General Manager: David Dombrowski
Farm Director: Glenn Ezell
Scouting Director: David Chadd

FanGraphs’ Top 10 Prospects:
(2009 Draft Picks/International Signees Not Included)

This was a tough organization to rank. There is very little in the system in terms of impact talent, aside from a couple of 2009 amateur draft picks (Jacob Turner, Daniel Fields), but ’09 picks were omitted from consideration for the Top 10 list. Casey Crosby has a chance to be an impact talent, but he’s just in low-A ball. The club has a couple of interesting catching prospects in Alex Avila, and Dusty Ryan, who just missed making the Top 10 list. The system is getting better but it’s a slow process, especially when the big-league club is trying to win now.

1. Casey Crosby, LHP, low-A
DOB: September 1988 Bats: R Throws: L
Signed: 2007 5th round – Illinois HS
MLB ETA: Mid-2012 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 89-94 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

Crosby is currently sandwiched in between Rick Porcello and Jacob Turner as the best young pitcher in the organization. He needs to keep developing if he’s going to avoid being surpassed by Turner in 2010. Crosby made just three appearances in his debut season in ’08 after being drafted in ’07 without making an appearance thanks to Tommy John surgery. That makes his numbers in ’09 all the more impressive. The walk rate of 4.13 BB/9 can be blamed partially on the long layoff. Beyond that, though, Cosby had few issues, as he posted a 2.80 FIP, 10.06 K/9 rate and allowed just three homers in 104.2 innings (0.26 HR/9). His 50+% ground-ball rate was nice, as was the line-drive rate of just 11.7%. There could be some concern with the huge increase in innings that Crosby pitched in ’09 compared to ’08 (4.2 IP) but he does have a big, strong frame.

2. Ryan Strieby, 1B, double-A
DOB: August 1985 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2006 4th round – University of Kentucky
MLB ETA: Mid-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3

Injuries derailed his season, but Strieby still showed some improvements in ’09 over his ’08 season, with an excellent .445 wOBA in 86 double-A games. Overall, the first baseman hit .303/.427/.565 with a .262 ISO in 294 at-bats. His power will likely be muted somewhat by playing in Detroit, but his OPS has increased with each level he’s played at and his walk rate jumped from 9.9 to 16.2 BB% in the past year. On the down side, the strikeout rate was a little high, even for a power hitter, at 27.2 K%. Defensively, he saw time at both first base and left field, where his work left something to be desired. Strieby’s bat should be ready for the Majors in 2010, and he could see time at first base and designated hitter.

3. Alex Avila, C, Majors
DOB: January 1987 Bats: L Throws: R
Signed: 2008 5th round – University of Alabama
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2

Avila has shocked just about everyone with his quick development since turning pro in ’08. A fifth-rounder, he arrived in The Show in ’09 and promptly hit .279/.375/.590 in limited duty (61 ABs). He’s shown excellent patience in pro ball, including a walk rate of 13.6 BB% in double-A this past season. His strikeout rate was a little high at 23.4 K%, but he did post an ISO of .185. One knock on Avila is that he needs to improve against southpaws if he’s going to avoid the platoon; he hit just .216/.300/.392 against left-handers at double-A. Even if his batting average stays low in the .240-.260 range, Avila has value due to his patience at the plate and developing, left-handed power. He’s solid defensively and he threw out 44% of base stealers in double-A – but just 27% in the Majors.

4. Scott Sizemore, 2B, triple-A
DOB: January 1985 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2006 5th round – Virginia Commonwealth University
MLB ETA: Early-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3

He has yet to play in the Majors, but Sizemore is currently being considered for the everyday second base job in 2010, if incumbent Placido Polanco leaves via free agency, as expected. The keystone prospect rebounded from an injury-marred season in ’08 to hit .300-plus at both double-A and triple-A. At the lower level, Sizemore produced a triple-slash line of .307/.402/.535 in 228 at-bats. Then in triple-A, he hit .308/.378/.473 with an ISO of .164 in 292 at-bats. The right-handed hitter showed more power in ’09 than he has at any point in his career. He also has good patience at the plate with a career walk rate above 10%. Along with 15 homer potential, the 24-year-old prospect could steal 10-15 bases. Defensively, Sizemore will not come close to matching Polanco’s defensive value.

