The Hindenburg is an accurate portrayal of the 2009 Mets. Injuries, more injuries, and even more injuries lead to a disastrous campaign from the Metropolitans despite the opening of a new stadium in what was supposed to be a ceremonious christening like the other New York team witnessed. Amongst the questions the Mets will attempt to answer during the off-season includes David Wright’s 2009 and where he stands for 2010.

Wright’s power went on sabbatical in 2009. His ISO dropped from .225 from 2006-8 to .140 last year in spite of an inflated average on balls in play. Wright popped at least 25 home runs in each of his first four full seasons, but managed only 10 last season, and failed to reach 40 doubles for the first time in a full season, either – although he did hit 39. The Mets’ new park gives the appearance of a pitcher’s haven, which raises the question: was a lack of power only a problem for Wright, or was this a widespread occurrence?

To attempt and answer this question I took every member of the 2008-9 Mets who had at least 250 plate appearances in both seasons and compared their ISO. Unfortunately, this only resulted in five samples: Wright, Carlos Beltran, Fernando Tatis, Luis Castillo, and Ryan Church. Below you will see the results, but anecdotally I feel obligated to mention that Church saw 144 plate appearances with the Braves and had his ISO rise closer to expected levels.

Each player involved saw his ISO drop by nearly 20 points, and that’s even with Castillo’s inclusion. In theory, Castillo’s slap-hitting approach should be unaffected in large part by the ballpark’s steeper dimensions, but here that doesn’t seem to be the case. One season’s worth of data from five individuals isn’t enough for me to say one way or the other about the legitimacy of Wright’s blackout, but here’s another dataset to consider with each of their home/road ISO:

Even smaller sample sizes and also a mixed bag. Barring any Earth-shattering revelations or limb amputations, I would expect Wright to hit for more power in 2010. Mostly because it seems unlikely he would see his ability to hit for power decay in such an abrupt fashion.

This past week, we wrapped up our 2009 Minor Reviews for each organization in Major League Baseball. The posts took a look at a few prospects for each organization that failed to make the Top 10 lists, for a variety of reasons.

The Top 10 lists will begin posting this coming week, beginning with the Kansas City Royals. We will spend two days looking at each organization; the first day will be a review of the last four amateur drafts for each club, while the second day will break down the Top 10 lists, complete with commentary on each player.

One difference with our Top 10 lists from most other publications is that they will not include 2009 draft picks. To be honest, it’s very difficult to effectively rank most same-year draft picks (not including the likes of Stephen Strasburg, of course) because of the small sample sizes offered in their debut seasons. As well, many top-ranked draft picks have been signing late each year with many of them not making their debuts until the following year. Key ’09 draft picks will be highlighted during the four-year amateur draft reviews that precede the Top 10 lists for each team.

If you missed your team’s Minor Review series, the links are posted below for your convenience, along with the five players reviewed for each club. In some instances you’ll notice some top prospects were reviewed (and will be showing up again on their teams’ Top 10 lists) because they were highlighted during the ’08 Minor Review series as their teams’ sleeper prospects for 2009.

The National League East

As explained in the overview post, here, this is part of a series looking at the best and worst defensive performers over the past three combined seasons. Rankings are done by adding a player’s UZR with his aggregate positional adjustment so as to level the playing field with regards to difficulty. Essentially, it’s removing the grading curve.

Previously covered:
The Best
5th, Ryan Zimmerman 43.7 runs above average.
4th, Omar Vizquel 45.8 runs above average.
3rd, J.J. Hardy 48.7 runs above average.
2nd, Franklin Gutierrez 51.4 runs above average.
1st, Chase Utley 54.8 runs above average.

The Worst
5th, Jason Bay -64.9 runs to average.
4th, Ken Griffey Jr. -66.9 runs to average.
3rd, Jermaine Dye -80.6 runs to average.
2nd, Brad Hawpe -101.1 runs to average.

