The inevitable finally happened today, as the New York Mets added LF Jason Bay on a four-year deal with a vesting option for a fifth. Bay will, of course, be the next starting left fielder for the Mets and will likely push Fernando Martinez to either the bench or the minor leagues.

This deal definitely improves the Mets’ offense for 2010. Bay’s roughly +30 run bat replaces Martinez’s, which only projects at -5 to -10 runs against average. Bay’s bat combined with Jose Reyes, Carlos Beltran, and David Wright gives the Mets a scary top of the order for opposing pitchers.

That’s about where Bay’s effectiveness ends. Bay’s defense is questionable at best. Even with the park effects with the Green Monster on Boston LFs, it’s hard to imagine Bay as an above average defensive left fielder. UZR has Bay at -54.7 runs over four years, including 1.5 poor years in Pittsburgh. TotalZone thought Bay was decent last year, at +4, but still rates him at -40 runs overall in the last four years. The Fan’s Scouting Report has Bay as a below average LF.

His non-SB baserunning numbers do look decent, as he is roughly a +1 to +2 runner by Baseball Prospectus’s EQBRR statistic. Still, that’s pretty insignificant, and it’s safe to say that his value comes from his batting.

Of course, the real interesting point of the contract is the dollar value. The Mets will pay Bay 66 million dollars over the four guaranteed years of the contract, and the vesting option reportedly pays an amount similar to that 16.5M AAV. Given the current market, $3.5M per WAR, the Mets are expecting 4.5 wins per season out of Bay. Is Jason Bay the type of tier-2 superstar that deserves this contract?

As a 31-year-old with what we tend to call “old people skills” – high power, poor defensive range and average-at-best speed – Bay can be expected to decline at a faster rate than the average player. He has averaged 2.1 wins per season since 2007, although giving higher weight to his better 2008-2009 seasons vs. his replacement-level 2007 gives a weighted average closer to 2.8-3.0 wins, close to the 3.1 wins that the fans have projected him to at the time of this writing. Yes, it’s possible his defense is better than UZR/TZ/FSR think, but it would take a 15-20 run swing in his defensive value to produce market value with this contract. This is without even considering the effect that playing in Citi Field could have on his offensive value.

The Mets can afford to overpay given their place on both the revenue curve and the win curve. However, this contract could really hamstring their situation in 2012/2013 as Bay declines, and it could also severely hamper the development of Fernando Martinez. This move appears to be one of the more significant overpays of the offseason, and it by no means vaults the Mets into the playoffs. Much needs to go the Mets’ way for this contract to work out as planned, and it appears that this is just yet another example of Omar Minaya overpaying for a veteran presence.

So long as you didn’t bring the party too hard over the Christmas holiday, there’s a chance you remember the article I submitted for the readership’s consideration last week. In said article, I roundly praised research conducted by Lookout Landing’s Jeff Sullivan this past August — research in which he explored the relationship between pitcher contact rates and strikeouts. Moreover, I posted a Top 10 Leaderboard of the starting pitchers (50 IP and up) with the best Contact%.

Well, in the comments section of said article, user Toffer Peak brought to our collective attention a study done by user matthan over at DRaysBay. Matthan is the user name of Matt Hanna, and his work is an exciting complement to Sullivan’s as it gives us some idea of the importance of Out-of-Zone Swinging Strikes (OZSwStr%) relative to In-Zone Swinging Strikes (InZSwStr%).

The relevant article provides all the answers your little heart would desire — complete with a Google spreadsheet of every pitcher from last year — but the relevant content for our purposes is this formula that Hanna concludes is the best fit for calculating Expected Strikeout Percentage (eK%). Said formula goes:

eK%=(ClStr%*.9)+(Foul%*.5)+(InPly%*-.9)+(InZSwStr%*1.1)+(OZSwStr%*1.5)

The Adjusted R-Squared is: 91.4%

The surprising result here is the degree to which OZSwStr% is weighted over and above InZSwStr%. Nor does that even account for the fact that the average for OZSwStr% (4.89%) is already about twice as a high as InZSwStr% (2.73%).

