“There is little if any difference among major-league pitchers in their ability to prevent hits on balls hit in the field of play.” If you’re reading this site, I imagine these are not foreign words to you, as I’m quoting from Voros McCracken’s first article outlining his famous DIPS theory. With that sentence, pitching evaluation was changed forever. But, I do find it interesting that McCracken limited himself to “major-league pitchers,” as his findings surely represent a universal truth in baseball.

Yesterday, I began my writing at FanGraphs with the assertion that right-handed sinker-throwing prospects are a breed inherently undervalued by the conventions of Minor League prospect coverage. They do not throw hard, they do not strike people out, and they do not possess a ceiling. These are not power pitchers that need to be coddled and have their command harnessed, because for a right-handed worm-burner to be drafted, some semblance of secondary skills must be present. This is merely a group of prospects that relies on their fielders’ ability “to prevent hits on balls hit in the field of play” more than any other type of prospect. Simply: they are underrated because they are most dependent on inexperienced fielders.

In the Major Leagues, fielders seem to routinely turn about 69% of balls in play into outs. Last year, I wrote an article that found the 2008 NCAA Division I average defensive efficiency to be 61.7%. This difference, I don’t have to tell you, is astronomical, and varies even further on a team-to-team basis. My article focused some on the notion that the “what have you done for me lately” aspect of scouting is susceptible to underrating a pitcher because his defense doesn’t get to balls and runs cross the plate. The response I heard from Major League executives seemed to validate this theory.

If scouts are making this mistake at the college level, then I have no qualms accusing prospect evaluators (big note here: myself included!) of doing the same with Minor League pitchers. To reinforce the notion that a hit in Peoria isn’t the same as a hit in Chicago, I calculated the Defensive Efficiency of each full season league for the past five years. I should note these figures will be slightly inflated, as it just seems impossible to weed out batted ball errors from the total figure. Still, that would only have an incremental effect on these numbers, which show that fielding gets better as you move up the ladder and get more experienced defenders behind you.

League               DER
Midwest              .6495
South Atlantic       .6461
California           .6348
Carolina             .6589
Florida State        .6566
Eastern              .6642
Southern             .6614
Texas                .6595
International        .6660
Pacific Coast        .6571

Obviously, the altitude and park effects present in the California and Pacific Coast Leagues skew their data a bit, but it’s clear that a pitcher should expect a better defense with each promotion in the Minor Leagues. And as such, the baseline H/9 that we judge pitch-to-contact pitchers by should be higher in the lower levels. If a sinkerball pitcher is getting his ground balls, regardless of the outcome, he is doing his job. A player with an identical percentage of ground balls in play at each level is simply going to have more success to the most advanced level he is assigned.

I’ll close out with an example. Rick Porcello is, without question, one of the most talented players I chose for my sinkerballers sampler. He’s a guy that no one really underrated, but he’s a prime example of the defensive difference between High-A and Major League Baseball, given that he made the jump in just one year. In 2008, Porcello posted a 3.83 FIP with the Lakeland Tigers. He had a ridiculous 64.1 groundball percentage, a 25.2 flyball percentage, and a 8.3 line drive percentage. Using David Appelman’s expected BABIP formula for pitchers, Porcello should have had a .252 BABIP. It was .280. In the Majors, he essentially gave up 10% of his groundballs and turned them into line drives, as he faced a hugely more talented group of hitters. His expected BABIP at the Major League level was a still respectable .298. But the Detroit Tigers defense gave him a .281 BABIP.

There were no significant differences in Porcello’s stuff between 2008 and 2009. But the reason he was able to make such a fascinating transition so seamlessly was because his pitching style is just as suited for the benefits of a Major League defense (as compared to a High-A one) as it is for the trade-off of facing an average High-A hitter compared to a Major League one. With the emergence of batted ball data in the Minor Leagues, the influx of support in DIPS theory and the importance of defense, using hit rates to evaluate sinkerballers should soon become a thing of the past. We’ll see where Major League Baseball teams have made this mistake when I analyze the Minor League commonalities of my sinkerballer sample group tomorrow.

On Monday, Dan Uggla agreed to a 7.8 million dollar contract for 2010, avoiding a second year of arbitration. This makes Uggla the highest paid player on the Marlins heading into 2010. Uggla has proven to be a valuable asset over the years – our dollar values have him as being worth at least 10 million dollars each year of his career, and both CHONE and the fans have projected him to be worth over 3 wins, which would put his free agent market value for this year at somewhere between 10.5 and 12 million dollars, based on the current state of the free agent market.

