infield featured Mike Jacobs, Dan Uggla, Hanley Ramirez, and Jorge Cantu. Though these four players combined for approximately +90 runs with the bat, Uggla’s +0.3 UZR topped the bunch defensively. Despite defensive improvements from Ramirez and Uggla, their projections for next season still place them around a half-win below average with the glove.

One member of this quartet will not return in 2009, as GM Larry Beinfest sent Jacobs to the Royals this offseason. According to recent reports, however, a new infielder might be joining the team: Orlando Cabrera.

In a recent analysis of Cabrera’s future, I surmised that his value for next season is right around +3.1 wins. He isn’t a terrific hitter but is durable and plays solid defense at the toughest non-catcher position. The problem here is that Hanley Ramirez plays the same position. While it may seem obvious to place the better defender at the position, the more likely scenario involves Cabrera manning the keystone corner.

Except Dan Uggla plays that position. Again, even though Uggla had an average year defensively, Cabrera would likely play much better defense. With Cabrera at second base, where does Uggla go? He could play first base and replace Jacobs in this scenario, or he could head over to the hot corner. Assuming the signing of Cabrera results in Uggla moving to third base, Cantu gets displaced to first base.

Signing Cabrera would most likely see him playing out of position, Uggla moving to third base, and Cantu moving to first base. Unless Cabrera plays remarkably better defense at second base than at shortstop, his win value decreases to somewhere in the +2.7 to +2.9 range. Uggla’s suspect defense could be exploited less at third base, though, perhaps resulting in a higher UZR rating. Cantu, however, loses plenty of value with the shift to first base due to the positional adjustment.

How would their infield look under different circumstances? If Cabrera is not signed and league average play at first base occurs, the foursome is worth right around +13.5 wins. With Cabrera at second, Uggla at third, and Cantu at first, the infield is worth approximately +14.1 wins. If Uggla plays first, with Cabrera at 2nd, they are worth +13.3 wins. Therefore, the most productive alignment would be the proposed shift assuming Cabrera signs.

Of course, if he doesn’t sign, this has all been one monumental waste of time, but I always find it very interesting when values shift with different defensive alignments. As we saw here, merely moving players around the diamond could see an improvement of up to +0.8 wins.

I’ve made a few improvements to the win values section, so the numbers across the board will all be slightly different.

The main change is a switch to different park factors. We’re now using the exact same methodology as Patriot’s park factors. This will effect the pitching win values more than the hitting win values.

The other change is with the dynamic runs to wins converter in the pitching win values. It’s now weighted properly by innings pitched per game so it’s no longer a straight average of league runs per game and a player’s FIP, converted to wins.

The Red Sox continue to avoid arbitration like the plague as Theo Epstein has added Kevin Youkilis to his list of arbitration-eligible players signed to long-term contracts. Apparently the deal is still unofficial at time of writing, but the details have sufficiently leaked to give us a good idea of the clauses. It’s going to be something around a four-year, $40-million deal with a fifth year option valued at $14 million with a $1.25 million buyout. Pursuant to tradition, we will evaluate the contract on the basis of the minimum guaranteed amount, that is four years and $41.25 million.

Youkilis may have only been a 2nd year arbitration player, but he was already heading into his age 30 season so this contract covers at least his age 30-33 years. That’s still a period where we’d expect Youkilis to remain effective, especially given his slew of good skills, but it is near the edge of danger and he certainly wouldn’t be expected to get any better. Furthermore, we have to account for a 2008 season that was far and above his previously established level of performance and a home park in Fenway that can vastly skew the numbers for right-handed hitters.

Dealing with projection first, we can note that in a rare case of agreement, all three of Bill James, Marcel and CHONE peg Youkilis as posting a wOBA in the .370-.382 range in 2009, pretty much dead on with what he did in 2007 (.373). Those figures are not park-adjusted, so we need to figure out what effect Fenway has. As a primarily doubles hitter, Youkilis has ample opportunity to exploit the green monster in left field and as such, controlling for his home park necessitates reducing his wOBA by about 2%, much in the same way we had to do with Jim Rice earlier.

