Most of us are still recovering from this week’s Big Awards Euphoria, especially from Monday’s announcement of the 2009 Carter-Batista Award winner (I recommend reading that post before this one), which found that Ryan Ludwick was the 2009 player whose RBI total most exaggerated his offensive contribution.

Personally, I feel that the RBI/wRC system is the best way for figuring out how much RBI totals reflect true offensive contribution. But I also understand that some prefer a more “contextual” approach. As I did at greater length in an earlier series, let’s revisit the same ground using one of FanGraphs’ more context-sensitive stats — RE24 (Cf. Part Two of my Driveline Series) — to discover an “Alternate Universe” winner.

RE24 might appeal to those who believe situational hitting is a repeatable skill (I’m currently agnostic on this). The basic difference between RE24 and traditional linear weights (e.g. wRAA) is that it takes base/out state into account. For traditional linear weights, a double with two men on and two outs “counts” the same as a double with none on and no outs. RE24 recognizes that in those situations, the run expectancy both before and after the plate appearance are different. To quote myself:

There are 24 base-out states (hence the “24” in “RE24”): eight different combinations of baserunners (e.g., runner on first, bases empty, runners on second and third, etc.) multiplied by the three out states in which hitter might have that situation (no outs, 1 out, 2 outs). RE24 measure the difference in Run Expectancy from the beginning of the play until the next play.

For our purposes, the application is obvious — RE24 might identify players who were particularly good in situations with high run expectancy, and thus “earned” their RBI more than wRAA lets on.

To convert RE24 to an “absolute” measure like wRC, subtract the wRAA from wRC and add RE24. I call this “24RC“. Divide RBI by 24RC to get the comparison of real (situational) production to RBI. [Note that it’s not quite apples-to-apples, RE24 is park-adjusted, and the RBI are not, although it’s not a big problem.] The players are ranked by RBI/24RC. I’ve also included a number that sort of isolates situational contribution by subtracting wRAA from RE24. I dubbed it “Sitch.” Clever, huh?

Here are the 2009 Alternate Universe Carter-Batista Award leaders (among qualified hitters with at least 90 RBI).

5. David Ortiz, 1.134 RBI/24RC. .340 wOBA, 99 RBI, 6.40 Sitch
4. Alex Rodriguez, 1.138 RBI/24RC. .405 wOBA, 100 RBI, -10.03 Sitch
3. Michael Cuddyer, 1.141 RBI/24RC. .370 wOBA, 94 RBI, -17.48 Sitch
2. Cody Ross, 1.188 RBI/24RC. .342 wOBA, 90 RBI, -3.02 Sitch
1. Jose Lopez, 1.202 RBI/24RC. .325 wOBA, 96 RBI, 3.72 Sitch

Congratulations, Mr. Jose Lopez! You may have been just outdone by Mr. Ludwick on Monday, but here in the alternate universe, You’re the Man. Maybe in that alternate universe you’re on Shaq Vs., too. Kate Hudson works wonders, I wonder what B-list actress Big Papi is dating? Michael Cuddyer is showing that it’s not his Sitch (or defense) that got him resigned, but those awesome RBI. And what can I say about Cody Ross? Seriously, what can I say?

2009 “Trailers”

47. Adrian Gonzalez, .772 RBI/24RC. .402 wOBA, 5.29 Sitch
48. Joe Mauer, .751 RBI/24RC. .438 wOBA, 0.32 Sitch
49. Chase Utley, .727 RBI/24RC. .402 wOBA, 4.14 Sitch

Someone recently asked me what it would take for Chase Utley to win the NL MVP. I said to wait a couple years for Pujols to reach free agency and come home to Kansas City. I guess I didn’t realize how terrible Chase is at maximizing his RBI opportunities.

