If you’ve been reading the site for a while, you’ve probably figured out that I like groundball pitchers. Due to the emphasis placed on strikeout rates as a predictor of future success, too many sinkerball strike throwers have been overlooked as prospects on their way to success on the majors, and too often, their ability to get outs is dismissed as a fluke because they don’t generate an above average amount of swinging strikes. However, when you see guys like Aaron Cook, Jake Westbrook, Paul Maholm, and John Lannan consistently keep runs off the board, it becomes easier to realize that there’s a path to success that doesn’t involve high strikeout rates.

However, there’s a downside to being an extreme groundball pitcher. Most of the guys who rack up tons of groundballs rely heavily on their two seam fastball, and as Dave Allen showed with Pitch F/x data, the two seamer has the largest platoon split of any pitch in baseball. It is a terrific pitch against same-handed hitters, but it’s not much of a weapon against opposite handed hitters. Scouts have intuitively known this for a long time, which is why so many sinker-slider guys gets pigeonholed as relievers, where they can be used in situations where the platoon problem can be minimized.

If a groundball pitcher has a good change-up (or split finger, or even a curve in some cases – vertical movement is the key), he can neutralize opposite handed hitters and be an effective starting pitcher. However, without that off-speed pitch, he’s probably destined for the bullpen or a Vicente Padilla career path (check out his career L/R splits some time).

So, all that said, this post is actually about Chad Jenkins, the Toronto Blue Jays first round pick in last week’s draft. Jenkins was one of the more interesting pitchers in the draft for me, because I’m really curious to see how well his repertoire translates to professional baseball. The scouting report on him gives him a 90-94 MPH heavy sinking fastball, a potentially plus slider, and an average change-up. Given those pitches, we’d expect him to be a groundball guy with potentially a platoon problem.

Thanks to the work of Kent Bonham and Jeff Sackmann, we have split data for college players. How well does the data line up with our expectations based on the scouting report?

Vs RHB: 56 2/3 IP, 1.27 BB/9, 11.28 K/9, 1.75 G/F
Vs LHB: 28 1/3 IP, 2.22 BB/9, 7.62 K/9, 1.72 G/F

He destroyed right-handed bats, holding them to a .200/.230/.259 mark, but wasn’t nearly as good against lefties – .287/.341/.344. He still managed to get LH hitters to pound the ball into the ground, but his fastball/slider don’t work as out pitches against opposite handed hitters, and his change-up looks like it could use some work, based on both the scouting report and the data.

The Blue Jays love groundball pitchers almost as much as I do, but the ones they’ve had success with have developed good secondary stuff. That’s going to be the key for Jenkins as he gets into Toronto’s system. If he can refine his change-up and make it a real weapon against lefties, he has a chance to be one of my favorite pitchers in a few years. If he can’t, I hope he likes hanging out in the bullpen.

More than 200 plate appearances into the season, Brian Giles remains the worst regular in baseball. Suffice to say, Giles abrupt decay is a bit surprising. Sure, he’s 38 years old and plays in a notoriously suppressive offensive climate, but even Giles’ park-adjusted numbers are repulsive. His .255 wOBA translates to -12.7 offensive runs. Giles has played nearly as poorly on defense, posting a -8.1 UZR despite playing an outfield corner.

All told, Giles has been worth 1.5 wins below replacement level, good for a “value” of $-6.9 million; the Padres are paying him $9 million over the course of this season.

Giles has struggled to hit the fastball this season to the tune of -2.25 runs per 100 heaters faced, a glaring weakness which the league has exploited by throwing him fastballs 66% of the time. It’s hard to tell whether Giles has lost his bat speed or something else along the way, but his performance this year represents a drastic drop from that of his previous seasons:

2006 0.12 wFB/C

2007 0.92 wFB/C

2008 1.16 wFB/C

Meanwhile, the velocity of the average fastball he’s seen is just about the same: ~91 miles per hour this season and last, and ~90 MPH in 2006 and 2007. In other words, Giles’ subpar performance against the hard stuff this season can’t be attributed to his having faced a greater percentage of flamethrowers. The two home runs he has hit were surrendered by Chad Billingsley and Edinson Volquez, and both came in fastball counts.