That means that we’d project Youkilis to post a park-neutral wOBA in the .363-73 range next season, worth about 20 runs above average. Youkilis now has a sufficient amount of time logged at first base and with consistent UZR results in all three seasons, it’s good enough to go with his average performance there, worth six runs above average. 20 runs of offense plus six runs of defense and 20 runs for replacement (he’s projected to be right around that 600 PA mark) net Youkilis with 46 runs over average. He loses 12.5 for playing first base however, leaving him with a grand total projection of 33.5, or between 3 and 3.5 wins.

That would be worth between $12 and $16 million on today’s free market, but Youkilis was not eligible for that yet, still having two years of arbitration left to serve. Past history shows that arbitration awards tend to be worth 60% of market value in their 2nd year and 80% in the 3rd and final year. Throw in the 10% discount for security and expected aging and that means a fair contract for four years would have fallen between $37 and $48 million. The actual contract falls just about right in the middle of that, suggesting that the Red Sox signed a perfectly legitimate contract with Youkilis. It’s not really a win (nor a loss) for either side from a value standpoint. Frankly, I think the projection is a little on the conservative side and that the Red Sox made out well here, but it’s nothing crazy.

After a solid enough 2007 season that saw the Padres come within one game (resist urge to make Holliday slide comment) of making the playoffs, the team took a large step back. In 2008, Bud Black’s bunch finished 63-99, four games worse than the Pirates. They managed to outperform the Nationals, but some minor league squads could have accomplished that feat. Offensively, the team not only struggled but lacked consistency and durability. Only Brian Giles, Adrian Gonzalez, and Kevin Kouzmanoff played 145+ games. The same can be said of their pitching, where nobody made over 27 starts.

GM Kevin Towers cut ties with Khalil Greene this offseason, opening up a spot at shortstop. According to reports, that void may be filled as soon as this weekend, as the team has been talking to Omar Vizquel. Omar is not going to sign a 5-yr deal to become the new face of the team, or anything along those lines, but as a one season stopgap, the deal potentially makes sense.

Vizquel turns 42 years old on April 24 and is coming off of a disappointing, injury-plagued season. We all know his value primarily comes from the defensive side of the spectrum, as outside of the 1996 and 1999 seasons, his wOBA has been average at best. Even last season, when he partook in just 92 games, Vizquel managed a +5 UZR rating. Granted, he hit .222/.283/.267 with a .235 wOBA, but he was anything other than a liability defensively.

In 2007, with a full season under his belt, Vizquel saved just about +20 runs defensively. From 2004-07, he provided solid defense in 145+ games, and save for a couple of seasons, has been very durable. In fact, the value he gains above replacement simply for the number of plate appearances amassed generally counteracts his lack of offensive prowess.

Take a look at that 2007 season as an example. His offensive worth fell to -22.7 runs, but he produced a win total above average. How? Outside of the +20 defensive runs, he earned +6.7 runs for a positional adjustment and +19 runs for his number of plate appearances. All told, Vizquel played +2.3 win baseball that season, a number that fell below his marks from 2004-06. Over the last five seasons, his win values are +2.6, +3.4, +3.6, +2.3, and -0.3.

If Vizquel played more last season and lacked the health issues, he would have earned more runs for both of the adjustments. It is also likely that his UZR would have risen. Suffice it to say, the -0.3 wins is not, on its own, an accurate representation of what the Padres would receive. Most likely, they would be getting 140+ games and 600+ PA of +9 fielding and -17 hitting. With adjustments similar to those received in his durable years, Vizquel’s projection pegs him as a +1.8 win player next season.

Even at 42, Omar will be right around the league average given his ability to play stellar defense at the toughest non-catcher position. His fair market value would be in the $8 mil range. If Towers can ink Vizquel to a 1-yr deal for $8 mil or less, go for it. Anything requiring more funds or commitment would not be very wise, though. And if injuries are a big concern, an incentive-laden deal in terms of plate appearances would protect their investment.

The move does not have anything near the flash value of the major signings this offseason, but has the potential to improve the Padres while simultaneously providing them nothing more than a stopgap veteran. One has to wonder, though, if the team does not project to perform that well next season, why not give some younger players ample playing time? With Brian Giles also on the club, adding Vizquel makes the team even older, seemingly counterintuitive to a team trying to rebuild. Perhaps, then, the rebuilding will not impact the major league club until the trading deadline, or even 2010. Bottom line, though, in a vacuum, signing Vizquel would provide an overall upgrade over the departed Greene while not requiring much commitment.

