Lost amongst the CC Sabathia frenzy in Milwaukee last season was the under the radar acquisition of Ray Durham. While Durham in no way provided the same spark as Sabathia, he did produce for the BrewCrew and played a part in the team’s Wild Card run. In 41 games while donning the Brewers uniform, Durham hit .280/.369/.477, a .363 wOBA. Combined with his +2-run defense at second base, Durham produced exactly one win for Milwaukee in limited action. On the whole, he played +2.7 win baseball, production worth $12.5 mil on the open market.

It then comes as a surprise that not only has he failed to sign with any team this year, but his name has barely been mentioned. At 37 years old he might not be an everyday player but he still has value. I pegged him as one of the top non-Type A or B free agents available not too long ago but it seems as if Durham may actually more closely resemble something mentioned in an earlier post of Dave’s this offseason about players who were forcibly retired. If you recall, Kenny Lofton was the subject of that post, since he played +3.1 win baseball in 2007 yet couldn’t find a home last season.

Durham’s projections are a tad skewed in my eyes, primarily because they heavily count his 2007 campaign that, when stacked up against the rest of his career, was clearly a fluke among flukes. From 1998-2006, his lowest wOBA was .343, his lowest BABIP was .292, and his lowest OPS was .785. And keep in mind that these are the lows and by no means the averages, which are significantly higher. In 2007, his BABIP plummeted to .238, leading to an abysmal .282 wOBA and .638 OPS.

I would peg Durham as capable of posting a .340 wOBA in 450 PA, with league average defense. Factoring in the adjustments for replacement level and position, Durham would produce exactly +2 wins next season, the definition of league average. Even if that wOBA is a bit too high for your liking, if we make him a league average hitter, keeping everything else constant, he is still a +1.7 win player. The only way Durham’s production doesn’t fall within that general vicinity is if he completely forgets how to play defense, for whatever reason reverts to his fluky 2007, or simply does not accrue enough playing time.

Outside of potential fits for Durham, the issue of money looms large. He has already stated his lack of desire for a non-roster invite or a minor league deal. Durham has hinted at retirement if he cannot garner a respectable deal. I highly doubt he expects to earn the fair market value commanded by +1.5 to +2 win production, but he clearly wants more than say $1-2 mil.

What’s really interesting is that a healthy Orlando Hudson projects to around +2.6 wins next season, which is in no way substantially better than Durham. And, to top it off, since 2002, Durham has produced +19.1 wins to the +15.2 of Hudson. Teams that miss out on Hudson with a need for either a second base platoon or spark off the bench would serve themselves right by signing Durham to a one-year deal. Ray-Ray cannot possibly expect to receive a long-term commitment at this stage in his career, but as a one-year stopgap before a prospect joins the big show, or as a bench player and occasional starter, he does not cost anyone a draft pick, will not cost a ton of money, and still projects to produce between +1.5 and +2 wins.

Should his asking price lower, you better believe a plethora of suitors will line up, but the ball is firmly in Durham’s court. In the current economy, teams just are not willing to take risks assuming those risks involve $4-5 mil given to a 37-yr old part-time player. Ray Durham may join the Lofton ranks as a solid veteran who hung up his cleats due to very odd circumstances.

Most of you are familiar with Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR), a metric for evaluating fielding using detailed play-by-play data. For first basemen, like all other fielders, it measures the number of ground balls that are fielded and turned into outs as compared to an average-fielding first basemen, given the same number, type, and location of ground balls, as well as the same number of outs, the base runner configuration, and batter handedness (plus an adjustment for the parks and the ground/fly tendency of the pitchers). The difference between these two values is a fielder’s UZR. It is usually expressed as a number of runs saved or cost compared to an average player at that position over a specified period of time (usually defensive games). You will often see it as a rate stat, generally per 150 games.

What UZR does not measure for first basemen, because the requisite data is not readily available, are the theoretical runs saved or cost by virtue of a first basemen’s skill at successfully catching errant throws or throws in the dirt. For lack of a better word, I call these “scoops,” even though they necessarily include poor throws (e.g., high or off-line) that are not in the dirt.

