For whatever reason, statistical analysts have a strange fascination with guys who throw the knuckleball. Whenever anybody shows a remote amount of success throwing it, he immediately generates articles from around the world. So, despite the fact that he’s only made two starts in the big leagues this year, I’m guessing you’re aware of Charlie Haeger.

After turning back the clock to give starts to Eric Milton, Jason Schmidt, and Jeff Weaver, the Dodgers have decided to look forward and see what Haeger can offer. The early results have been outstanding, as he’s racked up 14 innings and allowed just three runs so far. His knuckler has been moving, but more importantly, he’s been able to throw it for strikes.

Saturday’s start was a bit different than his first one, however. In his season debut against St. Louis on the 17th, just two of his 80 pitches were fastballs. He went almost exclusively with the knuckler, and it worked. His second time out, he worked in 14 fastballs, mixing speeds a bit more and giving hitters a different look. Unlike most knuckleball specialists, Haeger’s fastball actually can be described as one without being ironic.

He throws it between 81 and 87, and I’ve seen him as high as 89 in the minor leagues. If Tim Wakefield ever threw a pitch at 89 MPH, Jerry Remy would fall out of his chair. Having a fastball that can be described as “just below average” in velocity sets Haeger apart from others who practice the knuckler.

Is he the next Wakefield? Probably not. But I think we’re all hoping he will be. His fastball will be a big key in seeing just how far he can go.

The Cardinals’ acquisition of John Smoltz sparked some debate here and elsewhere. The debate basically went like this:

“Smoltz is not done. His ERA is meaningless. His peripheral stats are still pretty darn good. His high batting average of balls on play and homer per fly ball rates are unsustainable. More importantly, he’s still missing bats. He may not be a dominant pitcher anymore, but there’s no reason to believe he can’t be decent. He’s just thrown 40 innings of unlucky ball.”

“Are you freaking kidding me? Have you seen him pitch? He’s old, coming off of major surgery and can’t hit his spots. He’s throwing meatballs and getting pasted. He can’t make it past one trip around the lineup. He should just retire.”

First hand experience can sometimes cloud our judgment when it comes to regression to the mean. In other words, perception and reality many times will clash. Having personally watched Smoltz pitch on TV yesterday, my feeling was the he is at the very least a reasonable facsimile to the Smoltzy of old. His fastball had decent life and he located the pitch well. His splitter was a thing of beauty. His slider and curveball both looked pretty good. The final result, Smoltz threw 5 innings, allowed 3 hits, no walks and struck out 9. At one point in the game, he struck out seven in a row. Granted, this came against San Diego’s weak lineup, but how in the world did Boston let this guy go?

Who is right? The Boston fan who witnessed this guy get blasted around Fenway, or me?The process in finding out is a lot more complicated than people think. We’ll have a clearer picture over Smoltz’s next few starts, but even then it’ll still probably be in the realm of small samples. Smoltz says it was mechanics, the Cardinals say it was a matter of tipping pitches. We can’t quantify either, really.

Here’s my lazy, take it for what it’s worth analysis. John Smoltz was by all accounts an awesome pitcher in 2007, when we started to get pitch f/x data. Not a full season’s worth, mind you, and there have since been some kinks worked out. Caveats now aside, here’s how his stuff stacked up from 2007 to his time in Boston to his one start for St. Louis —

(Sorry, not sure why the curves got cut off. Velo is the same year to year)

What can this tell us? Not a whole lot. Obviously his fastball and slider’s velocity is down. His fastball has been less than effective, while his slider is still an effective pitch. His splitter is also still a weapon, although I can’t explain the crazy horizontal movement from yesterday. Yes, his stuff is down. He’s not the “let’s stink up the joint” version of Smoltz, neither is he going to strike out 40% of the batters he faces. But I just don’t see any reason to believe he is finished, from a quantitative standpoint and from my own two eyeballs. I just trust the numbers more.

When someone discusses Derek Lowe’s pitching strategy, the term “pitching to contact” arises more often than not. It sounds good. Lowe uses his sinking fastball to generate groundballs in which his defense converts into outs. Lowe avoids walks and strikeouts while letting his defense do all the work. Most announcers would praise this approach and if you are ignorant to the common principles of pitcher BABIP, then it makes sense to preach it.

For the first time in a long time, Lowe’s pitching is finding a lot of contact. Despite being one of those vapid groundballers, Lowe’s contact rates over the last three years have resembled league average ratios. 82.1% in 2006 compared to 81% league average; 79.6% versus 80.8% in 2007; and 80.2% against 80.8% in 2008. So, Lowe’s 86.6% rate comes as a little bit of a surprise, especially since league average has maintained mostly static at 80.6%. Without surprise Lowe’s increase in contact rate marks the highest in the league amongst qualified starters.

