Lots of good comments in the post yesterday about things we’d like to learn about baseball. I’d like to expand on a few of the ideas, and maybe we can flesh out some thoughts to pursue, or at least plan to pursue them once we figure out how. The most intriguing ones, to me, were based on the concepts of performance being affected by teammates.

There were three suggestions that got at this kind of relationship, in different ways.

1. Catcher defense/pitch sequencing
2. Defense’s impact on developing a pitcher
3. Line-up synergy

In all three of these concepts, the idea is that one player is significantly impacted by the presence of another player. In general, statistical analysis doesn’t really account for any scenarios like that at the moment. We kind of throw our hands up in the air when it comes to catcher defense, and we create player projections in a context neutral environment and then add minor adjustments for things like park effects, but leave it at that.

From a practical standpoint, that’s okay for now. We don’t have any evidence that we should be doing anything differently, and you can’t just make up an adjustment for something that may or may not exist. But it’s not much of a stretch to think that there may be some kind of effects here that we’re missing.

The catcher/pitcher stuff is obviously ripe ground for study. With the accumulation of Pitch F/x data, we’re starting to get to the point where we can get some legitimate sample sizes, and start comparing what one catcher calls to others. We can look at trends of pitch usage and look for sequences of pitches that may be more effective than others. I think there’s a lot to be discovered in this area, and I’d expect it to be one of the major areas of study for statistical analysts in the next few years.

The interaction between a pitcher and his defense may be a little harder to study, but is also worth doing. Vince Gennaro, a professor at Columbia and a consultant to a lot of MLB teams, has recently done some work on the secondary effects of defense, quantifying the change in pitching staff usage for teams that flash the leather. They shift a lot of innings from their bad relievers to their good relievers and their starters, allowing for the distribution of innings to be more heavily skewed towards the top end of their talent pool.

However, there’s even further to drill on this issue. Do pitchers change their pitch selection based on the quality of their defense? If they have a bunch of gold glovers behind them, do they pitch more to contact? Does the resulting drop in baserunners result in lower stress pitches, which allow them to work deeper into games? These are benefits to the pitcher that have not yet been explored, but should be.

Finally, there’s the line-up synergy suggestion. This one, I’m a little less sure of, but would still think its worth our time to dive into. The protection theory has been studied to death and mostly debunked, but it isn’t hard to come up with scenarios where the performance of one hitter does affect others. It’s well known that nearly everyone hits better with men on base than with the bases empty, so anyone hitting behind an OBP machine should get a boost in performance, simply from that effect.

But there’s also other possible synergies, I would think. Having a balanced line-up of LH and RH hitters should limit a manager’s ability to play the match-ups late in games, reducing the amount of times a hitter has to face a same-handed pitcher in higher leverage situations. This would be especially important for a guy like Curtis Granderson, who should almost certainly hit between two RHBs. You could also argue for putting a left-handed groundball hitter behind a high on-base guy in order to take advantage of the hole created when the first baseman has to hold a runner on. These may not be huge changes, but they may add up enough to be worth considering.

While baseball is the most individual of team sports, it is not solely a one-on-one match-up at all times. If we look hard enough, I’d bet we’ll find ways that teammates do, in fact, influence the performance of those around them.

3B Jake Fox, Athletics

Fox’s hitting ability isn’t in doubt. Even in what was considered a rough stint with the Cubs, Fox managed to hit 11 HRs and posted a .208 ISO despite a mere .274 BABIP. Fox was roughly and average hitter last year, and his minor league numbers suggest the ability to put up slightly above average numbers at the major league level. His two weaknesses – walk rate and defense – likely pushed the A’s to retain Jack Cust at the DH position and acquire Adam Rosales and Kevin Kouzmanoff to go along with Eric Chavez at 3B.