2007-2009 Leaders and Trailers (qualifed, 250 RBI minimum):

1. Jeff Francoeur, 1.30 RBI/24RC. .313 wOBA, 252 RBI, -17.62 Sitch
2. Bengie Molina, 1.28 RBI/24RC. .317 wOBA, 256 RBI, 23.29 Sitch
3. Robinson Cano, 1.28 RBI/24RC. .346 wOBA, 254 RBI, -53.47 Sitch
4. Garrett Atkins, 1.19 RBI/24RC. .339 wOBA, 258 RBI, -6.31 Sitch
5. Mike Lowell, 1.18 RBI/24RC. .359 wOBA, 268 RBI, -4.79 Sitch
6. Ryan Howard, 1.16 RBI/24RC. .385 wOBA, 423 RBI, 22.80 Sitch
…
43. Lance Berkman, 0.80 RBI/24RC. .397 wOBA, 288 RBI, 25.32 Sitch
44. Albert Pujols, 0.80 RBI/24RC. .440 wOBA, 354 RBI, 15.22 Sitch
45. Hanley Ramirez, 0.72 RBI/24RC. .409 wOBA, 254 RBI, -27.34 Sitch

Note how much the Sitch scores fluctuate on both ends of the rankings and draw your own conclusions. Any list with Frenchy and Bengie on one end and Pujols and Han-Ram on the other speaks for itself. Other than noting Cano’s Sitch issues (!), I’ll leave it to you all to fill in the blanks. Perhaps this spreadsheet with complete rankings will help.

Jerry Crasnick has an excellent article on defensive metrics as they relate to valuing free agents, especially diving into how they affect Matt Holliday and Jason Bay. It’s no secret that, as the hosts of UZR, we’re big proponents of its usefulness. However, I still agree with essentially everything in Crasnick’s article.

There are aspects of defense that zone-based metrics won’t capture. There are results from UZR that make you scratch your head and say “really?” There is value in having the experienced eyes of a scout watch a player and offer an opinion on the abilities that he saw. We agree with all of that.

The cases where the value of metrics like UZR are the most contentious are when the results diverge significantly from what the perceived scouting wisdom says about a player. Often times, the reaction to counterintuitive data is to dismiss it entirely, offering up the example as evidence that the metric is flawed beyond use. Or, on the other side, to offer up the player’s numbers as proof that scouts just don’t get it, and that subjective opinions are worthless. Simply go back and re-read the threads about Mark Teixeira’s defense over the summer to see this effect in full force on both sides.

In reality though, both positions are wrong. Re-quoting the assistant GM from Crasnick’s piece:

“If there’s some kind of discrepancy, you need to use your best judgment,” the assistant says. “If a scout says, ‘This guy stinks,’ but the numbers say he’s excellent, the truth probably lies somewhere in between.”

This is essentially a paraphrase of the concept of regression to different means. If we have two players with identical UZRs, but scouts love one and abhor the other, our projection for their relative UZRs going forward should favor the one preferred by scouts. The fact that observational information is available gives us a useful data point to add to the calculation, pushing forward analysis that leads to “best judgment”.

I said last week that I think Teixeira is probably a bit better defensively than his recent UZR scores have indicated, and the foundation of that belief lies in the value of scouting information. Teixeira is revered by almost every scout in the game as an exceptional defensive first baseman. That matters when we’re projecting future defensive performance. There is no reason to simply ignore those opinions simply because they don’t line up with what UZR has measured. We account for those opinions by regressing Teixeira’s UZR projections to a different mean than a player that scouts are less enamored of.

UZR is a tool. Scouts are a tool. They can be used together to produce better information than either can on their own. It is not an either/or proposition. Use both.

General Manager: John Mozeliak
Farm Director: Mike Girsch
Scouting Director: Jeff Luhnow

2006-2009 Draft Results:
First three rounds included
x- over-draft signees ($200,000+)

2009 1st Round: Shelby Miller, RHP, Texas HS
2. Robert Stock, C, Southern California
3. Joe Kelly, RHP, UC Riverside

The Cardinals organization appears to have had a strong draft in ’09, but it will likely be a while before fans reap the benefits, especially in the case of Miller. The right-hander was drafted out of a Texas high school, so he’ll likely need about four years of development time before he’s ready to contribute on the big-league stage. In his debut, Miller made just two starts. In three innings, he allowed five hits and two walks. He also recorded two strikeouts. Miller’s repertoire includes a fastball that can touch 95 mph, as well as a curveball and a change-up. He’s considered a future No. 1 or 2 starter.