So it seems like the Marlins are getting a pretty solid discount on Uggla, even if it is slightly above the 60% discount for second year arb-eligible players that we usually see. Still, rumors are persistent that the Marlins will attempt to move Uggla before the season starts, despite the pressure from the MLB and the MLBPA to increase payroll.

The main reason for this is that Uggla is a poor fit for this Marlins team. At second base, Uggla is a poor defender. His career UZR/150 is -3, and he’s had two -9 or worse seasons in the past three years, suggesting that his true talent is actually closer to his CHONE-projected defensive value of -7. He’s still valuable, as a 3-win player, but the Marlins have better options in their system.

Right now, the Marlins have Chris Coghlan in LF, but he is a natural second baseman, who put up slightly above average TotalZone numbers in the minors at 2B (+3 overall from 2007-2009). Coghlan is projected to be a roughly average corner outfielder, and he would also likely be roughly average at 2B as well. Given that the position adjustment for 2B is about a win higher than that for LF, that adds about a win to Coghlan’s value, taking him from about 2.3 WAR/150G to 3.3 WAR/150G.

If we take Uggla out of the picture and move Coghlan to 2B, the Marlins likely move Brett Carroll into either LF or RF. Carroll is a very solid defender with a weak bat, and CHONE projects him at about roughly 1.0 WAR per 150 G. Alejandro De Aza is projected favorably by CHONE and could compete for a job in this scenario – he’s projected to be a roughly average hitter and a good defender in the corner, worth about 2.0 WAR per 150 G [EDIT: De Aza was claimed by the White Sox on waivers.]

If we split the difference here and say that that the Marlins could get 1.5 WAR out of LF and 3.3 WAR out of 2B without Uggla, and they get about 2.3 WAR out of LF and 3.1 WAR out of 2B with Uggla, then that’s a difference of only 0.6 wins. Uggla could possibly shift to first base, displacing Gaby Sanchez (projected for about 1.1 WAR/150G) and play average defense, which would be worth about 2.3 WAR due to the position adjustment. Again, though, this significantly lowers Uggla’s value to the Marlins to a point where his value is certainly higher to the rest of the league.

With the 8 million dollars cleared by Uggla, the Marlins could sign a SP like Joel Pineiro, Erik Bedard, or Ben Sheets, who would move into the rotation immediately and nearly his full value over replacement would be realized. It’s possible that they would still have money to spend on their weak corner IF spots then, and could possibly replace Jorge Cantu with Joe Crede or Sanchez with Russell Branyan, and that’s even before accounting for the possible value they could acquire by trading Uggla.

If the Marlins move Uggla, cries of penny-pinching will likely arise. However, we must wait and see what they would do after a trade before we can truly make this judgment. Dan Uggla has more value to other teams than he does to Florida, and as such the prudent move for Florida is to move this asset.

Looking back on it, the winter of 2006 might go down as the worst offseason of all time concerning free agent pitchers. A smattering of the contracts signed that winter:

Danys Baez – 3 years, $19 million. Produced -0.5 WAR.
Miguel Batista – 3 years, $25 million. Produced 1.3 WAR.
Adam Eaton – 3 years, $24.5 million. Produced 0 WAR.
Keith Foulke – 1 year, $5 million. Didn’t throw a pitch.
Orlando Hernandez – 2 years, $12 million. Produced 0.9 WAR.
Kei Igawa – 5 years, $20 million plus $26 million posting fee. Produced -0.2 WAR so far.
Daisuke Matsuzaka – 6 years, $52 million plus $51 million posting fee. Produced 7.7 WAR so far.
Guillermo Mota – 2 years, $5 million. Produced 0.1 WAR.
Mark Mulder – 2 years, $13 million. Produced -0.4 WAR.
Vicente Padilla – 3 years, $34 million. Produced 4.5 WAR.
Jason Schmidt – 3 years, $47 million. Produced 0 WAR.
Scott Schoeneweis – 3 years, $10.8 million. Produced -1.5 WAR.
Justin Speier – 4 years, $18 million. Produced -0.2 WAR, released in 2009.
Jeff Suppan – 4 years, $42 million. Produced 1.6 WAR so far.
Jamie Walker – 3 years, $12 million. Produced -0.6 WAR.
Jeff Weaver – 1 year, $8.5 million. Produced 1 WAR.
Woody Williams – 2 years, $12.5 million. Produced -0.1 WAR.
Barry Zito – 7 years , $126 million, full no trade clause. Produced 5.3 WAR so far.