With Cust on the team, if Fox doesn’t show some improvement with the glove in the spring, it’s hard to imagine Oakland having the room for another poor defender. Hitters of Fox’s caliber will have value to some team at some position, and so look for Fox to find his way on to a ML roster by midseason if not by opening day.

OF Wladimir Balentien, Reds

Balentien is another guy who has shown prolific power in the major leagues. With the rise of Michael Saunders in left field and Balentien underperforming in Seattle, the Mariners were forced to jettison the 25 year old outfielder last season. Outside of some home runs, though, Balentien has been poor in the major leagues so far, compiling a terrible wOBA of .285 in his first 559 PAs. Balentien’s solid minor league numbers – two seasons in AAA with .370+ wOBAs – give hope for breakout. CHONE expects a huge power surge and a .358 wOBA in Cincinnati next season.

The question is if he can make the big club. His major league numbers, as mentioned, are very discouraging, and he’s certainly behind Drew Stubbs and Jay Bruce on the depth charts. Chris Dickerson and the newly re-signed Jonny Gomes probably will make the team as well. That leaves Balentien in a fight with Laynce Nix for the 5th outfielder spot, meaning that with a poor spring, Balentien could find himself job-hunting again. I wouldn’t count on it, though, as Balentien could be a major piece in a potentially resurgent Reds lineup.

Now, I leave it to you guys. Who else do you find interesting that’s out of options and could potentially find themselves struggling for a 25-man roster spot? Let’s see who you think of in the comments, both among position players and pitchers. These could be some under-the-radar story lines in the spring that should be fun to watch unfold.

FanGraphs Audio is the gift that keeps on giving — giving ear aches!

Episode Five
In which the guest is a real-live author.

Headlines
Bloomberg Fantasy Nerd Thing
Do You Know Who Vince Naimoli Is?
Homage to Moneyballs
Dog Show! (Or: Maybe I am, and Maybe I Am.)
… and other dramatic gestures!

Featuring
The Incomparable Jonah Keri

Finally, you can subscribe to the podcast via iTunes.

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Exhibition games are near, thus ending the never-ending off- and on-season cycles. Remembering every transaction with the potential to make a difference this year is impossible. With that in mind, here’s a rundown of fun facts for five moves within the American League that may have slipped your mind. Why five? Because arbitrary numbers are fun. As is alliteration.

SP Kevin Millwood, Orioles

Millwood is in the final year of his five-year, $60M contract signed way back near the end of December 2005. Incredibly, he could still be receiving money, a $15M signing bonus, from this contract through 2015. The irritating thing about Millwood is not his 6’4” frame, the all-business goatee, or even the two l’s in his last name. No, it’s that seasons of poor ERA overshadow his quality of pitching. According to ERA, his five best seasons are 1999, 2005, 2002, 2009, and 2003. His five worst are 2007, 2008, 2004, 2000, and 2006. Here are the FIP of those seasons:

1999: 3.53
2005: 3.73
2002: 3.29
2009: 4.80
2003: 3.59
Average FIP: ~3.83
Average ERA: 3.29

2007: 4.55
2008: 4.02
2004: 3.80
2000: 4.06
2006: 3.87
Average FIP: ~4.02
Average ERA: 4.82

Millwood did pitch better in those five seasons with solid ERA, but not a run and a half per nine. Odds are, Millwood is underrated by the masses, perhaps looked upon as an underachiever, since his career is a mixture of ERA successes and ERA failures. The great irony in this paragraph is that Millwood’s 2009 looks pretty solid by ERA, but is actually the second worst of his career when ranked by FIP. All of this to say this: The Orioles acquired Millwood for a marginal reliever with an injury history and a Rule 5 pick. Even with the salary, the Orioles appear to win out.

DH Nick Johnson, Yankees

Johnson makes for great writing fodder. Besides the fact the he’s reunited with the guy who the Yankees traded him for in 2003, there’s also the fact that he’s never been an All-Star. That’s not important for our line of player evaluation, but here are the Yankees’ primary designated hitters by season since 1990 and the number of All-Star appearances made throughout their careers.