Brandon Erbe, Chris Tillman and Brian Matusz get a lot of attention in the Baltimore Orioles system, but David Hernandez could beat them all to the big leagues. The 23-year-old, right-handed hurler was recently added to the club’s 40-man roster and he could claim one of Baltimore’s vacant starting rotation slots sooner rather than later. In 2008, Hernandez spent the year in Double-A and allowed 112 hits in 141 innings of work. He posted rates of 4.53 BB/9 and 10.60 K/9, while also keeping the ball in the park by allowing just 10 home runs (0.64 HR/9). Obviously the control needs to improve if he is going to have long-term success in the big leagues, but the potential is there once things click. He features a repertoire that includes an 89-93 mph fastball, a curveball and a change-up.

Right-handed Chorye Spoone was on a similar path before shoulder surgery ended his 2008 season after just nine starts. He will miss the majority of 2009 as well, but that did not stop Baltimore from protecting him on the 40-man roster. When healthy, Spoone features a 91-95 mph fastball, plus curveball and change-up.

Brad Bergesen’s 2008 numbers at Double-A look better than Hernandez’ on the surface with a record of 15-6 and an ERA of 3.22. His walk rate was also a nifty 1.64 BB/9 but his strikeout rate was troublesome at 4.38 K/9. Despite not striking out a lot of batters, the right-hander allowed just 143 hits in 148 innings. Bergesen can dial his fastball up to 93-95 mph but he commands it better in the low 90s. He also has a slider and change-up.

Wilfredo Perez (or Wilfrido, depending on whom you speak with) is a left-handed reliever who split the 2008 season between High-A ball and Double-A. The 24-year-old fanned 92 batters in 79.2 combined innings. Like the pitchers above, though, Perez struggled with his control and posted walk rates of 4.79 at High-A and 3.09 at Double-A. After beginning his career by being very good against left-handed hitters, the southpaw has actually had more success against righties in the past two seasons (.244 versus .165 in 2007, .253 versus .192 in 2008).

The only non-pitcher added to the 40-man roster this off-season was outfielder Nolan Reimold, a former second round draft pick out of Bowling Green University. His prospect stock has been up and down since he signed in 2005 but he rebounded in 2008 at Double-A. He hit .284/.367/.501 with an ISO of .217 in 507 at-bats. The 25-year-old has big-time power but it remains to be seen how well he’ll hit for average against Major League pitching. In his career, Reimold’s slugging percentage is almost 100 points higher against southpaws (.572 versus .482).

Rotation

2006: Roger Clemens, Al Leiter, Jake Peavy, Dontrelle Willis
2009: Jake Peavy, Roy Oswalt, John Lackey

It’s hard to believe, but Leiter somehow made the staff. It’s also hard to believe that three of the four pitchers listed in 2006 are either out of the game or simply ineffective. Of course, Oswalt, Peavy, and Lackey had down years, but even still come within a run of the 2006 staff. Oh, and that’s with one less pitcher, and without a 5.3 win pitcher in Clemens. Assuming the U.S.A. team adds a non-Paul Byrd starter to the mix, it seems safe to give the nod to the ’09 “rotation”.

Overall advantage: 2009
Individual advantage: 2006

Bullpen

2006: Chad Cordero, Brian Fuentes, Todd Jones, Brad Lidge, Gary Majewski, Scot Shields, Mike Timlin, Huston Street, Dan Wheeler
2009: Scot Shields, J.J. Putz, B.J. Ryan, Jonathan Broxton, Matt Lindstrom, Matt Thornton, Joe Nathan, Brian Fuentes

Yikes, look at the flamethrowers in that 09 bullpen. Nathan is better now than he was then while the opposite is true for Shields. Fuentes has remained relatively static. Outside of Nathan, none of the new relievers are quite equal to 2006’s Lidge, but that’s not to say the pen is poor, in fact it beats the ’06 unit 16.9 to 14.7. Perhaps the most fun thing about this bullpen will be all of these superb relievers without roles defining them. Joe Nathan entering in the 6th when the tying run is at third and there’s one out should be a bit more realistic in this tournament setting, and that’s pretty intriguing.

Overall advantage: 2009
Individual advantage: Tie.

So we’ve covered each of the positions, has team U.S.A upgraded? Well, almost. Team wide win values:

2006 – 84.8
2009 – 84.35

That’s right, despite having six fewer players, the new U.S. gathering rates within a half of a win of the 2006 team. Encouraging for those rooting for them. Now, if only they’ll play Rollins in place of Jeter.