Stock has been on the draft radar for quite some time, and he even left high school early to pursue his collegiate career. Many expected Stock to be drafted as a pitcher, but the Cardinals allowed him to pursue his preferred vocation. As a pitcher at the University of Southern California, Stock allowed just 61 hits in 77.2 innings of work and had a strikeout rate of 10.0 K/9. As a hitter, he posted a triple-slash line of just .226/.345/.453 in 137 at-bats and failed to surpass the .300 batting-average mark in all three of his college seasons. Upon turning pro, Stock hit .322/.386/.550 with an ISO of .228 in 149 rookie-league at-bats. He also received a five-game trial in low-A ball. The 20-year-old surpassed all expectations with the bat in pro ball in ’09, but he was a college player playing in rookie ball.

Taken in the third round out of U.C. Riverside, Kelly should be considered an interesting sleeper. The right-hander is a ground-ball machine like a number of other Riverside grads, including Toronto’s Marc Rzepczynski. Kelly had a solid debut in short-season ball by posting a 2.61 FIP and a strikeout rate of 8.90 to go along with his ground-ball rate of 56.4%. He dominated lefties in his debut (.188 average), which is a good sign for a pitcher who relies heavily on his slider. Kelly made two starts in his debut, but he’ll likely end up as a dominating reliever, and quite possibly a closer.

2008 1st Round: Brett Wallace, 3B, Arizona State (Traded to OAK)
1S. Lance Lynn, RHP, Mississippi
2. Shane Peterson, OF, Long Beach State (Traded to OAK)
3. Niko Vazquez, SS, Nevada HS

Both Wallace and Peterson were used to acquire veteran Matt Holliday during the ’09 season. It was a high price to pay for what may end up being less than a year’s worth of Holliday. Wallace, 23, could find himself in the Majors in 2010 at either third base, first base or designated hitter. His power output improved after the move to Oakland and he posted an ISO rate of .203. Peterson had a solid season playing for both St. Louis and Oakland, but he may not have enough sock in his bat to play every day.

We’ll talk more in-depth on Lynn tomorrow during the Top 10 list, but he’s been a pleasant (fast-moving) surprise by reaching triple-A in his first full pro season. Vazquez had a terrible offensive season by hitting .197/.295/.250 in low-A ball and .209/.283/.293 in short-season ball. He’s also shown limited power and stole just three bases all year, so his value is tied solely to his ability to hit for average. He’s still just 20 years old, though. Scott Gorgen (4th round) is another pitcher to keep an eye on, and catcher Charles Cutler (14th round) has shown a solid left-handed bat.

2007 1st Round: Peter Kozma, SS, Oklahoma HS
1S. Clayton Mortensen, RHP, Gonzaga (Traded to OAK)
2. David Kopp, RHP, Clemson
2. Jess Todd, RHP, Arkansas
3. Daniel Descalso, 3B, UC Davis
x- Brett Zawacki, RHP, Illinois HS

The Cardinals organization had a number of extra picks in ’07, but the results have been fairly modest, especially with Mortensen flipped to Oakland in the Holliday trade and Todd sent to Cleveland in the Mark DeRosa deal. First rounder Kozma, 21, has already reached double-A, but he hit just .216/.288/.312 and many are now projecting him as a utilty player. He still has promise, but he’s a middle infielder with limited power (.096 ISO) and he hasn’t had much success on the base paths, either.

Descalso, like Kozma, appears on the Top 10 list. Zawacki has yet to justify the above-slot deal he received and made just eight appearances in ’09. Kopp has had OK results, but projects as a reliever in the Majors. Tyler Henley (8th round), Adam Reifer (11th round), and Adron Chambers (38th round) were nice late-round finds. Signing college outfielder Kyle Russell in the fourth round would have made this draft all the better.