Tonight, the worst player from 2007-9: OF Adam Dunn.

In a remarkable come from behind loss, Adam Dunn managed to out suck Brad Hawpe right at the finish line to steal this title from him. Though Dunn cannot claim to be as consistently poor as Hawpe, he can lay claim to the single worst season by UZR in this covered period.

Adam Dunn’s -46.2 runs to average in 2009 not only edged out Hawpe’s -43.6 from 2008 and Griffey’s -37.1 from 2007 as the worst overall season, but he managed the biggest gap between leader and second place in any category since Barry Bonds last played. As previously mentioned, Brad Hawpe was the second worst fielder in 2009. His fielding was -27 runs below average. Adan Dunn (-46.2) was nearly 20 runs worse than that. 20 runs, almost two whole wins worth of extra bad.

Of course, Dunn’s terrible was not limited to just 2009 or else he would not be atop this esteemed list of iron gloves even with his astounding 2009 figure. His 2008 was up to snuff as well, finishing second to Hawpe at -35.9 runs and he was the sixth worst aggregate fielder in 2007 leading to his total of -108.1 runs against average for the three seasons combined.

Adam Dunn is so bad in the field that he loses roughly two wins of value by not being a DH. And that includes factoring in the hitting penalty faced by full time DHs. His contract is not a bad one, it’s just a comically bad match although there is something poetic about seeing lineups with Adam Dunn and Ryan Zimmerman manning the infield corners.

Over the last couple of days, the rumor mill has flared up in Detroit, suggesting that the Tigers were open to moving Curtis Granderson and Edwin Jackson in the right deals. The rationale offered for making them available would be cost reduction, as the Tigers have a bloated payroll and are more vulnerable to the current economic climate than most clubs. With Justin Verlander eligible for arbitration, their payroll isn’t going down without making some moves.

But, let’s just take a step back and evaluate the rumor on its face – the Tigers are looking to reduce their costs by trading Granderson, who is owed a whopping $5.5 million in salary in 2010? Really? The actual cost savings, once you factor in that they have to replace him, would be in the low single millions, or about the same amount as they could get by just non-tendering Gerald Laird.

To save a few million bucks, the Tigers are going to give up one of the best values in baseball? Keep in mind, Granderson has been worth an average of $19.4 million over the last four years, and never less than $14 million. He’s a +4 win player under the age of 30. He’s essentially the equal in value of John Lackey, just without all the injury risks, and he’s due a total of $36 million over the next four years.

This is a franchise that just let Magglio Ordonez’s $18 million option for 2010 vest in pursuit of a playoff spot. Now, we’re supposed to believe that they’re going to turn around and ship off one of the game’s best center fielders to save a fraction of what they wasted on Maggs?

This just doesn’t pass the smell test. Granderson is a star and a massive bargain. When you’re cutting costs, you don’t start with the guy producing the highest return on investment on the roster. It doesn’t make any sense.

There’s merit to trading Edwin Jackson while his ERA is still shiny and he’s not overly expensive. There’s logic behind that. There’s no logic behind trading Curtis Granderson unless you’re getting a monstrous package of talent in return. And that wouldn’t be a cost savings decision, but instead a talent decision.

I wouldn’t be surprised if the Tigers trimmed payroll this winter, but I’d be stunned if Granderson was traded. Unless some team is going to take every bad contract the Tigers have with him, he’s more valuable to them as a player than as trade bait.

I know this is about a week late on the uptake, but I just had to get it off my chest. Sorry.
While I’m going to use numbers here to “prove” my point, I will admit that the terms “overrated” and “underrated” are (a) overused and (b) relative to a number of factors that are difficult-to-impossible to quantify in terms of measuring fan perception, what counts, etc. I’m clearly as guilty of overusing them as anyone.

But why do I care about this? After all, I like Jimmy Rollins, but I’m not a Phillies fan.