Once we adjust for that difference as well, OZSwStr% comes out to roughly 2.5 times more important than InZSwStr%. If I’m being honest, I’ll say right now that that runs counter to what I would’ve guessed. My impression has always been, if a pitcher can throw a pitch past a swinging batter but still place said pitch within the strike zone, then he (i.e. the pitcher) would be truly unhittable. What Hanna’s research suggests is quite the opposite, in fact: A pitcher who is able to induce swings (and misses) at pitches out of the zone is, in fact, most likely to tally big strikeout numbers.

This research is quite relevant to the present interweb site, as FanGraphs carries both O-Contact% and Z-Contact% on every player page and in the leaderboards section.

And though, much like Forrest Gump, I’m not a smart man, I thought it might make sense to create a leaderboard in which O-Contact% (or OZSwStr%) was given its due. To that end, what follows is a Top 10 list of the starting pitchers with 50+ IP who led the league in what I’ll call Adjusted K. In fact, what I did was to find how many standard deviations all such pitchers were from the mean in both O-Contact% and Z-Contact%. I then multiplied the O-Contact% standard deviation by 2.44 and averaged it with the Z-Contact% standard deviation. Here are the results (SDO = Standard Deviations from O-Contact% mean / SDZ = Standard Deviations from Z-Contact% mean):

This list greatly resembles the one we looked at last week — with one exception, that is: Freddy Bloody Garcia. Granted, he only pitched 56 IP through nine starts last year, but it appears to be a skill he’s carried throughout his career, as his 46.5% lifetime mark suggests.

So that’s one thing. Now here’s another question of some interest, I think: Which pitchers posted the biggest O-Contact%/Z-Contact% splits in 2009? In other words, which pitchers are best at getting swinging strikes outside the strike zone despite allowing somewhat frequent contact within it. Truly, this would be a list of pitchers who use their talents most efficiently, getting swings and misses outside of the zone, where they are more valuable. Here’s a list of such pitchers (SD O-Z = Standard Deviation of O-Contact% minus the standard deviation of Z-Contact%):

Some of those guys are what you might describe as a pretty big deal. Carpenter and Wainwright, certainly, were at least part of the Cy Young convo in the National League — and both accomplished the feat while conceding a below-average contact rate on balls in the strike zone.

There are certainly other questions to ask about this work. I’m in Paris right now, though, so I’m probably not gonna ask them for at least a couple days.

General Manager: Omar Minaya
Scouting Director: Rudy Terrasas

FanGraphs’ Top 10 Prospects:
(2009 Draft Picks/International Signees Not Included)

The Major League squad may still look a little rough around the edges but the minor league system is starting to round into shape. The first four players on the list all received consideration for the top spot, while the last six could all face big breakout seasons. The ’09 draft did not infuse much talented into the system.

1. Fernando Martinez, OF, Majors
DOB: October 1988 Bats: L Throws: R
Signed: 2005 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2

Although some have already, it is far too early to give up on Martinez. Just 21 years old, the Dominican outfielder just needs to have a healthy season. When he did get on the field in ’09, he hit .290/.337/.540 with an ISO of .250 as a 20 year old in triple-A. That is pretty darn impressive. He reached his ’08 total in home runs in about half the at-bats. Martinez actually had a career-high OPS of .877 in ’09. He also kept his strikeout rate below 20% at 18.8%, but it would be nice to see more patience at the plate (5.9% walk rate). At the MLB level, he was over-matched and hit just .176/.242/.275 in 95 at-bats. With a career line against southpaws of .237/.308/.392, he has some work to do against lefties. Despite that, he still has a chance to be a very good player.

2. Ike Davis, 1B, Double-A
DOB: March 1987 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2008 1st round – Arizona State University
MLB ETA: Mid-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

A lot of eyebrows were raised (including mine) when Davis hit zero homers in his ’08 debut, which spanned 239 plate appearances. He responded to the criticism in a big way in ’09 and split the year between high-A and double-A while slugging 20 homers and 31 doubles. At the higher level, the first baseman hit .309/.386/.565 in 233 at-bats. He posted a wOBA of .426 and an eye-popping ISO of .256. Davis also showed a willingness to take a walk (11.2 BB%) but his strikeouts started to get out of hand (29.0 K%). He has some work to do against lefties, as seen by his OPS split: .672 against left-handers compared to 1.000 against right-handers. One caution about Davis’ breakout season: He’s a slow-footed player that posted a BABIP of .350 at high-A and .381 in double-A, so we’re likely to see his batting average come down in 2010, especially if the strikeout rate remains high.