2006 1st Round: Adam Ottavino, RHP, Northeastern
1S. Chris Perez, RHP, Miami
2. Brad Furnish, LHP, Texas Christian
2. Jon Jay, OF, Miami
2S. Mark Hamilton, 1B, Tulane
3. Gary Daley, RHP, Cal Poly
x- Tommy Pham, SS, Nevada HS

Ottavino has had an up-and-down career in the organization mainly due to poor control and command; he posted a walk rate of 5.13 BB/9 in ’09 and has seen it increase over the past three seasons, while climbing the organizational ladder. Perez, like Todd, was traded to Cleveland. Jay may wind up as the most valuable pick in this draft. Furnish (6.48 FIP in double-A), Daley (5.99 BB% in low-A), and Pham (.691 OPS in high-A) have all disappointed. Hamilton showed improved power at double-A and triple-A in ’09, but his career has been slowed by injuries.

Late round finds include: Allen Craig (8th round), P.J. Walters (11th round), and Nick Additon (47th round). Luke Gregerson was another great find, but he’s applying his trade in San Diego now after being sent there in the Khalil Greene swap. D’Marcus Ingram (25th round), who has good speed, is someone to keep an eye on.

Tomorrow: The Cardinals Top 10 prospect list

Yesterday we looked at the best baserunners of the 2009 season; now let’s finish up by looking at the laggards. Again, these numbers are taken from Baseball Prospectus’ baserunning metric (EQBRR), which was created by Dan Fox. Stolen bases/caught stealing are already factored in FanGraphs’ version of wOBA, so I’ve just subtracted the steals (EQBRR-EQSBR).

We’ve found out that only a handful of players have had major impacts on the diamond with their baserunning, and these players are the ones who really dragged down their WAR by their plodding and/or boneheaded play on the basepaths.

	       Runs
Melvin Mora     -8
Jorge Posada    -8
Carlos Lee      -6
Yadier Molina   -5
Pedro Feliz     -5
Josh Bard       -5
Billy Butler    -5
Michael Young   -5
Bengie Molina   -5
Jim Thome       -5

To no great surprise, we have a couple of Super Molina Brothers and a few “pleasantly plump” non-catchers such as Billy Butler and Carlos Lee.

Is Melvin Mora’s career over? Yep, probably. He’s going to be 38, he hit the skids offensively and now factoring in his awful baserunning, he was replacement level for 2009. He’s now a free agent, and it’s hard for me to envision him receiving a contract.

We’re filling in the holes in some player’s WAR looking at baserunning, and our own Matt Klaassen has done some hole-filling of his own with his version of quantifying catcher defense. Bookmark it folks: it’s an awesome reference on catchers. Using his run totals on some of these catchers and the baserunning numbers, the picture gets even clearer.

Yadier Molina’s gun-slinging ways have firmly established his defensive reputation. Matt has him at +7 runs — not as high as one might’ve imagined, but still very good. While Yadi’s defensive giveth, unfortunately his lack of ability on the basepaths taketh away, or at least a good bit.

The eldest and most hack-tastic Molina brother isn’t quite the hitter or the defender he once was. The d_f’s catcher metric has him at -3. For the Giants, Molina’s WAR was 1.8 but this drops him to 1 WAR. Bengie’s now a 34-year-old free agent. Given his rep as a steady backstop, I’m sure he’ll find a starting gig somewhere, whether he’s deserves it or not.

Jorge Posada stunk at both defense and baserunning. We have him at 4 WAR, which is obviously great, but when factoring Matt’s defensive numbers (-6) and his horrid baserunning, JP’s WAR goes down to 2.6, which is still good, but not quite as lofty. If you look into the scout’s dictionary and find the word “baseclogger,” you’ll see a picture of Jorge Posada.

I don’t have much to add to this article. It’s just fun.

“That’s pretty much how I pitch, to try to keep my FIP as low as
possible,” Greinke said.”

You’re pretty good at it, Zack.

