Yesterday we took a look at the best and worst offenses and defenses to make the playoffs since 2004. Perhaps the most interesting discoveries involved the Yankees, who produced the top three offenses as well as the bottom three defenses in this span. In 2005, however, their defense plummeted ten miles south of abysmal towards incalculable, unfathomable depths.

That season, the aggregate UZR in the Bronx was -130 runs. -130! Despite a tremendous offense worth +139 runs, only nine runs remained due to defensive ineptitudes.

How were they that bad? Not only is it the worst team defense of playoff teams, it is the worst team defense of anybody since at least 2002. The next worse mark belongs to the 2003 Brewers at -75 runs. Essentially, the Yankees defense in 2005 fell 5.5 wins below the next worse defense in the same seven year span.

Of players with at least 70 games played at a position, only Alex Rodriguez’s third base performance of +1.4 runs surpassed the league average mark of zero. After Rodriguez came Tino Martinez, with a -1.3 mark at first base, and Hideki Matsui, with -1.9 run defense in left field. Jason Giambi logged 78 games at first base as well, with -3.2 run defense. So far, things don’t look that bad, but we’re just getting started.

Every stathead’s favorite whipping boy, Derek Jeter, is next with a -12.5 rating at shortstop. Jeter won a gold glove for his “stellar” defense. His partner up the middle, Robinson Cano, played even worse defense, at -18.4 runs. The poor defensive performances of both Bernie Williams and Gary Sheffield dwarf that figure, however. Williams played -28.6 run defense in centerfield, which was almost equally as poor as Sheff’s -29 UZR in right field.

So there you have it: the worst defensive team in the win values era. I would venture a guess that their reign would extend even farther back as well. Luckily, they were able to hit, but the team could have been even better with more solid defenders. Everyone is quick to point fingers at A-Rod or concoct other reasons for their dearth of recent championships, but perhaps much of it has to do with how offensive production looks sexier than defense, and the Yankees have trotted horrible defenders out, time and time again.

As most of you know, the Win Values we present here on FanGraphs are wins above a replacement level player. Replacement level, essentially, is the expected performance you could get from a player who costs nothing to acquire and makes the league minimum. That’s the baseline that players add value over – performance over their no-cost substitute.

However, I know examples can be extremely helpful, so starting on Monday, we began looking at some players who currently personify replacement level, and what their respective organizations should expect from them in 2009. We’ve already covered catcher, first base, second base, shortstop, third base, left field, and center field. We’ll do the pitchers tomorrow. For now, we finish off the positions.

Right Field

A few of the LF guys could be listed here as well, as we noted that there’s significant overlap between the two corner OF spots.

Laynce Nix, Cincinnati, .338 wOBA
Jeff Salazar, Pittsburgh, .332 wOBA
Trot Nixon, Milwaukee, .337 wOBA
Chris Aguila, Unsigned, .324 wOBA
Brad Wilkerson, Boston, .312 wOBA
Jacque Jones, Cincinnati, .313 wOBA
Emil Brown, Unsigned, .322 wOBA

That’s a projected .325 wOBA for the group – nearly as good as the projected offensive level for first baseman. Besides Jones and Brown, though, it’s mostly a collection of below average defenders.

((.325 – .330) / 1.2) * 600 = -2.5

-2.5 offense, -5 defense, -7.5 position adjustment gets us -15 for this group, and I could be talked into a lower defensive rating for these guys, considering most of them are aging and well past their primes. So, after the little hiccup in center field, it looks like we’re right back to the -15 to -20 range for all the rest of the positions.

Pitching has been a long-term nightmare for the Colorado Rockies’ franchise, thanks to the thin air of Denver. The club’s history of poor pitching is slowly becoming a thing of the past for the Rockies. Aided in part by the humidor, the Rockies pitchers have gone from being one of the worst three teams in baseball each year in FIP (Fielding Independent Pitching) to middle-of-the-road (an average of 16th overall in the past three seasons) since the 2005 season.

It’s not all about the humidor, though. The pitching in Colorado has improved significantly and the club finally has some depth. Aaron Cook is an unlikely staff ace with his low strikeout rates (career 3.58 K/9) but his groundball tendencies make him the perfect pitcher for Colorado. Former No. 1 draft pick Jeff Francis was starting to learn the ins-and-outs of pitching in the park before being sidelined by shoulder woes. The club also developed workhorse Ubaldo Jimenez, who could become quite a pitcher if his arm does not fall off after walking 103 batters in 198.2 innings in 2008. The club also brought in Greg Smith (Oakland) and Jason Marquis (Chicago NL) during the 2008-09 off-season via the trade route.