Kudos to the Cubs for Ted Lilly, and half kudos I guess to the Royals for Gil Meche. Though based on their subsequent track record, and given the information known at the time, I’m betting that they simply got lucky with Meche’s 2007 and 2008.

That’s a grand total of 18.9 wins, thanks in large part to Barry Zito and Daisuke Matsuzaka, who have produced 13 WAR so far. For that, teams have paid roughly $440 million dollars in contract value so far, with Zito, Igawa, Matsuzaka and Suppan still active. That’s a whopping $23 million per marginal win. If you take out Zito and Daisuke then you’re left with 5.9 wins and about $314 million spent for an earth-shattering $53 million per win.

The Dodgers avoided arbitration with two of their brightest young players today by signing Jonathan Broxton and Andre Ethier to a duo of two-year deals. Let’s take a look at each situation.

Broxton is one of the best relievers in baseball. This represents his second year of arbitration, which means the Dodgers have set their price for his final arbitration-eligible season as well. Broxton will make $11M total. Papelbon is also in his second year of arbitration and he agreed to a new contract worth $9.35M. If the Dodgers motivation was to avoid an arbitration award similar to Papelbon’s $6.5M last season, then they did a pretty fantastic job.

Broxton has 317 career innings, a 2.92 ERA, and a 2.83 xFIP. Batters miss his pitches at a high frequency and when they do put it in play, it’s generally a groundball. He’s basically the perfect reliever. Even if you think WAR and the WAR-to-dollars translation generally leave high-leverage relievers undervalued, Broxton’s last three years average is around $9.3M. 60% of that is a little under $6M. And this is without noting that Broxton wasn’t a full-time closer until this season.

Ethier is actually in his second year of arbitration too, but he actually has an additional two remaining since he reached Super-Two status last year. He will make roughly $15M over the next two years, which works out to an average of ~$7.5M – or depending on the cost of a win, 1.5-to-2 wins – he’s been good for that every year of his Majors career. He turns 28 next season and it seems unlikely he’ll be -16 runs in the outfield again.

I don’t know who this R.J. Anderson character thinks he is, but if he’s under the impression that I’m just gonna sit back and let him destroy FanGraphs all alone, he’s got another thing coming his way. No, if FanGraphs is going to be ruined by a series of highly speculative posts almost entirely devoid of advanced metrics, I’m going to have a say in it. Consider this my riposte, Anderson!

In the event that you didn’t read Anderson’s post yesterday, go for it: it’s a free country and nobody’s stopping you.

In the more likely event that you’re already mesmerized by my prose styling and must keep reading straight through to the end, here’s an outline of Anderson’s article: First, he looks at some Tampa Bay attendance figures and finds that many more fans go to see the Rays play the Yankers and Sox than the Orioles. Then he discusses how we can assume generally that a win is more fun to watch than a loss. He then wonders why, if wins are more fun to see, why Rays’ fans might go to those types of games and not games against, for example, the Orioles.

What Anderson’s post and a number of the more thoughtful comments that follow it bring to light is something that many of us have probably intuited: that the quality of the visiting team matters considerably as we evaluate how best to spend our baseballing dollar. Of course, in some cases — as with the Red Sox-Yankees matchups — the presence of a heated rivalry provides an extant narrative that ensures drama and creates an atmosphere of excitement. In other cases — such as a visit from the Yankees or Red Sox or any perennial contender — the prospect of beating a talented team is the draw.

Commenter Chris addresses this point concisely, admirably:

I go for the highest upside. Seeing a game a team is ’supposed to win’ means that anything less than a win is super disappointing and a win is expected. Seeing your team play the best, even if there is a lower probability of leaving with a win, allows for a much higher euphoria when they do win.

This is why mediocre college basketball teams that host the #1 team in the country get the best attendance – because the win means a rush of the court and great excitement.