5. Wilkin Ramirez, OF, Majors
DOB: October 1985 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2003 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2

Ramirez had a respectable season in triple-A in ’09, and he has an intriguing combination of speed (33 steals in 43 attempts) and power (.187 ISO). Quite possibly a future 20-20 guy if he gets the chance to play everyday, Ramirez likely won’t hit for a high average due to his high strikeout rates (32.9 K% in triple-A in ’09). The converted third baseman is also not a good fielder despite a strong arm that is good enough for right field; he’s stuck in left, thanks to poor routes and range. If the 24-year-old prospect can curb his whiffs and show a little more drive, he could develop into an above-average regular. Otherwise, he’ll likely never reach his full potential.

6. Robbie Weinhardt, RHP, double-A
DOB: December 1985 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2008 10th round – Oklahoma State University
MLB ETA: Late-2010 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 89-94 mph fastball, curveball

One of the many ’08 college relievers drafted by the Tigers organization, Weinhardt is my personal favorite. The right-hander has done a respectable job of missing bats while showing solid control (save for double-A in ’09), and he’s also posted nice strikeout rates, including a rate of 11.27 K/9 in 67.0 high-A innings over two seasons (’08-’09). In close to 100 career innings, Weinhardt has allowed just three homers. He posted a line-drive rate of 12.9% in ’09. The right-hander showed his late-inning moxie by allowing a batting average of .160 with runners in scoring position and a LOB rate of 87%. He could very well be helping out the big-league bullpen by mid-2010; although his stuff is not as electric as Ryan Perry’s, Weinhardt is a better all-around pitcher at this point.

7. Cody Satterwhite, RHP, double-A
DOB: January 1987 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2008 2nd round – University of Mississippi
MLB ETA: Mid-2010 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 92-97 mph fastball, slider, change-up

Satterwhite was one of the hard-throwing college relievers nabbed during the ’08 draft. The right-hander did not progress quite as well as hoped during his college career after demanding (and failing to get) big money coming out of high school. Command and control issues have always been a concern for Satterwhite, who posted a walk rate of 4.93 BB/9 at double-A in ’09. In 49.1 innings of work, he allowed 46 hits and posted a strikeout rate of 9.49 K/9. His ground-ball rate improved almost 10% over ’08 to 47%. Satterwhite did quite well against left-handed batters and held them to a .179 batting average, with a strikeout rate of 11.19 K/9. Because of his control issues, he’s probably going to top out as an eighth-inning guy if that doesn’t change.

8. Brennan Boesch, OF, double-A
DOB: April 1985 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2006 3rd round – University of California
MLB ETA: Late-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3

The lack of overall depth in the system – especially amongst the bats – helps to move Boesch up the depth chart. You cannot argue with his power, as the left-handed hitter posted an ISO of .235 at double-A in ’09. At 6’6”, Boesch could simply be a late bloomer, as larger hitters tend to need extra time to learn to repeat their swings. However, his walk rate of 5.9 BB% leaves something to be desired; the highest OBP he’s posted in the past three seasons is .318, with the lowest being .297. Not the fleetest of foot, the outfielder has shown that he’s a pretty smart base runner after stealing 11 bases in 13 attempts this past year, as well as 15 of 19 in ’07. His career OPS of .654 against southpaws suggests that a platoon role is in Boesch’s MLB future.