Moving forward, I would still expect Giles to improve offensively. He currently sports a .218 BABIP, compared to his low of .274 over the past three seasons. Giles’ line-drive rates remain respectable, and his walk/strikeout rates have stabilized. The only weapon his game definitely lacks is power. His ISO is down from .150 to .083, although as Dave pointed out in the off-season, the inverse relationship between fastballs seen and ISO likely explains some of this decline.

I’m sure the Padres were a bit miffed with Giles’ decision to block a move last year. I can’t imagine how thrilled they are to see his value all but vanish within a year.

With the activation today of Brian Bruney from the disabled list and the designation of Jose Veras, I thought it a particularly good time to check in the end of the line of the Yankee’s bullpen, Mariano Rivera.

The first year into his three-year, $45-million contract, signed about two weeks after he turned 38, Mariano Rivera posted his best strikeout rate since his first full season in the bigs in 1996. And his 12.83 strikeouts to each walk absolutely shattered his previous career best of 6.92. On top of all that personally controlled awesomeness, Rivera also benefited from a .232 BABIP and the lowest hits per batter faced of his career. Add it all up and it is no wonder he posted a 1.40 ERA. His 2.03 FIP showed it was no fluke though.

Move forward to 2009 and how has Rivera done? Well, noticeably worse is easy to see, but there are some frightening numbers beneath the surface. Rivera’s 7.5% swinging strike rate is the lowest on record for him. There has been a sizable dip in the number of pitches thrown within the strike zone and hitters are not chasing these extra balls out of the zone.

Rivera’s ground ball rate is also at its lowest point on record, though that is over a smaller sample than his individual pitch results. It is no surprise then that the home run rate has increased, though the rate by which is has increased is surprising and not likely to continue. Rivera has allowed five home runs already this season through 26.2 innings. The last time he allowed more than five home runs was 1995 when he was a starter.

Interestingly, Rivera’s strikeout and walk rates have not moved much despite the drastic change in his individual pitch outcomes. 32 strikeouts to just two unintentional walks, and no hit batters, gives Rivera an even better ratio than last year. Given his extreme drop in missed bats and overall strikes thrown however, I would not expect that to continue. It will be interesting to see which regression, the strikeout and walk rates or the home run rate, influences Rivera’s final line the most.

This afternoon, we looked at Johan Santana’s loss of velocity of late, and what it might mean for him going forward. Let’s pull a double header and take a look at another National League arm who has recently wondered where his fastball has gone – Todd Wellemeyer.

In a conversation after his last start, Wellemeyer told the St. Louis Post Dispatch “Last year I was throwing 94-96 (mph), this year I’m topping out at 90-91. I don’t know what it is but there’s definitely a difference. It makes things more of a challenge, that’s for sure.”

A 5 MPH decrease in fastball velocity would be a huge red flag, and something that very few pitchers could actually overcome. Thankfully, Wellemeyer hasn’t actually lost that much zip on his fastball. Here’s his Pitch F/x velocity chart.

As you can see, his fastball averaged 92-93 for most of last year, and there certainly were games where he was throwing 95 to 96 at the high end. This year, none of his top end speeds reach 95, and in three of his last four starts, the average fastball has come in around 90-91. So, while he hasn’t lost 5 MPH off his fastball, his average speed is down from 92.7 a year ago to 91.3 this year.

Unlike with Santana, who is still topping out at the same speed as always, Wellemeyer’s top end fastball is down significantly. He’s thrown 7 pitches at 94+ this year, the fastest of which was 94.4 MPH. For comparison, he threw 36 pitches at 94+ in one game last year (July 6th against the Cubs), the fastest of which was 96.1 MPH. 28 of those 36 pitches were faster than any pitch he’s thrown this year.