3. Jenrry Mejia, RHP, High-A
DOB: October 1989 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2007 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Late-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 90-96 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

Mejia did not turn 20 until after the season ended and he reached double-A as a teenager, which says a lot about his potential. The right-hander began the year in high-A where he posted a FIP of 2.52 and allowed 41 hits in 50.1 innings. He showed good control with a walk rate of 2.86, but that jumped to 4.67 BB/9 in 44.1 double-A innings. His strikeout rate of 7.87 also increased with the promotion, though, to 9.54 K/9. Mejia allowed just two home runs on the season, thanks to a ground-ball rate just shy of 60%, which is outstanding for a flame-thrower. He dominated left-handed batters, as seen by his 10.71 K/9 rate against them, and they hit just .247 against Mejia despite a .354 BABIP. After making just 19 starts in 2009, the talented youngster should open 2010 back in double-A but he could reach the Majors by the end of the season, if needed.

4. Wilmer Flores, SS, Low-A
DOB: August 1991 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2007 non-drafted international free agent (Venezuela)
MLB ETA: Mid-2012 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

Another young player, Flores is just 18 years old and he spent much of the year playing in low-A ball at the age of 17. Overall, he had a ‘foundation year’ with a line of .264/.305/.332 in 488 at-bats. His BABIP was just .305 so we can expect to see a bump in that in the future even though he lacks blazing speed. Flores has raw power, but he posted an ISO of just .068. He needs to show more patience at the plate after posting a walk rate of just 4.3% but he handled the bat well and struck out just 14.8% of the time. Because he profiles as a third baseman down the line, Flores will need to focus on getting stronger and driving the ball more (12.5 LD%) in 2010. He’ll likely be pushed up to high-A this coming year.

5. Jonathon Niese, LHP, Majors
DOB: October 1986 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2005 7th round – Ohio HS
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2
Repertoire: 88-92 mph fastball, cutter, curveball, change-up

Many Mets were cursed by injuries in ’09 and Niese was one of them. A torn hamstring tendon ended his season prematurely in August after he had made just five MLB starts. Despite that fact, Niese left a solid impression after posting a 3.25 FIP in 25.2 innings. His most effective pitch was a newly-honed cutter. Earlier in the season, the southpaw showed his MLB-readiness by posting a 3.38 FIP and 55% ground-ball rate in 94.1 triple-A innings, while also showing good control with a walk rate of 2.48 BB/9. Niese should be healthy and ready to go in spring training so he has a good shot at winning a spot in the MLB starting rotation.

6. Brad Holt, RHP, Double-A
DOB: October 1986 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2008 supplemental 1st round – University of North Carolina – Wilmington
MLB ETA: Late-2010 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 89-94 mph fastball, curveball, splitter

Holt had two distinct seasons in ’09. After a dominating pro debut, he opened ’09 by posting a 3.18 FIP in nine high-A starts. He also posted a strikeout rate of 11.22 and showed solid control (2.70 BB/9). Moved up to double-A, though, Holt struggled with a 5.01 FIP (6.21 ERA) and allowed 58 hits in 58.0 innings, despite a BABIP of just .292. His walk rate rose to 3.57 BB/9 and his strikeout rate plummeted to 6.98 K/9. He also struggled with the long ball (1.40 HR/9), and his ground-ball rate on the season was poor at 38%. Holt, 23, will certainly return to double-A in 2010 and look to conquer the league in his second try.

7. Ruben Tejada, SS, Double-A
DOB: September 1989 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2006 non-drafted international free agent (Panama)
MLB ETA: Mid-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

The organization has been extremely aggressive with the slick-fielding shortstop. Despite hitting just .229/.293/.296 in high-A in ’08, the Mets promoted Tejada to double-A in ’09 and he hit .289/.351/.381 in 488 at-bats. His wOBA jumped from .277 in ’08 to .346 in ’09. He also showed improved base running and was successful in 19 of his 22 attempts. Tejada is a free swinger, who posted a walk rate of 7.0% but struck out just 12.1% of the time. He should move up to triple-A in ’09 but he’s currently blocked by incumbent shortstop Jose Reyes. Luckily for Tejada, the veteran player was injury-prone in ’09. The youngster could also slide over to second base.