Some have expressed interest in the r-squared values for common metrics like walk and strikeout rates for starting pitchers. With that in mind I took each of the pitchers with at least 100 innings pitched in 2008-9 and ran their BB% and SO%. This gave us a sample of 92 pitchers and some numbers that are pretty similar all told.

Here’s the graph with important information for walk rate:

And here for strikeouts:

Minimal difference. Both are skills, albeit not 100% so. The more interesting aspect from the data set is the biggest droppers and risers for each. Jon Lester saw his strikeout rate rise from 17.4% to 26.7%; Justin Verlander from 18.5% to 27.4%; Joe Blanton from 13% to 19.5%; Matt Garza from 16.6% to 22%; others who jumped at least five percentage points include Adam Wainwright, Clayton Kershaw, and Zack Greinke. The biggest droppers for Ks were Joba Chamberlain (-9.5%), Scott Kazmir (-7.8%), Ervin Santana (-6.4%), Micah Owings (-6.1%), and Bronson Arroyo (-4.9%). Something must be in the Angels water bottles.

As for walks. Verlander again excels at something good and saw his walk rate decline 3.5%; Barry Zito and Ubaldo Jimenez saw 2.6% drops; Ted Lilly and Ubaldo Jimenez round out the top five with 2.3% drops and Felix Hernandez experienced the sole other 2% drop. Kyle Davies had his walk rate climb 3.5%, Livan Hernandez and Owings (ouch) 3%, Andy Pettite 2.9%, and finally Santana and Todd Wellemeyer had their walk rates go up 2.5%.

For those who love consistency, Jake Peavy, Lester, and Nick Blackburn saw zero movement in their walk rates and Lilly held the same distinction with his strikeout rate.

You may have heard that Bill Belichick, the head coach of the New England Patriots, made a controversial decision in Sunday’s night nationally televised game against the Colts. I’m not going to get into the details of the play here – there are tons of football blogs out there that can do a better job of discussing the context than I can. However, the reaction to the decision has some ties to baseball, and that’s what I want to talk about.

Belichick is a stats guy, sort of the NFL version of Billy Beane, only with championship rings to support his beliefs. He has built a dynasty in New England by eschewing traditional football truisms, and he has found great success with his methods. In general, he’s extremely well respected as a football guy, if not so much as a person to interact with.

So, I find the reaction to Belichick’s fourth down strategy interesting. Pretty much every member of the traditional media, including the announcers calling the game, immediately destroyed him for the call. There was no gray area. It was the wrong call because every other coach in America would have punted, and had punted, in that exact same situation. Belichick went out on a very thin limb, then watched it break when his team failed to convert and the Colts won the game on the final drive.

So, now, we get columns like this, decrying the statistical movement in sports as too rigid and not respectful enough of those with experience. The appeal to authority has been out in full force – Belichick was wrong because the majority say he was wrong, and the merits of his argument are generally ignored.

This is despite the fact that Belichick is part of the authority that should theoretically be appealed to. He’s been the head coach of three Super Bowl champions. He’s a football guy who appreciates numbers, not a numbers guy who appreciates football. Yet, for whatever reason, his credential cease to matter.

We see this in baseball all the time as well. Despite the fact that about half the teams in the sport are now run by people who could accurately be described as having a strong analytical background, the anti-statistical movement still paints people like us as a fringe movement on the outside looking in. Meanwhile, they’ve missed the fact that the inside is now a lot different, in large part due to the acceptance of the value of analytical methods of evaluation.

If the Patriots had made the two yards and won, would that have validated the entire statistical movement in sports? Of course not, because it was one play with an approximately 50-50 chance of success. Yet, when it doesn’t work, it becomes “proof” that the nerds have gone too far.

Let’s be better than that. Not every good move works out, and some bad moves end well. The end does not justify the means, however. Nobody can predict the future, so all we can evaluate is the ability for teams to give themselves a maximum probability of success. Sometimes, that means making choices that go against what everyone else is doing. Those choices aren’t wrong just because everyone else thinks they are.

Merit, not authority, should rule the discussion of the day. If the person in authority is right, he should be able to explain why using logic and reason. If he can’t, then perhaps he shouldn’t be considered an authority on the subject.