In fact, at the very moment that Anderson submitted his article, I was losing some of my money at Portland Meadows — i.e. Portland, Oregon’s finest (and, not so coincidentally, only) venue for live thoroughbred racing. The appeal of horseracing is almost entirely based on the prevalence of victories of the high-upside variety. Consider first that each race is itself composed of seven or eight or more horses, thus creating a situation where even a heavily favored horse must contend with many variables. Moreover, horseracing allows one to make any number of longshot-type bets, such as Superfectas or Pick Fours, where, though the chances of winning are low, the sweetness of victory is, uh, really sweet. Though baseball’s underdog triumphs are less surprising, they at least provide a similar pleasure.

Finally, a number of the commentariat suggested that they are most interested in attending games that will feature specific players — regardless of whether said player belongs to his (i.e. the fan’s) team or not. Certainly, some players are bigger draws than others. In particular, starting pitchers — Felix Hernandez, for example — seem to exert a particularly strong influence over the baseballing imagination.

Of course, as fans, we have almost no control over our own team’s personnel (a fact that is all-too real for residents of the Paris of the Plains). However, by picking and choosing games by opposition roster, we are, in a sense, exercising our somewhat limited powers to construct the ideal team.

I’ve seen — in some of my electronic travels — I’ve seen the term “rosterbation” used to describe the act of re-arranging a team’s roster to reflect a fan’s preferences. I disapprove of this term (i.e. rosterbation) on account of it forces me to think about private parts. As a Christian Gentleman, I spend a great deal of time and effort pretending that private parts do not exist, and such a term makes it difficult for me to persist in my illusion.

That said, I approve highly of the act itself — that is, of dreaming about and re-arranging rosters. But I believe it is best used not merely to address our favorite teams’ rosters, but a sort of platonic roster, composed entirely of ideal players.

To that end, I plan on unveiling soon, in these electronic pages, something that I plan on calling The All-Joy Team. (The Mark Fidrych All-Stars is another possibility — in honor of the all-time single season leader in joy.) While personal taste is obviously inherent to any such enterprise of this description, I believe that most FanGraphs readers will agree on the five criteria that I suggested back when it was warm outside.

A member of the All-Joy Team will probably be:

1. An MLB player whose advanced metrics (i.e. EqA, wOBA, VORP, UZR – really anything that attempts to improve upon AVG, HR, and RBIs) suggest greater production than is commonly perceived.

2. An MLB player whose peripheral numbers (i.e. xFIP, PrOPS, tRA) suggest greater production in near future.

3. Either an MLB part-timer or older (27 and up) minor leaguer whose production suggests probable success in expanded MLB role.

4. A younger (under 27) minor leaguer, but not top prospect, whose minor league numbers suggest success at the MLB level.

5. A player who demonstrates vigorously what Americans, quoting French poorly, call je ne sais quoi.

When will this All-Joy Team appear? Probably Thursday, provided that Anderson doesn’t give me any more reasons to fly off the handle.

Moreover, any nominations will gladly be accepted below, and will be given consideration directly proportional to the civility and enthusiasm with which they are proposed.

[Edit in response to The Boomer’s comment: I didn’t mention specifically that the players would be composed of current players, but that’s what I meant. That said, an All-Time All-Joy Team would also be an interesting project. I’m just not sure I’m smart/old enough to pull it off.]

Fangraphs shows 220 non-pitchers with Fan forecasts. The total WAR of those players forecasted is 685 wins. With my personal forecasts, I have those exact players at 496 wins.

Seeing that all non-pitchers in 2009 came in at just under 600 wins, and seeing that there were nearly 700 non-pitchers in 2009 (meaning that there are plenty of players still left to be forecasted), my personal forecast probably serves as a reasonable baseline.

On that basis, Fans are expecting 38% more marginal wins than will be generated. That works out so that the average team wins about 94 games.

Hope truly springs eternal, as everyone thinks they are a playoff contender. Not to worry though. At some point, the Fan forecasts will be recalibrated to knock out the optimism, so that the total WAR (nonpitchers + pitchers) will come in around 1000.

