This winter’s free agent class is full of guys with significant amounts of both talent and risk, especially on the pitching side of things. Rich Harden, Ben Sheets, Erik Bedard, Brad Penny, Brett Myers, John Smoltz, Pedro Martinez – the talent pool is very deep in guys with All-Star upside and spend-the-year-rehabbing downside. But it’s not just pitchers, either – there’s a first baseman who offers a similar problem for GMs with a shopping list.

I’m speaking of Mr. Disabled List himself, Nick Johnson. His list of health problems is longer than a typical Joe Posnanski column and not nearly as entertaining. With 542 plate appearances this year, this is only the third season in his career he’s topped the 500+ PA mark. But, as usual, he’s been an on base machine when on the field.

His .427 OBP ranks 3rd in baseball, behind two guys named Pujols and Mauer. He hasn’t posted an on base percentage below .400 since 2004, when he played for the Expos. Once again, he has more walks than strikeouts, and even without his usual power this year, he’s still been one of the league’s better hitters.

However, Johnson turns 31 tomorrow, and given his various surgeries and skill set, it’s fair to suggest that he’s walking around with the body of a 50 year old. He can hit, but his abilities to run and field have diminished, and his ability to stay on the field will always be in question. Just because he was healthy this year doesn’t mean he’ll be healthy next year. Unless the team invests in a protective bubble for him to walk around in, guaranteeing multiple years to a guy with his injury history is a pretty big risk.

Johnson’s production this year has been worth 2.5 wins, and the way he’s hitting in September, he could end the year as a +3 win player. Without all the injury concerns, we’d expect that level of player to get a multi-year deal for something between $10 and $15 million a year after a bidding war for his services broke out. But is anyone really giving Nick Johnson $30 to $35 million for his age 31 to 33 seasons? I doubt it.

My guess is Johnson will have to go year to year for the rest of his career, and teams will attempt to entice him with more dollars rather than more years. But an on base machine that doesn’t require a long term deal to sign is going to be a pretty popular target, so Johnson could find himself in the interesting scenario of having a whole bunch of teams bidding up his 2010 salary.

Engel Beltre entered 2009 as the seventh-best prospect, according to Baseball America, in a very deep Texas Rangers minor league system. The five-tool outfielder was originally given a large contract by the Boston Red Sox to sign as a non-drafted amateur free agent out of the Dominican Republic. Beltre was sent to Texas in the trade for reliever Eric Gagne in 2007.

Oozing with tools, he hit .283 with 31 steals at low-A in 2008 as an 18 year old, which excited some prospect evaluators – especially those that all but ignore statistics and prefer to focus on projection based on what they observe. However, Beltre’s 15 walks in 566 at-bats (2.66 BB%) were a huge red flag for some, myself included. Prior to the 2009 season, I stated, “…His plate discipline is terrible… That approach is obviously not going to cut it at the upper levels of the minors, or the Majors, but Beltre is just 19-years-old and has plenty of time to improve the rougher aspects of his game.”

Youthful aggression is one thing; a sub-3.0 BB% is a whole other ball game. On the plus side, unlike someone like Seattle’s Greg Halman, Beltre’s pitiful walk rate was not coupled with an outlandish strikeout rate. The Texas prospect’s strikeout rate was 18.6 K%, which (kind of, sort of) eased some of the worry. Here is what Baseball America had to say about him pre-2009, “He’s a free swinger who must improve his patience and pitch selection… Beltre remains raw but his development is well ahead of schedule and his upside is enormous. Down the road, he could be a five-tool superstar center fielder.”

Well, that definitely did not happen in 2009. Still a teenager at 19, Beltre hit .227/.281/.317 in 357 at-bats in high-A for an OPS of .598. A BABIP of .282 certainly did not help, but his walk rate remained far too low at 4.5 BB% and his strikeout rate rose a bit over 2008 to 21.6 K%. Along with his terrible plate approach, the left-handed hitting Beltre cannot hit southpaws. He hit just .209/.254/.306 against them in 2009 and also posted a line of .220/.257/.262 in 2008. For some reason, the organization decided to give Beltre a late-season taste of double-A but he hit just .071 (1-for-14) in four games after coming back from a broken hamate bone.

There is no doubt that Beltre has some impressive tools. Unfortunately, many a prospect has disappeared in the bowels of obscurity despite as much – or more – raw talent. Beltre should definitely return to high-A ball in 2010 and remain there until he makes some adjustments with his approach.

If I would’ve told you in spring training that Luke Gregerson would produce a higher WAR from a non-closer’s reliever role than Khalil Greene, you would’ve painted me eight different shades of crazy. It’s not longer insanity, it’s reality. Greene has struggled through his first season in the heartland, posting a .641 OPS to date and causing the Cardinals to acquire alternative options to fill their middle infield roles.