Fortunately, there is a way to estimate this skill, using a relatively simple method “invented” by Tom Tango, called “without and with you”, or WOWY. The WOWY methodology was explained by Tango in an excellent article in the 2008 Hardball Times as well as in various online forums, including his (and my) blog, www.insidethebook.com.

Basically, it goes like this: Figure out what happens when a particular player is on the field (generally something that explicitly involves that player, or at least is affected by that player, such as the number of ground balls a particular SS – say Derek Jeter – fields and turns into outs). Then figure out the same thing when that player is not on the field, but all other relevant variables (in this example, mostly the pitcher, park, and opponent batters) remain constant. The difference between the two rates (per whatever you want) should reflect the difference in skill, or at least in performance (skill is usually performance regressed toward some mean, the amount of regression being a function of the sample size of the performance) of whatever you are measuring, between the player in question and the average player when the player in question is not on the field (but in the data set).

In other words, to use the Jeter example, if Derek fields 4 balls per 9 innings and all other SS (let’s say that our sample of “other SS” is large and unbiased enough to consider them league average) field 4.5 balls per 9 innings, given the exact same pool of pitchers, batters, and parks, then we can safely say (more or less – within the bounds of sample error) that Jeter is .5 balls per 9 innings worse than the average SS. As I said, it is simple and brilliant. The results are extremely telling if we can get large enough samples of Jeter and lots of other SS that are “matched” with Jeter based upon parks, pitchers, batters, etc.

The methodology is a little more complicated than that, but hopefully you get the general idea. Anyway, the same thing can be done with first basemen in order to estimate their “scooping” performance and ability. What I did was look at every ground ball that was thrown from each infielder to each first baseman. I put that ground ball into one of two buckets: One, when there was no error on the throw, or two, when there was an error on the throw. The assumption is that when a throwing error is made, there is an errant throw (no duh) and the first baseman is not able to somehow coax that bad throw into an out by scooping it out of the dirt, jumping in the air, catching it while off the bag and still making the play, etc. Obviously most of the time when a throwing error occurs, there is nothing that any first baseman can do about it. However, in the long run, we can assume that a certain fixed percentage of bad throws from each infield position will always result in an error while another fixed percentage of those bad throws have a chance to be “saved” by a skilled (or tall) first baseman.

We can also assume that when an error is not made, that sometimes a bad throw occurs and the first baseman “saves the day.” Again, most outs and non-errors occur on easily catchable throws, but a certain fixed percentage of them will occur on bad throws that are skillfully and successfully handled by the first baseman.

Given these assumptions (which are true, by the way), if we look at all throws by a particular player at a particular position to a certain first baseman and then compare the results (error or no error) to when throws are made from the same infielder at the same position to all other first basemen, the difference can be attributed to the “scooping skill” of that particular first baseman.

An example:

Say that all infielders threw to Todd Helton 1000 times in 2007. And say that those exact same infielders threw to some other first baseman (and we are going to assume that all of these “other” first basemen are average, collectively) around 1000 times also (it does not really matter how many throws went to these other first basemen, although we would like it to be a lot). Now let’s say that 20 throwing errors were made on those throws to Helton and only 15 were made to all the other first basemen. We can safely say (with some uncertainty of course, due to sample error) that Helton was 5 plays per 1000 throws (about a full season actually) better than the other pool of first basemen, who we are assuming are average. So Todd is 5 plays, or around 4 runs, per season, above average at “scoops.”

In actuality what I did was to match up every player at every infield position (including pitcher and catcher) with every first basemen, and then for each, specific first baseman, I did a “with and without” and prorated or weighted that difference by the minimum of these two numbers – the throws made to the first baseman in question and the throws made to all other first basemen – by the same fielder.