During the World Series buildup, different writers whom I enjoy wrote that Rollins isn’t really a “star” despite being treated like one (whatever that means) and that he is overrated. So it wasn’t so much what they said, but who said it. No, I’m not going to name them — this isn’t a “call out.” I’m not anyone people should be afraid of being called out by, and this isn’t a lame attempt to shame anyone. The point is that even smart people usually conversant with the numbers can get carried away without examining the numbers. (Not me, of course. I’m always completely objective.)

What could these people who said Rollins is “overrated” be talking about? Obviously, in 2009, he had a dreadful time at the plate. Of course, a player is probably pretty good if he has a down year that’s so bad he ends up being “only” league average. Another complaint is that Rollins leads off, and he’s never had a particularly great on-base percentage. While OBP is very important, it’s only part of a players’ value. Moreover, it’s his manager who makes him lead off, a role for which Rollins isn’t well-suited.

More importantly, though, saber-friendly writers know that current season stats don’t tell the story about a player, right? That’s MGL 101. Rather than going through the hassle of a projection, let’s see what kind of company this player has been keeping while being “overrated.” Over the last three seasons (including 2009), Rollins has accumulated 14.4 wins, making him “only” the 17th most valuable position player in that period according to FanGraphs’ WAR. Whose company is he in? Ichiro Suzuki is at 15.0, only half-a-win away (practically nothing over three years). Derek Jeter is Mr. Overrated Guys Bloggers Love To Whine About, and he’s the same as Ichiro. Ryan Zimmerman has been exactly as valuable. Grady Sizemore has been ever-so-slightly less valuable; is he a hack? How about Lance Berkman or Adrian Gonzalez?

Look, Rollins shouldn’t have won the 2007 NL MVP, when he wasn’t even the best player on his own team (ahem). Again, I don’t know exactly who’s been doing the “rating.” But if you ask me (and you didn’t), it’s tough to imagine that a guy who’s been about as good as Ichiro!, Jeter, Zimmerman, Grady Sizemore, Big Puma, and A-Gon over the last three years deserves the “overrated” label.

Then again, does Rollins have his own cologne?

Prospect ranking season is here. Top 10 lists will be arriving shortly and in preparation for that, we present an intro series looking at some of the players who deserve mentioning but probably will not be appearing on their teams’ Top 10 lists. The series is back for a second year.

The Graduate: J.A. Happ, LHP
Happ did not garner a lot of attention while rising through the minors, but the left-hander had a solid rookie season for the Phillies. He did a nice job of keeping runners off base with just 149 hits allowed and a walk rate of 3.04 BB/9 in 166.0 innings. Happ’s strikeout rate dipped from his minor-league average, but it was still reasonable at 6.45 K/9. If he can utilize his curveball more often, it might help him with his strikeout rate, because it will change the hitters’ eye levels. One of the biggest ugly marks on his stats line is the 38.4% ground-ball rate.

The Riser: Trevor May, RHP
The 20-year-old May made just 15 starts in ’09, but he flashed some intriguing potential. The right-hander posted a strikeout rate of 11.06 K/9 while allowing 58 hits in 77.1 innings at the low-A ball level. May did struggle with his control, posting a walk rate of 5.00 BB/9. He did a nice job of keeping the ball in the park with a HR/9 rate of 0.35. Left-handers hit just .188 against him in ’09. May features an 87-93 mph fastball, curveball and change-up.

The Tumbler: Anthony Hewitt, OF
Hewitt is a classic raw athlete with the potential to absolutely explode if he can embrace the nuances of the sport. It could be a long wait for Phillies fans, though. After struggling during his debut in ’08, the 20-year-old Hewitt scuffled again in ’09 and hit just .223/.255/.395 in 233 at-bats. He posted a low walk rate of 3.7% and his strikeout rate was far too high at 33.0%. In a small sample size of 44 at-bats, his performance against southpaws was brutal: .136/.188/.273. Hewitt did show some power with an ISO of .172. He has some speed on the bases, but his base-stealing skills are raw, and he was successful in just nine of 14 attempts.

