Last week I looked at Chipper Jones’s first-pitch aggressiveness. This aggressiveness is a little surprising because Jones has extraordinary plate discipline, with more walks than strikeouts in his career. Jones explained it as a way to not get behind good pitchers. It turned out this was the correct, as Jones swung more often against first pitches in the zone from low-xFIP pitchers than high-xFIP pitchers. On subsequent pitches in the zone this relationship was lost and he swung at a relatively constant rate.

This result led to a number of natural questions the two most pressing: how does this compare to other hitters and how much of a role does it play in Jones’s success?

Here I address the first question. I repeated the graph from Thursday for all batters rather than just for Jones. That is, I looked at the Z-Swing rate (swings at pitches in the zone) for first pitches and subsequent pitches based on the pitcher’s xFIP. The curves are below with standard errors indicated. For comparison, I added Jones’s curves as dotted lines but omitted his standard errors to keep the graph from being too cluttered.

There is a striking difference. The average hitter swings much less often at first pitches than all others, but with no discernible trend based on the quality of the pitcher. This is very different from Jones’s first-pitch curve, which drops off rapidly as the pitcher xFIP increases. On subsequent pitches, the average hitter’s swing rate increases compared to his first-pitch rate, but again has little relationship with the xFIP of the pitcher. Here, Jones is not different than average.

So it looks like the average batter is not making the same effort as Jones to not get behind the best pitchers. This is surprising. I thought we would have seen this trend — just to a lesser extent — with all hitters, but that is not the case. Tomorrow I will look at the effect this has on at-bat results.

General Manager: Dan O’Dowd
Farm Director: Marc Gustafson
Scouting Director: Bill Schmidt

FanGraphs’ Top 10 Prospects:
(2009 Draft Picks/International Signees Not Included)

The Rockies organization does not have the strongest system in the game but it’s far from the weakest and you have to be impressed with how many top prospects are homegrown talent. This organization knows how to find, sign and develop prospects. Six of the 10 prospects were international free agent signings and all 10 were originally signed by the club (a rare feat).

1. Christian Friedrich, LHP, Double-A
DOB: July 1987 Bats: L Throws: L
Signed: 2008 1st round – Eastern Kentucky University
MLB ETA: Late-2010 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 88-92 mph fastball, plus slider, curveball, change-up

Friedrich continues to prove that he was an absolute steal as the 25th overall pick in the ’08 draft. He cruised through low-A ball in ’09 by posting a 1.92 FIP and a strikeout rate of 13.10 K/9 in 45.1 innings. The left-hander then moved up to high-A where he had a 2.55 FIP and allowed just 59 hits in 74.1 innings. His strikeout rate remained excellent at 11.26 K/9 thanks to his plus curveball. He also shows an average ability at inducing ground balls. Friedrich did a nice job of holding his own against right-handed batters in ’09 and he kept them to a .218 batting average. However, his walk rate did rise against them (3.43 vs righties, 2.32 vs lefties). Friedrich has the ceiling of a No. 2 starter and he could conceivably reach Colorado by the end of the season if he gets off to a fast start in double-A.

2. Jhoulys Chacin, RHP, Majors
DOB: January 1988 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2004 non-drafted international free agent (Venezuela)
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2
Repertoire: 88-93 mph fastball, change-up, slider

Just 21 in ’09, Chacin reached the Majors and appeared in nine games, including one start, for the big league club. Along with his four-game stint in triple-A, the right-hander showed that he still has some work to do – especially with his control (24 walks in 25.1 combined innings). Chacin spent the majority of the season in double-A, where he allowed 87 hits in 103.1 innings of work. He posted a walk rate of 3.05 BB/9. His strikeout rate was a respectable 7.49 K/9 and his ground-ball rate was solid at 54%. With the ability to keep the ball on the ground and a repertoire that includes two plus pitches (fastball, change-up), Chacin should develop into a No. 3 starter at worst.

3. Wilin Rosario, C, High-A
DOB: February 1989 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2006 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Late-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3

Rosario first showed up on prospect radars after a solid ’08 season in which he hit .316/.371/.532 in 263 at-bats in rookie ball. The now 21-year-old catcher followed up the breakout season with a huge jump to high-A ball, bypassing both short-season ball and low-A ball. He hit OK, considering his age and the huge leap, with a .266/.297/.404 line in 203 at-bats. Unfortunately his walk rate was almost cut in half (from 8.2 to 4.5%) and his power output dropped (.217 to .138 ISO). A wrist injury ended his season prematurely but he was starting to hit well at the time (.725 OPS in June, .840 in July). Rosario returned for the Arizona Fall League and looked good. Defensively, he has a strong arm and has thrown out 46% of base runners over the past two seasons.