One pitcher who should not get lost in the shuffle – despite his 2008 struggles – is Franklin Morales, the Rockies’ former No. 1 prospect. The 23-year-old southpaw posted a 6.39 ERA (5.58 FIP) and allowed 28 hits in 25.1 innings this past season. His control completely deserted him and he walked 6.04 batters per nine innings, while posting a strikeout rate of just 3.20 K/9. His control issues haunted him in the minors last season too. In 110.1 Triple-A innings, Morales posted a walk rate of 6.69 BB/9.

The Venezuelan native had a successful MLB debut in 2007 when he allowed just 34 hits in 39.1 innings. He posted a 3.43 ERA (3.80 FIP) and compiled rates of 3.20 BB/9 and 5.95 K/9. His groundball rate was 54.9%, compared to 40% in 2008.

Interestingly, Morales’ fastball lost about 1.5 mph between his stints in the Majors in 2007 and 2008. His change-up also added two miles per hour. Hitters were seven percent less likely to swing at his pitches outside the strike zone but they made contact with those pitches almost 20 percent more often.

His control issues are troubling, but Morales is still young and has a great arm for a southpaw. He also has a history of being his own worst enemy by over-thinking and over-analyzing things. The winter break from baseball may have been just what he needed. We’ll find out soon enough.

As most of you know, the Win Values we present here on FanGraphs are wins above a replacement level player. Replacement level, essentially, is the expected performance you could get from a player who costs nothing to acquire and makes the league minimum. That’s the baseline that players add value over – performance over their no-cost substitute.

However, I know examples can be extremely helpful, so starting on Monday, we began looking at some players who currently personify replacement level, and what their respective organizations should expect from them in 2009. We’ve already covered catcher, first base, second base, shortstop, third base, and left field and we’ll move on through all of the positions the rest of this week.

Center Field

Unlike the LFs, these guys are mostly the same skillset – flycatchers with range and questionable bats.

Reggie Abercrombie, Houston, .301 wOBA
Corey Patterson, Washington, .304 wOBA
Chris Duffy, Milwaukee, .313 wOBA
Jason Ellison, Philadelphia, .298 wOBA
Ryan Langerhans, Washington, .330 wOBA
Scott Podsednik, Colorado, .305 wOBA
So Taguchi, Chicago (NL), .291 wOBA

Besides Langerhans, pretty similar projections for most of these guys, and the group gets a .306 average wOBA projection for 2009. That’s quite a bit better than the C/SS, just slightly better than 2B, and not that much worse than 3B. For a premium defensive position, this is a decent level of free offense.

((.306 – .330) / 1.2) * 600 = -12

This group is -12 offensively, and considering they’re mostly above average defenders, we might have our first deviation from the norm. With a +2.5 position adjustment for CF, these guys would have to be something like -10 defenders in center field to be two wins below average. But there’s no way to make that argument – Patterson, Abercrombie, Duffy, Ellison – these guys are good defenders. Using their historical UZRs, we’d conclude that they’re probably +5 with the gloves.

-12 offense, +5 defense, +2.5 position adjustment = -4.5 runs.

Half a win. The CHONE projections suggest that you could get a center fielder who is half a win worse than league average for free.

What’s going on here? Are teams really undervaluing this skillset? Is our position adjustment off? Is this just a banner crop of freely available center fielders? I don’t know, honestly. This is definitely an area that needs more research.

Athletics trade Matt Murton to the Rockies for Corey Wimberly

Rather than defalcating millions of dollars into a free agent outfielder, the Rockies have taken to Oakland’s surplus for a second time this off-season, and have yanked away the redheaded stepchild of the bunch, Matt Murton. It appears that Brad Hawpe will be the lone player with a guaranteed starting job as the Rockies will have Dexter Fowler, Carlos Gonzalez, and Ryan Spilborghs competing for the center field job, and if the Rockies have the desire, a platoon of Murton and Seth Smith in left field is sensible. Murton himself is a slightly above average fielder who can hit well enough to be an above average asset in either corner.

In exchange for Murton, the Athletics free a 40-man roster spot, an outfield from an overflowing unit, and Wimberly. The 25-year old is going to remind some of former Rockies Chone Figgins and Juan Pierre. Throughout his minor league career he’s played the majority of his time at second base, but has also made cameos at shortstop, third base, center field, and left field, and a few games as a designated hitter. Wimberly has displayed a knack for the stolen base and an ability to avoid the strikeout.