The ’10 Sleeper: Yohan Flande, LHP
The 23-year-old Flande had a solid debut in North America in ’08, and he followed that up by making 13 starts in both high-A and double-A in ’09. The left-hander allowed 81 hits in 70.2 innings at the senior level, but he posted a solid FIP of 3.94. Flande posted solid walk rates at both levels and averaged out around 2.65 BB/9. His strikeout rate dropped from 7.35 in high-A to 6.27 K.9 in double-A. Overall, his ground-ball rate was solid at 52.1%. Flande’s repertoire includes an 87-91 mph fastball, a plus change-up and a developing slider.

Bonus: Drew Naylor, RHP
Naylor was highlighted in the ’08 series as the Phillies’ breakout candidate for ’09. Pitching in high-A in ’09, he had an OK year but really did nothing to distinguish himself. Naylor showed good control with a walk rate of 2.11 BB/9, and his strikeout rate was OK at 6.55 K/9. He allowed 162 hits in 158.0 innings of work. Naylor, 23, should move up to double-A in 2010.

Prospect ranking season is here. Top 10 lists will be arriving shortly and in preparation for that, we present an intro series looking at some of the players who deserve mentioning but probably will not be appearing on their teams’ Top 10 lists. The series is back for a second year.

The Graduate: Bobby Parnell, RHP
Parnell was having a very fine season as a reliever in the Mets bullpen before the club tried him in the rotation. The right-hander has a heavy fastball that sits at 94 mph and he backs that up with a good slider. His change-up is not developed enough, which is one of the reasons why he struggled as a starter. Parnell also doesn’t throw enough first-pitch strikes (almost 10% below the league average). If left in the bullpen in ’09, the 25-year-old should be a solid reliever.

The Riser: Kirk Nieuwenhuis, OF
Nieuwenhuis had a solid first full year in professional baseball in ’09. He began the year in high-A ball and hit .274/.357/.467 with a .193 ISO in 482 at-bats. He also stole 16 bases in 20 attempts. If Nieuwenhuis can continue to develop his raw power into over-the-fence power, he could become a 20-20 or 25-25 player at some point in his MLB career. The 22-year-old outfielder earned an eight-game trial in double-A and he should begin the season there. He has the makings of a solid everyday center fielder, but he needs to improve against southpaws after hitting just .235/.294/.348 in ’09.

The Tumbler: Eddie Kunz, RHP
After reaching the Majors in his first full MLB season in ’08, Kunz spent the entire ’09 season in triple-A where he posted a 5.53 FIP. The right-handed reliever allowed just 54 hits in 61.0 innings, but he posted a walk rate of 4.57 BB/9 and allowed a home-run rate of 1.18 HR/9. Kunz, 23, has a 90-95 mph fastball and slider; he needs to improve his command of both. These quick-to-the-Majors college relievers never seem to work out quite like they’re supposed to.

The ’10 Sleeper: Jeurys Familia, RHP
Familia came close to making the Top 10 list after the 19-year-old hurler allowed just 109 hits in 134.0 innings of work in low-A ball. He posted a walk rate of 3.09 BB/9 and a strikeout rate of 7.32 K/9. Impressively, the young right-hander gave up just three homers (.020 HR/9) all year. Familia’s ground-ball rate was just shy of 50% at 48.8% and he limited the line-drive rate to just 12.3%. He features an 88-93 mph fastball, curveball and change-up.

Bonus: Jefry Marte, 3B
Highlighted in the ’08 series as the sleeper to watch out for in ’09, Marte made it onto the Top 10 list for 2009 so I won’t divulge too much information here. The 18-year-old third baseman spent the year in low-A ball and did not embarrass himself, although he needs to show more patience at the plate.