Gregerson on the other hand, has pitched about as well as you could ask. A 2.33 FIP and 2.62 tRA are extremely solid. His sinker/slider combination is producing groundballs (45.5%), infield flies (16.1%), and outfield flies that aren’t turning into home runs (3.6%). Nobody is hitting him. His 65.7% contact rate is one of the lowest in the major leagues. He’s not just blowing fastballs by hitters like Jonathan Broxton either, Gregerson’s fastball sits in the low-90s and he uses his slider (which sits in the low-80s) on a nearly equal basis. There’s some deception involved and his arsenal causes batters to swing out of the strike zone on nearly 40% of occasions.

In the spring, Padres Assistant General Manager Paul DePodesta wrote this on his blog:

We came into this spring knowing that a number of bullpen roles would be up for grabs, and with the recent loss of Mark Worrell for the year to elbow surgery (the other player acquired for Khalil) there are fewer guys in the mix. Our scouts believe that Luke could factor in our pen sometime in 2009, so we’re excited to add him.

I’d say Gregerson has exceeded expectations.

You always hear about how happy, excited, and relieved a player is to finally join a contender. These stories write themselves following an in-season trade. Well, Alex Rios hasn’t had much fun in Chicago. In 97 plate appearances he’s hitting .140/.156/.215 for the White Sox which translates into a .165 wOBA – or -13.2 wRAA. His simple batting figures aren’t the only out of place numbers since changing addresses:

ISO
2009 Jays: .163
2009 White Sox: .075

BABIP
Jays: .294
Sox: .174

BB%
Jays: 6.6%
Sox: 2.1%

K%
Jays: 17.9%
Sox: 24.7%

Contact%
Jays: 82.7%
Sox: 73.8%

It is only 97 plate appearances, meaning Rios is about three trips away from some Chicago-based columnist writing a piece proclaiming Rios as a player unable to adapt to the large market atmosphere.

Honestly it’s pretty hard to get worked about any of the numbers involved. None of them are good, none are encouraging, but remember John Smoltz and all the talk about 40 innings worth of work? Well Joe Mauer endured a 79 plate appearance streak that lasted from mid-August through early September in which he had an OPS of .804. In late April, Derek Jeter began a 84 plate appearance streak with a .643 OPS. Mark Teixeira’s first 95 plate appearances resulted in an .189/.358/.351 line.

I cannot definitively state that every single batter in the majors goes through streaks of 75-100 plate appearances where they experience what many label as slumps. However those were the first three players I checked and those are three very good batters whom each experienced a similar phenomenon just this season.

Poor timing? Absolutely. A sign of pressure getting to Rios? Probably not.

You know a player is talented when he is ranked as an organization’s third best prospect despite not throwing a pitch in his entire pro career spanning two years. The Yankees’ Andrew Brackman was highly regarded coming off of his collegiate career at North Carolina State University. Despite focusing on two sports for much of his college career (baseball and basketball), the 6’10” Brackman made huge strides from a developmental standpoint and posted solid numbers in his junior year after focusing solely on baseball.

As Baseball America – the publication that ranked Brackman as the third best prospect in the system – stated prior to the ’07 draft, “Now a legitimate 6-foot-10, 240 pounds, his upside is considerable… He’s still unrefined, but even without the polish, Brackman shouldn’t slide out of the top 10 picks.”

Unfortunately for Brackman, he suffered an elbow injury that same year and questions about his health dropped him out of Top 10 consideration in the 2007 amateur draft. Undeterred, and ecstatic to get such a quality talent with the 30th overall pick, the Yankees organization grabbed the Ohio native and handed him a $4.55 million guaranteed contract with incentives that could push the deal to as much as $13 million. Immediately after the draft, though, the organization had Brackman undergo Tommy John surgery on his wonky elbow.

That surgery caused the big righty to miss his debut season in 2007, as well as the entire 2008 season. With a strong off-season between ’08 and ’09, Brackman was finally ready to go for the 2009 season and his debut was eagerly anticipated – but with some trepidation. As Baseball Prospectus stated pre-2009, “…To paraphrase Casey Stengel, Brackman has it in his body to be great, but whether or not he will be is anyone’s guess.”

The year started off well for Brackman as he allowed 28 hits in 25.2 innings of work in April. He walked just 11 batters and struck out 26. Things began to fall apart in May (despite the 2.45 ERA). He allowed just 24 hits in 33 innings but walked 21 to go along with 27 strikeouts. He completely fell apart in June and July by allowing 41 hits and 33 walks in 28 innings. Placed in the bullpen for August and September, Brackman recovered to allow 17 hits and 11 walks in 20 innings.