Murton is more likely to make an immediate impact, but Wimberly should open in Triple-A and make his debut in the latter stages of 2009 in a role similar to how the Rays used Fernando Perez.

Brewers trade Eric Fryer to the Yankees for Chase Wright

Wright is best known for being wrong in four consecutive at-bats versus the Boston Red Sox, with each resulting in a homerun. Wright’s minor league numbers aren’t spectacular, but they aren’t exactly poor either. He’s a groundball inducer who works off a fastball and change-up combination with a slider thrown in. The Brewers already have R.J. Swindle and Mitch Stetter sitting around in the bullpen, so it seems unlikely Wright breaks camp with the big league team, but for a back of the pen type, Wright can be decent.

Fryer is a minor league catcher who really isn’t. In 2007 33 of Fryer’s 42 games involved catching, in 2008 that number was 39 of 105. Fryer hits well though, so the Yankees are getting a guy who likely won’t stick at catcher (five passed balls and 11 of 58 CS in 2008) but might have the bat to make it as a corner outfielder somewhere down the line. Frankly, Fryer seems like a bit much to give up for Wright, but I’ll give the Brewers and their exposure to Fryer the benefit of the doubt until proven otherwise.

In the midst of recording data for the playoff teams in the win values era, I came across something extremely interesting: since 2002, the best bullpen of any team, playoff or not, belongs to the 2006 Minnesota Twins. Johan Santana and his second Cy Young Award garnered much of the attention that year, but the Twinkies relief corps was far and away the best in the league. In fact, in this seven year span, the next closest bullpen fell almost a full win behind.

In 2006, the Twins bullpen produced +99.7 runs above replacement. +99.7! Second place that season was over 20 runs behind. Of playoff teams, only the 2004 Angels at +89.1 and the 2004 Twins at +88.0 came close. The Gardenhire Gang produced +30 runs with the bat and +19 runs in the field, but boasted much of their success thanks to the rotation and bullpen.

Joe Nathan led the ‘pen with +32.2 runs, +3.1 wins. As R.J. pointed out not too long ago, non-closer relievers generally do not sport solid runs or wins above replacement marks, primarily due to the lack of innings. Many relievers fall below the +1 win mark, making it incredibly remarkable that the Twins bullpen in 2006 featured five different relievers at +1 win or better.

After Nathan came Juan Rincon (+1.8 wins), Jesse Crain (+1.2 wins), Dennys Reyes (+1.1 wins), and Pat Neshek (+1.0 wins). And Francisco Liriano even pitched a bit in relief, racking up +0.8 wins. Here are some of their other statistics that season:

Joe Nathan     64 g   1.58 ERA   1.68 FIP   12.5 K/9   2.1 BB/9
Juan Rincon    75 g   2.91 ERA   2.84 FIP    7.9 K/9   2.8 BB/9
Jesse Crain    68 g   3.52 ERA   3.38 FIP    7.0 K/9   2.1 BB/9
Dennys Reyes   66 g   0.89 ERA   2.87 FIP    8.7 K/9   2.7 BB/9
Pat Neshek     32 g   2.19 ERA   2.88 FIP   12.9 K/9   1.5 BB/9

Nathan has continued to be very successful, putting him on a very small list of closers successful for a relatively extended period of time. Unfortunately, the others are yet to experience as much success. Rincon last pitched for the Indians in 2008, and Reyes is a Type B free agent still on the market. Crain and Neshek are still members of the Twins bullpen. By nature, relievers are a fickle bunch, but the 2006 Twinkie relief corps was the best of the last seven seasons.

The Moneyball revolution in sports performance analysis, in which the value of on base percentage was hammered into the consciousness of the reader over and over, has perhaps led to an oversimplified vision of what a successful ballplayer’s stat line should look like. Walks are great; it’s been said that walks, like defense, never slumps, and there’s a kernel of truth in that. A good degree of plate patience and discipline helps buffer the hitter from the inevitable streaks in batting average. However, just because a hitter doesn’t walk much doesn’t mean he cannot be successful.

Furthermore, said hitter doesn’t even need to hit for prodigious power to overcome from the lack of walks either. And he doesn’t have to play a premium position either. Ichiro Suzuki who ended up spending the majority of his time in right field this season, and incidentally had close to his worst offensive season of his Major League career and his worst UZR marks in right field ever, still put up 3.3 wins for the Mariners, a total worth just shy of $15 million in value, 26th amongst all outfielders in baseball.