I took each of the 78 starting pitchers contact rates with 100+ innings in this and the prior season then ran the year-to-year correlation, in which I got 0.5398. That means there’s some skill to missing bats, which is intuitive.

For whatever reason Lowe’s contact rate was its lowest in April, but its highest in June. Even the low watermark is higher than Lowe’s previous rates. Our pitch run values show his slider as the biggest difference. A perennial good pitch, last year it was a great pitch, and this year it’s a really poor pitch. The pitch is moving slower with more horizontal and less vertical movement, which could be a conscious decision made by Lowe. There seem to be three answers to the lack of utility: 1) the change has hurt his command – leaving him incapable of properly locating the pitch, but that seems like something Lowe would’ve adjusted to by now – or 2) the pitch has lost deception.

Lowe isn’t pitching to contact; he’s just been unable to avoid it.

In this day and age of Internet coverage, it is hard for a player like Julio Borbon to get under-hyped. But that is exactly what has happened… and the deep minor league system in Texas is no doubt partially to blame. This speedy outfielder was selected 35th overall by the Texas Rangers in the 2007 draft. The former University of Tennessee star had a very nice college career and he actually slid a bit in the draft because of his adviser, Mr. Scott Boras.

Borbon held out after being drafted – of course – and appeared in just eight minor league games in his draft year. As a result, he entered 2008 with little pro experience. Undeterred, the now-23-year-old prospect hit .306/.346/.395 in 291 high-A at-bats and moved up to double-A where his numbers improved to .337/.380/.459 in 255 at-bats. Overall, Borbon stole 53 bases, but was caught 18 times. Unfortunately, his walk rate sat right around 5%, which is not really acceptable for a speedy/leadoff-type hitter. He did, though, keep his strikeout rate down around 11%.

This season in triple-A, Borbon got the ol’ walk rate up to 7.5% and really trimmed the strikeout rate at just 9.8%. Whether that is sustainable or not remains to be seen. It is impressive, nonetheless, given that it was done over 96 games. Borbon also posted a line of .307/.367/.386 in 407 at-bats. He stole 25 bases in 32 attempts.

Upon hitting the big time in Texas, Borbon has been on fire. Through 10 games, he’s currently hitting .485/.528/.636 in 33 at-bats. He’s also shown better instincts on the base paths with eight steals in as many attempts. Borbon’s small-sample-size numbers at the plate are clearly aided by the .652 BABIP but at least he’s taking a few more walks.

Clearly, Borbon is not this good. However, he certainly has the potential to be an above-average contributor to the Texas Rangers for quite some time. With limited power, Borbon has shown the ability to hit .300 and he has the speed to steal 40-50 bases in the Majors, especially if he cuts down on the caught-stealing rate. On the downside, he probably needs to show a little more patience at the plate to take full advantage of the offensive package that he offers. The club will certainly benefit by giving him playing time, as Borbon offers skills that are lacking on the club (plus outfield defense, blazing speed). His base-running antics could be especially valuable in the playoffs.

Perhaps more than any other free agent this winter, Joel Pineiro should be a fascinating case to watch. You probably know the story by now – journeyman with a checkered history buys into Dave Duncan’s two-seam fastball plan, becomes an extreme groundball strike-thrower and, at age 30, has the best year of his career.

No one thinks he’s a 3.04 FIP guy going forward (his HR/FB rate will regress, of course, driving his FIP up with it), but his ZIPS projection from here on out has him as a 3.87 FIP guy, which is a well above average starting pitcher. But it’s also a very weird version of one – the strikeout rate is low even for an extreme sinkerball guy, and teams historically have rewarded pitchers for missing bats when it comes to handing out contracts.

Pineiro is going to hit free agency coming off a season where he pitched like Derek Lowe, but teams were reluctant to throw big money at Lowe last year and he had a 10 year track record of succeeding with this skillset. So, I don’t think he should be holding his breath waiting for the $15 million per season that Lowe got from Atlanta, but that raises the question of what, realistically, he should get?

If you believe that he’s really reinvented himself into being the new Aaron Cook, then you’re looking at Pineiro as a ~3 win pitcher, and that’s probably worth around $12 to $13 million per season on a two or three year deal. But how much confidence do you have in his ability to retain a good chunk of this year’s value, considering it’s a radical change from everything he’d ever done before.

There’s certainly more risk factors with Pineiro, so that will lead to a discount of some sort. But how much?

I honestly have no idea. Last year, Milton Bradley was the free agent who had a ton of positives and negatives on both sides, and he ended up at 3 years, $30 million. And that might look like a realistic target for Pineiro, except Kyle Lohse got 4 years, $41 million for posting an inferior season for the same team. Does Pineiro really take less than what Lohse got last winter? Will anyone really give him a 4 year deal?