9. Alfredo Figaro, RHP, Majors
DOB: July 1984 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2004 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2
Repertoire: 89-93 mph fastball, plus curveball, change-up

Figaro has posted some solid FIPs in the minors without rising above 3.86 in the past four seasons. In ’09, he allowed just 67 hits in 80 innings of work in double-A, while posting a 3.67 FIP. He also continued to show solid command with a walk rate of 2.59 BB/9 and his strikeout rate hit its highest mark in four years at 7.76 K/9. Promoted to the Majors, Figaro struggled by allowing 23 hits, and three homers (1.59 HR/9), in 17 innings of work. The right-hander struggled with his control and posted a walk rate of 5.29 BB/9 in the small sample size. The 24-year-old hurler does not have the biggest arm in the system, but he’s got more than enough to offer in the back end of the rotation as a fourth starter – especially if he can get his ground-ball rate back above 50%, where it was in ’06-’08. He also needs to improve his change-up against left-handed hitters (.331 vs .218 in double-A).

10. Luis Marte, RHP, triple-A
DOB: August 1986 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2005 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Late-2010 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 89-93 mph fastball, slider, change-up

Perhaps a bit of a controversial pick to appear on the Top 10 list, Marte has shown solid control in his career, including a 2.39 BB/9 rate in ’09 at double-A. He’s hit a bit of a wall the past two seasons in double-A but he’s also struggled with his health. At just 5’11”, the slight right-hander may be better suited to bullpen work to help ease some of the strain on his body. It could also help him since he struggles against left-handed hitters when he cannot command his change-up, which is his third-best pitch. Marte needs to work down in the zone more often, as well, and he allowed a home-run rate of 1.54 HR/9 in ’09. It will be interesting to see what the 23-year-old right-hander can do during a full healthy season.

Up Next: The Pittsburgh Pirates

Cultural norms are a powerful force. Even though we have different backgrounds, we were raised with similar understandings of how certain aspects of the world work, and we agree to abide by these rules without much thought. We eat three meals a day because, well, that’s what we do. I can’t tell you why I sit around waiting for lunch time when I’m hungry and my body is asking for food – I just know I’m supposed to eat around noon. I’m sure there’s a reason for it, but I have no idea what it is, even though I’ve been eating for 29 years now.

It occurred to me today that our discussions about what constitutes a player’s value at award time is kind of like that. Especially if you’ve been a part of the statistical analysis crowd for any length of time, you have a pretty well defined idea of what the parameters of value are. Offense counts the most, obviously. Most people will adjust for the expectations of the defensive position you play, even if they won’t factor in how well you play that position. How well your team performs as a whole matters to some more than others, which is also true of stuff that gets labeled as intangibles, leadership, chemistry, etc…

Not everyone weights everything the same, but the things that we’re attempting to measure are all pretty much agreed upon. I’m wondering, though, is this a case where we agreed to the definition without really thinking about why we did it?

Specifically, I’m wondering why salary is not included. By anyone. Ever.

In terms of practical value to a team, there is no real difference between a player’s salary and the position he plays. The entire point of adjusting for position is to account for the opportunity cost of occupying that spot on the field. If the Tigers didn’t have Miguel Cabrera, they’d get some other decent hitting first baseman, because it’s not all that difficult to find a guy to play that position and hit competently. This matters, and we account for it. Almost everyone does, anyway.

Yet, we never factor in the opportunity cost of a player’s portion of his team’s budget, even though it is the exact same concept. If a player makes $15 million and his team has a $100 million budget, he comes with a significant opportunity cost, as he has effectively lowered the budget for his 24 teammates to $85 million. If he made the league minimum, the franchise would have $99.5 million to surround him with talent, and he would invariably have more talented teammates, given that the guy picking them was not named Dayton or Minaya.

We hear players lauded all the time for “making their teammates better”, yet we ignore the one instance where the player actually does directly influence the performance his teammates are likely to offer. Why? Is there any real good reason why salary shouldn’t be considered in our discussions of value? It matters at least as much as the position they play, and in many cases, a lot more.