2008-9: Hideki Matsui (2)
2005-7, 2002-3: Jason Giambi (5)
2004, 1995-6: Ruben Sierra (4)
2001: David Justice (3)
2000: Shane Spencer
1999: Chili Davis (3)
1998: Darryl Strawberry (8)
1997: Cecil Fielder (3)
1993-4: Danny Tartabull (1)
1991-2: Kevin Maas
1990: Mel Hall/Steve Balboni

That’s right. Since 1990, the Yankees have had a combined four seasons from designated hitters who never qualified for an All-Star game. Johnson figures to be the fifth, barring injury that leads to Randy Winn (to steal a phrase from Rob Neyer) hitting designatedly for most of the season.

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Those familiar with this site probably know who Graham MacAree is. If not, his dossier reads something like this:

– Inventor of tRA (and subsequently tERA)
– Writes at Lookout Landing
– Uses diction like he salutes the Union Jack while singing along to God Save the Queen

It’s time to add another bullet to that list. Graham is now playing the role of the ice cream man and giving us a different flavor of sabermetric goodness on a daily basis over at LL. The complete archive of the aptly named Sabermetrics 101 feature can be found here, with the most recent post covering financial and roster constraints. The work is top-notch as the posts aren’t too detailed or long, but provide enough information and knowledge to understand what the heck the topic means.

Graham’s series isn’t the only primer set in town, though. My former colleague – and one of the new sabermetrics-orientated writers whose future I’m geeked about – Steve Slowinski rolled out the Sabermetric Library. This is the link to Slowinski’s introduction of the site and here is a direct link to the Library. Basically, any stat from this site that you can think of has a page with details, links, and even some illustrations through tables.

I’d also recommend Alex Remington’s fantastic series on Big League Stew and Michael Jong’s series of posts, too. Purple Row has also featured some excellent primers and just recently this meta-primer on wOBA popped up throughout the land. Appreciate the work put forth by these folks. Not just for our purposes, but for the next baseball fan yearning to take a dip into the sabermetrics’ side of the pool but with no concept of where to begin.

A glance at Chan Ho Park’s 2009 statistics can mislead. None of his aggregate stats stand out. His 4.43 ERA ranked below league average, a 96 ERA+, and his 9.1 hits per nine and 3.6 walks per nine led to an inflated 1.40 WHIP. Combined with his poor reputation, this might lead someone to believe that Park stunk in 2009. As Dave explained during the World Series, that opinion does not reflect Park’s mid-season transition. His overall stats suffered from his poor performance as a starter early in the season. The real story lies in his move to the bullpen in May.

Park produced horrible results from the rotation. Over seven starts, from April 12 to May 17, he lasted just 33.1 innings, or just about 4.2 per start. In that time he allowed five home runs while walking 17 and striking out 21, for a FIP of 5.42 to go with his ERA of 7.29. Some of that, at least, appears to be bad luck. In April, for instance, Park allowed four of those five home runs, but on just 20 fly balls. But even in May, with a lower HR/FB rate, he still allowed 14 runs over 18 innings while starting, walking 12 to 11 strikeouts. At that point the Philies rightly decided that Park’s stint in the rotation was over.

From that point on Park allowed zero baseballs to leave the yard. That covers 49 innings, including 38 fly balls. In that span he struck out 52 batters while walking just 16, for a FIP of 2.06, which undercut his 2.57 ERA. He allowed runs in just eight of 37 appearances, and allowed multiple runs just four times, more than two runs just once. Over July and August, in 16 appearances and 25.1 IP, he allowed just three earned runs, walking just five to 29 strikeouts. Clearly, the move to the bullpen did him wonders. But can we expect that again in 2010?