4. Hector Gomez, SS, High-A
DOB: March 1985 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2004 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Mid-2011 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2

Gomez’ development was stunt in ’08 when Tommy John surgery limited him to just one game. He came back in ’09 and appeared in 83 games in high-A ball and showed improvement. The shortstop hit .275/.310/.423 in 338 at-bats. Because of a chronically-low walk rate, Gomez consistently posts a low on-base percentage, which limits his stolen base numbers (10 in 14 tries in ’09). Despite his thin frame, the right-handed hitter has surprising pop, although it’s currently more of the line-drive variety than over-the-fence. Defensively, he has a rocket for an arm despite his surgery but he makes youthful mistakes. With Troy Tulowitzki currently manning shortstop in Colorado, the club can afford to be patient with Gomez.

5. Esmil Rogers, RHP, Majors
DOB: August 1985 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2003 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 1
Repertoire: 90-94 mph fastball, slider, change-up

Rogers has two distinct seasons in ’09. He began the year in double-A and had few troubles with the hitters by posting a FIP of 2.51. He allowed 87 hits in 94.1 innings. Promoted to triple-A, his FIP rose to 5.49 and he allowed 77 hits in 60.2 innings. The main issue was a lack of command and control. His walk rate rose from 1.18 in double-A to 5.19 BB/9 in triple-A. Rogers left balls up in the zone and was creamed; his HR/9 rate rose from 0.19 to 1.34 HR/9. Clearly the 24-year-old right-hander has some work to do as a former hitter who was converted to the mound after turning pro. With a little polish, though, he could develop into a No. 3 starter.

6. Eric Young Jr., 2B, Majors
DOB: May 1985 Bats: B Throws: R
Signed: 2003 30th round – Chandler-Gilbert CC
MLB ETA: Now 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2

Young Jr. has done nothing but hit and run in the minors. Over the past four seasons, he’s produced a batting average of more than .290 while stealing an average of 66 bases a year (87 was his highest total in ’06, 46 was his lowest in ’08). He does a nice job of getting on base and has posted a walk rate in double-digits for three of the past four seasons. On the negative side, he still strikes out a bit too much (16.7% in ’09) for his modest power output (.131 ISO). In the field, Young Jr. is not a great defensively player so he could end up moving permanently to the outfield or he could serve as a super-utility player who would be deserving of 300-400 at-bats. Outside of improving his defense, Young Jr. has nothing left to prove in the minor leagues.

7. Michael McKenry, C, Double-A
DOB: March 1985 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2006 7th round – Middle Tennessee State University
MLB ETA: Late-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 3

Just 5’10”, McKenry generates surprising pop thanks to his squat build. He also historically hits for a pretty solid average and gets on base. Overall in ’09, he hit .279/.376/.455 in 358 double-A at-bats. He did see a decline in power last season as his ISO rate dropped from .210 in ’08 to .176. However, his walk rate remained strong at 12.9% and his strikeout rate dropped 6% to 19.3%. McKenry is a notoriously slow starter and his numbers could improve if he can find a way to get the bat going in April and May. Defensively, he’s a born leader who does a nice job of throwing out base runners (33% in ’09). He has the potential to be a solid big league regular, and he should have a nice MLB career even if he doesn’t hit as well as he did in the minors.

8. Casey Weathers, RHP, Double-A
DOB: June 1985 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2007 1st round – Vanderbilt University
MLB ETA: Mid-2011 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 91-96 mph fastball, plus slider

Weathers, a former No. 1 draft pick, was rocketing through the minors and reached double-A in his first full pro season before he blew out his elbow and had Tommy John surgery. The right-hander is expected to by ready for the start of the 2010 season. With a big-time fastball and a heavy fastball that produces a good number of ground balls, Weathers projects as a future closer but his control was questionable (5.68 BB/9 in double-A) even before the injury. The 24-year-old should return to double-A in 2010 and he could reach the Majors by the end of the season if his stuff bounces back as expected.