For example, let’s say that over the sample time period, Edgar Renteria threw 300 balls to Albert Pujols (by the way, I used all data from 2000 to 2008) and he made 6 throwing errors. Now let’s say the Renteria also threw 800 balls to other first basemen (on the Cardinals or any other team he played for) and made20 errors. The difference in error rate is .5 errors per 100 throws in favor of Albert. Thus we give him credit so far for .5 errors per 100, weighted by 300 throws (the lesser of 300 and 500). We do that for every fielder who threw to Albert at least 20 times and 20 times to other first basemen, and then we add everything up to get a weighted average. This weighted average represents a first baseman’s “scooping” skill as compared to an average first baseman, or at least as compared to the average first baseman in that player’s “matched pool” of first basemen.

That last part of the last sentence is the primary flaw in the methodology. Since I am only comparing each first basemen to all other first baseman who had the same fielders throwing to them, it is possible, and in some cases, inevitable, for one first baseman to be compared to a pool of primarily good or bad first basemen, since each one will tend to be compared with the others on his own team. For example, Helton will tend to be compared with whomever else manned first base for the Rockies when he was not on the field. If those few backup first basemen happened to be particularly bad at “scooping” balls, then Helton will be overrated by this methodology. In fact, because of this flaw, and because regular first basemen tend to be better at “scooping” than backup first basemen, any regular will tend to be overrated (because they are often compared to a backup) and any backup will tend to be underrated (because they are often compared to a regular). Keep in mind, for example, that because some of Helton’s infielder teammates played on other teams, he is not always going to be compared to another Rockies’ first baseman. Anyway, for now, it looks like we are going to have to live with this flaw or weakness in the system. The correct way to handle the data, of course, is to adjust each first baseman’s rating by that of his “others” by doing an iterative process. In the future I may do this, but for now, we are stuck with version 1.0.

Here are the results:

Again, I used play-by-play data from 2000 to 2008.

Interestingly, and not unexpectedly, there were significant across-the-board differences in the scooping ability of the average tall and short, lefty and righty, and regular and backup first baseman.

Tall (>6’1”) RH: .6 runs per 1000 matched throws, or around a full season.
Tall LH: 1.2 runs

Short RH: -.8 runs
Short LH: .6 runs

Less than 300 matched throws: -1.5 runs
300 to 1000 throws: .4 runs
More than 1000 throws: .6 runs

Players with at least 1000 matched throws total where the minimum of the two pair for each fielder is added to the total:

Best per 1000 throws

Berkman +4 runs, 2928 matched throws
Choi +4, 1361
Conine +3, 3100
Connor Jackson +3, 1790
Loney +3, 1679
Mientkewicz +3, 4344
D Ward +3, 1119
Olerud +2.5, 4481
Sexson +2.5, 6471
Tony Clark +2.5, 2880
Dan Johnson +2.5, 1774
Overbay +2.5, 4834

Worst

Karros -4, 2986
Mo Vaughn -4, 1644
Galaraga -3, 1842
Stairs -3, 1122
Bagwell -2.5, 4931
Casey -2.5, 6444
Julio Franco -2.5, 2010
Swisher -2.5, 1134
Thome -2.5, 4476

When we regress these numbers in order to turn them into “true talent” scooping ability, we get slightly smaller values, depending on the number of matched throws (sample size) of course. In fact, it appears that the spread in talent between the best and worst “scoopers” at first base is on the order of 2-3 runs, plus or minus (a 4-6 run spread). So before you start opining about how your favorite first baseman is so great defensively because he “saves so many errors,” consider that scooping ability is probably worth less than a ¼ of total defensive ability or value at first base. Fielding grounders is at least 75% of the package and “scooping” is the rest. But every little bit helps.

We can all rest easy from now on safe in the knowledge that we no longer have to hear about Ryan Howard’s arbitration demands again. Today the Philadelphia Phillies and Ryan Howard agreed to a three-year, $54 million contract.

The $18 million average annual value matches Howard’s arbitration request for this, his upcoming fourth year of club control. This contract buys out Howard’s remaining three arbitration years, and does not have any control over what was going to be his first free agency year, following the 2011 season.