Apparently the Yankees, who signed Park to a one-year, $1.2 million deal with an additional $300K in incentives, think there’s a chance. Even accounting for a league average HR/FB rate in 2009, Park’s xFIP was still 4.02. There’s a chance, though, that Park continues to keep fly balls in the park at a below league average rate. It won’t be zero, but if Park can continue what he did in 2009, he might keep that HR/FB low. That makes him slightly less valuable, but considering his strikeout and walk rates in the bullpen we still might expect a considerably above average performance in 2010.

The Yankees’ hope is that something changed for Park in 2009, because his 2008 stint in the bullpen didn’t go as well. Over 70.1 IP he struck out just 49 to 28 walks, posting a 4.85 FIP, a full run higher than his 3.84 ERA. The drastic increase in Park’s strikeout rate and reduction in walk rate from 2008 to 2009 does suggest that something changed, though we’d be hard pressed to prove it.

We could look to his PitchFx data, but from what I understand the pitch classification algorithm changed from 2008 to 2009. That might partly explain Park’s reduced use of his four-seamer and the increase in his two-seamer. The only other major change I can see is the reduced use of his slider and the increased us of his changeup. But, again, this counts both his starts and relief appearances, so it’s difficult to draw conclusions. Looking at his pitch type chart, he does appear to have increased his changeup usage later in the season.

It’s always a risk when a team signs an aging pitcher who showed signs of improvement in limited duty the previous season, but the Yankees are in a position to take the gamble. Adding Park to the bullpen gives the Yankees even more depth, allowing them to perhaps trade one of Sergio Mitre and Chad Gaudin, or otherwise send Joba Chamberlain or Phil Hughes to AAA in order to build up their innings, rather than sending one to the bullpen initially. If Park pitches near his 2009 level, they’ll benefit from a stronger bullpen. If he flops, the can afford to eat the remainder of Park’s $1.2 million salary, like they did with LaTroy Hawkins in 2008.

Here at FanGraphs, we attempt to answer a lot of questions. How good is this guy compared to that guy? Who throws the hardest? Which pitches are effective against different hitters? What should I expect from that rookie?

For the next few days, however, I’m going to take a slightly different approach. As baseball analysis has begun to explode on the web, there is no shortage of answers to common questions. However, I think that we may have a shortage of questions. So, rather than attempting to figure out something that we want to know, I’d like to spend a few days trying to figure out what else we should want to know.

I’m not going to have any answers on this. My hope is that this would turn into a discussion where we can stimulate some ideas for what things may be worth answering in the future, even if we can’t answer them now. What don’t we know that may be important, and that we maybe haven’t even attempted to answer yet?

The main area in baseball that still strikes me as something of a mystery is pitching. We understand some things about the art of pitching. We know that, in general, more velocity is good, and it helps to be able to throw the ball in the strike zone with regularity. But do we have any idea why some guys have good command and other’s don’t?

Really, this seems like a fairly basic thing, but I don’t know if we have an answer. We could throw out a word like “mechanics,” but what does that tell us, really? For all the talk about good and bad mechanics, there doesn’t seem to be a “do-this-thing-and-you’ll-succeed” blueprint. Different stuff works for different guys. So what is it that drives a pitcher’s command? Arm angle? Muscle memory? Practice?

I don’t know. Maybe you do – if so, great, let’s hear it (with proof, please). But this seems like something we’d like to know, right? So, this is my question – what else should we want to know that we don’t? What parts of baseball have we just not given attention to?

The format for my weekend rundown is going to change in the future — though even I still can’t profess to know where it’s headed. As always, the more people let me know what you’re interested in, the more this column promises to change in your favor.

In their last five drafts, the Los Angeles Angels have failed to sign six different players they drafted in the first five rounds. For a scouting department that has admirably built up an organization with years of success, this is a damning statistic that suggests a failure in the team’s ability to judge the signability of their draftees. The sting of this is going to be felt everytime Brian Matusz takes the mound for the Orioles. (Matusz was an unsigned fourth-rounder out of high school before starring for three years at the University of San Diego.) The list includes both players that have failed to improve their profile in college (Russ Moldenhauer) to players that have sustained their status (Matt Harvey), but either way, there is no question this is a trend the Angels need to stop. By comparison, in the same five years, the rest of the AL West has failed to sign just three top-five round picks combined.