9. Juan Nicasio, RHP, Low-A
DOB: August 1986 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2006 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Mid-2012 40-Man Roster: No Options: 3
Repertoire: 91-95 mph fastball, slider, change-up

Nicasio is a little rawer than you’d like from a 23-year-old pitching prospect, but you can’t argue with his results so far. The hard-throwing right-hander posted a 2.57 FIP in ’09 while allowing 110 hits in 112.0 innings of work. He produced a good walk rate against inexperienced hitters (1.85 BB/9) but he still has work to do with his command. Nicasio has done an excellent job avoiding the long-ball throughout his career, which should help him in Colorado. Because of his age, inexperience and lack of a reliable third pitch, a bullpen role is probably in his future.

10. Sam Deduno, RHP, Triple-A
DOB: July 1983 Bats: R Throws: R
Signed: 2003 non-drafted international free agent (Dominican Republic)
MLB ETA: Mid-2010 40-Man Roster: Yes Options: 2
Repertoire: 88-92 mph fastball, curveball, change-up

A little old for a prospect, Deduno is on the cusp of being MLB ready. He spent the Majority of the ’09 season in double-A and allowed just 94 hits in 133.0 innings of work and posted a strikeout rate of 8.32 K/9. On the downside, his control is questionable, as he posted a walk rate of 4.87 BB/9. That issue, combined with the fact that he’s basically a two-pitch pitcher, suggests that Deduno’s future is probably in the bullpen. With a solid fastball and a plus curveball for his out-pitch, as well as a 57% ground-ball rate in ’09, this right-hander could make a solid set-up man for the Rockies. His first taste of the Majors could come by mid-2010.

Up Next: The Top 30 is done!

With Brandon Webb possibly starting the season on the DL, the back of the Diamondbacks rotation will have to step up in the early goings. This affects no one more than Ian Kennedy, whom the Diamondbacks acquired from the Yankees this off-season. He came into camp expected to compete for a starting gig, and with Webb out his spot seems more of a certainty. The Diamondbacks sound eager to see what Kennedy can do now that he’s out of the AL East and in the weaker hitting National League. But can he succeed in the hitter friendly confines of Chase Field?

Kennedy is not short on potential. He put his talent on display during his first two seasons at USC, striking out 278 batters in 209.2 IP during his freshman and sophomore years. His performance dropped off during his junior year, as his ERA rose by over a full run and his strikeout rate dropped, though he still struck out a batter per inning. The knock on that year was that he lost a few miles per hour on his fastball. Despite the performance and speed loss, the Yankees picked him in the first round of the 2006 draft.

While, like many of his peers, he didn’t sign in time to pitch significant innings in his draft year, Kennedy came on strong in 2007. Starting in advanced-A ball he dominated the minors, climbing to AAA by August. His strikeout rate jumped back above a batter per inning, to about 10 per nine — though that dropped a bit at AAA. Impressed by his rapid rise through the system, the Yankees called him up in September to start in place of the struggling Mike Mussina, a pitcher to whom Kennedy has drawn comparisons. He pitched very well in his three starts, leading the Yankees to hand him a rotation spot the following year.

This is where Kennedy unraveled. In his first six starts he saw the fifth inning just three times. He had problems throwing strikes and ended up walking 20 batters in 24.2 innings. This seemed particularly odd, because walks were never a problem for Kennedy. He didn’t have the lowest walk rate, but it was at 3.0 per nine in the minors in 2007, a respectable rate. The walk issues begat baserunners, which begat runs and plenty of them. After allowing 23 in his six starts, the Yankees demoted him to AAA.

He returned to the majors twice, but faced similar issues. In his second stint he walked fewer batters, five in 14 IP, but allowed four home runs in that span. An injury shelved him for a month, and when he returned it was apparent that the Yankees did not want him back in the majors. His only performance afterward came on August 8, a horrible two-inning, five-run outing against the Angels coming after Joba Chamberlain hurt his shoulder. Even after Kennedy finished the season at AAA, the Yankees did not recall him in September.

Now, after missing almost all of 2009 recovering from surgery to remove an aneurysm under his right armpit, Kennedy will attempt to resurrect his career in the National League. While he might find it easier going than the AL East, his troubles could still follow him to Arizona. His minor league track record doesn’t bode well for his ability to keep runners of the base paths and, more importantly, his ability to keep the ball in the park.