Why has his top end fastball gone away? Well, if he doesn’t know, and Dave Duncan doesn’t know, odds are pretty good that I don’t know either. But, unlike with Santana, I’d suggest this is certainly a legitimate cause for concern long term. A sharp, significant decrease in top end fastball velocity is fairly highly correlated with arm injuries. Not always, of course, but it’s pretty common that a guys fastball disappears and he ends up on the disabled list in the not too distant future.

I told Mets fan not to worry about Santana. Unfortunately for St. Louis fans, I’m not sure I can say the same thing here. It’s probably time to worry.

Major League Baseball players, generally speaking, have reputations for being superstitious people. One of the more popular superstitions in baseball is that of the “sophomore jinx.” The dreaded disease has ruined the careers of many a promising young rookie. Over the next week or so, we’re going to take a look at how many of the 2008 rookies from around baseball are surviving in 2009 as they attempt to evade The Sophomore Jinx. The American League Central division is up first.

The Chicago White Sox club did not employ many rookies in 2008. In fact, Cuban defectee and middle infielder Alexei Ramirez was the only rookie to see extended playing time for the club. Ramirez, 27, had a fine debut season, although his walk rate was noticeably lacking with at 3.6 BB%. On the plus side, the lanky infielder has almost doubled that rate in 2009 to 7.0 BB% while maintaining an almost identical 12.8 K%. His triple-slash numbers has dropped from .290/.317/.475 to .252/.302/.345. Ramirez’ impressive power display from 2008, which resulted in 21 home runs in 480 at-bats, has bottomed out in 2009 with his ISO dropping from .185 to .093. His offense value has obviously decreased significantly, but he’s moved from second base to shortstop where his defense has been better than average, which helps soften the blow.

This may be more of a case of playing above one’s own head, than being bitten by the sophomore jinx. Shortstop Mike Aviles, now 28, burst upon the scene in KC in 2008 and was one of the club’s biggest offensive threats throughout the second half of the season. The infielder, who had a fairly undistinguished minor league career, hit .325/.354/.480 with 27 doubles and 10 homers in 419 at-bats. The walk rate at 4.1 BB% and a healthy BABIP of .359 were perhaps early warning signs that his numbers would see a dip in 2009. So far this season, Aviles has been a disappointment with his walk rate dropping to 3.2 BB%. His triple-slash line is just .183/.208/.250 in 120 at-bats.

The former No. 1 overall pick in the 2006 draft, right-hander Luke Hochevar had a mediocre rookie season in 2008, even without considering his lofty draft status. He posted a 5.51 ERA (4.43 FIP) and allowed 143 hits in 129 innings of work. His rates were nothing special at 3.28 BB/9 and 5.02 K/9. Realizing he was far from dominating, KC sent him down to triple-A to begin the 2009 season but recalled him when injuries and ineffectiveness reared their ugly heads. In 29 innings, Hochevar has a 5.60 ERA (5.53 FIP) with 25 hits allowed. He has also walked 10 batters with just nine strikeouts (2.96 K/9). With a 56.7 GB%, Hochevar, 25, has at least been keeping the ball out of the air on a regular basis.

Outfielder Josh Anderson spent the 2008 season as a member of the Atlanta Braves organization where he was unable to break into a long-term, regular gig with the club (He played in 121 triple-A games) despite its lack of outfield depth. The speedy athlete hit .294/.338/.426 in 136 at-bats. He also stolen 10 bases in 11 attempts. Traded to Detroit prior to the 2009 season, the 26-year-old outfielder is hitting .250/.286/.325 with 10 steals in 12 attempts in 120 at-bats. It’s clear why he’s been in three organizations in three years; he’s a borderline fourth outfielder.