General Manager: Michael Hill
Farm Director: Brian Chattin
Scouting Director: Stan Meek

2006-2009 Draft Results:
First three rounds included
x- over-slot signees ($200,000 or more)

2009 1st Round: Chad James, LHP, Oklahoma HS
2. Bryan Berglund, RHP, California HS
3. Marquise Cooper, OF, California HS

The draft spending was kept in check in ’09. The club still nabbed a couple of interesting arms in the first two rounds in James and Berglund. The former player saw his stock rise quite a bit during the prep season and his fastball jumped into the low 90s, while he already featured a good, if not plus, curveball. James did not make an appearance in pro ball after signing and he should begin his career in extended spring training and then, likely, rookie ball. Berglund also did not make his debut in ’09 and, like James, his stock rose quite a bit during his senior year of high school. His fastball crept into the low-90s, but it has yet to remain there with an consistency.

Cooper is a raw athlete, who played both baseball and football in high school. He hit .193/.317/.259 in 140 at-bats. Just 5’9”, power will likely never be his game (.057 ISO), but he does have speed to burn despite getting caught stealing four times in 10 attempts.

2008 1st Round: Kyle Skipworth, C, California high school
2. Brad Hand, LHP, Minnesota HS
3. Edgar Olmos, LHP, California HS
8x – Isaac Galloway, OF, California HS

Skipworth has been a disappointment. He hit just .208/.263/.348 for an ugly wOBA of .278 in 264 at-bats in low-A ball in ’09. His strikeout rate was an alarming 34.5%. The catcher also threw out just 20% of base runners. The good news: He’s still just 19.

Hand had a nice debut but he struggled a bit in his first full season by allowing 130 hits in 127.2 innings. His walk rate also jumped to 4.65 BB/9. On the positive side, he posted a good strikeout rate at 8.60 K/9 and his ground-ball rate was just shy of 50%. Injuries have prevented Olmos from realizing his potential. The 19 year old has appeared in just four starts since signing in ’08. In those 10.2 innings, though, he’s allowed just six hits with 14 strikeouts.

Galloway sneaks onto the Top 10 list due to his potential and an overall lack of depth in the system. Daniel Jennings (9th round) could prove to be a useful bullpen arm and he reached double-A in ’09.

2007 1st Round: Matt Dominguez, 3B, California high school
2. Mike Stanton, OF, California HS
3. Jameson Smith, C, California CC

The club scored some good value in this draft with both Dominguez and Stanton showing up on the Top 10 list. Fourth rounder Bryan Petersen, an outfielder, also made the list. Smith reached high-A in ’09 but he hit just .243/.333/.318 in 148 at-bats. He has shown little power (.074 ISO) and his strikeout rate is still too high despite hitting a career low this past season of 21.6%.

2006 1st Round: Brett Sinkbeil, RHP, Missouri State
1S. Chris Coghlan, IF/OF, Mississippi
2. Tom Hickman, OF, Georgia HS
3. Torre Langley, C, Georgia HS
3. Scott Cousins, OF, San Francisco

Sinkbeil has been a disappointment and still posted a 6.15 ERA in ’09 despite moving to the bullpen in triple-A. He allowed 106 hits in 82.0 innings of work. He also had a walk rate of 4.83 BB/9 and a strikeout rate of 5.60 K/9. On the plus side, the club made up for that pick with the addition of Coghlan, the National League’s Rookie of the Year. Eventually, though, he’ll under-perform for a left-fielder and is much better suited to second base once the club can shed Dan Uggla’s contract.

Cousins has out-performed both players and squeaked onto the Top 10 list.

Hickman has yet to show much life with the bat, mainly due to his perennial +30% strikeout rate. Langley hit just .223/.261/.391 in 229 low-A at-bats in ’09 and did himself no favors with a walk rate of 4.6%. If he can show a little more control, Jay Buente (14th round) could see some time in middle relief in the Majors, thanks to his good strikeout rate (8.26 K/9) and ground-ball rate (54%). He has a low-90s fastball and a splitter.

Up Next: The Florida Marlins Top 10 Prospects

The Mariners have reportedly agreed to a 5 year, $78 million contract extension for Felix Hernandez. Mariner fans (including this one) are obviously thrilled with the deal from an emotional standpoint. We’ve been attached to King Felix since he was 17, and after watching the likes of Randy Johnson, Ken Griffey Jr, and Alex Rodriguez depart, it is refreshing to see the team finally lock up a superstar to a long term deal.

But, I’ll keep my celebrating to a minimum over here. Let’s take a look at this deal from the perspective of what Hernandez surrendered by signing this deal.