This is made plainly evident in trade negotiations with high salaried players. Often times, a team trading the player of value with a significant contract will offer to pay a portion of the remaining amount due to the player in order to increase the return they’re getting in talent. There is no way around it – teams are explicitly stating that they value player X at a certain threshold when he’s paid salary Y, but they value him at a higher amount if he only has to be paid salary Z instead. His value is inextricably tied to how much money he earns.

This is why teams that trade away stars so often come out of it looking just fine – they take the money they would have spent on the traded player and give it to some other talented player, replacing a portion of his value in the process. Just like if a team loses a first baseman, they go out and find another guy who can hit okay. Filling the first base spot isn’t very hard, and neither is getting a valuable player when you have $15 million to play with.

Yet no one accounts for this in any MVP discussion. Why? Because we’ve never cared about salary, so why start, I guess.

I’d write more about this, but it’s noon, and I think that means I’m supposed to go eat now.

Word from Ken Rosenthal is that Jermaine Dye is open to moving from his primary position of right field to first base in order to land a job in 2010. This is coming on the heels of some especially brutal defensive seasons from Dye. From 2006-2009, here are Dye’s respective UZRs: -22.5, -21.6, -19.4, -20.0. With the RF positional adjustment at -7.5, it’s pretty apparent that Dye is a liability in the outfield. Considering that first base is the easiest position to play (something that I can back up with personal experience), Dye’s openness to the move should help him get work. But can it make him a productive player?

The first question is whether or not Dye’s transition to first base would actually make him a better defensive value. Right now, he’s worth roughly 27 runs less than the average fielder over 150 games. I haven’t scouted Dye; I wouldn’t know if Dye has the necessary skills to become adept at picking throws or stretching off the base, or fielding ground balls.

We saw with Skip Schumaker’s move to 2nd base from center field that the transition certainly wasn’t smooth at the outset. Schumaker’s situation is similar because Schumaker hadn’t seen any time in the infield in his professional career, much like Dye, who’s played all of one game in the infield over his 15 major league seasons. Dye just hasn’t shown much athleticism in the outfield, so it would seem that he would still be a below-average defender at first base anyway, even without considering the effects of the positional move. Because of that, I personally wouldn’t expect Dye’s transition to go nearly as smooth as Schumaker’s seems to have worked out.

Of course, we can entertain the possibility. Let’s say that Dye somehow ends up as a semi-respectable fielder at first base, somewhere around a -2.5 first baseman. Then his value relative to the average defensive player is -15 runs, which adds around 12 runs to his value and makes him even slightly more valuable in the field than at the DH position. How will his bat play?

Dye will be 36 next season. As such, it’s hard to imagine any sort of dramatic increase over his .344 wOBA from 2009, although his 2008 wOBA of .376 is encouraging. A good estimate would probably lie on the low end of that range, in the +7.5 to +12.5 wRAA per 150 games, which would make Dye a 1.25-1.75 win player per 150 games.

Honestly, though, I find it really hard to believe that Dye will be any sort of productive defensive player. His transition will likely mirror Adam Dunn’s play at 1B for the Nationals moreso than Skip Schumaker’s, and Dye will probably continue to be a huge liability on defense. It’s possible he could be a slightly above replacement DH, but unless he’s willing to take a huge paycut, he’s not worth taking the spot of a prospect or some sort of freely available talent like a Brian Myrow or Jeff Fiorentino.

While doing some recent fiddling with data, I ran across something mildly interesting: the Red Sox’s offense is highly consistent. To be honest, this collection was for a Rays-related piece on teams with similar wOBA and how they performed when factoring in other variables like stolen base attempts, strikeouts, and ISO. The Red Sox entries had mostly one thing in common as you can see here:

2009 .352
2008 .352
2007 .352
2006 .340
2005 .352

Four of five years the crew from Boston produced identical wOBA. Now they didn’t post the same peripherals across the board – i.e. some years they had more steals while others they had more power – but as best as I can tell, this is the most consistent lineup in the league on a wOBA basis. It hasn’t been the same lineup year in and year out, either: below are the nine players each season who received the most plate appearances.