One of the more intriguing free agents, to me, is Marco Scutaro. After years of solidly below-average production, he was traded to the Jays and in 2008 had a good year last year (WAR 2.7) and then busted out this year with a WAR of 4.5 (making him one of the top 35 position players).

The big change came at the plate. Prior to this year, he had always been a below-average offensive player (negative wRAA every year), but this year he posted a wOBA of .354 over 680 PAs to provide 14 runs above average at the plate. Doing that while playing average defense at short will result in huge value, as seen by his 4.5 WAR.

The increase in offensive value came, largely, from an increased walk rate, 13.6%, a career high for him and in the top 25 of all of baseball. He coupled that with a low strikeout rate; he was one of the few players in the game to have more walks than strikeouts. This led to a jump in his OBP, and thus offensive value.

A big drop in his swing rate and increase in his contact rate caused to the increase in walks. He was the second best at not swinging at pitches out of the zone (12.3%), had the third lowest overall swing rate (34.5%, behind only Bobby Abreu and Luis Castillo), and he tied Castillo for the highest contact percentage (93.3%). His offensive game is very similar to Castillo’s, which I described in this post.

Here is what it looks like to swing at almost nothing. I mapped out his swing probability by pitch location and then drew the contour line where it switches from greater than 50% to less than 50%. So he is more likely than not to swing at pitches inside the contour line, and less likely than not to swing at those outside. I broke it up based on the number of strikes and, for the zero-strike case, also plotted the 25% contour. I plotted Scutaro’s contours and the average for all right handed batters.

When there are zero strikes Scutaro’s 50% contour is non-existent. On average he takes a pitch even if it is right down the middle when he has no strikes. Generally, he swings at fewer pitches out of the zone, but he is also taking lots of pitches in the zone compared to average. By swinging, Scutaro has a chance to end the at-bat; instead, he will take pitches in hopes of continuing the at-bat and getting enough balls to earn a walk. He will take some strikes, but that is ok, because once he gets two strikes, his contact skills are so good he will rarely strike out swinging.

Here are the same graphs as above but for contact rate, and the contours are for the 90% contact rate. So on pitches inside the contour Scutaro has a greater than 90% contact rate.

Scutaro’s are, not surprisingly, much larger than average, and they get bigger as the number of strikes increases. So he is able to swing defensively at two strikes and rarely miss a pitch. This means he can take pitches freely up to that point, hope they are balls to get a walk, but even if they are strikes, he will be ok.

As I noted, Scutaro’s approach is very simliar to Castillo’s. The difference is that Scutaro hit only 37% of his balls in play on the ground compared to 59% for Castillo. So when Scutaro puts the ball in play, he actually has some chance at extra base hits (ISO of .127 compared to Castillo’s .043). Scutaro has Castillo’s excellent plate discipline and contact skills, coupled with at least a modicum of power, making him a solidly above average hitter.

Scutaro is due for some serious regression to his offensive level, as is anyone who posts 2400 PAs at wOBA of .311 and then 680 at .354. But I think that, because the change is supported by the per-pitch level data, which is not immune from regression itself, we can temper that regression somewhat.

Scutaro can play average defense at second or slightly below average at short, is 34 coming off far and away a career year at the plate, and is a type A free agent. It will be interesting to see what kind of deal he gets.

Since Dayton Moore has taken over as the Royals GM, he’s taken a lot of flak from the sabermetric community for acquiring guys who make a lot of outs. He built an offense around tools players who don’t get on base, ranging from the likes of Jose Guillen to Mike Jacobs and Yuniesky Betancourt. He talked about the importance of OBP, but when push came to shove, the evidence that he valued players who could get on base just wasn’t there.

So, now, there are rumors that the Royals are considering shipping Alberto Callaspo to the Dodgers in exchange for AJ Ellis, a 28-year-old minor league catcher whose biggest selling point is his on base percentage. The last two years in Triple-A, he’s posted OBPs of .436 and .438, racking up more walks than strikeouts. His career OBP in the minors is .398. For once, the Royals appear to be pursuing a player whose best skill is controlling the strike zone.