Howard will hit free agency going into his age 32 season, still young enough to probably get another mega-value contract, though if anything like this winter’s trend continues, he may not be looking forward to the 6-8 year deal that he would have gotten as little as last winter in a similar circumstance.

Eric Seidman took a look at Howard’s projections when the arbitration demands were leaked and came to a conclusion that Howard would account for about 4.2 wins. I’m a little more pessimistic on Howard, thinking he’s more about on the 3.7-win level. At that level, Howard is still around the $18 million mark in value, though a tad under and given the falling amount that teams are paying per win, this could get worse as time goes on.

Furthermore, we usually expect players to take a 10% discount when they sign multi-year deals to account for the long-term security that they get and to mitigate some of the risk the teams assume when they sign players to market value for more than one year. Given that, I project a fair deal for Howard at about $15 million per year, making this an overpay on Philadelphia’s part if Howard were a free agent.

Given that he’s not, and that his value is tied to the arbitration process, this looks like even more of an overpay on the surface, the typical 40/60/80% suggesting that for these three seasons, Howard should earn about $27 million instead of the $54 he will get paid. The problem is that the arbitration process works in favor of Howard in this case because it overrates the aspects of the game that Howard excels at (power) and underrates that which he lacks (position, defense). So the Phillies had to balance against what they would expect Howard to win in arbitration rather than receive on the open market. All in all, this looks like it is close enough to a fair deal, though perhaps siding a tinge on Howard’s side.

Randy Wolf had a season not unlike that of Jim Edmonds, wherein he was awful for the Padres, was traded off mid season and then blossomed into a player San Diego were hoping they might have been getting in the first place.

Edmonds remains unsigned this winter, but finally Randy Wolf has put his name to the dotted line, with Los Angeles. Does this mark the beginning of a shift away from pursuing Manny Ramirez? That will be an interesting angle to watch in the forthcoming weeks.

Moving on to Wolf himself, the contract calls for $5 million in guaranteed money and up to another $3 million in incentives. The incentives kick in at $500,000 for reaching 170, 180, 185, 190, 195 and 200 innings pitched.

The various projections range from CHONE marking Wolf down for just 122 innings at a below average FIP to Marcel at 165 innings at a slightly above average FIP. Translated to wins, it comes out to between 1.4 and 2.4 wins. Neither of those projections have Wolf earning any incentives, which means he would end up with just the $5 million paid. Given the value of those seasons ($6.3 million by CHONE, $10.8 by Marcel), this is a good to great deal for the Dodgers.

There are really two possible downsides for LA here. One is that Wolf gets hurt entirely. In that case, they’re out $5 million without much production at all. That’s not too much of a problem as long as they have adequate backups planned. The other is if Wolf is healthy but not overly effective, getting to 190 or so innings of below average pitching. In that case, the Dodgers would probably break even on value unless Wolf is really mediocre, which would seem to go against the whole pitching lots of innings assumption. This comes across as a mild-risk/medium-reward deal for the Dodgers; well done.

With Spring Training set to kick off in about a week, the storylines involving several high-profile free agents will only grow increasingly more dramatic. Based on the headlines, the market for pitchers seemingly dwindled down to the extremely risky right arm of Ben Sheets and the questionable skillset of lefty Randy Wolf. I have already covered how Braden Looper is realistically just as talented at Wolf while simultaneously costing a fraction of the money, but another pitcher has flown under the radar: Odalis Perez.

Perez’s name was recently withdrawn from the list of available hurlers, though, as he inked a minor league deal with the Washington Nationals. The deal is interesting given that it comes in the non-guaranteed form with a maximum potential salary well under the eventual deals that will be signed by Wolf and Looper. If Odalis makes the team, he can earn $850,000, which seems a bit off. Granted he played for the Washington Nationals last season, but he still produced to the tune of +1.5 wins.

He also does not carry the inconsistencies of the other pitchers. His win values over the last four years: +1.6, +1.4, +1.5, +1.5. Last season, he produced a 4.62 FIP in 159 IP. Marcel has his 2009 pegged at a very similar 4.59 FIP in 151 IP. There really is no reason to think Perez could not be equally as valuable as last season. Perez has somehow managed to garner a reputation for being old despite the fact that he won’t turn 32 until June.