I bring this up because it was a little surprising to me that the star of college baseball’s first weekend was an unsigned third-round draft pick by the Angels in 2008. Zach Cone was drafted by the Halos out of Parkview High School in Lilburn, Georgia, where he starred both in the outfield and on the mound. He was ranked as the 80th overall talent in the draft by Baseball America, but saw fit to turn down a high six-figures bonus offer to head to the University of Georgia program that Gordon Beckham had just led to the College World Series. Cone’s decision has never looked so good as it does on this Monday morning, following the most dominating weekend of any college player in the nation. In four games against two top-70 programs in Baylor and Duke, the sophomore Bulldog outfielder went 11-for-16, including hitting for the cycle in a loss on Saturday.

There were signs of this ability in the summer — Cone played for Cotuit in the Cape Cod League — but a .243/.268/.331 batting line isn’t going to inspire, even if its only a tick below league average. Cone showed his five tools there, stealing 10 bases, placing second on his team in home runs, playing a damn good outfield. But like so many five-toolers before him, Cone showed he was still raw in the BB/K column, ending up at 5/42 in 136 AB. He didn’t register a mark in either column over the weekend, but there is nothing wrong with making hard contact in nearly 20 straight at-bats.

The 2011 draft has already been framed as a battle of Rice 3B Anthony Rendon (on base in 9 of 14 PAs in his first weekend) vs. UCLA RHP Gerrit Cole (1 H, 2 ER, 9 K in 6 IP) for the top spot, with Texas RHP Taylor Jungmann in the discussion or right behind it. Cone won’t have to show all his ability to land a first-round grade from scouts — surely some have already slapped that tag on him — but he’s a dominant sophomore removed from top-10 discussion. The Bulldogs did themselves no favors in scheduling a tough non-conference schedule leading into the rigors of the toughest conference season in college baseball, so if Cone can dominate this competition, he’ll fly up those 2011 draft boards in a hurry.

And hopefully in doing so remind the Angels that they can’t afford to not sign top draft picks.

Best 3 Team Impressions From the Weekend:
1. Stanford: Swept Rice at home, showing a much greater ability to score runs than people gave them credit for.
2. Oregon: It hasn’t taken long for George Horton to make the Ducks a solid team, with wins over Cal State Fullerton and Long Beach State highlighting a promising opening weekend.
3. Florida Gulf Coast: It was only Temple, but a 39-7 run differential in a sweep is a sign of things to come for a program entering its first season of the ability to contend in postseason baseball. And trust me, they will.

It’s hard to believe that pitchers and catchers have already reported and Johnny Damon is just now reaching a deal. Scott Boras has finally managed to find a home for his client, and, unsurprisingly, that home will be in Detroit. Damon will receive $8 million for his services – a hefty sum compared to what the Yankees were reportedly offering, but peanuts compared to what he was hoping for.

Some say that Scott Boras hung him out to dry, but the truth is that a multi-year, $10+ million market simply wasn’t going to be there for a player like Damon. Teams have taken note of Damon’s poor arm, and his bat simply wasn’t good enough to be worth more than $10MM in a market that pays $3.5MM per win. CHONE projects him for 3.0 wins with what looks like a very questionable defensive projection of +10 R/150 G. Knocking that down to +2.5 – his career UZR/150 in LF and a tad higher than what his -9 UZR/150 in CF would suggest – leaves him at 2.3 WAR. That puts the deal at $3.5MM/WAR, or almost exactly market value.