The point of this is not just to spend a little time extolling the excellence of Ichiro, but also to point out this valuable lesson. Anytime that you try to evaluate based on sticking things into pre-determined buckets or roles, you are doing yourself a disservice and providing an opening to your competition to exploit your inefficiency. Ichiro isn’t your prototypical right fielder but he makes it work. Tim Lincecum is under six feet tall and some teams passed on him in the draft because of that.

Baseball is a really simple game and its core; hitters try to avoid outs, pitchers and defenders try to generate them. Always make sure that you are tethered to only that paramount principle and you’ll avoid letting your judgment being clouded by ancillary concerns.

One of my favorite new features here is the win value section of the team pages. Instead of looking at the components for each individual player we now have the capability of checking which teams produced the highest batting runs total. Or which teams played the best overall defense. While scanning through the numbers I suddenly became interested in the value components for teams that made the playoffs. After all, much of the Rays success last year was attributed to their defense, and sure enough, their +70.6 team UZR rating led all of baseball. Were they the best defensive playoff team in recent history? And how did their offense rank amongst playoff-bound teams?

Our win value metrics currently date back to 2002, but I chose to look at the playoff teams from the last five years, setting 2004 as the starting date. The batting runs and defensive marks were recorded for each team that played into October and there were some very interesting results.

For starters, yes, the 2008 Rays were the best defensive team to make the playoffs over the last five years. In fact, their +70.6 UZR almost dwarfed the second place 2004 Dodgers, with +53.2. That Dodgers team featured Adrian Beltre’s +24.5 and Cesar Izturis’s +11.9. The only player on their roster with a UZR below -2 was Jason Grabowski, in 30 games, in left field. Amongst those with more than 80 games at a position, the low happened to be Shawn Green at +0.2. They were followed by the 2006 Padres, at +51.0, who were led defensively by Brian Giles, Dave Roberts, and Adrian Gonzalez. The Friars defense that year was more evenly split up, with nine different player positions recording ratings exceeding +3.5.

How about the flip side? Which playoff teams over the last five seasons have been the worst with the glove? This may or may not be surprising, but the bottom three teams are the Yankees… the Yankees… and the Yankees. To be more specific, the Yankees from 2004-06. In 2006, the Bronx Bombers posted a -58.6 UZR. Two years earlier they were about one win worse with the glove, at -68.9. In 2005, however, they received an absolutely abysmal -130.9 UZR. The 138.9 batting runs recorded that year were almost completely wiped away by defensive ineptitudes.

Speaking of the 138.9 batting runs posted by the 2005 Yankees, that team and figure comes in third place amongst the top playoff offenses of the last five years. Ahead of thhem are the, um, 2006 Yankees at 146.1 , and the 2007 Yankees at a whopping 170.1. To put this in perspective, the Yankees made the playoffs from 2004-07, with a minimum of 127 batting runs coming in the 2004 season. A minimum of 127 batting runs. The highest such total for a senior circuit team since 2004 belongs to the Phillies, at 103.6 runs in 2007. Despite their offensive prowess, the Yankees have given plenty of runs back due to poor defense. Their best defensive season in this span came in 2007, at -27.2. Basically, the Yankees position players were at their best in 2007, with an aggregate batting runs total that exceeded the previous three seasons, and defensive ratings that bested their 2004-06 totals as well.

The issue here is that the pitchers are being counted on the National League teams, which actually makes the 2007 Phillies offense look all the more remarkable. With that in mind, here are the top three NL offenses in this span, of teams that made the playoffs: 2007 Phillies (103.6), 2004 Cardinals (87.8), 2008 Cubs (74.5).

Lastly, we have the worst, or most anemic offenses to play more than 162 games. Ironically, the worst two both played their way into October in 2007. The 2007 Diamondbacks, who have become the posterchildren for W-L records besting Pythagoras, put together a -85.2 run offense. Just three players amassed batting runs of +10 or more, with Eric Byrnes leading the way at +15. Almost half as bad were the 2007 Cubs, at -45.9 runs. Oddly enough, the Cubs actually received three separate +20 or more run contributions, from Derrek Lee, Aramis Ramirez, and Alfonso Soriano. The problem is that everyone else ranged from +7 to -14. The best of the worst were the 2005 Astros. With Pettitte, Clemens, and Oswalt ranging from +5.8 to +6.1 wins, and Lidge at +2.5 wins, it is easier to see why their offensive production was not necessarily imperative. At -34.9 runs, though, they fell into third place.