8. Josh Thole, C, Triple-A
DOB: October 1986 Bats: L Throws: R
Signed: 2005 13th round – Illinois HS
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3

This converted catcher has his share of doubters, but he’s done nothing but hit over the past two seasons with a batting average above .300. He even received a 17-game trial in the Majors at the end of the season and hit .321/.356/.396 in 53 at-bats. At double-A, Thole hit .328/.395/.422 in 384 at-bats. The left-handed hitter has walked more than he struck out for three straight seasons and posted a BB/K at double-A of 1.24. He doesn’t need to be platooned, as he actually has a better career batting average against southpaws (.317 vs .284). On the down side, Thole has little power and posted an ISO of .094 in the minors and .075 at the MLB level. Defensively, he’s still learning the position but he improved his throwing in ’09 and nabbed 30% of runner trying to steal.

9. Kirk Nieuwenhuis, OF, Double-A
DOB: August 1987 Bats: L Throws: R
Signed: 2008 3rd round – Azusa Pacific University
MLB ETA: Mid-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

Nieuwenhuis’ first full pro season was a success, as he hit .274/.357/.467 in 482 high-A at-bats, while also playing a solid center field. The speedy player also stole 16 bases in 20 attempts and showed surprising power with an ISO of .193. His strikeout rate was high at 28.1% but he offset that a bit with a solid walk rate at 11.1%. He has work to do against southpaws after hitting just .235/.294/.348. The outfielder received an eight-game trial in double-A and he should head back there in 2010.

10. Jeurys Familia, RHP, Low-A
DOB: October 1989 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2007 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Late-2012 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 88-94 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

Familia is a hard-throwing right-hander who is still quite raw. However, despite being basically a one-pitch pitcher in ’09 (the fastball), he more than held his own in low-A ball at the age of 19. In 134.0 innings, he allowed just 109 hits, thanks in part to a .283 BABIP. He showed good control for his age with a walk rate of 3.09 BB/9 and his strikeout rate was modest at 7.32 K/9. His ground-ball rate was just shy of 50% at 48.8%. Familia did not allow a home run to a left-handed hitter all year (217 batters) but his strikeout rate was just 4.83 K/9 against them. If Familia can continue to grow as a pitcher, he could be a real breakout candidate in 2010.

Up Next: The Baltimore Orioles

A while ago, we talked about the marginal value of a win, and how it differs from team to team, changing the calculation on what a team should pay for a given player given what they already have on the roster. The wins that have the largest impact on playoff odds are in the upper-80s, so if you’re a slightly better than .500 club, adding another additional win or two can have a pretty dramatic impact on your chances of playing in October.

For a team that isn’t likely to contend, the marginal value of each win is pretty low, which is one reason why those teams often go young and give prospects a chance to play rather than upgrading the roster with more expensive veterans. However, the win curve has two sides where the marginal value of an additional win is low, and in New York, we may be seeing evidence of how a team responds when their marginal value of a win is way past the peak.

The Yankees have made a bunch of good moves this winter, adding Curtis Granderson, Nick Johnson, and Javier Vazquez to a roster that was the best in baseball a year ago. Their true talent level, as currently constructed, is probably that of a 100 win team. The Yankees are going to be very good in 2010.

So, perhaps we should not be so surprised that New York is bargain shopping in left field, avoiding the likes of Matt Holliday and Jason Bay. They are at the other end of the win curve, and it doesn’t make much sense to spend a lot of money there either. The marginal value of the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd win in terms of playoff odds is really quite small. And that’s approximately the upgrade that Holliday would represent over the current production that Gardner offers in left field.

The Yankees have entered the prime area of significant diminishing marginal utility. They are so good that adding another high quality player doesn’t help them that much in 2010, and because of the long term contract that is required, they’d be risking future flexibility to add wins that may actually matter for an upgrade that just isn’t necessary.

It’s a rational decision made by smart people who understand just how good their roster currently is. In the past, New York has pursued every big ticket free agent on the market because they represented a real, tangible improvement in their quest to bring home another championship. Given how well Brian Cashman has put together this roster, though, a big ticket left fielder is superfluous. He’s right to keep his money locked up. They just don’t need another good player.