As a second year arbitration eligible player, Felix was in line for a significant paycheck with or without this contract. Based on his 2009 salary of $3.8 million, his performance last season, and what comparable (yet still inferior) pitchers got in their second arbitration year, he would have been expected to come in around $9 or $10 million in salary for 2010.

So, in reality, his 5 year, $78 million deal is more like 4 years and $68 million, because he was already getting the first 10 million. Or something really close to it. How does $68 million over the next four years, or about $16.5 million per season, compare to what we think he would have gotten had he not signed this deal?

Given a realistic projection for his performance, you’re looking at something like a $15 million payout in arbitration next year if he stays healthy. Even if he gets hurt (non-labrum tear category), he’s likely looking at another $10M-ish payout, as we’ve seen teams offer arbitration to players like Brandon Webb and Erik Bedard even coming off lost seasons, because the upside is high enough to justify a one year contract.

Alternately, a healthy Felix could have opted to sign long term next year, following in the steps of Johan Santana in buying out his free agent years at the end of his fifth full season. Johan got 6 years, $137 million. Felix doesn’t have Santana’s track record, but he’s younger and has better raw stuff, so you’d have to think an extension after next season would have been in that neighborhood.

To buy his long term security a year earlier in an attempt to avoid what happened to players like Bedard, Webb, and Ben Sheets, Felix signed at a pretty significant discount. He turned ~$20 to $25 million in payouts plus free agency at age 25 (or $10 million in payouts plus a ~$20M/year AAV extension in a year) in exchange for about $53 million over his first three free agent years.

$17 to $18 million a year for three free agent years is a really large discount over what his expected payouts for those years would have been in in the future. He sold the risk of injury in 2010 for probably something between $5 and $10 million per season from 2012 to 2014.

Given the risks inherent with pitching, it’s understandable. Felix’s family is now set for life. But he left a pretty decent amount of money on the table by signing now. Not that I’m complaining.

We’re really excited to introduce you to the newest writer to join the FanGraphs team – Bryan Smith. He’s covered minor league and college baseball for nearly every site on the planet, and we’re thrilled that this will be his new home. Please welcome him to the site.

Brad Bergesen was not the most exciting player that had his Major League debut with the Baltimore Orioles last season. Not even close. When Bergesen was called up in late April, the fan base was too busy anticipating Matt Wieters arrival to notice. His season-ending injury was suffered in late July, one day after Chris Tillman made his debut, and six days before Brian Matusz would follow suit. The minor league strikeout numbers of David Hernandez and Jason Berken surely held more promise for Orioles fans.

A lot of blue-chip players debuted for the Orioles last season, ushering in a new era of trust in the farm system. Of all those players, Brad Bergesen was the most valuable. The 2.3 WAR he accumulated in 19 starts was more than those other pitchers combined, and still managed to top Wieters and Nolan Reimold. Bergesen, amazingly, was the Orioles’ Rookie of the Year.

Now, I don’t believe that when it’s all said and done, Bergesen will end up as the career WAR leader of this esteemed group. But even within his small sample size of success, I think there is a lesson to be learned for those of us that follow (and report on) Minor League Baseball. I use Bergesen as a very particular example as I begin my first project here at FanGraphs. I posit that no type of minor leaguer is typically as undervalued as the right-handed sinker-slider brigade, for a couple reasons: 1) the sheer number of them gives the notion they are fungible, 2) they don’t light up radar guns or strikeout columns and, most importantly, 3) their success depends upon the inexperienced eight players in the field.

More than three years ago, I wrote an article for The Hardball Times predicting eight breakout prospects for the 2007 season. (I ask you to ignore the article so as not to become blinded by my Eric Campbell infatuation). One of the diamonds in the rough in the piece was Vince Mazzaro, coming off his debut season in the minor leagues: 5.05 ERA, 11.0 H/9, 6.1 K/9. But armed with the knowledge that he had a solid sinker, and quoting his .320 BABIP and 62.4 LOB%, I saw someone that would improve as his defenses did.

After his first 17 Major League starts yielded replacement level results, Mazzaro probably shouldn’t serve as my credibility-defining example. But his progression up the minor league ladder, from “bust” to 2008 Texas League Pitcher of the Year, serves as an interesting narrative to begin this series. I plan to isolate a sample of Major League sinkerballers, define their minor league commonalities, and use this information to help us recognize a different breed of prospects. The criteria I used to isolate the sinker guys was as follows:

— At least 40 IP in 2009.
— At least a 50% groundball percentage in 2009.
— Neither left-handed, nor right-handed with an average fastball above 93.0.
— And then I used my eyes to do things like eliminate the side-armed Cla Meredith’s of the world.