Throughout his college and minor league career, Kennedy did a great job of limiting opponents’ home runs. He allowed just six home runs during his 2007 run through the minors, and then allowed just four in his 69 innings in 2008. This ability, however, had much to do with his unsustainably low 3.6 HR/FB% in the minors. This number figures to rise in the majors — it was at 7.6 percent in 2008 with the Yankees, and could get even higher at Chase Field, which has ranked as one of the most homer-friendly parks in the majors over the last three seasons. Even worse for Kennedy, he has always been a fly ball pitcher, allowing 41 percent fly balls in the minors and, in his limited major league experience, 48.7 percent.

His other college and minor league strength, his strikeout rate, probably won’t translate to the majors. Throughout his minor league career he struck out 9.63 hitters per nine innings, or 28 percent of the batters he faced. During his 59.2 major league innings that number has been 6.49 per nine, or 15.5 percent. While that could certainly rise, especially in the NL, he likely won’t approach his minor league numbers. That, combined with his unspectacular walk rate, could hurt his chances for success.

None of this, of course, precludes Kennedy’s success. Perhaps his work with the Diamondbacks coaches will help him rediscover what made him a standout college pitcher and first round draft pick. Maybe the aneurysm surgery fixed a lingering issue in his arm. His performance to date, however, in both the majors and minors, does not portent success. He’ll need to make changes in order to keep the ball out of the air, and in the park, while pitching in Arizona. Even if he doesn’t he could make a nice No. 5 starter, but if he does he could become even more valuable to the Diamondbacks. With Brandon Webb out to start the season and possibly gone after the season, they could certainly use the help.

The Twins signed Nick Blackburn to a four year contract worth 14 million dollars on Sunday. The contract covers Blackburn’s final pre-arbitration season, all of his arbitration seasons, and also contains an $8 million option for 2014, Blackburn’s first free agent season.

Blackburn has been a quietly productive pitcher for the Twins over the last two seasons, compiling 5.5 WAR, a big boost to a rotation which had just seen Johan Santana leave via trade and Francisco Liriano struggle with injuries and ineffectiveness. This effectiveness has come despite poor peripheral stats – fewer than 4.5 K/9 and over 1 HR/9 are generally not signs of MLB quality pitchers. However, Blackburn has managed due to his spectacular control – a career walk rate below 2 BB/9, keeping his K/BB ratio to a respectable 2.5 level for his career.

Blackburn is a ground ball heavy pitcher, which may account for his ERA outperforming his FIP by about 0.40 runs each of the last two years. Regardless, his 4.39 career FIP makes him a roughly average starting pitcher, the kind of guy who can expect a two-year, $16MM deal, or even a three-year, nearly $30MM deal.

As this deal is covering 1.8 effective free agent seasons (based on the 40/60/80 scheme of arbitration payouts), this deal values Blackburn similarly to Joel Piniero, a very fair comparison according to CHONE projections. If Blackburn’s performance remains at its current level, this contract will likely have a very similar payout to any arbitration rewards he would have received, and avoids the hassle and emotional turmoil of hearings for three years.

Hopefully, the baseball market (and overall economy) will be on the rise by 2014, the year of Blackburn’s option. By then, the cost per marginal win will likely be closer to $5MM or more, making Blackburn’s $8MM option attractive if he can maintain his production. He will, however, be 32 by that point, meaning his peak will likely have passed. With the team option, the Twins cannot lose – either Blackburn is gone with little cost, or they pick up another cheap year of a productive pitcher.

Last week my colleague Bryan Smith got an interesting conversation started in a post he titled The Next Step.  In a nutshell, his question was “what does sabermetric prospect analysis look like?” That question got a lot of good dialogue going, and I’m sure it’s something you might be seeing more of here at FanGraphs in the coming days and months.

Today I’m just going to approach it in the most back-of-a-napkin method as possible with a prospect who I feel is a tad undersold, and that’s Peter Bourjos, a center fielder in the Angels’ system. If you listened to the corresponding podcast we did about taking the next step in prospect analysis, you know that Peter Bourjos gets me all tingly for some reason. I think it’s probably because I’m the sort of person who likes to see players who fly a bit under the radar succeed, and I like players who I suppose you can call throwback types who may not hit for power, but can run and play good defense.

First, I dug up my trusty 2010 Baseball America Handbook, the 2010 Minor League Analyst and then surfed the web for different scouting reports. I even looked at some video on YouTube.  (Remember, this is nothing really scientific). From there I got enough info for me to put together this scouting report, based on the 20-80 scale.