Overall in 2009, he ended his first season with 106 hits in 106.2 innings of work. The biggest downside was obviously the walk total, as he posted a walk rate of 6.41 BB/9. His strikeout rate was good at 8.69 K/9 and he did a respectable job of keeping the ball in the park with a homer rate of 0.68 HR/9. Brackman’s numbers were much better when he came out of the bullpen, which is likely a result of needing to improve his stamina, as well as his secondary pitches. He was, after all, injured and unable to pitch for a year and a half. Prior to the injury he was a two-pitch pitcher with a mid-to-high-90s fastball and a plus curveball. Both pitches showed some rust post-surgery.

In reality, Brackman’s season really wasn’t that bad, especially if you ignore the ERA (His FIP was 4.66). Yes, he was old for the league and did not dominate, but he was raw for his age coming into pro ball and his control has always been issue. The 2010 season will be a big one for Brackman, who will be 24. Luckily for him, he’s in an organization that can afford to be patient. The bullpen may be the best spot for the right-hander, but he needs innings so he’ll likely remain a starter. It’s been well documented that Brackman has considerable upside if everything clicks, and that belief remains true. But there aren’t many bigger gambles in baseball.

If you ever need to convince someone of the uselessness of the save statistic, make them watch Brian Fuentes pitch. Fuentes leads the major leagues with 41 saves, and is simultaneously on the verge of losing his job. And for good reason – he’s been pretty bad this year.

After dominating the National League with his unique brand of walks, strikeouts, and non-HR flyballs (while pitching in Colorado, nonetheless), Fuentes has seen the critical component of that trio abandon him in the switch to the AL. His strikeout rate has fallen from 11.78 a year ago to 7.71 this year, a precipitous drop that he simply could not afford.

As a flyball pitcher (47.3% of his balls in play this year are FBs) with below average command, Fuentes has to limit the amount of contact he allows. When he’s not striking batters out, bad things happen. And bad things are happening to him a lot lately.

He blew another save last night, costing the Angels a win over the Red Sox, and Mike Scioscia had already been talking about working Kevin Jepsen into some ninth inning situations. Given the difference in how the two are pitching, that’s not a bad idea.

Jepsen has a similar strikeout rate to Fuentes, but he’s walking a batter less per nine innings and is an extreme groundball guy, which helps him limit the number of soul-crushing home runs he gives up. And for a closer, that’s a pretty important factor.

If the Angels want to win the World Series, they probably need to stop giving Fuentes so many high leverage opportunities. He’s not their best relief pitcher, even if he does lead the league in a remarkably meaningless statistic.

Quick, who is the best defensive shortstop in the National League? Jimmy Rollins? Troy Tulowitzki? Alcides Escobar? Rollins won the Gold Glove last year and is having a fine but unspectacular year, as measured by UZR. He’s been worth 6 runs. Troy Tulowitzki has a terrific defensive reputation, but UZR isn’t a huge fan this year at 2 runs. Jack Wilson is right there at +11 runs, but he’s since taken his act to the American League. Escobar has only been up for a short while. There’s still a whole lot of wait-and-see with him.

I humbly submit to you that the best defensive shortstop in the Senior Circuit has been Brendan Ryan. After riding the Memphis-St. Louis shuttle much of last year, Ryan has been thrust into full-time duties because of Khalil Greene’s struggles and battles with an anxiety disorder. His spasmodic behavior has formerly turned off to his conservative manager; Ryan has toned down the jumpiness a bit and turned up his game. According to the early returns on the Scouting Report by the Fans, Ryan’s defensive skills are drawing rave reviews across the board. He’s scoring 4.5 out of 5, and is right up there with Rollins and Tulo. He’s also leading NL shortstops in UZR with +13 runs.

In his brief career (161 games), Ryan has a UZR/150 of 14.3. While it’s better to have at least three years of data before we start making assumptions on a player’s defense, the eyes also really like him. Having personally watched him play for quite a while now, I would not be shocked if he was a +1 win defender every year. He has a flair for making the spectacular almost look routine.

He’ll never wow anyone with his bat. His career wOBA is .313, this season it’s .317. That’s close enough to average to make him a valuable player when you factor in his defense. From utility player to becoming a 3-win shortstop, Brendan Ryan is overshadowed by some of the stars on the Cardinals, but he’s been a big part of the team’s success.