I want to clarify my third criteria. When a scout sees a player, there’s no question a few traits will inspire a little bias off the bat. You’ll find that all scouts love lefties that can touch even 90 mph, especially lefties with the kind of control that sinker/slider guys possess. Paul Maholm and Marc Rzepczynski don’t have better stuff than the guys in my sample, but because they were left-handed, they were a lot more noticed at the college level. The velocity requirement is similar: Fausto Carmona could get by in the minor leagues at times solely based on his velocity — and scouts held him up as a prospect as a result of velocity + movement.

So, with all that out of the way, I whittled down a nice sample of sinkerballers. We have 24 in all, complete with guys you would expect, like Derek Lowe, or Aaron Cook, or Chien-Ming Wang. And also a whole lot of guys who are, yes, fungible (I’ll leave the whole list in the comments). Still, the job of a prospect reporter is to identify as many up-and-coming Major Leaguers as possible — even the guys capable of just 40 decent innings. Prospect coverage can get better, and I see sinkerballers as a fine place to start.

Final Note: I’m thrilled to say that I’m joining David Appelman’s fantastic outfit here at FanGraphs for the indefinite future. I’m very pleased to be joining friends of mine, like, Dave Cameron and Erik Manning, and just as pleased to be joining the company of guys I admire, like, well the rest of this staff. If you’d like to get a hold of me, please try bsmithwtny AT gmail, or I’m going to try this Twitter thing again with the @bsmithwtny handle. Thanks!

With arbitration filings coming up and settlements flying in, today would be a good day to examine the early returns on arbitration eligible players. Many teams appeared to believe that arbitrators would not be giving the same type of discounts versus free agent rates as they have in recent years, given the rules of arbitration combined with the struggling economy. Now, with some numbers in, we can evaluate that claim.

Following are tables showing the settled salaries for arb-eligible players as of Monday night. For reference, “eqFAyrs” are the equivalent free agent years purchased in this contract. Arbitration in the past has tended to award 40% of FA market value in year 1, 60% in year 2, and 80% in year 3. So for third-year eligible players, a one-year contract is buying .8 equivalent free agent years, or eqFAyrs. The column “actYrs” simply shows the actual amount of years the contract covers. The “chWAR” field is WAR as projected by CHONE. Finally, we have “eq$/war,” which is $/war with the discount factored in, and “act$/war,” which is just salary divided by projected WAR. Each * after a player’s name means they were signed to a multi-year deal, with as many extra years as *s present.

Here are the third-year arbitration eligible players.

No major surprises here. There are some overpays (Heilman, Santiago), and some good deals (Gaudin, Gerut, De La Rosa, Correia). Overall, this market is very much in line with the overall free agent market, which is hovering somewhere between $3.5M and $4.0M per marginal win, as shown by the 3.44 eq$/WAR total for this group. At 2.75 act$/WAR, this group is still a good discount.

The second-year arbitration eligible market is more interesting.

Even looking at act$/WAR here, this group is hardly even a discount, at 3.2M. This group is seeing the type of raise that we would have expected without the economic collapse – a raise from $4.4M/WAR in 2009 to $4.8M/WAR in 2010 would have followed normal trends. These players are overall slightly better than the third-year arb group, but not by a significant amount. It appears that these players are either getting raises or are having their salaries stay constant as a result of high arbitration rewards in the 2009 offseason, and the arbitration rules are making the process less of a discount for the teams.

Finally, we have the first-year arbitration players.

This group is more in line with the free agent market and the third-year arbitration eligible group. As this group does not have any high arbitration rewards to serve as a lower bound for next year’s salary, this seems to follow. These players are generally a fantastic deal, coming in overall at only $1.58M per marginal win, somewhere near 40% of their free agent market value, as expected.

So far, we’ve seen two groups act as expected and the second-year arbitration eligible players showing up as a bit of a market irregularity. It will be interesting to see if this is corrected when arbitration hearings and settlements are complete, and it will be interesting to see if the other groups remain as they are as we proceed through the offseason.