Tim Redding is one year younger than Perez, and over the last four seasons has an aggregate win value of 1.0. Despite a minimal age discrepancy and the performance differences pointing very favorably in Perez’s direction, Redding signed a guaranteed $2.25 mil contract while Odalis will have to settle for one third of that salary once he makes the actual major league roster.

Why the Mets didn’t spring for Perez is beyond me, especially given that they apparently valued a consistent 5th-starter type quite highly. And, on that note, why did Perez have to settle for the Nationals anyways? He isn’t as attractive as the top-tier free agent pitchers but teams could do much worse than he as a back of the rotation starter, especially on a low risk, high reward contract. Perez should easily make the big league team and the current contract values him at +0.2 wins, under one seventh of the win values he has produced in each of the last four seasons. A good deal for the Nationals even if it won’t make any difference whatsoever.

We’ve spent the past week talking about the projected level of production teams could get in 2009 from various minor league free agents at different positions. After all, since we talk about replacement level so frequently, we want to be able to give examples to people of exactly who these freely available, somewhat useful players are.

Next week, we’ll dive into the pitchers, but for today, I want to talk a little bit more about some things that came up during the discussion of the position players.

One point of wOBA is worth about half a run per 600 PA.

I’m assuming that this became pretty obvious to most of you as we did the run value formula in each post, but I wanted to reinforce it here, because I think it’s useful to grasping the relative importance of offense, especially as it compares to defensive value. Because we know how wOBA relates to runs, and we have defensive metrics expressed in runs, it’s easy to compare how different skill sets are valued.

For instance, we pointed out that the .306 wOBA/+7.5 defense group that we called center fielders weren’t finding jobs any easier than a .315 wOBA/-12.5 defense group (left fielders). However, since we know 11 points of wOBA is worth 5.5 runs offensively, and UZR suggests that there’s a 20 run gap in defensive ability, the weaker hitters are obviously better players. It’s not even close.

Even if you think our assumptions about the groups relative defensive abilities are off, you could (at best) close the total value gap to something like +5 to +10 runs, instead of the +15 we’d conclude based on the projections of these handful of players. There’s just no way to argue that the center fielders that are settling for minor league contracts are equal in value to the corner outfielders who are getting minor league contracts. The CFs are clearly better players. Why can’t they land major league contracts?

Honestly, I think this is just an incorrect evaluation of the offense/defense split by MLB clubs, which is most obvious in the outfield. As we talked about in the Three CF post from a few weeks ago, several clubs have caught on to the fact that using a okay bat/great glove guy in a corner OF spot can be an extremely effective use of resources.

This idea that the corner outfield spots are the dominion of large power hitters only, and that any skillset in those spots besides the lumbering oaf is a weakness on a major league roster, is left over from days of less knowledge. As we move forward, it will become readily clear to major league teams that they have been, and continue to be, significantly undervaluing the okay bat/great glove types and overvaluing the good bat/bad glove types.

As long as guys like Chris Duffy and Ryan Langerhans continue to have to settle for minor league contracts, there are market inefficiencies that smart teams will take advantage of.

There is a little bit of instability in the Chicago White Sox infield as the team prepares to head to spring training in advance of the 2009 MLB season. Joe Crede and Orlando Cabrera are gone from the left side of the infield. Veteran infielder Juan Uribe also flew the coop. Incumbent second baseman Alexei Ramirez is expected to slide over to shortstop.

There is a gaping hole at second base and the club has attempted to address that by signing Colorado castoff Jayson Nix and trading for former Atlanta Braves prospect Brent Lillibridge. But the best option may be one that can be found in-house.