Back in the early part of the summer I wrote about Padres’ long-man Luis Perdomo. To call him a mop-up man is being generous. His average leverage index is 0.26, which is almost half of the next lowest-leveraged reliever. The Padres really don’t want him pitching in games in which the outcome is up in the air. It’s like Kevin Towers issued Bud Black a simple set of guidelines called the Perdomo Principles with the following instructions:

1. Only use when the score is +/- 5 runs.
2. Follow the first point religiously.

So I did what any person desperately wanting to label a player as the human white flag does and created graphs showing the margin of lead based on when Perdomo enters the game:

For those who prefer their data in words, here is a breakdown of Perdomo’s usage:

32 appearances
1 appearance when the Padres held the lead
2 appearances when the Padres were tied
29 appearances when the Padres were trailing
5 appearances when the Padres were trailing by less than five runs
15 appearances when the Padres were trailing by five or six runs
9 appearances when the Padres were trailing by seven or more runs

While serving as the anti-Heath Bell, Perdomo has shown some ability to strike batters out (21%), generate groundballs (50.6%), and give up home runs (19.6% of total fly balls). His 93-94 MPH fastball actually holds a plus run value despite being used more than half of the time meanwhile his other main pitch — a slider that sits in the high 80s — does not hold that same distinction.

The Padres can’t be blamed for limiting his exposure. Perdomo spent about a minute in Triple-A earlier this season but otherwise made the jump to the bigs straight from Double-A. It would seem protecting Perdomo’s confidence level is the only reason the Padres haven’t dropped him in more of their games, seeing as how the results matter little at this point.

Would you believe that for the first time since 2004 Carlos Zambrano’s tRA is under 4.5? Heck, for the first time since 2005 his FIP is under 4. I would heap praise on Zambrano’s improvement and such, but it’s not really to his credit.

Zambrano’s career home run per fly ball rate is 9.1% which falls into the 9-12% range we usually look for in starting pitchers. This year his HR/FB% is 6.5%. Everyone reading this is well aware that 6.5% is less than 9.1%. What happened? Well, he didn’t move to a pitchers park or an inferior league and he didn’t become a groundball maven or reliever, so that means he’s just been on the receiving end of some really good luck and wind gusts on his outfield flies.

His pitch selection has altered little; fewer fastballs per 100 pitches, more cutters in place of sliders, and some extra split-fingered pitches. His stuff gets more groundballs than fly balls which is a positive sign, but generally speaking there’s nothing here to indicate he’s going to continue giving up less than seven home runs per 100 fly balls. That means you should expect regression moving forward which will balloon his tRA and FIP upon its arrival.

He sells himself if the Cubs decide to put him on the block. He’s won 99 games since 2003 (an average of ~14 wins per season), a shiny ERA, and a recognizable name. Zambrano is no longer the stellar pitcher he was from 2003-2006 (although he’s still above average) but he’s not exactly Jeff Suppan either. Factor in his hitting — which seems silly, but his wRAA over the last three years projects him to be a -5 < x < 0 hitter during any given season – as an upgrade over most pitchers and you get a nice package. I wouldn’t recommend dishing out the players and 18.3 million for him through 2013, but I’m sure some team will.

When you think of the guys who swing and miss the most, a few names probably pop into everyone’s minds – Mark Reynolds, Jack Cust, Ryan Howard, Carlos Pena, Adam Dunn, and Russ Branyan have been the kings of whiffing for a while, and they are always at the top of the strikeout leaderboards.

Not surprisingly, these are the names that show up when you sort contact% from lowest to highest. Contact rate and strikeout rate are very highly correlated for obvious reasons. But they aren’t perfectly correlated, and if you look at the two leaderboards next to each other, you’ll notice something strange.

Nelson Cruz has the fifth lowest contact rate of any hitter in baseball this year, with his 67.9% rate sandwiching him right between Howard and Cust. However, his K% isn’t anywhere near those guys. In fact, despite a massive drop in contact from last year, his strikeout rate is basically unchanged.

Last year, Cruz made contact 77.8% of the time, which led to a 24.3# strikeout rate. This year, he’s contact rate is down 10 percentage points, but his strikeout rate has only increased by eight-tenths of one percent. He’s swinging through pitches he hit a year ago, but apparently not in situations with two strikes on him.

I don’t know what this means, honestly. My instincts would suggest that the decrease in contact rate is more “real” than the stability of strikeout rate, and that his K% will increase if his contact% doesn’t return to prior levels, but I haven’t studied the issue close enough to prove it. It is at least possible that Cruz has adopted an extreme shift in how he swings the bat based on the count, where his two strike swing is further away from his regular swing than any other hitter in baseball, but that seems like the kind of thing that would have been picked by up the team’s fanbase, and I haven’t seen anyone talk about this before.

So, Ranger fans, help me out here – am I missing something you guys have already figured out? Why is Nelson Cruz making contact like Jack Cust but only striking out like David Ortiz?