We ended the last post in this series by talking about run environments. Generally, when you hear someone talk about a run environment, you think of either a specific park that has a notable influence on run scoring (say, Coors Field) or an era of baseball where the offensive level was significantly different than it is today (the dead ball era, for instance). In these environments, the game is a bit different, and runs can be either much more valuable or less valuable in helping win a game, depending on the context of the environment.

However, it’s not just in extreme parks or long ago where the run environment varies from the modern norms. Indeed, the run environment of current baseball varies from day to day depending on which pitcher is on the mound. CC Sabathia, through his dominance with the Indians and Brewers last year, created his own traveling low-run environment. When he took the mound, runs became hard to come by. Through his own abilities, Sabathia created a run environment in his own starts that wasn’t that close to the league average run environment of 2008.

This presents an issue. If we were to use the standard league average runs to wins conversion based on a normal run environment, we’d run into problems. By virtue of creating his own run environment, Sabathia has changed the context of the value of runs in relation to wins. All pitchers do this to an extent, and the further away from league average they are, the more they influence their particular environment.

So, if we know that pitchers are changing the relationship between runs and wins in their starts, then we need a dynamic runs to win estimator that adjusts for their individual run environment. This is where the always awesome Tom Tango comes to the rescue, as usual. In talking with him about this, he suggested that we use the formula ((League RA + Pitcher’s RA)/2)+2)*1.5, which would handle the runs to wins conversion in differing environments.

Essentially, that formula averages the pitcher’s FIP scaled to RA with the league average RA, then adds in the constants to create the run to win conversion for a given environment. If we looked at an average pitcher in the AL, for instance, the formula would give us (4.78 + 4.78)/2, which is of course 4.78. (4.78 + 2)*1.5 gives us 10.17, which is the average runs to wins conversion for the AL in 2008.

Now, if we had a pitcher whose park adjusted FIP scaled to RA was 3.00, then the environment would be 3.89 RA, and the runs to wins conversion would be 8.84. As you can see, an excellent pitcher significantly lowers the amount of runs it takes to equal a win. Doing the basic “divide runs by 10” thing shortchanges good pitchers and overvalues bad pitchers.

So, we’ve built this dynamic runs to wins conversion tool into the win values you see on the page. I know, this is a level of detail that most of you won’t care about and can understandably be tough to wrap your head around, but as we said, we want these win values to be transparent, and this calculation is required if you’re trying to re-engineer the values on the site.

As we talked about last night, pitcher replacement level is set at a .380 win% for starters and .470 win% for relievers. However, because of the differences between the AL and the NL, as well as varying offensive levels over the years, that means that there isn’t a fixed mark that we can point to as replacement level FIP that works for each year and each role.

However, since we’ve got the .380/.470 marks, we can derive those numbers with just a little bit of work. Let’s walk through the process, first using a 2008 American League starting pitcher as our example.

The league average runs per game in the AL last year was 4.78. The FIPs that are displayed on the pitcher’s player card here at FanGraphs are scaled to ERA, but for the win values, we modified the formula slightly to scale it to match league RA. However, there’s a shortcut if you want to take a pitcher’s traditional FIP and have it match up with the league RA – that’s dividing his FIP by .92.

For instance, a 4.40 FIP divided by .92 will give you a 4.78 FIP. That .92 is the ERA-RA bridge, and allows us to conclude that 4.40 would be a league average FIP in the American League last year. So, a pitcher with a 4.40 FIP in a neutral park would be a league average pitcher. Or, put back into win% terms, a .500 pitcher.

Now, because we’ve set replacement level at .470 for relievers and .380 for starters, we know that a replacement level FIP for an AL reliever will be a lot closer to 4.40 than it will be for a starter. How much closer? Running the numbers through the formula gives us a 4.68 FIP (traditional, not scaled to RA) for an AL reliever and 5.63 for an AL starter. So, if you’re looking at a pitcher’s FIP here on his FanGraphs page, and that pitcher happens to be in the American League, those are the numbers you’d want to compare him to in order to see how far away from replacement level he is.

For the NL in 2008, the numbers are 4.45 for a reliever and 5.37 for a starter – the lack of a DH drives down the league’s offensive level, and so the performance of a replacement level pitcher will appear better in the NL than in the AL.