All told Ortiz and Varitek are the last men standing from the 2005 squad, and even their expiration dates appear to be approaching. Some tidbits from the teams and their differences:

In 2005, they stole 45 bases. That number has steadily increased each year and hit 126 this season.

Their highest BABIP of the four matching seasons came in 2008 and their lowest n 2009. I’m not sure what to make of that.

Their walk rates have been extremely static. In order from most recent; 10.6%, 10.3%, 11%, 10.7%, 10.4%. Same can be said for their strikeout rates, again in order from most recent; 20.2%, 19.1%, 18.6%, 18.8%, 18.6%. ISO, not as much; .184, .168, .165, .166, .174.

Other than Zack Greinke’s historic season, the 2009 Royals had little go right. Billy Butler was one non-Greinke bright spot. After a disappointing 2008, Butler raked in 2009, hitting .301/.362/.492 (.369 wOBA). He even became the everyday first baseman despite questions about his defense, beating out celebrated glove-man Mike Jacobs.

The Royals’ other “Savior,” Alex Gordon, has not quite (ahem) lived up to expectations. Hailed as “the next George Brett” upon being drafted in 2005, Gordon started at the hot corner on Opening Day 2007 and received a standing ovation. Things went downhill from there, as Gordon ended 2007 with a .317 wOBA. In 2008, he posted a merely decent .344 wOBA. Gordon got seriously injured to start 2009 , struggled upon returning, got demoted, and finally limped to a .321 wOBA (although 189 PA tells us next to nothing). The current attitude of many is understandable: Butler is The Man, and Gordon is a question mark at best.

Butler is clearly superior to Gordon as a hitter, and his minor league performances always indicated a higher offensive upside. But it is curious that so many smart people following the Royals have so readily hailed Butler’s 2009 as an awesome breakthrough while saying “meh” to Gordon’s decent 2008. Why is this curious? Because despite the glaring offensive disparity, we live in the Age of WAR. Let’s compare each player’s best season so far: Butler’s 2009 vs. Gordon’s 2008.

Butler’s 2009 value was excellent offensively at 21 runs above average. It was less impressive defensively. Despite looking better than expected, Butler posted a -6.7 UZR at first base (with a -12.6 overall positional adjustment). Butler’s overall WAR for 2009: an above-average 2.4.

Gordon’s 2008 value was more evenly distributed. +7.7 runs hitting, but only -3.0 UZR. However, the latter was accumulated while playing the much-more-valuable 3B. Altogether Gordon had a 2.6 WAR in 2008. It is obvious why many were down on Gordon’s 2008 relative to the Butler’s awesome 2009. Wait, what? Gordon was actually slightly more valuable in 2008 than Butler was in 2009?

Not really. After all, FanGraph WAR doesn’t currently include baserunning (other than SB/CS, which are included in wOBA/wRAA). Looking at the non-SB elements of baserunning using Baseball Prospectus’s EqBRR, as Erik did, we find that Butler was one of the worst baserunners in baseball in 2009 at about five runs below average, putting his WAR at about 1.9. In 2008, Gordon was about +3, which puts his WAR at about 2.9. So Gordon’s 2008 wasn’t “slightly” more valuable than Butler’s 2009, it was significantly more valuable. In fact, once baserunning is fully taken into account, Butler’s 1.9 WAR 2009 isn’t even quite as good as Gordon’s 2.1 WAR from his “disastrous” 2007.

My point is not about the relative value of Butler and Gordon going forward. Batting generally improves the most in the early 20s (whereas fielding and baserunning are relatively static), and Butler is two years younger than Gordon. There are legitimate questions about Gordon’s future given his performance and health. My intent is neither to run down Butler nor celebrate Gordon. One might respond that “Gordon’s value was primarily due to defense, position and baserunning!” But that is exactly the point — those things matter. Despite living in the Age of WAR, informed observers sometimes still focus on only one aspect of a player’s performance. And that can lead to a gap between a perception of one value disparity and the reality of the opposite.