Tomorrow we will take a look at NL and AL pitching staffs in this same span.

As most of you know, the Win Values we present here on FanGraphs are wins above a replacement level player. Replacement level, essentially, is the expected performance you could get from a player who costs nothing to acquire and makes the league minimum. That’s the baseline that players add value over – performance over their no-cost substitute.

However, I know examples can be extremely helpful, so starting on Monday, we began looking at some players who currently personify replacement level, and what their respective organizations should expect from them in 2009. We’ve already covered catcher, first base, second base, shortstop, and third base and we’ll move on through all of the positions the rest of this week.

Left Field

Splitting up the outfielders who sign minor league contracts is somewhat arbitrary. An outfielder is an outfielder. They all do the same thing – chase fly balls and throw it back in. Now, because there are some differences between the throws between RF and LF, the guys with better arms end up in right field, while the fastest guys end up in CF to get the most opportunities to enhance their defensive value. However, the fundamentals of the positions are all the same, and anyone who can play one outfield spot could play all three. Not equally well, necessarily, but they really aren’t different positions in the way that the infield has different positions. I say all that because I don’t want people to fall into the trap that these are the only options a team had available to fill their LF hole. We’ll cover CF and RF tomorrow, but really, any of those guys could also have been acquired to play LF. Like with 2B, the pool of potential replacements also includes SS – the pool of potential LFs includes all CFs and all RFs as well.

Chip Ambres, Boston, .323 wOBA
Justin Christian, Baltimore, .299 wOBA
Jonny Gomes, Cincinnati, .354 wOBA
Nathan Haynes, Texas, .274 wOBA
Rob Mackowiak, New York (NL), .318 wOBA
Paul McAnulty, Boston, .339 wOBA
Craig Monroe, Pittsburgh, .315 wOBA
Dan Ortmeier, Colorado, .298 wOBA

Now this is a variety of players. Ambres has been tearing the cover off the ball in Triple-A for a few years, but at 30, he’s got the Quad-A bat label and his defense is pretty lousy. Haynes, on the other hand, can’t really hit much at all but is an outstanding defender. There are more okay bat/no glove types on the list (Gomes, in particular, should never be allowed to play the OF), but there are a mix of skillsets represented here. The average wOBA is just .315, though, not that much better than the average third baseman that we looked at. Converting to runs:

((.315 – .330) / 1.20) * 600 = -7.5

-7.5 runs on offense, -5 runs on defense, -7.5 run position adjustment gives us a -20 run total compared to average. That makes this group of replacement level outfielders -2 wins. The beat goes on.

The Minnesota Twins organization has enviable depth when it comes to young pitching. The club already boasts a starting rotation that includes Glen Perkins, Kevin Slowey, Nick Blackburn, Scott Baker, and Francisco Liriano. Blackburn and Baker are the oldest pitchers at just 27 years of age.

Another youngster – perhaps more talented than any of the pitchers save for Liriano – should spend the majority of the 2009 season in Triple-A. Anthony Swarzak, 23, was originally selected in the second round of the 2004 draft out of a Florida high school. The right-hander immediately took to pro ball and has had success at every level in the minors.

Swarzak’s biggest speed bump in the minors came in 2008 at the Double-A level. In 20 minor league games, he posted a 5.67 ERA (4.42 FIP) with 126 hits allowed in 101.2 innings. He walked 3.28 BB/9 and struck out 6.73 K/9. After pitching more than 80 innings in Double-A in 2007, Swarzak’s struggles this past season may have been more about a lack of motivation than anything else. Once promoted to Triple-A, he made seven starts and allowed 41 hits in 45 innings. He posted just 2.80 BB/9 and struck out 5.20 K/9.

The big question marks about Swarzak include his lack of a reliable change-up, which could necessitate a relocation to the bullpen at some point. But his plus curveball and 91-94 mph fastball could allow him to thrive as a late-game reliever. Swarzak was also previously suspended for testing positive for a “recreational drug” so there are some lingering question marks about his make-up.

With a talented, young starting rotation already established at the Major League level, the Twins have time to be patient with Swarzak and allow him to mature in the minors – both as a pitcher and as a person. Many organizations in baseball would love to have that luxury.