Before the start of this season, I wrote a piece that mentioned the toughest pitches to hit in 2008. I them promptly forgot about the data that I had pulled to write that. Now fast forward to a few days ago, when I was again curious about the pitches that garnered the highest percentage of swings and misses. I ended up re-doing my work, but in a vastly more efficient manner (it’s nice to know that I’ve gotten smarter in at least some areas) this time around, so maybe I won’t forget and let this go to waste.

Anyways, last year’s toughest pitch was Ryan Madson’s changeup thrown to same-handed (that is, right-handed) hitters. Back then I broke each pitcher-pitch combo down into four groups, separated by role, starter or reliever, and batter handedness, same or opposite. This time, I am less inclined to do so, preferring to focus on bigger samples and effectiveness spread across platoon situations. I can still break it down like that in the future should the need arise, but for this year’s hardest pitch to hit award, I’m keeping it on the level.

And the winner of that award for 2009 goes to Brandon League. It’s a rather remarkable win, because the pitch in question, a changeup — or, possibly, a splitter — was a new one for League, who up until 2009 was a dominant fastball pitcher that tossed out a slider once in awhile. In 2009, League introduced the splitter pitch and relied on it, using it roughly 35% of the time. And boy did it work. 35% of the time that Brandon League threw that splitter, the hitter swung and missed. It was five percentage points better than the person-pitch in second place, an old friend, Ryan Madson’s changeup, at just under 30%.

Third and fourth place went to Jonathan Broxton and Huston Street‘s sliders, in that order, and Francisco Rodriguez’s changeup rounded out the top five.

At one point or another, everyone has been exposed to the concept of the spring training position battle. Whether it comes down to the fifth rotation slot or the final bench spot, these competitions are always made out to be the stories of the spring. Undoubtedly spring training has lead to some dismissals and promotions over the time, but should it?

Most agree that spring training stats are irrelevant which means the exhibition season is more about process than results. If Gabe Kapler hits .100/.200/.100 – which he basically did last year – it’s not the end of the world as long as he appears in shape and isn’t swinging at everything (or nothing). Pitchers often work on new grips or arm slots – amongst other things that become overhyped as reasons for a potential breakout season – so that 6.50 ERA from the staff ace isn’t concerning. The most common scenarios in which the idea of an open spring competition is used includes:

– Young players looking to crack the roster
– Two players of near equal value
– Non-roster players with a history of success

In each case we have some idea of expectations. Even with younger players we can assume league average performance for some of the top young talents and less from more fringe prospects. The second scenario seems to be the most likely where spring performance can be used while minimizing risk and accounts for the majority of middle reliever battles. Meanwhile, in the final tier, you have guys like Eric Hinske in 2008 coming off a down season. He shows health and no reason to believe the previous season was because of decaying skills and in exchange finds a spot on the 25 man.

I suppose we rely heavily on the past in any situation while weighing the newest information, but not being complete slaves to it. That seems like the way it should be. So maybe teams don’t really make decisions based on 20 games in the springtime, but rather 20 games in the springtime and the x before it.

I would like to make a plea with anyone who plans on writing anything about how a team’s off-season has gone – please, please, please do not treat 2009 as a constant.

This happens all the time. Team X added Player Y but lost Player Z, so they are about the same as they were. Or sometimes it will appear in a slightly different form – the team brought in this guy to replace the big hole they had last year, so with that improvement and no obvious downgrades, they’re going to be even better!

All of these statements presuppose that each team should expect to get something close to equal to the 2009 performance of all the players they are retaining from last year’s roster. But that’s not even remotely close to true, and everyone knows it. We all know about career years and how you have to expect regression after a player does something way outside the ordinary, but regression doesn’t just serve to bring players back to earth after a big year.

Regression “fixes” a lot of problem spots from the prior year, even if the team doesn’t make a serious effort to change out players. The Royals got a .253 wOBA out of their shortstops a year ago. I don’t care how bad you think Yuniesky Betancourt is, you have to expect that number to be higher this year. They didn’t do anything to improve their shortstop position this winter, but the level of production they got from the position in 2009 is not their expected level of production for 2010.

It isn’t just individual players performances, either. Last year, the Phillies had a LOB% of 75.0% despite a pretty mediocre 4.36 FIP as a team. They stranded a ton of base runners, something that is not an easily repeatable skill. They could pitch much better, thanks to the addition of Roy Halladay, and still give up more runs than they did a year ago.