Every year the pitching-poor Texas Rangers organization seems to give up on a young arm too soon. In 2008, it was right-hander Armando Galarraga. That year, he posted a 3.73 ERA (4.88 FIP) with 13 wins while allowing just 152 hits in 178.2 innings of work. He posted rates of 3.07 BB/9 and 6.35 K/9. The low strikeout total was a minor cause for concern, as was the home-run rate at 1.41 HR/9. Galarraga has been a mess in 2009. He has a 5.56 ERA (5.93 FIP) with 80 hits allowed in 69.2 innings of work. He’s also walking one more batter for every nine innings, so there are a lot of batters getting on base. The right-hander’s HR/9 rate has jumped to 1.81 despite pitching in a spacious home park.

Despite a hot stretch in 2008, Ben Francisco’s career so far has reeked of ‘tweener.’ He lacks the range to play center field on a regular basis and he lacks the pop in his bat to perform regularly at the corner outfield positions. In 2008, the outfielder posted a triple-slash line of .266/.332/.438 with 15 home runs in 447 at-bats. This season, he’s hitting just .245/.311/.392 with five home runs in 204 at-bats. At the age of 27, there is not much upside, although with a BABIP of .290 and a line-drive rate of 20%, we could see some modest improvements on the triple-slash line.

Southpaw Aaron Laffey, 24, narrowly missed losing his rookie status in 2007 by two-thirds of an inning. He posted similar numbers in 2007 and 2008, which meant both low walk and strikeout totals. The biggest difference was that his FIP jumped by more than a run in 2008 to 4.88. Laffey has spent time in both the starting rotation and bullpen in 2009 (as well as the minors) but he has a respectable ERA and has allowed fewer hits than innings pitched. The bullpen is probably the best place for a starter who uses his fastball 78% of the time despite averaging out at 87 mph.

If you’re a fan of FIP, you’re probably not a fan of Jensen Lewis. The right-handed reliever has posted pretty good superficial numbers over the parts of the past three seasons that he’s been in the Majors. However, his FIP has gone from 2.49 to 4.59 to 5.54. His line-drive rate was also a worrisome 24.5% in 2008, although it currently sits at 11.5%. His HR/9 rate has gone from 1.03 to 2.30 in the past two seasons. For what it’s worth, Lewis does have a nice K/BB rate at 3.00.

Technically a rookie despite having years of pro experience in Japan, right-handed reliever Masa Kobayashi falls under the category of the one-year trick pitcher, and his debut season was not all that good (4.55 FIP, 65 H in 55.2 IP).

It’s hard to believe that it wasn’t long ago that people were calling outfielder Denard Span a first round draft pick bust after he was taken out of a Florida high school with the 20th overall pick in 2002. The left-handed hitter, though, shook off the gossip and seized hold of a playing-time opportunity in 2008. His triple-slash line was solid for a player with his skill set (ie. speed) at .294/.387/.432 with 18 steals and six homers in 347 at-bats. Span, 25, even showed a willingness to walk a little bit (12.6%) while keeping his strikeout rate below 20%. His 2009 season has been an almost mirror image, although his power numbers are down and his ISO has dropped from .138 to .094.

Another 2008 rookie outfielder, more was expected from Carlos Gomez because he was the key name in the Johan Santana trade with the New York Mets. Gomez wowed a lot of people with his raw skills and potential, but there were a lot of hollow numbers, including his on-base percentage at .296. The 142 strikeouts were also troubling for a player that produced .360 slugging percentage, but it helped to explain the .258 batting average. His BABIP was .332 with a line-drive rate of 17.4… oh, if only he could put the bat on the ball more consistently. At 23, Gomez has time to learn and improve but he’d probably be better off getting regular playing time in the minors.

Left-hander Glen Perkins, 26, slipped into a starting rotation role in 2008 despite spending part of 2007 in the Majors as a reliever. He had an OK season for a No. 4 or 5 starter. Perkins won 12 games and posted a 4.41 ERA but his FIP was 5.14 and his strikeout rate was just 4.41 K/9 (It’s never a good thing if your ERA matches the K rate). He allowed 183 hits in 151 innings of work. Despite his less-than-stellar rookie season, the Minnesota club kept him in the rotation in 2009 but he’s responded with a 5.36 ERA (4.46 FIP) and 50 hits allowed in 47 innings of work.