Chris Getz is not the most gifted baseball player on the field, but gritty second baseman are back in vogue, thanks to Dustin Pedroia of the Boston Red Sox (2007 AL ROY, 2008 AL MVP). That’s not to say Getz’s ceiling is anywhere near that of Pedroia’s. The 25-year-old was selected in the fourth round of the 2005 draft out of the University of Michigan. He spent four seasons in the minors before getting a taste of Major League Baseball last season. In 10 games, Getz went 2-for-7 (.286).

Getz had his first taste of pro ball in A-ball after being drafted in 2005 and he hit .304/.407/.397 in 214 at-bats. That earned him a promotion to Double-A to begin 2006, which was also his first full minor league season. He struggled with the two-level jump and hit just .256/.326/.321 in 508 at-bats. Getz rebounded the next season, though, and hit .299/.382/.381 in 278 at-bats while repeating the level and also struggling with injuries.

The left-handed batter showed even more improvements in 2008 at Triple-A when he hit .302/.366/.448 with an ISO that almost doubled from 0.83 to 1.46. His rates were solid, including a 9.2 BB% and a 13.1 K%. Getz has also hit southpaws very well in his career, so there is no need to platoon him. He has a career batting average of .302 against left-handers and hit .319 against them in 2008.

Defensively, Getz’s arm is average, as is his range. He made just three errors in 61 games (.990 FP) at second base in Triple-A with a 5.07 RF/g. He also spent time at shortstop, third base and in the outfield at Triple-A, although he is definitely best-suited for second base at the Major League level – if playing every day.

Getz, perhaps in the No.2 hole, could certainly be a nice complement to the White Sox’ traditional plodding sluggers.

Okay, so, now that we’ve gone through all eight positions and looked at what the CHONE projections expect from the guys who are signing minor league contracts this winter, let’s put together a roster and see what it would look like. We’ll fill out 13 spots with position players, allocate playing time, and come up with a projected offensive and defensive level for these freely available talents.

Starting Catcher: Toby Hall – 375 PA, .292 wOBA, -5 defense
Starting 1B: Josh Phelps – 600 PA, .355 wOBA, -15 defense
Starting 2B: Chris Burke – 600 PA, .318 wOBA, +10 defense
Starting SS: Ivan Ochoa – 600 PA, .300 wOBA, +5 defense
Starting 3B: Jose Castillo – 600 PA, .299 wOBA, +0 defense
Starting LF: Corey Patterson – 600 PA, .304 wOBA, +10 defense
Starting CF: Chris Duffy – 600 PA, .313 wOBA, +0 defense
Starting RF: Laynce Nix – 600 PA, .338 wOBA, +0 defense

Backup Catcher: Jamie Burke – 275 PA, .282 wOBA, +0 defense
Backup IF: Brad Eldred – 350 PA, .321 wOBA, -5 defense
Backup IF: Omar Vizquel – 350 PA, .278 wOBA, +5 defense
Backup OF: Trot Nixon – 250 PA, .337 wOBA, -5 defense
Backup OF: Ryan Langerhans – 300 PA, .330 wOBA, +0 defense

Totals: 6,100 PA, .314 wOBA, +0 defense

A .314 wOBA would translate to about 81 runs below average, or ~650 runs scored over the course of a full season. Now, there’s a pretty good case to be made that these guys wouldn’t perform as well in full-time play as they do as part-timers (especially guys like Phelps, who would then be subject to facing a lot of RHPs), so a .314 wOBA is probably too optimistic. If we knock 10 points of wOBA off for all the guys we’re projecting as starters, that brings us down to a .307 wOBA, or 117 runs below average.

So, replacement level position players, we’d be looking at something like 620 to 650 runs scored with league average defense. You could adjust this roster a bit to go more offense/less defense (stick Jonny Gomes in LF, for instance) if you’d like, but this gives you a pretty good picture of what a league minimum, freely available talent roster for 2009 would look like.

Sabermetrically inclined analysts like myself are usually tagged with the label of not caring about the “intangibles” or “immeasurable” of certain players. That’s untrue. I’m quite aware that chemistry, leadership, and all that jazz exist, however their affects on winning and general player value are where I differ from those who preach the stuff. As most of you know, I’m a Rays fan and having experienced Cliff Floyd in 2008, I figured I’d bring that perspective to the table while analyzing the move.