Categories   Grades
Hitting      55
Power        30
Discipline   40?
Speed        70
Field        70

A quick rundown on each tool: Bourjos has some holes in his swing, but should make enough contact to hit about .275-.280 per season. He has gap power, but is very unlikely to crack more than 10 homers in a season. His selectivity at the plate improved, as shown by a 9.7% BB%, a rise of 6.2% from the season earlier. I put a question mark next to the grade because I don’t feel confident that he won’t walk more than 7% in the majors.

Bourjos’ speed and defense is his claim to fame, as I mentioned before. He steals a lot of bases in an organization that encourages being aggressive on the basepaths. He could improve upon his success rate, however.  His speed helps him to range almost effortlessly to balls that most outfielders would have to dive for. According to his Total Zone numbers found on MinorLeagueSplits.com, Bourjos has been worth 76 runs in just 363 games in the minors. That’s pretty freaking fantastic. CHONE projects he’d be good for 14 runs above average on defense now.

Putting this all together and assuming all goes well…

600 plate appearances, 42 walks, 117 singles, 26 doubles, 7 triples, 5 homers, 30 steals, 10 caught stealing = .318 wOBA.

• Batting wins above average (.318 wOBA, league .335): -9 runs
• Defensive wins above average: +14 runs
• CF Positional Adjustment: +2.5 runs
• Replacement: +20 runs

Total: 2.8 WAR.

That to me would represent pretty close to a perfect world scenario of what Bourjos becomes while under team control. I think Angel fans would gladly take that. Well, they would if Bourjos had a place to play, as center field is currently occupied by Torii Hunter. His downside would be something like a right-handed version of Endy Chavez. How is that for hedging my bets? There’s no shame in that considering Chavez has been worth about a win per year coming off the bench.

Anyway, this is HIGHLY subjective and I know opinions on prospects can greatly differ, so don’t stone me if you think I’m being too optimistic or pessimistic. This is just meant as more of a fun, quick-and-dirty way that you can use to get a glimpse of a prospect’s potential in terms of wins above replacement from information you can glean from their scouting reports.

Rickey Henderson is not one for conservative claims. Not during his playing career and certainly not now. Henderson, working as Oakland’s baserunning instructor, recently said that Rajai Davis could steal 80 bases. It’s been a while since one player stole that many bases on his own throughout a season. Jacoby Ellsbury took 70 last year, Jose Reyes grabbed 78 in 2007, Scott Podsednik hit 70 during 2004, Tony Womack swiped 72 in 1999, Brian Hunter and Kenny Lofton stole 74 and 75 in 1997 and 1996, and so on. The last time someone took at least 80 bases was 1988, when Vince Coleman lead the National League with 81 and that Henderson guy took 93 in the American League.

Davis’ career high in steals is 41 and he’s stolen 93 bases in 333 career games. He’s been caught 27 times, giving him a 78% success rate. That means Davis would need to attempt roughly 103 steals, if and only if, it is to be assumed that his success rate would remain static to his career rate. The odds of that occurring are highly unlikely. Yes, it’s just a throwaway spring quote meant to inspire confidence in a player, and yes, I’m totally going to overanalyze it.

Let’s start with the historic data. Since 1961 (or Baseball-Reference’s “Expansion Era” filter) there have been 18 players who successfully stole 80 bases. They averaged an 83% success rate with the lowest individual success rate belonging to Omar Moreno (74.4%). This makes sense, both intuitively and numerically. Managers are not going to allow wishy-washy basestealers to attempt upwards of 100 grabs a year if it means being thrown out 30 or more times. For now, let’s say Davis is going to need something like 90-110 steal attempts to make this thing a reality.

There are a few conditions needed to actually steal a base – among which, actually being on base is the most vital and obvious. Davis’ career on-base percentage is .336. If you simply multiply his on-base percentage by his career plate appearances, then divide that number by his steal attempts, then you will find that he’s attempted a steal in roughly 40% of the times he’s reached base throughout his career. But that’s just not true because Davis has been used aggressively as a pinch runner.

Say Davis lives up to his ~.330 projected OBP. That would be pretty low, but not the lowest (or even close to it) in the 80 steals club. Vince Coleman stole at least 80 three times with an OBP of .320 or below; including 1986 when he stole 107 bases despite a .301 OBP. Moreno got on base about 30.6% of the time in 1980, and even Maury Wills only had a .330 OBP when he stole 94 in 1965. It’s doable, certainly, but that means Davis will need even more pinch running appearances and even more plate appearances.