I have no idea, honestly. Watching Pineiro navigate free agency, and seeing how teams view him, is going to be a lot of fun to watch.

For all of Bud Selig’s efforts to strong-arm owners into signing draft picks to slot recommendations, it is painfully obvious to anyone paying attention to the game of baseball that this system is woefully broken. Every year, it’s the same thing. A good chunk of the draft class has to while away time rather than playing baseball before Bud will allow ownership the freedom to do whatever the heck they want. Development time is lost; recommendations go completely ignored and the amount of bonuses getting handed out goes up instead of down. It’s completely counterproductive on both sides.

While players are waiting to sign, plenty of rumblings go out on what different player’s asking prices are, and threats are issued of going to play at college or the independent leagues are made if demands are not met. Players and agents are vilified as selfish little punks. The general feeling seems to be that draft picks need to prove something before they get paid, and that handing out big dollars to a player who hasn’t done anything in the big leagues is a huge waste of resources. After all, even first round draft picks bust all the time. But are they really overpaid?

I’ve gone back and researched the draft from the past decade, similarly to what Victor Wang has done, only using WAR. In my research I’ve listed out the total WAR for each first round draft pick during their cost-controlled years to see what sort of surplus value they have. We’ll say a win on the free agent market is worth today’s rate, $4.4 million. I know we’re looking at six years, so just forget inflation for a moment. The picks were worth –

• Picks 1 though 5 on average gave their teams $32M of production.
• Picks 6 through 10, $22.4M
• 11-15, $17.6M
• 16-20, $18.9M
• 21-30 $6.6M

That’s a lot of surplus value. Even with the relatively high failure rate, first round draft picks are incredibly valuable and actually have proven to be quite a bargain. For example, recommended slot for the first overall pick is this year was $3.6M. While it’s only a group of ten players, 1st overall picks from ’90-’99 produced on average $51.5 million worth of value that a team would normally pay for on the free agent market, or about roughly 14 times today’s recommended bonus!

Even with his record deal, Stephen Strasburg is a great value. If you don’t think so, just imagine the bidding war that would go on between large market teams if he were a free agent. Dump the slots. Let teams do whatever they want. If they can’t do their homework on what a kid’s asking price is before the draft him, that’s their own failure.

Assuming Billy Wagner’s appearances are nothing but an audition for another team, his first act went about as well as the Mets could script.

Wagner entered last night’s game in the eighth and faced Reid Gorecki, Chipper Jones, and Brian McCann. His first pitch was a 94 MPH fastball that missed inside. Wagner would fire a 94.7 MPH fastball for a strike on his next pitch before tossing Gorecki an off-speed pitch and some breaking stuff and retiring him on a swinging strikeout.

He’d fall behind Jones 3-0 and then induce a fly out to right field and make short work of McCann; getting ahead with two heaters (one hit foul, the other for a called strike) and then using his slider to generate a swing and a miss. It was like Wagner was in typical August fashion, making just another appearance.

14 pitches, two swinging strikes, and nine strikes total. Only five of those strikes were actually within the strike zone, meaning Wagner’s stuff looked attractive enough to batters to have them chase outside of the zone, as you can see here. He doesn’t touch 98 anymore, but the eight fastballs last night averaged about 95 miles per hour with good inward break towards lefties.

Wagner’s 2009 salary was 10.5 million with a little under two months to go, that cost is down considerably, making him a possibility for most teams. His 2010 club option is worth 8 million and comes with a million dollar buyout. The problem is that Wagner’s value doesn’t match his pending salary. Over the last three years he’s cracked 2 WAR once and that was in 2006.

As a 38-year-old reliever with injury issues, you have to believe whatever team Wagner winds up on will simply buy him out before attempting to re-sign him; especially given the market for old and injury prone relievers.

On May 1st, the Dodgers stood at 16-8 and already had a 3.5 game lead in the NL West, at the time over the 11-10 San Francisco Giants. By June 1st, the lead had grown to 8 as the Giants remained in second place and one game over .500 at 25-24 while the Dodgers had also kept up their pace and were now 35-18.

By July 1st, the Giants were showing some life, now at seven games over .500, but they remained a meaningful seven games back of the Dodgers and chipping away at a one-game-per-month pace was going to put the Giants in good position come February of 2011. The Rockies roared to life in July and by August 1st, they were tied with the Giants at 57-47, but both teams remained seven games back of the Dodgers with now just 58 games left to play. The odds seemed, and were, grim.