Let’s be frank. Floyd makes no sense for the San Diego Padres purely as a player. His knees and ailing body have all but eliminated his ability to field. Last season Floyd touched a glove in spring training perhaps five times, it wasn’t his but instead shortstop Reid Brignac’s, he played catch with Evan Longoria for five tosses then gave the glove back to Brignac and declared he was finished for the day. During short his Rays career he played in 80 games, all as either a designated hitter or pinch hitter.

The Padres all ready have a young left fielder in Chase Headley, a young and extremely underexposed first baseman in Adrian Gonzalez, and a pretty talented right fielder in Brian Giles. This suggests Floyd will become a pinch hitter and feel good clubhouse leader type, and that’s exactly what he’ll bring to the Padres. Floyd only hit 11 homeruns last year, but I’ll never forget the one he hit on May 30th against Chicago.

Scott Linebrink entered the game in the bottom of the 9th while the scored was tied at one apiece. Floyd would take the first pitch for a called strike, and the second ball way out of the field, winning the game and doing what his knees do best – jog – around the bases as his teammates – all ecstatic for a victory, but clearly appreciating who hit the ball – gathered at home. Then Rays announcer Joe Magrane described it as “Daddy coming home.”

That’s not too far off. The local media maligned B.J. Upton for not hustling, the home crowd booed him, and Joe Maddon benched him for failing to hustle on groundballs. It would’ve been easy for Floyd to question Upton’s love of the game or desire to be the best, but in typical Floyd fashion, he spoke in support of Upton, and promised that he would help him overcome the obstacle. Upton and Floyd were nearly inseparable in the dugout as the elder acted as a mentor for one of the Rays most talented youngsters.

It wasn’t just Upton either, during spring workouts, when the articles about improved chemistry were freshly printed, Carl Crawford, Upton, and others would gather around Floyd, playfully engaging the veteran as if he were their big brother. Floyd would even bemoan the fact that this was Crawford’s team and locker room before calling him Superman.

Floyd is not going to help the Padres win many games next year. There’s a perfectly correct case to make that the Padres should be taking shots on high-upside players rather than playing the twilight of Floyd’s career. I agree with that and Floyd would be better suited to serve as a coach with San Diego, but even still I’ll miss Cliff Floyd the person next year.

Even if I won’t miss Cliff Floyd the player.

Today brought the news that many of us were starting to suspect; Ben Sheets arm is far worse off than we anticipated. In fact, there appears to have been an agreement in place with the Texas Rangers on a two-year deal when the normally routine physical turned up how serious the injury was and now Ben Sheets is weighing surgery that may put him out all of the 2009 season.

Given the rumors floating around earlier of a scary medical report and the complete lack of reported interest all winter, I have my doubts that the other 29 teams didn’t have at least some suspicion that this was going to be the outcome for Sheets. Then again, the Brewers did offer Sheets arbitration this winter, so they must have not been aware of the full extent of the injury at the time and given their playoff run and long standing relationship with Sheets, you would have expected them to be the most on the ball of teams.

Regardless of the nature of when the information was disseminated, it is out there now and it certainly throws a wrench into contract proceedings for Sheets. Off the top of my head, it would seem that there are two options for Sheets. One being for him to sign some sort of two or three year contract with little guaranteed but plenty of incentives in order to entice a team to pay for the surgery and rehab and give them the possible reward of having his service at a reduced cost in exchange. The other would be to get the surgery and rehab on his own and then depending on the time frame of recovery, maybe he can snag a pro-rated deal near the end of the season (how great of a story would that be for teams in late August looking to gain an advantage?) or perhaps waiting until the 2009 off season.

Of course, perhaps Ben Sheets will not need surgery, but right now it looks like teams are going to be staying away from any big commitment until he shows some health. This is a big loss for Sheets and a loss for us as baseball fans, deprived yet again of one of the top pitching talents in baseball.