Looking at the team side of the deal, Damon should be a decent fit. Between the three outfield spots, there are probably about 2100-2200 plate appearances available, leaving plenty of playing time for Damon, Magglio Ordonez, Carlos Guillen, Austin Jackson, and Ryan Raburn. This should be a decent outfield, as Ordonez and Damon are both above average players and Raburn is near average. Guillen should rebound and, as Dave showed, could be a sleeper this year. Jackson remains a question mark, but this outfield will provide some punch.

The problem is that even with Damon on board, this team is nowhere near a contender. Major middle infield and starting pitching issues look like too much to overcome, and both the Twins and White Sox look clearly better than the Tigers right now. As it stands, the Tigers will probably need some luck to clear .500, and their playoff chances, with or without Damon, look bleak.

When evaluating this deal, there’s one main question to be asked: are the roughly two wins provided by the Damon signing worth eight million dollars to the Tigers, even if they’re eventually irrelevant to this year’s playoffs? It’s hard to answer that question without knowing the details of the Tigers’ budget. Wins, even at the lower end of the curve, do correlate to ticket sales, and teams obviously need whatever revenue they can get. Detroit won’t be handcuffed down the road by this contract. As long as this deal isn’t the reason that Detroit is inactive in the international free agent market or passive in the draft, this deal can only improve their team, both in the sort term and the long term.

When it comes to analyzing general managers, there’s a large degree of deferment. The intimate knowledge necessary to fully evaluate their job lacks when it comes to budgetary limits, and the input offered by their scouting and information staffs is largely unknown. Similar to cases where pitching or hitting coaches are removed, we have to defer to the organization and trust that something in their teachings and instruction simply didn’t work, even if those complaints fail to show in statistics.

Even with some degree of deferment, the Ed Wade extension is hard to grasp. Ignore the slight losing record in Wade’s two full seasons at the helm. There are cases where a losing record for a period is unavoidable and not the kiss of death. Take, for instance, Andrew Friedman’s 127-197 record through his first two seasons. Under Friedman’s watch, the Rays continued to develop their farm system while acquiring and nurturing youth and potentially useful role players alike. Wade hasn’t done that.

The questions extend beyond the record. Wade has avoided signing questionable long-term deals for the most part. It’s far too early to attempt and judge his draft classes, though the Astros’ farm system had little room to decrease in quality. His major moves have mostly been through trades, the most notable of which occurred in a short span of 2007, which saw Wade trading Brad Lidge and Eric Bruntlett for Michael Bourn, Geoff Geary, and Mike Constanzo; sending Constanzo, Matt Albers, Troy Patton, Dennis Sarfate, and Luke Scott to Baltimore for Miguel Tejada; then turning Chris Burke, Juan Gutierrez, and Chad Qualls into Jose Valverde.

A few non-descript moves have worked out along the way, too, like trading Chad Reineke for a few months worth of Randy Wolf, then trading Matt Cusick for LaTroy Hawkins. Those moves could be useful on a talented team, but the problem is that Houston has an identity crisis. Trading for middle relievers and rentals on mid-rotation starters when you aren’t really in the position to compete for the playoffs seems like a misuse of time and resources. They’re in a rut where they can float around .500 and occasionally sniff out a season like 2008, but anything more is unlikely.

The Astros’ payroll is incredibly top heavy. Carlos Lee still has three years and $55M left on his contract, yet he turns 34 years old in late June. Roy Oswalt is Houston’s property through 2012, but he no longer appears to be an ace. Lance Berkman is the only other player making more than $6M on the roster and he qualifies for free agency after next year. After that trio, the Astros payroll is split into a few million dollar chunks here and there. Bright spots like Wandy Rodriguez and Hunter Pence are nearing their pay days too.

That leaves little flexibility moving forward and when met with a weak farm system, the odds of Houston becoming a worthwhile contender during Wade’s tenure are slim to none. Add in that the team could evidently be in the process of being sold, and really, this entire thing makes no sense. I don’t know what Drayton McLane is doing and frankly deferring to him scares me.