It is August 20th and I just saw a question pop up about whether the Dodgers were choking in the NL West. It is difficult to accuse them of choking when they are still 21 games over .500 at 71-50 currently, but they are 7-11 in the month of August and their lead has been halved to just 3.5 games over the Rockies and 4.5 over the Giants. Ominous signs right?

Well, maybe, but in terms of probability, not really. Here is a timeline (x-axis. Note: in days, not games played) chart of each of the three teams’ odds of winning the NL West (y-axis):

You see, the Dodgers are still hovering around the 80% odds that they have been at for the past 60 days or so. Why? Well, for one, even through their lead has shrunk by 3.5 games, they still own a 3.5 game lead and instead of 58 games to play, there is now just 40 games left to play. The shrinking window of opportunity helps keep some of the Dodgers chances afloat, but that is not the main reason they remain such clear favorites.

The main reason is simply this. In 18 games played in August, the Dodgers have won 7 and lost 11, but they have scored 87 runs and allowed just 69, a run differential that you would expect to reverse that 7-11 record. The Dodgers are 1-5 in their last six extra-inning games and 1-7 in their last eight one-run games. They have been unlucky, but they are still the same juggernaut in the West that they have been all season. The Rockies and Giants are making excellent plays for the Wild Card, but both teams still have a long road ahead to pass the Dodgers for the division crown.

Nobody expected Everth Cabrera to go from A-ball to the majors and have a lick of success, but after 255 plate appearances in the majors, Cabrera has done nothing but impress. When the Padres took the Rockies farmhand third in the Rule 5 draft, they stated their intent to keep him on the roster – a necessity if the Pads hoped to steal a potentially useful part from their division rivals.

The 5’9” shortstop has shown the ability to swipe bags (18/20 on the year), walk (10.9%), and play a decent major league shortstop while posting an above average wOBA. The little guy is hitting nearly 60% grounders and has parlayed his speed into 13 infield hits and a modest success rate (4/13, ~31%) on bunting for a hit. Those type of hits are fueling his .335 BABIP

The sample size is far too small to make any type of definitive statements on Cabrera’s defense, but for someone making such a leap in levels, it’s pretty impressive that Cabrera is capable of putting up a slightly below average season. Worth noting is that Baseball America labeled him as a fine defender in their Rule 5 wrap.

Obviously we have little data available for Cabrera at comparable levels, which makes projecting him moving forward a bit more difficult, but ZiPS has his wOBA at .287 moving forward and .338 on the season. Even if Cabrera does struggle down the stretch he’s a 22-year-old without much experience in Double or Triple-A, and he still might post a two-win season. Oh, and he was acquired for the price of a roster slot.

The Padres have to be thrilled with the results thus far.

It took a little longer than expected, but the Cleveland Indians finally recalled prized offensive prospect Matt LaPorta on Wednesday. The first-baseman-turned-outfielder received a brief taste of the Majors back in May but he hit just .190/.286/.286 in 42 at-bats. Sent back down to triple-A, the 24-year-old former No. 1 draft pick (by Milwaukee) hit .299/.388/.530 with 17 homers in 338 at-bats. Prior to his recall, LaPorta was hitting .333 with four homers and eight walks in his past 10 games.

With the trade-deadline deal that sent Ryan Garko to San Francisco, as well as the continued shoulder woes plaguing Travis Hafner, there are plenty of at-bats available for LaPorta if Cleveland wishes to plug him in at first base or designated hitter. The club also currently has just three outfielders on the big league roster – including LaPorta, whose third best position is probably left field (behind DH and 1B). With the club’s playoff hopes non-existent, there should be lots of time for LaPorta to audition for a regular gig in 2010, which he deserves regardless of how well he hits in the final five weeks of the season. Despite his earlier MLB troubles, LaPorta projects to be an offensive force in the Majors with the potential to hit 25-30 homers.

Given the state of the big-league club in 2009, Cleveland fans will probably have to endure a rebuilding effort in 2010. The club lacks the veteran presence on the roster to make a significant playoff push next year and the organization does not have the money needed to bring in high-priced free agent talent (not that a lot of it is available this winter). On the plus side, though, the team brought in a lot of young, affordable talent at the trade deadline and now quite possibly has one of the top three minor league systems in all of baseball.

Some of the prospects that should be ready to contribute in 2010 include: catchers Carlos Santana and Lou Marson, infielders Wes Hodges and Jason Donald, outfielder Michael Brantley, and pitchers Hector Rondon, Carlos Carrasco, and perhaps Scott Barnes. The 2011 season should see another wave of key prospects reach the Majors, such as third baseman Lonnie Chisenhall, as well as pitchers Nick Hagadone, Bryan Price, and Jeanmar Gomez. The 2009 season has been a disappointing one, and 2010 will probably be equally as tough, but the future is bright for the Indians.

And one final thought: Free Jordan Brown.