Nick Blackburn, 27, is basically a right-handed version of Perkins. Neither pitcher throws very hard and they both rely on excellent command and control. In 2008, Blackburn allowed 224 hits in 193.1 innings of work. This year, he’s given up 86 hits in 84.1 innings. His strikeout rate has dropped from 4.47 to 3.95 K/9. The good news is that Minnesota has found its No. 4 and 5 starters for the next five years in Perkins and Blackburn.

On Sunday, the Yankees blistered Johan Santana for nine runs, the most he’s ever given up in a start. We’re not used to seeing Johan get beat like he stole something, so after the game, theories began to fly. Almost all of them centered on his decrease in velocity of late, which is usually a pretty good reason to be concerned. Take a look at Santana’s velocity chart.

As you can see, Santana’s velocity has been lower as of late, with a shift coming around the sixth start of the season. Let’s break Santana’s season into two parts, isolating his first five outings of the year and his most recent seven starts.

April 12th – May 6th.

Pitches of 87 MPH+ – 330 of 514 (64.2%)
Average of those pitches – 91.3 MPH
Pitches of 92 MPH+ – 94 of 514 (18.3%)
Average of those pitches – 92.7 MPH
Pitches of 93 MPH+ – 29 of 514 (5.6%)
Average of those pitches – 93.4 MPH

May 7th – June 14th.

Pitches of 87 MPH+ – 398 of 675 (58.9%)
Average of those pitches – 90.3 MPH
Pitches of 92 MPH+ – 40 of 675 (5.9%)
Average of those pitches – 92.6 MPH
Pitches of 93 MPH+ – 7 of 675 (1.0%)
Average of those pitches – 93.4 MPH

As you can see, the frequency with which he’s throwing higher velocity pitches is down, but the average of the pitches he throws at the top of his range hasn’t changed much. His top end velocity is basically still the same as it was at the start of the year – he’s just not getting the ball up to 93 as often.

This should be encouraging for Mets fans, I think. If the velocity drop was a sign of a serious arm problem, we’d see a bigger fall from top-end velocity. Instead, what we’re seeing is that he’s throwing more pitches in the 88-90 range that used to be in the 89-91 range, which is accounting for most of the 1 MPH dropoff he’s experienced in his overall fastball speed.

This data supports the blister theory that suggests he’s adjusted his grip to avoid popping the blister, and that the adjustment has caused his ball to cut a bit more with a bit less velocity. We’ll have to keep an eye on Santana’s velocity over the next few weeks, but I wouldn’t be surprised if this was just a temporary problem.

When I told the writing staff here of my desire to write a post on regression to the mean, using Matt Cain as the proxy of sorts, Dave replied: “Admit it, you just want to write about Cain again…”. He wasn’t really wrong, as many of you know that Cain happens to be my favorite non-Greg Maddux pitcher, but his 2009 season has been so interesting to date that he seems like the perfect subject for a discussion of regression. I have seen it happen countless times, but fans interested in developing their statistical knowledge tend to go through a few stages with regards to the evolution of a particular metric.

First, they are very skeptical, wary to accept something new as meaningful. Next, they grasp the underlying meaning and begin to incorporate the stat into analysis. Finally, basking in the fact that they understand the benefits of the stat, it gets tossed around whenever possible and treated like the gospel. Unfortunately, when this last part occurs, the true understanding is not fully developed and definitive claims are often a bit off course. This is in no way a criticism, as I myself have gone through the same stages at one time or another, but rather an observation.

With regards to Cain, I have seen way too many analyses discussing his ERA-FIP disconnect and how an ugly regression causing his ERA to balloon was inevitable. I profiled this over at Baseball Prospectus, begging for those making such claims to dig deeper and find out what pitchers are doing differently, if anything, before jumping to conclusions. After all, not everyone regresses, and not all regressions are bad. The problem is that the term regression takes on such negative connotations these days that it seems odd for it to portend anything positive. Regression is in fact a two-way road, though, and deserves to be treated that way.