Note: What follows contains little in the way of quantitative analysis. It does mention The Book, however, and that’s gotta count for something.

I believe the readership will agree that, of all the things that are great about wedding receptions, probably the best thing about them is that phenomenon known as the “open bar.” If you’re like me (intelligent, physically impressive), you like beer…a lot. You think that just as books such as Cod and Salt have tried to explain the world through the lens of those respective materials, that probably the world could, and ought to, be understood through the lens of beer. (Note: This is different than seeing the world through beer goggles. Those you should avoid at all times.) You think that, in particular, the concept of free beer — especially when consumed in the company of loved ones — goes a pretty good way to proving the existence of God. And whenever beer touches your lips, you feel compelled to echo Kanye West’s sentiments from Late Registration — i.e. “It’s a celebration, bitches.”

So, we’re agreed: beer is great. But this isn’t merely an ode to fermentation that I’m writing. It’s serious business. Because you see, drinking at a wedding is especially important if, as I was this past weekend, you’re expected to prepare and deliver a toast.

Nor when I say “toast” should you imagine one of those sprawling, nebulous accounts of late adolescence where the speaker recalls that one time he and the groom yelled “movie” in a crowded firehouse. No, the ideal toast requires structural rigor, not a little wisdom, and something of what the Surrealists refer to as “the marvelous” (and what Kanye West calls, once again, “a celebration, bitches”).

To attain the proper state of (what I’ll call) “enthusiasm,” one must drink. Beer, wine, something called a “Toasted Almond”: whatever. But as is made all-too-obvious by too many Facebook pages, excessive drinking causes sloppiness. There’s little that’s charming about watching an otherwise handsome young man vomit on his lapels in the presence of multiple grandmothers.

Excessive sobriety, however, has its own perils. Public speaking is one thing; speaking on the nature of love, quite another. Owing to the inter-generational nature of this blessed sacrament, one is forced to appeal beyond his own peer group. A Benny Goodman joke here or there is sometimes necessary. One must say to oneself what Arthur Rimbaud said to the world: “I have all the talents!”

In short, there is a “zone” — a state that one hopes to achieve in which one’s faculties are not so impaired as to render him inaudible, but in which one’s nerves are sufficiently dulled so’s to allow the speaker a breeziness and expansiveness appropriate for the occasion.

Read the rest of this entry »

General Manager: Dayton Moore
Farm Director: Mike Arbuckle
Scouting Director: J.J. Picollo

FanGraphs’ Top 10 Prospects
(2009 Draft Picks/International Signees Not Included)

The system certainly has some talent brewing, but most of it lies below the double-A level, so fans are going to have to be patient. A renewed emphasis on the draft should definitely help turn the organization around. For more on the ’09 draft picks, see yesterday’s post.

1. Mike Montgomery, LHP, high-A
DOB: July 1989 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2008 supplemental 1st round – California HS
MLB ETA: late-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 89-95 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

If the organization can find a way to keep its current ace, then it could have a nasty one-two punch at the MLB level with Zack Greinke and Montgomery. The left-hander has flown through the system and will likely open ’10 in double-A. Montgomery, 20, posted a 2.30 FIP in 52.0 innings in high-A in ’09. He allowed just 38 hits and posted a walk rate of 2.08 BB/9. He also showed that he can miss some bats with a strikeout rate of 7.96 K/9. In his career, Montgomery has allowed just three homers in 152.2 innings of work, thanks in part to his solid ground-ball rates. His rate averaged out at 50% for the ’09 season.

2. Mike Moustakas, 3B, high-A
DOB: September 1988 Bats: L Throws: R
Signed: 2007 1st round – California HS
MLB ETA: mid-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

Still just 21 years of age, Moustakas has been hurt by some low BABIPs over the past two seasons: .291 in ’08 and .277 in ’09. As a result, this former No. 1 draft pick’s triple-slash numbers have plummeted each of his three pro seasons. Moustakas is going to have to improve his patience at the plate (6.1 BB% in ’09) but he does flash some raw power (.171 ISO in ’09). A .319 wOBA is not going to make him an impact third baseman.