For Jon Heyman and the rest of the reactionary “Keith Law should lose his ballot” crowd, I present the following comparison between Joe Mauer and Miguel Cabrera.

Singles: Mauer +2
Doubles: Cabrera +4
Triples: Mauer +1
Home Runs: Cabrera +6
Runs: Cabrera +2
RBI: Cabrera +7
Walks: Mauer +8
Outs: Cabrera +87

In terms of raw production, you’d be hard pressed to find two guys who had more similar years than Mauer and Cabrera. The differences in practically all of the counting stats is single digits, making those numbers a virtual tie. The only counting stat where there is much in the way of differentiation is outs. Essentially, the difference in playing time was entirely consumed by the equivalent of Cabrera enduring the worst slump baseball has ever seen.

If Mauer had played through his back problem in April without reaching base once, going zero for the month, then Cabrera and Mauer would have had approximately equal offensive seasons.

Seriously, there is no argument for a first place vote for Miguel Cabrera. Mauer’s team made the playoffs, beating out Cabrera’s team for the last spot. Mauer hit better. Mauer fielded better. Mauer played a more important position.

None of those facts are disputable. A vote for Cabrera being more valuable in 2009 is like a vote for the sum of two and two being five. It’s not an opinion – it’s a lack of understanding.

So, writers who criticized Law for his vote and pointed to it as evidence that he’s screwing up the process, you are hereby required to do the same thing to the Cabrera voter. At least Keith had a reasonable explanation for his vote. There is no reasonable explanation for a Miguel Cabrera first place MVP vote. It’s just stupidity on display.

To the other 27 voters – congratulations on continuing the trend of this awards season and giving the player the award he deserves. The BBWAA has done itself proud this year.

Jay Bruce so far, in two major league seasons, has a .328 career wOBA in 839 plate appearances. As such, one might be surprised to see the following Bill James projection on his player page:

.274 AVG, .340 OBP, .537 SLG, .373 wOBA

Given what we’ve seen of Bruce in the majors, this projection seems a little bit ridiculous. James projects Bruce to pick up 45 points of wOBA. His projections have been known to be a bit optimistic for some offensive players. Is this another one of those cases?

Let’s compare Jay Bruce’s 2009 to his projected mark for 2010.

2009: 9.9 BB%, 21.7 K%, .303 OBP, .470 SLG, .246 ISO, .222 BABIP, .329 wOBA
2010: 8.9 BB%, 22.0 K%, .340 OBP, .537 SLG, .263 ISO, .290 BABIP, .373 wOBA

There’s really only one major difference there, and that’s his BABIP. Bruce’s BABIP is one of the more interesting anomalies in the game, as I explored over at Beyond the Boxscore earlier in the season. As a quick summary, Bruce’s BABIP on line drives and fly balls in particular has been particularly low for his whole career, and he’s had more than 20 fewer hits on those two types of batted balls than we would expect. This has dealt a pretty substantial blow to his value, as these hits would add up to more than 11 runs in value.

BABIP luck and skill is one of the more interesting topics of conversation in the sabermetric world. The league average is around .300, and we don’t usually see much variation in the statistic, but that isn’t to say that batters don’t have an inherent skill as far as reaching base on balls in play. However, with a sample of 840 PAs with Bruce, we can’t really say for sure if there’s something about Bruce’s batted balls that lead to outs or if he’s just had poor luck. James’s projection system is operating on the assumption that there’s a large amount of luck at play with Bruce, and as such he projects a breakout year for the young outfielder.

Jay Bruce will be one of the most interesting players to watch in the majors in 2010. He has incredible power and is a very toolsy player. The question is if he shows the potential he flashed in the minor leagues (AAA slugging percentage over .600) or if he continues to hit like a league average player.