Oakland has a stacked outfield depth chart and he happens to be right-handed, meanwhile they have a switch-hitter (Coco Crisp) and two lefties (Ryan Sweeney & Gabe Gross) also on the depth chart. He’s not starting most days. That didn’t stop Eric Davis (487 PA) or Ron LeFlore (587) from swiping more than 80, but those are the only two players with fewer than 600 plate appearances to do it.

As you can see, the odds are stacked against Rajai. That doesn’t mean the discussion is over though. Check back later for the answer. Mostly for the sake of blowing this totally out of proportion, but also showing something about the relationship between stolen base success rate and runs added.

Episode Ten
In which the panel tries not to over-extend itself.

Headlines
Justin Upton’s Contract in Context
Thither Adrian Gonzalez?
Travis Hafner’s Herniated Everything
… and other moving speeches!

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Dave Cameron
Joe Pawlikowski

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I was in Vancouver last weekend following along with the hockey games and got to raging against the overtime method used in the final game. I can understand limiting overtimes during the run up to the medal games as there are a lot of games to play in a short amount of time but for the medal games I firmly believe it should stay 5-on-5 and go until somebody scores.

My discussion on the matter lead me back to thinking about NFL’s overtime rules, which seem to be under review, and then to Tango’s two prompts about possible rule changes in baseball and it clicked how much I enjoy baseball’s overtime rules compared to every other sports.

To me, baseball gets it perfect. I want overtimes to not fundamentally change the sport and I want them to present equitable opportunities for both teams. The NFL fails drastically on the latter aspect and college football on the former. I think shootouts and penalty kicks and other gimmicks are dumb, but tolerable if you really cannot stomach the idea of a tie and they are contained to the regular season only.

When it comes to the playoffs though, you need to let the players play the sport they’re being paid for. Does anyone enjoy the World Cup being decided on penalty kicks? The US-Canada gold medal game was thrilling but the chance of a shootout deciding it was a possible wet blanket hovering over the enthralling overtime period.

I know some people toy around with the idea of modifying the innings once extras are reached. I understand the thoughts behind starting each inning with a man on second for example, but I am perfectly content with extra innings as they are now. It makes games longer, sure, but that extra tension is part of the fun for me.

I am by no means a traditionalist and generally welcome discussion on any subject that might conceivably make a sport more enjoyable, but it’s a subjective measure of enjoyment and personally there’s no way to top what we have now. Kudos, baseball, for getting that one right.

I hope you all have had as much fun dissecting opposite field splits this week as I have. Today, we take one more look with another odd example: Ichiro Suzuki. Ichiro’s style is so different from anything else that we’ve seen in United States baseball that projection systems still have issues nailing down a forecast for him.

A major part of that is that Ichiro has a definite ability to get more hits on balls in play than other major league hitters. As ground balls have a higher BABIP, his roughly 2.3:1 GB:FB ratio is part of that. Still, ground balls only fall in for hits about 24% of the time on average, and Ichiro’s .357 career BABIP is well above that. How do we account for this?

Naturally, we look at his pull-push splits. Looking specifically at balls hit the other way, Ichiro’s .327 wOBA to left field is good, but not terribly impressive. With the average lefty push split at .316, that makes Ichiro only about two runs above average per 200 balls – approximately how many he hit to left field last season.

What makes him amazing is that he manages this with a microscopic amount of power. Ichiro’s career ISO of .112 is certainly below average, but it’s not terrible. When he goes the other way, though, his ISO is only .047, nearly 100 points below the lefty-to-left average, in large part due to a 0.2% HR/FB. That’s not a typo – Ichiro is essintially the anti-Ryan Howard when it comes to opposite field hitting, as he has only hit 1 opposite field home runs in his career, and that’s out of 1663 batted balls.

However, unlike the typical hitter, Ichiro actually hits more ground balls to the left side than fly balls. His speed out of the box and a roughly 4:3 GB:FB ratio to the left side results in a high infield hit percentage – exactly 20% – and a BABIP over 60 points above the typical lefty push split. This is wildly different from most hitters, regardless of handedness, as the fly ball is about 2 to 2.5 times more likely for the average hitter when going the other way. That’s how Ichiro manages to get around his lack of power and remain a productive hitter even to the left side, and this highly elevated BABIP to the left side is a large part of his high career BABIP.