3. Eric Hosmer, 1B, high-A
DOB: October 1989 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2008 1st round – Florida HS
MLB ETA: mid-2012 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

Big things were expected of Hosmer in ’09, but he struggled with his vision and hit just .254/.352/.382 in 280 low-A at-bats. Curiously, the organization chose to promote the first baseman despite the lackluster numbers. He then hit .206/.280/.299 in 97 high-A at-bats. On the plus side, Hosmer posted a walk rate of 13.6% in low-A, which is extra impressive considering he was not seeing the ball very well.

4. Danny Duffy, LHP, high-A
DOB: December 1988 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2007 3rd round – California HS
MLB ETA: mid-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 88-93 mph fastball, curveball, slider, change-up

He’s certainly not the hardest thrower in the system, but Duffy knows how to pitch, as witnessed by his 2.84 FIP in high-A ball in ’09. Duffy allowed 108 hits in 126.2 innings of work. He gave up just six homers (0.43 HR/9) and showed solid control with a walk rate of 2.91 BB/9. His strikeout rate dropped from 11.24 in low-A in ’08 to 8.88 K/9 in ’09, but it’s still an encouraging number. A word of caution: Despite his low homers-allowed totals, Duffy is a fly-ball pitcher. He posted a ground-ball rate of just 42.2% in ’09 and 36.6% in ’08, so that suggests he’s going to have to work down in the zone a little more.

5. Tim Melville, RHP, low-A
DOB: October 1989 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2008 4th round – Missouri HS
MLB ETA: early-2012 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 89-94 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

Melville entered the ’08 draft more highly regarded than organization-mate Montgomery, who has now passed him. Melville had a solid debut year (unlike Montgomery, he did not pitch in ’08) and allowed just 89 hits in 97.1 innings. The right-hander pitches up in the zone more than Montgomery, and he was hurt by a 0.92 HR/9 rate. He also showed less control with a walk rate of 3.98 BB/9. Melville did, however, show the ability to strike out batters with a K-rate of 8.88 K/9.

6. Kila Ka’aihue, 1B, triple-A
DOB: March 1984 Bats: L Throws: R
Signed: 2002 15th round – Hawaii HS
MLB ETA: early-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 1

Ka’aihue was the forgotten man in the organization while Mike Jacobs played everyday and provided below average production (-0.7 WAR). Despite slugging 38 homers in ’08, the 25-year-old spent the entire year in triple-A where he hit .252/.392/.433 with an ISO of .181 in 441 at-bats. Ka’aihue walked 102 times on the year… or six fewer times than Jacobs has in the last three years combined. If Kansas City is not going to take him seriously as a cheap source of power, it should do the slugger a favor by trading him.

7. David Lough, OF, double-A
DOB: January 1986 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2007 11th round – Mercyhurst College
MLB ETA: mid-2010 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

The 23-year-old Lough had a breakout ’09 season and could be the best in-house option to eventually replace David DeJesus or Coco Crisp (when they are deemed too expensive). Lough, though, is probably still a year away from being ready to play everyday at the MLB level. In ’09, he began the year in high-A and hit .320/.370/.473 in 222 at-bats. He then moved up to double-A where he hit .331/.371/.517 with a .186 ISO in 236 at-bats. Lough stole 19 bases but was caught eight times, and he needs to get on base more frequently (4.8 BB% in double-A) to take advantage of his speed.

8. Jeff Bianchi, SS, double-A
DOB: October 1986 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2005 2nd round – Pennsylvania HS
MLB ETA: late-2010 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

Finally healthy, Bianchi showed consistency in ’09 and reached double-A. In high-A ball, the shortstop hit .300/.360/.427 in 220 at-bats. Moved up to double-A, Bianchi responded with a triple-slash line of .315/.356/.441 in 270 at-bats. He also stole 22 bases on the year and was caught just six times. The 23-year-old infielder strikes out too much (21.5 K%) for his modest power.