If multiple reports from Friday come to fruition, the Chicago White Sox will make the first major league signing of the free agency period by adding infielder Omar Vizquel. Terms are unavailable; however, given Vizquel’s modest one-year for $1M contract last season, it seems unlikely that Kenny Williams is breaking the bank on the 42-year-old who turns 43 in late April.

In limited action as Elvis Andrus’ mentor, Vizquel actually hit fairly well by his standards. In 195 plate appearances he batted .266/.316/.345 and possessed a .301 wOBA. That’s an accomplishment considering he hadn’t topped .300 for a full season since 2006. Clearly Vizquel isn’t in baseball because of his lackluster bat, but instead because of his well-earned reputation as a defensive virtuoso.

Vizquel’s UZR/150 the last three years at shortstop rate as “fantastic”, “great”, and “historical”, which is probably a bit optimistic and scrambled by small sample sizes in the previous two seasons. The Fans Scouting Report showed that 15 voters thought highly of him, though, and Dewan’s +/- says he’s saved about 25 runs the past three years at short. It’s hard to get a good read on just how much another year will affect Vizquel’s range and other defensive capabilities. It seems completely plausible that with enough playing time he could be a well-above average defender but, at the same time, completely ludicrous. I’ll stay conservative and say above average, albeit to a lesser degree than +10. Maybe in the 5 < x < 10 range. The White Sox’s infield situation was already intriguing, with Gordon Beckham changing positions and Alexei Ramirez sitting around. Throw in probably the best defensive shortstop over the last decade and it would seem tempting to either shift Ramirez to second base and leave Beckham at third, or put Ramirez at third with Vizquel and Beckham up the middle. There’s also the possibility of having Vizquel simply play third base as he did with the Rangers last season. Of course there’s also Mark Teahen and … well, Ozzie Guillen can’t complain about a lack of infield options next year, now can he?

Note: This is not in defense of Keith Law’s voting order. Please don’t confuse it as such because my points have little to do with how Javier Vazquez or Chris Carpenter pitched in comparison to each other throughout 2009.

Let’s get this out of the way before someone spoils it in the comments: I am a fan of Law. I do not always agree with his analysis but I find his takes interesting and usually thought-provoking if nothing else. The same can be said for Dave Cameron, Sky Kalkman, Rob Neyer, Tom Tango, and whomever else. Law and I have exchanged some emails over the years. He’s always been personable and honest. With that said, none of it comes into play with what I’m writing here.

Law made a decision on his National League Cy Young ballot that has blown up into something ridiculous. You have fellow BBWAA writers taking shots at him (after breaking BBWAA creeds by announcing the winners early themselves), you have at least one crazed Missourian searching for his home address, and there’s just a general sense of distaste for someone who didn’t make that big of a transgression on his ballot no matter what you use to judge pitchers.

Let’s consider a few things:

1. Keith Law worked in a front office.

Whatever you think of his job there or his credentials to land that job, he does have that experience. This doesn’t mean he’s automatically correct. What it does – or rather, what it would mean – if he (hypothetically) chose Rick Porcello for rookie of the year is that some of these people slamming him for the Cy Young pick would use his opinion in their arguments as an appeal to authority. “Oh, so you’re saying you with your fancy FIP are smarter than a former assistant GM? Hah, right.”

2. Other, less defensible, voting choices

Law’s perceived gaffe:

Name	Wins	IP	ERA	FIP
Vaz	15	219.1	2.87	2.77
Carp	17	192.2	2.24	2.78

The real mistake of the voting process:

Name	        W	IP	ERA	FIP
Greinke	        16	229.1	2.16	2.33
Verlander	19	240	3.45	2.80
Hernandez	19	238.2	2.49	3.09

Someone voted Justin Verlander first over Greinke and Hernandez. If everyone is going insane and willing to burn Law at the stake for taking Vazquez’s 0.6 runs higher ERA then pass the tar and feathers and let’s get the sucker who voted Verlander first. Verlander is the same guy with an ERA nearly a full run higher than Hernandez and nearly a run and a half higher than Greinke. Can anyone tell me who made that vote, because I haven’t seen it anywhere, but go to Jon Heyman’s twitter feed and you’ll find quite a few Law quips.