This applies across the board. Injuries, clutch hitting, variance in run distribution – all of these are subject to extreme amounts of regression, and they all had a significant impact on how some teams performed last year, both in terms of “raw” wins and losses and things like runs scored and runs allowed. You cannot just look at a team’s prior year won loss record – or even their pythagorean record – make some adjustments for the off-season transactions, and presume that’s a good enough estimator of true talent for the 2010 team.

However, it’s done all the time. I’m not just talking about mainstream writers here – you’ll see this kind of “analysis” on pretty much every blog and commentary about baseball, sabermetric or otherwise. For whatever reason, it’s become acceptable to just plug in the new guys numbers in place of the old guys numbers and call it a day, pretending like everything else from last year is not going to change at all.

That’s lazy and it’s wrong. Don’t do it.

The Baltimore Orioles have a difficult task ahead of them the next few years with three juggernauts ahead of them in the American League East. However, since Andy MacPhail took over baseball operations in 2007, the Orioles have positioned themselves for a bright future. Part of this is manifested in their crowded, young, and skilled outfield.

The two best players in the outfield are right fielder Nick Markakis (26 in 2010) and center fielder Adam Jones (24). Combining ZiPS, CHONE, and my own projections for offense and Jeff Zimmerman’s UZR projections and CHONE’s TotalZone for defense, Markakis projects as a +21/150 hitter in 2010, and +2 defender in right field for about 3.6 WAR.Jones’ projections vary more widely, but he comes in at about +9/150 hitting, +1 fielding (both Jones and Markakis had surprising down years defensively in 2009) for about 3.2 WAR. Those are the obvious guys. For the remaining outfield spot, the Orioles have three candidates: Nolan Reimold, Felix Pie, and Luke Scott.

The 26 year-old Reimold will probably begin 2010 in left field, assuming he recovers well from ankle surgery. Reimold came on strong in 2009, projecting at about +12/150 offensively. His defense was less impressive, and he projects as a about a -6/150 defender in left field. Overall, that’s about about a league-average player. Still, there’s a lot of uncertainty in his defensive projection, and he is young.

While Reimold is the popular choice to start in left field, it’s not obviously the correct choice. While Felix Pie projects as the worst hitter in the group a -4/150, he’s also as good or better than Jones as a center fielder (+2), which would translate to about +12 in left field. So he projects as about a league average (2.0 WAR) player, and is the second-youngest player in the group (only to Jones). While he probably won’t ever be the superstar people though he would be become before the Cubs started jerking him around (as is their tradition), he’s young, good, and has little enough service time that it’s understandable why other teams are interested in obtaining him, and also why the Orioles have so far refused to sell him for a bag of magic beans.

Scott is the odd man out in this situation, but it’s hardly due to a lack of talent. As a hitter, he projects at +11/150. Despite being primarily a designated hitter in 2009, his past performance in the field suggests that is a waste of his talents, as he projects as +2 in left field — clearly better than Reimold. Overall, that makes Scott about a 2.5 WAR player.

The Orioles are in an enviable position of not only having excess talent in the outfield, but not necessarily having to trade any of them. Scott is an underrated player, but given his age (32), arbitration status, and the Orioles overall situation, he should be the first to go. But it’s not as if his arbitration award will be onerous relative to his value. If he’s willing to move to first base (despite his defensive ability), that would fill a hole for the Orioles. But he might have the most value in trade to a team that needs a left fielder, where his skills are best utilized as a 2-2.5 WAR outfielder rather than a 1-1.5 WAR DH.

Pie is the wildcard, as he’s barely older than Jones, and perhaps the most defensively skilled player of the group. Baltimore has understandably committed to Jones in center given his superior bat (although Pie has better plate discipline). While Reimold is the popular choice to start in left, Pie’s far superior defensive skills make him more than just a fourth outfielder. For the future, the Orioles might be best off trading Pie and/or Scott for prospects and/or filling another area of need in the majors. On the other hand, especially in Pie’s case, he’s young, cheap, and skilled enough that they don’t have to trade him, and can certainly find something for him to do around the office. Not many teams find themselves in such a comfortable situation.

Click here to enter your projections for the Orioles various outfielders.

Frank Wren’s modus operandi to the 2010 offseason: Replace younger, healthier players with older, more injury prone players. He’s not a doctor, but he plays one in real life. Actually, I’m not here to pick on Wren. You can make arguments for all of his acquisitions this offseason. But seriously, this is getting weird.