Unfortunately for Royals fans, even when Moore pursues a high OBP guy, he still finds one with a fatal flaw. With Ellis, that would be a complete lack of power. His ISO in the minors is an unimpressive .097, and that’s despite playing in hitting environments that are very conducive to offense. Over the last two seasons, he’s managed just 40 extra base hits, or 22 percent of his total hits. He’s a slap hitter without the ability to make the pitcher pay for making a mistake.

Guys who run up high OBPs in the minors without much in the way of power generally just don’t do well in the big leagues. It’s one thing to work the count against minor league pitchers who lack the command the pound the zone with good stuff, and another to try that same tactic in the big leagues. Without the ability to make the pitcher afraid to leave one over the heart of the plate, the ability to draw walks is severely limited.

This is why minor league walk rates actually don’t correlate all that well with major league walk rates. There are some guys who have the ability to make this work (Chone Figgins, Luis Castillo), but those guys can run. You just don’t find slow, no power guys in the big leagues who maintain a high on base percentage.

This doesn’t mean Ellis is worthless. He’s got a decent defensive reputation and can make contact, and as a catcher, the bar for offense in the majors is pretty low. He could probably be a useful backup catcher and maybe even a not horrible starter for a couple of years.

But, if Moore really wants to get KC’s OBP as a team up, he needs to acquire some good hitters, and AJ Ellis is not a good hitter. It should be refreshing to Royals fans that Moore is interested in a guy who gets on base, but it shouldn’t be an OBP or power trade-off – the goal is to get guys who can do both.

As we inch closer and closer to the impending free agent signing period, rumors are picking up over some of the big name free agents. On the hitting side, we have guys like Matt Holliday and Jason Bay. On the mound, the closest thing to a superstar we have is John Lackey.

Recently, reports have come out linking Lackey to teams like the Brewers, Mariners, and Rangers, not to mention the obvious links to both New York teams, Boston, and a possible return to the Angels. Of course, unsubstantiated claims will abound until Lackey actually picks a team. What kind of value will Lackey be bringing to the table in 2010 and beyond?

A quick look at Lackey’s career shows arguably three or four all-star caliber seasons, despite the fact that he only made one all-star game, in 2007, when his 3.01 ERA led the league. Indeed, 2007 was an excellent season for Lackey, but so were 2005, 2006, and 2009, all seasons where Lackey posted 175+ IP and an FIP under 3.75. He suffered in 2008 due to an abnormally high HR/FB of 15.3% but still maintained an excellent 3.25 K/BB ratio.

There just isn’t a whole lot not to like about Lackey’s performance. His K/9 hasn’t dropped below 7.00 since 2005, and his BB/9 hasn’t been above 3.00 in that same time frame. Even in 2008 and 2009, seasons in which he suffered injuries, he managed to pitch over 160 innings and make at least 24 starts, much more than can be said about such injury-prone pitchers as Rich Harden, Erik Bedard, and Ben Sheets, who will be competing against him on the SP free agent market.

That being said, Lackey is 31. Although he’s averaged over 4 wins above replacement the last four seasons, expecting that out of a pitcher from his age 31 through age 35 or 36 seasons is irresponsible, and he has suffered injuries twice in the last two years. Lackey is likely looking for a four or five year deal. Over four years, a contract that expects 4 WAR worth of performance is worth roughly 18 million dollars. With the slight discount we usually see on long term contracts, that comes out to a 4 year/64 million dollar deal, or maybe a 5 year/80 million dollar deal.

That’s an awfully substantial risk for a team in any market. We know that Lackey can be a great pitcher, but for any team willing to sign him, they have to be ready to absorb the risks that are incurred with a 4 year commitment to any pitcher, much less one in his mid-30s.