3. Bias

The Law backlash isn’t merely from his vote. He’s a snarky internet writer and some perceive him as a holier than thou critic with a God complex. Even if you do think of Law in that capacity, why is he the martyr for supposedly “dumb” voting decisions? I am by no means a BBWAA awards historian, but using Baseball-Reference and Google I found two decisions that reek of far more incompetence than any ballot Law could create using the top four choices. Last year Brad Lidge and Francisco Rodriguez received first place MVP votes. Lidge actually received two. CC Sabathia received zero NL MVP votes. Let’s compare their numbers:

Sabathia (NL only): 130.2 IP, 1.65 ERA, 11 W
Lidge: 69.1 IP, 1.95 ERA, 41 SV

Did anyone ask Buck Martinez what he thought of those voters?

Whether you use WAR, WARP, ERA, or flip a coin, this isn’t the worst voting decision ever. Hell, it’s not even the worst of this awards season. For those members of the BBWAA (and please note it’s a select few) making a fracas over this when you stood silent in the past: shame on you. Any progress seemingly made on the Greinke vote is being undone because of sour grapes by folks hoping to keep the BBWAA an old boys club.

This afternoon, I mentioned that there may be an opportunity for teams to improve their rosters through diversification rather than purely pursuing upgrades. Let’s take a look at one of the specific opportunities and how this could work practically.

Atlanta, Left Field

The Braves want to upgrade their output for 2010, and the natural spot to do that would be left field. Garret Anderson didn’t produce at all in the position last year, posting a .305 wOBA while UZR hated his defense. They can certainly do better, and there are some big name run-producing outfielders on the market this winter.

However, they also have Jason Heyward, the best prospect in baseball, who happens to be a corner outfielder. He’s just 20 years old and has less than half a season of experience above A-ball, but his natural abilities and 2009 performance put him squarely in the 2010 picture.

There’s some real upside to handing Heyward the left field job and letting him run with it, but his projection necessarily has to include significant amounts of risk as well. He’s a classic high variance type of player, and the relatively high probability of failure drives down his expected value to the point where you can make a good case that he should be replaced, at least for 2010.

However, this is a situation where I’d argue for depth rather than replacement. Instead of bringing in an established player to perform at a level above what you’d expect from Heyward, the Braves may instead be able to bring in a player that allows them to minimize the cost of Heyward’s downside while still allowing them to give him an opportunity.

Randy Winn, for instance, is a low upside, low variance veteran that won’t command a large contract as a free agent. You generally know what you’re going to get from him – good contact, good defense, and no power. Having Winn on the team would allow the Braves to give Heyward a shot without bearing the full risk of collapse, as his steady but unspectacular production would serve as a stop loss if Heyward proves to not be ready for the big leagues.

By adding a player like Winn, the Braves minimize the variance that would be attached to giving Heyward a real look at the LF job. Removing risk in that way is significantly cheaper than doing so by pursuing a superior player with a steadier projection. It’s not free, of course – Winn will require some money to sign, and carrying both Winn and Heyward would cost the Braves an extra roster spot that consolidating into a better player would not.

In this case, though, I’d argue that the benefits probably outweigh those costs. A Winn/Heyward pairing in left field for Atlanta could provide a similar expected return to pretty much any of the non-Holliday free agent outfielders at a fraction of the cost.

This is just one example of a situation where pursuing depth is preferential to upgrading talent. Hopefully, it helps illustrate the point I was trying to make this afternoon. We’ll talk more about this next week, as we flesh out some of the issues that we didn’t have time to cover today.