Ichiro will turn 37 in October. He has maintained his speed throughout his career, a key to his success pushing the ball. It will be interesting to see if this kind of magic can hold up as his career continues. He’s shown no sign of slowing down, in any sense of the word, and I certainly don’t expect any downturn in 2010.

Who is Alexei Ramirez? Well, he’s the starting shortstop for the Chicago White Sox who hails from Cuba. But who is he really as a baseball player? No, this isn’t a predictable comment about the birth certificates of Cuban players. Rather, it’s about the striking contrast between his only two seasons of playing baseball full-time in the MLB. (He did not play in the minor leagues.)

Many players have widely varying performances from season to season. Ramirez’s jump in Wins Above Replacement from 1.0 WAR in 2008 to 2.2 WAR in 2009 isn’t all that shocking; it happens all the time. Breaking it down into offense and defense doesn’t surprise either, on the surface. Dropping from a .336 to a .319 wOBA isn’t unusual, and I think we all know enough about the year-to-year variation and the error bars surrounding defensive metrics that a -10.6 to +2.3 in fielding isn’t all that unbelievable, either. It isn’t necessary to postulate a shift in true talent — there have been far more bizarre cases of observed performance jumping around from season to season. In Ramirez’s case, it’s the closer look that makes things surprising.

Let’s begin with fielding. As mentioned above, year-to-year correlation of fielding performance is fairly weak compared to overall offensive statistics, so while -10.6 to +2.3 is big, it’s not as if it is unprecedented. What makes it more surprising is the circumstance in which is occurred. In 2008, the bulk of Ramirez’ time in the field was spent at second base, where his “rate” stat was -10.6 runs below average UZR/150 (which coincidentally matches his overall fielding “counting” version of UZR for 2008). In 2009, Ramirez moved to shortstop. Shortstop is more difficult to field than second, so even after regressing the 2008 performance, you’d have a hard time expecting him to be good at shortstop in 2009. Well, Ramirez put up a +2.4 UZR/150 at short in 2009.

The Fans Scouting Report is a good resource for helping sort these things out. But if we look at Ramirez’s 2009 rating among second basemen, hardcore fans saw him as a second baseman on par with defensive standouts like Placido Polanco and Dustin Pedroia. Maybe that meant he was ready to make the shift to the more challenging position for 2009, despite UZR. Sounds promising, except in the (currently unweighted) 2009 Fan ratings for shortstops, Alexei is ranked among the likes of Ronny Cedeno, Julio Lugo, and Nick Green, none of whom are going to be mistaken for Adam Everett. What is going on here?

That’s fielding, with all its usual caveats. What about offense? A .336 to .319 wOBA (+1.2 to -7.1 Batting Runs against Average) is, again, not shocking. But the peripherals tell a strange story. One typical explanation — changed luck on balls in play — doesn’t stand out, as Ramirez’s BABIP and batted ball profile were roughly the same in both seasons. While assessments Ramirez’s modest success in 2008 tended to be qualified by concerns about his plate discipline, he actually improved his peripheral performance in that area. In 2008, he had a measly 3.5% walk rate, which reflects his near 60% of pitches swung at (league average is usually around 45%), including swinging at an incredible 43.7% of pitches outside the strike zone (O-Swing%). In 2009, his walk rate increased dramatically to a near-league average 8.1%, while his Swing% was a more reasonable 50.7% and his O-Swing%, while not great, was much improved from to 32.1%.

Make no mistake, Ramirez’s actual offensive contribution was far superior in 2008 — mostly due to hitting for a slightly better average (.290 vs. .277) and much better power (.185 vs. .113 ISO), the latter probably due to a superior HR/FB rate (13.8% vs. 8.2%). Still, he was even better at stealing bases in 2009 (14 out of 19 safe) than in 2008 (13 out of 21). It appears as if Ramirez became much “smarter” both at the plate and on the bases in 2009, and it got him… much less.

I’m not drawing any conclusions. I was simply struck by the various changes with opposite results from what one would expect. This is not to say that this makes Ramirez “hard to project.” For all the variations between projection systems, the core of all good systems is still regressing components, adjusting for age and context, and weighting them properly. Ramirez’s true talent is probably somewhere between his 2008 and 2009 performances. But that doesn’t make his 2010 performance any less intriguing to watch.