No, Matt Cain is not very likely to sustain an 88% strand rate, but he is also unlikely to post walk and strikeout rates that drastically stray from his true talent level. A pitcher with strikeout rates ranging from 7.4-8.4 has a pretty low likelihood of suddenly whiffing hitters at a rate closer to 6.0 per nine innings; likewise, one with an established unintentional walk rate around 3.5 probably will not finish the next season closer to 4.3 barring unforeseen circumstances. Despite these assertions, after Cain’s 8th start, when his 2.65 ERA supremely bested an FIP built upon a 4.24 UBB/9 and 6.0 K/9, nobody really thought to suggest that those rates would regress (in this case a positive regression). The moral here I suppose is that even though his strand rate will not stay that high, he is going to allow fewer baserunners that need to be stranded.

Five starts later, Cain has reduced his UBB/9 to 3.44 and increased his strikeout rate to 7.10. The ERA is still quite low thanks to the extraordinary strand rate, but his FIP is regressing itself towards levels of the recent past. If I had to bet money on it, I would agree that Cain’s ERA is more likely to increase than his FIP is to decrease, but regression does not occur in just one metric. If his strikeout rate continues to regress and his walk rate either improves or holds true, combined with a regression in stranding runners, Cain could conceivably have an ERA around 3.25 with an FIP at the 3.70 mark. At that point, the disconnect between the two stats isn’t that vast.

In fact, ZiPS sees Cain finishing the season in a similar fashion to the aforementioned numbers, with a 3.28 ERA and 3.83 FIP. An FIP of 3.83 is certainly very solid, as is a 3.28 ERA, and the main reasons the disconnect would reduce involve regression towards established talent levels in walks and strikeouts, that have not yet been experienced this season.

These are certainly big “if’s” but I really just wanted to hammer home two points: the numbers beneath the numbers really need to be analyzed in order to find out why certain rates are where they are, and that regression works both ways, meaning we should not ignore the areas bound to experience a positive regression, which in turn could reduce the amount of negative regression inherent in a dataset.

As if the Angels hadn’t been through enough already, Ervin Santana will miss tonight’s scheduled start with right forearm tightness. Santana has already missed time this season with an elbow injury that left him out until mid-May. Injuries to John Lackey and Kelvim Escobar have already forced the Angels to dig into their farm system, and now Sean O’Sullivan will be called upon to make at least a start. O’Sullivan will become the 12th starter on an Angels team decimated by injury, tragedy, and ineffectiveness.

Questioning whether Santana was really healthy is nothing new. A decline in strikeouts and increase in walks and homeruns against raised red flags. Fewer batters are chasing Santana out of the zone and this is the most contact Santana has ever allowed. Our batted ball data has Santana giving up 26.1% line drives. That measure usually stabilizes early, so while there’s some sample size issues at play, there’s reason to believe Santana was being hit quite hard.

Part of the reason for the increased contact rates is the velocity of Santana’s fastball. No longer is Santana flashing a fastball that sits in the mid-90s; instead, he’s barely touching that point. Dave covered this back in early June, but here’s a look at Santana’s updated velocity chart:

Whether the problem stemmed from Santana still being hurt or still building arm strength, pitching him every five days was doing little to rectify the situation. The Angels are deciding against placing Santana on the disabled list, at least for now, as they await results from a MRI test. Having a roster spot taken by someone unable to pitch seems like a waste, but be that as it may, the Angels have decided to roll the dice and hope Santana is ready to go on June 23rd. If not, the Angels can active Escobar while placing him in the bullpen, disable Santana, and leave O’Sullivan in the rotation.

At least nobody will be able to accuse Tony Reagins of being unaware of any disabled list intricacies

Approaching the same issue that I covered in my last post from the opposite side, consider the Washington Nationals. Their .333 team wOBA ranks 13th in baseball. We do not have much information on their new park yet in order to adjust for it like we would like, but factoring in adjustments on all other teams bumps the Nationals up to 12th in baseball in terms of value derived from their lineup. But just as the Rangers were hurt by the American League/National League wOBA gap, so are the Nationals helped. They actually rank 4th out of 16 teams in the senior circuit in batting value according to the numbers listed here.