9. John Lamb, LHP, rookie
DOB: July 1990 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2008 5th round – California HS
MLB ETA: late-2012 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 87-91 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

Lamb did not pitch after signing in ’08, so he made his pro debut in ’09 and pitched well at two rookie ball levels. Overall, he allowed 57 hits in 68.2 innings and showed good control with a walk rate around 2.70 BB/9. Despite an average fastball, Lamb used his control and deception to strike out almost one batter per inning. He should jump to low-A in 2010, and he still has a long way to climb before reaching Kansas City.

10. Tyler Sample, RHP, rookie
DOB: June 1989 Bats: L Throws: R
Signed: 2008 3rd round – Colorado HS
MLB ETA: mid-2013 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 89-94 mph fastball, plus curveball, change-up

This ’08 draft pick gets lost in the shuffle behind some of the bigger names, but Sample had an impressive year in ’09. The right-hander allowed 41 hits in 54.2 innings of work while posting a strikeout rate around 8.00 K/9. His control is still a work in progress, but it was right around 3.60 BB/9. Sample posted a modest 43.4% ground-ball rate, but he allowed just two home runs (0.16 HR/9).

Up Next: The St. Louis Cardinals

Joel Pineiro is a guy who got a lot of press this season because of his drastic shift from an ok pitch-to-contact, slight ground ball pitcher to an amazing tiny-BB-rate, extreme ground ball pitcher. Now that Pineiro is a free agent, it is incumbent on teams examine the roots of this change as they evaluate him.

First, looking at his BB rate, here is his career history.

He has always been above average at limiting walks but, last year, entered the “good” range and, this year, dropped even farther to 1.14 BB/9, the lowest rate for a starting pitcher. He also had the lowest walk per batter faced, 3.2%.

At first blush the per-pitch data does not back up this extraordinary control. His Zone% is just 52.5%, which is good, but is the lowest rate of his career and only 14th best in the majors. How can this good, but not great, Zone% lead to the best walk rate in the majors?

The answer lies in his 87.7% contact rate, the highest of his career and third highest in the majors. Since he rarely misses bats, his at-bats just don’t go long enough for him to walk many batters. This is sort of the opposite of what I noticed with Scutaro and Castillo, who take strikes in hopes of extending the at-bat long enough to get a walk. Pineiro’s pitches are so hittable that at-bats rarely last long enough to reach four balls even if they aren’t in the zone at the same rate Cliff Lee or Johan Santana. On the other hand, this hittableness resulted in his 4.42 K/9 rate, third worst in the game.

So Pinerio is an extreme pitch-to-contact pitcher, but if you are going to give up a ton of balls in play, you want to do it the way he does. He led the league by a fair margin in ground balls per ball in play, which results in more double plays and fewer extra base hits. That was the second big change for Pineiro. Red is LDs, blue FBs and green GBs.

Over the past couple years, 2006 to 2008, he had a ground ball rate of 48% — good, not extraordinary — but in 2009 it jumped over 60%. Obviously this was the result of his development of and increased use of a sinker or two-seam fastball. Here are his pitch use break downs in 2007 through 2009 (the years we have the pitchf/x data, which I used to classify his pitches).

+--------------------+------+------+------+
|                    | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 |
+--------------------+------+------+------+
| Four-Seam Fastball | 0.54 | 0.36 | 0.11 |
| Two-Seam Fastball  | 0.03 | 0.23 | 0.59 |
| Slider             | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.12 |     
| Curve              | 0.16 | 0.09 | 0.09 |     
| Changeup           | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.09 |     
+--------------------+------+------+------+

That two-seam fastball he is using so much more often has a 68% ground ball rate and a 91% contact rate. Thus it is the big reason he is so hittable, which plays a role in the decrease in walks, and the big reason he got so many ground balls this year.

As I wrote before, Pineiro will regress in 2010 and very likely not perform as well. This season was about the best you can expect from a pitcher who strikes out less than one batter every two innings. But assuming he keeps throwing that sinker so often, he will limit walks, get tons ground balls and be a solid pitcher.