Last week Wren traded Javier Vazquez and essentially replaced him with Tim Hudson. Hudson threw a grand total of 42 innings last season for the Braves, and it was enough to convince him to re-sign him to a 3-year/$28 million deal. That pretty much sealed Vazquez’s fate as a Brave, as no one was interested in picking up Derek Lowe’s ugly contract. Vazquez has thrown over 200 innings the past four seasons, averaging 5.3 WAR per season during that span. Hudson has been a 5+ WAR pitcher four different times over his career, and the success rate of Tommy John surgery is pretty good. This might work out just fine, and at least the Braves got a decent return for Vazquez.

The Braves also replaced 30-year-old Rafael Soriano with 38-year-old Billy Wagner, who is also is coming off of Tommy John surgery. Soriano was a 2 WAR reliever in 2009 but has a checkered injury history of his own. Still, he showed us last season what he is capable of. Soriano surprisingly accepted arbitration, but the Braves had no trouble finding a taker for his services, swapping him to Tampa Bay for Jesse Chavez.

Now the Braves are replacing Adam LaRoche with Troy Glaus. Glaus is reported to have signed for a $2 million deal, with incentives. The deal is pending a physical, but the well-respected Dr. Lewis Yocum has already given the thumbs up on Glaus’ surgically repaired shoulder to interested parties. It’s worth noting that it was more than just Troy’s shoulder that limited him to just 14 games last season; he also experienced troubles with his back.

Glaus will play first base with the Braves, which should help health-wise. When he’s right, he is plenty productive. Over his career, his wRC+ is 123, and in his last healthy season Glaus posted a 131 wRC+ with the Cardinals in 2008. For the money, this is a nice upside play in an iffy 1B market for Wren and Co. On the flip-side, they’re obviously showing that they are not counting on a whole lot from Glaus.

I’m seeing a lot of roster-churning going on, but I’m not sure I’m seeing a lot of progress. If anything, it looks like they’ve taken a step back. Jason Heyward could go Cameron Maybin on the Braves, Matt Diaz may not be able to handle regular duty, and Glaus, Wagner and Hudson are all too familiar with the disabled list.

The Braves were in shouting distance of the wild card last year. If they want to send Bobby Cox out a winner, filling their needs with a bunch of injury-risks in hopes of improving seems like an “interesting” way to go about accomplishing that task. Considering some of the alternatives, it might have been the best, but definitely not the safest approach. It will be interesting to see how it all plays out.

It is not very controversial to state that “Moneyball” was a divisive book. Michael Lewis wrote some things that can only be interpreted as denigrating to the scouting community, painting a picture of an out-of-touch collection of old men being replaced by smarter, better analysts. It should have been no surprise that people who considered themselves scouts, or had a lot of respect for the profession, were offended by some of the stuff Lewis wrote.

I wonder how different the book would be if it written today, though, because we are currently in the midst of a market correction based on statistical analysis agreeing with long held scouting beliefs. Defense is at a premium while high strikeout sluggers are struggling to find offers, and this charge is being led by the “smart teams” that Lewis would espouse are doing things the right way.

The Mariners focus on defense under Jack Zduriencik is a well known story by now. But, they aren’t the only ones heading that direction. The Boston Red Sox signed Mike Cameron to replace Jason Bay and have made their interest in Adrian Beltre well known. The A’s signed Coco Crisp and currently have an outfield with three center fielders penciled in as starters. Defensive specialists Adam Everett, Alex Gonzalez, Jack Wilson, Placido Polanco, and Pedro Feliz have all signed, while the guys who provide value with their bats are still sitting on the market.

The teams that use statistical analysis the most are doing what their scouts have been recommending for years. Stats geeks are validating the insights of scouts. If Lewis was following the game right now, documenting stories from inside a “smart” front office, the tone would have to be dramatically different, even if the point was still the same – good teams spend money on undervalued assets.

Timing really is everything. That Lewis chose to write the book when on base percentage was undervalued created a division between stats and scouting that simply would not exist if the book was written today. With the new found appreciation for defense and its place in a player’s total value, stats and scouts agree more than they disagree at the moment.

Perhaps the subtitle for the sequel to Moneyball should be “Why The Fat Scout Was Right All Along”.