And once again, it is not just FanGraphs. They rank 4th in the National League, and 10th overall, at StatCorner as well. Baseball Prospectus also agrees that the Nationals are the 4th best NL hitting club, and they have them as the 8th best overall.

Nick Johnson has been healthy and producing in his usual way with 36 walks to 44 strikeouts and a .416 on base percentage. Christian Guzman continues his remarkable transformation with a .790 OPS, though his slipping strikeout to walk ratio (31-6 this season after a 57-23 last year) are cause for concern going forward. Adam Dunn is … well … Adam Dunn (at the plate, that’s a good thing). and Ryan Zimmerman, highlighted by his long hitting streak, is finally hitting like many foresaw after his debut in 2005.

It all adds up to a lineup that is one of the best in the league. Now if only they could figure out a way to get the same level of production at the plate without completely sacrificing defense in the meantime, they might be on to something for the future instead of setting up another clock in their draft room counting down until the second they get to pick Bryce Harper with the first overall selection in the 2010 draft.

Dave Cameron mentioned it in his weekly blurb piece this morning, but I wanted to take some extra time to highlight the Texas Rangers, namely their offense.

I have mentioned the concept of numerical anchors a couple times already on this site and others, but as an extremely brief refresher, it basically describes how it is our nature to form opinions around extremes and around first impressions. This is why grounded analysts have to work so hard to point out small sample sizes. I am writing today to try to dispel another potential anchor around the baseball community, that the Texas Rangers have a potent offense. Now, the critical part of this statement rests on the park factors for The Ballpark in Arlington (TBiA). Over the years, TBiA has consistently ranked as one of the most hitting friendly parks out there and its’ effects have colored how many people have seen the Rangers offense.

One only needs to compare two different numbers to see this. The Rangers have a team wOBA of .342 as published here. That ranks 7th in baseball. That seems pretty potent, doesn’t it? Turn them to Batting value, which is the park adjusted version of wOBA translated into runs above or below average and suddenly the Rangers, at 12.2, drop to 11th in baseball. Okay, so not world beaters certainly, but hey, they are above average still, right? Well, except we are still ignoring the league differences. The NL essentially punts a batting slot every game. The difference between the average NL wOBA and the average AL wOBA is around 10 points so far this year and is usually about five or six points. Counting just AL teams, the Rangers actually rank 8th out of 14th, below average.

This is not just limited to FanGraphs’ interpretations of the stats either. At StatCorner.com, where I make use of the wOBA formula without a running game element and park factors developed by David Gassko at The Hardball Times, the Rangers check in with a .339 park-adjusted wOBA to a league average of .341. Baseball Prospectus ranks the Rangers as having the 8th best EQA in the AL and 16th overall.

The Rangers had a torrid start to the season at the plate, but they have had some very ugly stretches since. After May 17th, the Rangers had won seven in a row and sat 4.5 games clear in the AL West with a 23-14 record having scored 5.65 runs per game. Since then, the Rangers are 12-13 and the scoring has dropped to just 4.04 runs per game. Michael Young has a .673 OPS, Josh Hamilton .696 and now he’s gone for a month or two. Chris Davis has struck out 38 times in just 80 plate appearances since May 17th. Andruw Jones is hitting .200/.260/.444. About the only person who has continued hitting is Nelson Cruz who is still proving people stupid for letting him rot in Triple-A for so long.

The entire sample of the 62 games that we have seen this season paints the picture that most projection systems thought they would see, the Rangers have awful pitching supported somewhat by an improved defense, and a roughly average offense. That is not a recipe for winning a division usually, but this year’s AL West is no usual division and Texas may yet hold on. Just know that it should be a closer race than it might seem now and remember to constantly check yourself before falling back on opinions formed early in the season.