Remember, these are park neutral numbers, so if you’re looking at a player who pitched in a park that significantly effects offense, you’ll have to adjust his FIP to account for the park effects. If the NL starter that we were looking at pitched in a park that suppressed offense by 5%, then a replacement level for that park would be 5.10, not 5.37. Thus, you’d want to use the lower replacement level for his home innings, and the league average replacement level for his road innings. Assuming equal distribution, that would make the replacement level FIP 5.23 for that NL starter pitching in a park with a park factor of .95.

As you can see, the run environment that the pitcher exists in has a substantial effect on the replacement level value. But the impact of run environments don’t stop there, and are further complicated by the fact that starting pitchers have a significant impact on their own run environment. The expected offensive level is a lot lower in a game where Johan Santana is pitching than where Cha Seung Baek is pitching. In order to calculate the runs to wins conversion for each pitcher, we have to take into account that a pitcher impacts his own run environment. We’ll talk more about this later this afternoon.

The World Baseball Classic will kick off within the next few weeks, and in a few days preliminary rosters are due. At this point ,the United States team has 24 players listed, a few shy of their 2006 roster. Of course 2006’s results weren’t quite what the country had envisioned, and as we approach the second tournament, is the 2009 team better equipped to take home the trophy than in 2006?

Catchers
2006: Jason Varitek, Michael Barrett, Brian Schneider
2009: Brian McCann, Chris Ianetta

This seems more lopsided than it is. Nowadays Varitek is a shell of his former self, Barrett signed on a minor league deal, and Schneider is nothing special. Meanwhile McCann and Ianetta were two of the best offensive catchers in the National League last season. Using three-years wins values (so, for 2006’s team we’re talking 2003-2005, and for 2009 we’re talking 2006-2008) the 2006 catching staff combines for 8.3 wins on average. 2009’s team is at a bit of a disadvantage at the moment, but nonetheless combines for 6.3 wins. McCann figures to get most of the playing time, and he’s better than any catcher the 2006 American team could offer. Odds are another catcher will be added at some point.

Overall advantage: 2006
Individual advantage: 2009

Corner Infield

2006: Derrek Lee, Alex Rodriguez, Mark Teixeira, Chipper Jones
2009: Kevin Youkilis, Chipper Jones, David Wright

Much like with the catcher situation, the looks of things would suggest 2006 runs away, but not so fast. Again, we’re talking about one less player – although I suppose you could throw Ryan Braun into a reserve role, but whatever. Despite having A-Rod, a young Teixeira, and a fresh off 2005 Lee, the 2006 team only has a three win advantage over the 2009 grouping; 20.5 to 17.1. No player on this year’s team compares to Alex Rodriguez at the time, although David Wright comes closest.

Overall advantage: 2006
Individual advantage: 2006.

Middle Infield

2006: Derek Jeter, Michael Young, Chase Utley
2009: Dustin Pedroia, Jimmy Rollins, Derek Jeter, Mark DeRosa

I have the sneaking suspicion that Jeter will receive most of the playing time, despite Rollins being the better player at this point. Whether you classify DeRosa as an outfielder, corner infielder, or middle infielder, the 2009 team is still seeing an upgrade up the middle. Jeter has declined by a tenth of a win, Pedroia is a win better than Young, and Rollins is a better player than the young Utley. Throw DeRosa in and the 2009 staff has a 16.4 to 9.6 win.

Overall advantage: 2009
Individual advantage: 2009

Outfield

2006: Ken Griffey Jr., Matt Holliday, Vernon Wells, Randy Winn, Johnny Damon, Jeff Francoeur
2009: Ryan Braun, Curtis Granderson, Grady Sizemore, Brad Hawpe

The 2006 outfield looks loaded, but yet again looks are deceiving. Sizemore has averaged 6.6 wins, or as many as Griffey Jr., Holliday, and Francoeur combined. Hawpe is an odd choice, and as a bit of a Rays homer, I wouldn’t mind seeing a Carl Crawford/Grady Sizemore/Curtis Granderson outfield at some point with a flyball pitcher on the mound. Despite the difference in size, the 2009 quartet holds up favorably at 15.65 wins, but the 2006 team has the edge for now at 16.8.

Overall advantage: 2006
Individual advantage: 2009

Tomorrow we’ll look at the pitching staffs and reach a conclusion.